ML18046A873
| ML18046A873 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Hoffman D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| TASK-03-04.D, TASK-3-4.D, TASK-RR LSO5-81-08-005, LSO5-81-8-5, NUDOCS 8108190117 | |
| Download: ML18046A873 (9) | |
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Docket No. 50-255 LSdS-8.1-08-005 Mr. David P. Hoffman
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N,uclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company
_ 1945 W Parnall Road...
Jackson, Mi ctitga
.49201
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Dear Mr. Hoffman:
August 3, 1981.
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC 111-4. D, SITE PROX.MITY MISSILES (PALISADES)
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Enclosed is a copy of our final safety ev~luat1on of Topic 111-4.D, "Site Proximity Missiles" for the Palisades Plant. This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. *~o-255, with the criteria currently used by the.regulatory staff for licensing new facilities.
This evaluation incorporates those comment.s provide4 *in your letter dated July 2, 1981.
Your comment.. regarding the three airports located between 10 and 13 miles from the plant has been included.
However, the nature and di$tance of these airports preclu~e them from having a signifi-cant effect on plant safety*.*. Therefore, our conclusions regarding aircraft hazards has ~ot been changed.
This eval i.laJ~on wll l be used-as a basic input to the integrated. sa:fety assessment for your facility unless you ident_ify changes needed to,
reflect the as-.bu1lt.condition~ at your facility.
This topic assessmeht.
may b.e revised in the future if your facility design 1s changed.
En~losure:
As stated Sincerely, Dennis M.
Crutchfi~ld, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing
Mr. David P. Hoffman cc M. I. Miller, Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Co~any 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire
- Consumers Power Corrq::iany
- 212 West Mi chi gan. Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire
.. Suite 4501 One I BM Plaza Chi~ago, Illinois* fi0611 Ms. Mary P. Sinclair
.Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive
- Midland, Michigan 48640 Kalamazoo Public Library*
315 South Rose Street.
Kalamazoo, MiChigan 49006 Township Supervisor Covert Township Route l,* Box 10 Van Buren County, Mi ch1 gan Office of the Governor (2)
Room 1 - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard
- Ann* Arbor, Michigan 48103 Palisades P*lant ATTN:
Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager
. Covert, Michigan 49043 49043
- u. s. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V Office ATTN:
EIS COORDINATOR 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and.Licensing Board Panel
- u. S. N.uclear Regulatory Co!flllission Washington, D. c.
20555 Or. George C. Anderson Department of Oceanography University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 Dr. M. Stanley Livingston 1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, New M~xi co 87501 Resident Inspector c/o u~ s. NRC P. O. Box 87 South Haven, Michigan 49090
I.
INTRODUCTION y
. ; PALISADES SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC TOPIC 111-4.D, SITE PROXIMITY MISSILES (INCLUDING AIRCRAFT)
The safety objective of this topic is to ensure that the integrity of the safety-related structures, systems and components would not be jeopardized due to the potential for a site proximity missile.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and Missile Design Basis."
of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,"
to 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,"
requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be appropriately protected against events and conditions that may occur outside the nuclear power plant.
II I. *.RELATED SAFETY TOPICS Topic II-1.C, "Potential Hazards or Changes in Potential Hazards Due to Transportation, Institutional, Industrial and Military Facilities" provides a description of the potential missile hazards *.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review was conducted in accordance with the gui~ance given in.*
Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.2.3, "Evaluation of Potential Accidents," 3.5.1.5, "Site Proximity Missiles (except Aircraft),"
and 3.5.1.6, "Aircraft Hazards."
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V'.
EVALUATION The potential for hazardous activities in the vicinity of the Palisades plant 1
has been addressed in SEP topic II-1.C, Potential Hazards due to Nearby Industrial, Transportations and Military Facilities.
As in.dicated therein, there is little industrial activity near the plant. The distances to the nearest land transportation routes are such (about 3600 feet to the nearest highway, and 11,880 feet to the nearest railroad) that the risk associated with potential missi~es from transportation accidents on these routes are well within the SRP 2.2.3 guidelines~ Similarly, the nearest pipelines are about three miles from the plant, and do not pose a missile threat to the plant. Lake traffic is also sufficiently far away (about 10 miles) so as not to present a credible missile hazard. There are no military facilities or activities near the plant which would create a missile hazard.
The one activity in the vicinity of the plant that could be a potential missile hazard is in connection with the operation of the So~th ~aven Municipal Airport which is about three miles northeast of the.plant.
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South Haven Airport is a general a*viatio_n*facility ~ith one paved runway and one turf runway.
The P*c:i.ved ru~way, designated 4-22 and thus oriented in a northeast-southwest direction, is 3485* feet long and 50 feet wide.
The airport is used primarily by light single engine aircraft engaged in general
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aviation activities such as business and pleasure flying and agric~ltural spraying operations. There are currently about 20,000 operations per year 1* ;
at the faci-1-ity and 12 to 15 :based aircraft exclusive of aircraft used for
.. crop dusti n~,-*---------------...:--...:-------------~
In addition, th~ee ~dditional airports, Ross Field, Mill burg and Mate~vliet are located between ten and thirteen miles.from the plant.
Ross Field has approximately 34,000 operations per year involving general aviation, air carrier, air taxi and military operations. Millburg and.Watervliet are uncontrolled airports which do not.have a recorded operation history.
- Since, the nature of operations and distance of these three airports from the Palisades Plant will not have a significant effect on the safety of the plant, we have only considered these operations from.the South Haven A~rpott in our safety evaluation.
The regulatory staff, based on evaluations performed i~ several licensing reviews~ has concluded that nuclear power plant structures which are designed to withstand tornado missiles and other design loads can withstand the collision forces imposed by light general aviation aircraft without adverse consequences.
Safety-related equipment located outside of such structures, however, would be vulnerable to a light airplane crash. Employing the analytical model given in SRP 3.5.1.6, we calculate, on a conservative basis, that the overall propability of a light aircraft striking such equipment at the Palisades plant for the present level of aircraft operations is about 1.55 x 10-7 per year. This is considered an acceptable level and in accordance with the acceptance criteria of SRP 2.2.3. A major conservatism in our calculation is that all operations at South Haven Airport involve aircraft which arrive or depart the field by :passing over the plant area.
Only a fraction of the total reported airport operations would involve flights near the plant. Since an operation is considered to be either a takeoff or a landing! o~
than one half of the operations are expected to have the potential for being ne~r the plant. Another conservatism stems from the assumption that each rele:vant plant target is vulnerable to riircraft crashes f~om any ~irection. However.
most of the targets are shadowed by other plant buildings from one or more directions, so that the effective target area is significantly less than what was used in our evaluation~
The above considerations notwithstanding. we have reviewed the safety-related equipment vulnerable to potential aircraft impacts with respect to availability of backup systems, and the importance of the equipment with respect to achieving a safe shutdown. Specifically, the following equipment was evaluated with respect to aircraft impacts:
- 1. Condensate Storage Tank This is a source of water for the auxiliary feed system pumps, and is not required for achieving a safe shutdown under nonnal plant operating conditions. A backup water supply is available from.the fire protection system.
The tank is shadowed from three sides by sourrounding plant buildings.
- 2. Atmospheric Dump Valves The dump valves service the main steam lines and are protected by bJo feet of concrete. However, the vents protrude beyond the building roof and could conceivably be crimped in the event of an aircraft crash. :The dump ~alve operation is needed for accommodat-ing a plant trip,with a loss of offsite power.
The simultaneO'us ---
- ~,'. loss of offsite power in the event of ~n aircraft crash onto the vents is considered to have a low probabilit.,¥.
Hence, the potential for crimping of the vents in the event of an aircraft impact is acceptable, since the vents are not needed for achieving a safer*
shutdown under normal plant operating conditions.
- 3. Transformer Area Damage of the station transformers in the event of an aircraft impact could cause a loss of offsite power.
This is acceptable, however, since the diesel generators would be available for supplying the required electrical power for vital plant systems.
The transformer area is partially shielded by the Containment and Turbine buildings.
- 4.
Safety Injection and Refueling Water Tank
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This is a source of water for the Safety Injection System.
Although there is no backup water source avaiable for the safety injection function, it is not needed for achieving a safe shutdown under normal plant operating conditions.
The tank is shadowed on three sides by the Containment, Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings.
Diesel Generators The Diesel Generators are redundant and physically separated by a concrete and masonry block wall.
They are protected by a minimum
- of~T8--incnes of concre-te.- -me -airTnfiil<e-an_a_ exhaust pip1ng-is located in two separate, semi-enclosed concrete structures which are open to I
the outside on one side.
The open side i's partially shadowed by the Auxiliary Building structure. The separation of the openings. is such that it is highly unlikely.that a small aircraft would
- incapacitate both intake/exhaust piping systems.
In any event.
the Diesel Generators are not needed for achieving a safe shutdown under normal plant operating conditions. since a simultaneous loss of offsite power is considered to be a lO\\v _probability event.
- 6. Spent Fuel Pool The Spent Fuel Pool is used for storage of spent reactor fuel beneath about 23 feet of water. The nominal plan ~iew pool dimensions are 15 fee~
by 38 feet.
The probabilit~ of a light aitcraft striking this area is*
about 2.5 x 10-8 assuming lhat the building walls and roof were not pr~sent. This is a conservative estimate. Alfhough the walls and roof are constructed of relatively thin metal panels, the building support _columns and roof beams Would provide substantial resistance to aircraft impacts.
The roof area in particular is covered by a framework of I-beams which are spaced 6 feet apart.
In order fo~ the airc~aft to land within_ the pool,.ft would have to miss. these structural members.
Hence, there.
is a very low likelihood (well within SRP 2.2.3 criteria) of an aircraft entering the Spent Fuel Pool and damaging a sufficient number of fuel assemblies such.that 10 CFR Part 100 dose guidelines would l:e exceeded.
As indicated above, tile safety-related systems potentially valncrable to light aircraft impacts either have a backup system available or are not needed for achieving a safe shutdown under normal plant operating conditions. This finding is based on the consideration that the combined probability of an.aircraft impacting one of these systems and the simultaneous loss of a normal operating functibn which 1<1ould lead to a demand for that system is sufficiently low and well within the criteria of SRP 2.2.3.
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- 7 It should be noted that the projected annual number of operations, as described in the airport master plan for the South Haven Municipal Airport1, is forecasted to reach a two to three fold increase over the 21 year-period from 1974 and 1995.
However, this projection was based on the assumption that the airport would have an expanded runway to be built by 1980.
To date, the expansion has not taken place, and discussions with the airport management2 indicate that expansion is not contemplated in the foreseeable future. Should the airport activities begin to show a discernible potential for a substantial expansion, we will require the licensee to inform* the staff in a timely manner so that we may evaluate effect of the expansion on the aircraft with respect to the Palisades Plant.
VI.
CONCLUSION We conclude that the risk of missile impacts (other than aircraft) from offsite sources on the Palisades plant is well within the SRP 2.2.3 criteria.
The risk of ai'rcraft impacts on the plant is judged to be sufficiently low on the basis of meeting SRP 2.2.3 criteria and the finding that the consequences in th~ eve~t of an aircraft crash onto the site are acceptable since the plant will have the ability to achieve a safe shutdown.