ML18046A944
| ML18046A944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hoffman D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| TASK-05-10.A, TASK-5-10.A, TASK-RR LSO5-81-09-069, LSO5-81-9-69, NUDOCS 8110010215 | |
| Download: ML18046A944 (7) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-255 LSOS 09- 069 Mr. David P. Hoffman Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W Parnall Road Jackson. Michigan 49201
Dear Mr. Hoffman:
September 26, 1981
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC V-10.A. RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE FAILURE - PALISADES En~losed is a copy of our final evaluation of SEP Topic V-10.A. This evaluation supercedes the evaluation previously sent to you by letter dated April 21. 1979.
As part of our integrated assessment review, we have reevaluate~ the need for the technical specification requested in our April 21, 1979 evaluation.
We have determined that since the possibility of leakage from the service water system into the component cooling water system is remote (see attached evaluation) the increased sampling requirement w111 not significantly increase safe plant opera-tion. Therefore, we have revised our evaluation to remove the request for additi.onal t.echnical specification changes. Since the technical content of our evaluation has not changed we regard this topic as complete.
This evaluation wfll be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for.
- your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built con-ditions at your facility. This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or 1f NRC criteria relating to this subject are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Enclosure:
As stated Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield. Chief Operating Reactors Branch Np. 5
<6'J'df Division of Licensing
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-~.NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NACM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-335-960
Docket No. 50-255 LS05 09-069 Mr. David P. Hoffman e
e UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 September 26, 1981 Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201
Dear Mr. Hoffman:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC V-10.A, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE FAILURE - PALISADES Enclosed is a copy of our final evaluation of SEP Topic V-10.A. This evaluation supercedes the evaluation previously sent to you by letter dated April 21, 1979.
As part of our integrated assessment review, we have reevaluated the need for the technical specification requested in our April 21, 1979 evaluation.
We have determined that since the possibility of leakage from the service water system into the component cooling water system is remote (see attached evaluation) the increased sampling requirement will not significantly increase safe plant opera-tion. Therefore, we have revised our evaluation to remove the request for additional technical specification changes. Since the technical content of our evaluation has not changed we regard this topic as complete.
This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect th~ as-built con-ditions at your facility. This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this subject are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure:
See next page Sincerely,
- ~JI/.. eu.J;tL:J.
Dennis M. Crutchfield, ~--,...
Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
Mr. David P. Hoffman r
cc M. I. Miller, Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One.First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue
- Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60611 Ms. Mary P. Sinclair Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive Midland, Michigan 48640 Kalamazoo Public Library 315 South Rose Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 Township Supervisor Covert Township Route 1, Box 10 Van Buren County, Michigan Office of the Governor (2)
Room 1 - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Palisades Plant ATTN:
Mr. Robert Montross Pl ant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 49043
- u. S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V Office ATTN:
Regional ~diation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 1 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co11111ission Washington, o. C.
20555 Or. George C. Anderson Department of Oceanography University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 Or *. M. Stanley Livingston 1005 Calle Largo*
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501.
Resident Insp~ctor c/o U. S. NRC Palisades Plant Route 2, P. o. Box 155 Covert, Michigan 49043
SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM PLANT SYSTEMS/MATERIALS PALISADES Topic V-10.A Residual Heat Removal System Heat Exchanger Tube Failures I
Ths safety objective of this review is to assure that impurities from the cooling water system are not introduced into the primary coolant in the event of shutdown cooling system heat exchanger tube failure. This was expanded to assure that adequate monitoring exists to assure no leakage of radioactive material in the other direction*- into the service water and thus to the environment.
Information for this assessment was gathered from plant personnel during the ~afe shutdown review site visit and from related telephone conversa-tions~.. :information was also t~ken from Palisades system drawings and the Palisades Technical Specifications.
Th~ bases for the review of these c~oling systems on today's plants include: (1) the NRC' s Standard Review Plan (SRP) 9.2. l, which requ-ires that the service water system include the capability for detection and control of radioactive leakage into and out of the system and prevention of atcidental releases to the environment; (2) SRP 9.2~.2, which requires that auxiliary cooling water systems (such as the shutdown cooling system) include provisions for detection, collection and control of system leakage and means to detect leakage of activity from one system to ano.ther.
and preclude its release to the environment; and (3) SRP 5.2.3, which
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discusses compatibility of materials with reactor coolant and requires monitoring and sampling of the primary coolant system. These Standard Revie~ Plans were used only in the comparison.of the Palisades plant against today's criteria and were not used as licensing requirements I
which must be met, especially if the plant incorpo'l"ates other equally viable means of accomplishing the stated goals.
The Palisades Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) heat exchangers (2) operate at pressures between 110 and 160 psig, although during shutdown of this system, pressures substantially lower will be experi~nced for a few minutes. The Component Cooling Water (CCW) system at this heat.
exchanger operates at a pressure between 70 and 110 psig. It can thus be readily seen that during operation of the SCS little chance exists for lea_k.age from CCW into the SCS.
There are four other factors which make undetected*leakage either into or out of the reactor coolant system through the SCS a very low probability event. These are:
(1) Technical Specification 4.5.3 requires testing of the SCS system outside containment at intervals not to exceed 12 months. This testing is required either by use during normal operation or at a hydrostatic test pressure of 255 psig. Although the staff would prefer specific hydrostatic testing of the
- SCS heat exchanger tubes, we will be satisfied with the above requirement until the implementation of
/.'
- J (2) the requirements of 10 CFR 50.SSa(g) governing inservice inspection. Such requirements will include the hydrostatic testing of the SCS heat exchanger tubes.
Technical Specifications 3.1.6 and 4.2 require sampling the primary coolant for chloride ions during power operation at a frequency of 3 times/
7 days with a maximum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> between samples.
Sampling for fluoride ions is performed once/30 days and following modifications or repair to the primary system involving welding.
(3) The CCW system surge tank includes high and low level alarms to alert the plant operators to leakage into or out of the system from or to any of the ccw~cooled components.
{4) The CCW system includes a radiation monitor and alarm to warn the operators of radioactive leak-age into the CCW system.
.. ' There is the possibility that leakage from the service water system into the CCW system may occur.
This is because the lowest CCW system pressure, 70 psig (with a range of 70-110-psig), is lower than the highest service water pressure of 75 psig.
However, in addition to the CCW surge tank high level alarm, plant procedures require a !
weekly sample of the CCW system.
This sample includes pH, con-ductivity, chromate ion (a compound of which is used in the CCW system for corrosion inhibition), sodium ion, and activity. This sample is sufficient to detect leakage not only from the service water system to the CCW system, but also serves as a means to dis-cover leakage from SCS (or any other CCW-cooled component) to the CCW system.
As a final defense against leakage to the environment, the Palisades service water system includes a radiation monitor to alert plant operators (1) to the unlikely failure of tubes in any combination of the two SCS and the two CCW heat exchangers or ( 2) failure of -* *
- any other CCW-cooled component and failure of tubing in either (or both) CCW heat exchanger.
We conclude that the likelihood of contaminant leakage into the primary system from either (or both) the SCS or CCW.heat exchangers is small, given the relatively small amount of time that primary pressure is low enough that inleakage could occur.
We also conclude that the systems adequately protect the environment.
Therefore, we conclude that the plant design meets current criteria and the topic is complete.