ML18046A708
| ML18046A708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1981 |
| From: | Boyd D, James Heller, Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18046A705 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-81-06, IEB-80-10, NUDOCS 8106090409 | |
| Download: ML18046A708 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000255/1981006
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/81-06
Docket No.
50-255
Licensee:
Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI
49201
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
Inspection At:
Covert, MI*
Inspection Conducted:
April 1-4, 6-10, 12-17, 20-24, 26-30, and May 1-2, 1981
/f(C~ -~
Inspectors:
B. L. Jorg'~nsen
~~-
S-/Y-J/
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J. K. Heller~
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Approved By:
J< c tc:uo1~
D. C. Boyd, Chief
,~
Reactor Projects Section lA
Inspection Summary
Inspection during April 1-4, 6-10, 12-17, 20-24, 26-30, and May 1-2, 1981
(Report No. 50-255/81-06)
Areas Inspected:
Augmented resident inspection program activities including
operations; surveillance; maintenance; reportable events; IE Bulletins;
spent fuel pool modifications; and independent reviews.
The inspection
involved a total of 172 inspector-hours by 2 NRC inspectors including 58
inspector-hours onsite during off-shift hours.
Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were
identified in five areas.
Two noncompliances were identified in the other
two areas .
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
2.
- R. W. Montross, General Manager
- J. S. Rang, Operations/Maintenance Superintendent
- H. J. Palmer, Technical Sup~rintendent
- G. H. R. Petitjean, Technical Engineer
- A. D. Kowalczuk, Chemistry/Health Physics Superintendent
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Administrator
- W. P. Mullins, Plant Health Physicist
W. S. Skibitsky, Operations Superintendent
G. W. Ford, Senior Engineer (STA)
A. F. Brookhouse, Shift Supervisor
S. Ghidotti, Shift Supervisor
A. S. Kanicki, Shift Supervisor
D. W. Kaupa, Shift Supervisor
E. I. Thompson, Shift Supervisor
E. Polk, Assistant Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
S. F. Pierce, Radioactive Materials Control Supervisor
W. M. Hodge, Property Protection Superintendent
K. M. Farr, Public Affairs Director
- Denotes those present at Management Interview on May 4, 1981 .
Numerous other members of the plant operations/maintenance, technical
and chemistry/health physics staff were also contacted briefly.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the
month of April, 1981.
The inspector verified the operability of
selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper
return to service of affected components.
Tours of auxiliary and
turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire hazards, fire extinguisher verified operable
and in place, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify
that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of
maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview
verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in
accordance with the station security plan.
Tours of the security
fence were conducted.
During a tour of the auxiliary building (spent fuel pool area) on
May 29, 1981, at approximately 1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br />, the inspector found a
bottle of methyl alcohol on the new fuel elevator.
Section 7,
paragraph 5.4.1.a and paragraph 5.4.2.b of the Palisades Fire
Implementing Procedure classifies methyl alcohol as a Class I
liquid and requires metal containers or safety cans for storage
and handling of all class I liquids. This item was discussed with
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the shift supervisor who took appropriate action to assure compliance
with the Fire Protection Implementing Procedures.
The methyl alcohol
was apparently staged for work being performed on the new fuel elevator.
The inspector verified, during subsequent tours of the spent fuel pool
area, adherence to the Fire Protection Implementing Procedures when a
class I liquid was on the job site.
Establishment, maintenance, and
implementation of the Fire Protection Implementing Procedure is a
requirement of Technical Specification 6.8.1.d.
Failure to implement
the Fire Protection Implementing Procedure as described above is
deemed to constitute an item of noncompliance with Technical Specifi-
cation 6. 8 .1. d.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions
and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During
the month of April 1981, the inspector walked down the accessible
portions of the service water system and the electrical portion of
M0-29.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive
waste system controls associated with radwaste shipment and barreling.
Two radwaste trucks awaiting shipment were independently surveyed on
April 8 and April 28.
These reviews and observations were conducted
to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the require-
ments established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and
administrative procedures.
The plant operated at essentially full power throughout the month
of April 1981, under the provisions of an NRC Confirmatory Order
dated March 10, 1981.
The plant has incorporated all items of para-
graph V.A.2 of the NRC Confirmatory Order dated March 10, 1981 into
chapter 18.1, "Procedure Development" of the Palisades Administrative
Procedures.
One item of noncompliance was identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components
listed below were*observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry
codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following Maintenance Order packages were reviewed:
a.
81-EPS-026
b.
81-EPS-022
c.
81-CVC-016
d.
81-WAS-006
e .
81-VAS-025
Rebuild emergency diesel air-start motor
Quarterly emergency diesel air-start system
preventive maintenance
Recharging "B" charging pump discharge accumulator
Replace inlet gasket on RV-1160
Replace solenoid coil on CV-1810
-'3 -
l
f.
81-VAS-006
g.
81-SWS-006
h.
81-SWS-002
i.
81-RPS-001
j.
80-CVC-189
Reconnect damper/stem and recalibrate CV-1804
Repair service water pressure sensing line on
EDG 1-2
Repack "A" service water pump
Repair/readjustment of "C" TM/LP trip channel
Replace studs and gasket on letdown heat exchanger
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls
were implemented.
Minor administrative and recordkeeping incongruities were noted in the
review, including two packages without prior Quality Control group
review, one package for which a referenced Equipment Outage Request
(EOR) was not attached, and one package for which the work performed
may have been beyond the scope of the Maintenance Order.
Further,
as identified in a previous inspectio~, one activity was apparently
performed without Shift Supervisor notification and authorization.
Again, this activity did not render components inoperable or otherwise
change their status.
The above items were discussed at the management
interview, and Shift Supervisor notification criteria for maintenance
activities not affecting equipment remains an open item.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs
and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment
maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
a.
Emergency Diesel Generator 1-2 oil leak repair
b.
Spent Fuel Pool rack removal and decontamination
c.
Preventive maintenance on the fuel ha~dling crane
d.
Pipe lagging on the critical service water header
e.
Verified proper use of a fire watch during welding of a hand
rail in the turbine building
Following completion of maintenance on the above systems, the inspector
verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
1../
IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/81-05
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
testing on the systems/components identified below, and verified
that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures,
that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for
operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected
components were accomplished, that test results conformed with
technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed
by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that
any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed
and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
a.
M0-7B
b.
M0-24
c.
MC-11
d.
Q0-05
Fire Water Pumps (P-lOB only)
Auxiliary Feedwater System:
Inservice Test Procedure
Safeguards Boron Sample (S.I. bottles only)
Valve Test Procedure (Includes Containment Isolation
Valves)
Completed data for several tests performed in March 1981, and April
1981 were reviewed.
The results of this review are listed below.
March, 1981
a.
MC-11
b.
M0-16
April, 1981
a.
M0-23
b.
M0-19
Safeguards Boron Samples
The Shift Supervisor did not sign step 5.2.14 of
Temporary Change 81-090 for MC~ll.
Inservice Test Procedure-Service Water Pumps
The pump discharge pressure for P-7A is miscalculated.
(Math error)
The pressure test evaluation acceptable
range was filled out incorrectly.
Both items are
contained in attachment 1 to M0-16.
Neither item
affected operability of the pump.
Inservice Test Procedure - Low Pressure Safety
Injection Pumps
.step 3.6.1 and step 7.3 of M0-23 requires attachment
of a calibration data sheet for the point 504 data
logger, but the calibration data sheet was not attached
to M0-23.
Inservice Test Procedure - Containment Spray Pumps
Step 3.6.1 and step 7.4 of M0-19 requires attachment
of a calibration data sheet for FI-0404A if the point
504 data logger is not in service.
The data.logger
was not in service at the time of the test, but a cali-
bration data sheet for FI-0404A was not attached to M0-19.
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c.
M0-7A
d.
MC-11
Emergency Diesel
- step 6.5 of M0-7A implies that a maintenance order
should be initiated when the difference between
diesel generator loaded cylinder exhaust temperature
exceeds l00°F, but this was not performed when the
loaded cylinder exhaust temperature for diesel
generator 1-1 exceeded l00°F.
Safeguards Boron Samples
Step 5.2.14 of Temporary Change 81-090 for MC-11
requires a signature showing that the Shift Supervisor
and Chemistry Supervisor directly supervised performance
of this section.
These signatures were not made, but
signoffs were made implying a supervisor directly
supervised performance of three sections of MC-11
that were not performed.
The completed procedures listed above had gone through several levels
of review and the items listed above had not been identified by the
licensee/a' 91screpancies.
The discrepancies listed above and in other
reports?-l!+/-. are evidence that the plant lacks an effective review process
in this area.
The plant should examine their review mechanisms and pro-
vide additional guidance in this area.
These items were discussed
with licensee personnel at the monthly exit interview.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, Ehe following event reports were reviewed to deter-
mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, innnediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence
had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
a.
(Closed)
LER 79-40 "Crack in Feedwater to Steam Generator Nozzle"
See Inspection Report 50-255/80-15.
b.
(Closed)
LER 80-043 "Excessive Leakage Through Component
Cooling Water (CCW) Supply Penetration". During valve inservice
testing the measured leakage through containment penetration #14
(CCW supply to containment) exceeded allowable limits.
The
containment penetration consists of a checkvalve and a butterfly
valve.
Acceptable leakage was obtained by replacing the check-
valve and repairing the seat to the butterfly valve.
c.
(Closed)
LER 80-044 "Stud Corrosion in the letdown Heat Exchanger."
While investigating a leak at the return head flange of the
letdown heat exchanger the licensee noted that the closure head
fasteners were corroded.
Stud corrosion was caused by contact
with borated water which leaked from the flange.
The leak was
2/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/80-20
3/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/80-24
!!_/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/81-05
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repaired by disassembly of the head, replacement of the damaged
studs and gasket, and reassembly of the head.
The leakage
apparently resulted from improper assembly of the closure head.
d.
(Closed)
LER 80-45
"Low Condensate Makeup Inventory"
The
licensee reported that for approximately twenty minutes the
auxiliary feedwater makeup inventory fell below the 100,000
gallons of water required by the Palisades Technical Specifica-
tion.
The decreased inventory was caused by non-availability of
the makeup
demineralizers, and loss of approximately 300,000
gallons of water due to high sodium content, and makeup demands
required during plant startup.
e.
(Closed)
LER 81-005
"Inoperable Diesel Generator due to
contractor worlanan actions." Diesel generator 1-2 was made
inoperable to repair a damaged copper tubing to the diesel-
genera tor service water low pressure alarm.
The copper tubing
was accidently damaged when a contractor worlanan accidently
bumped the tubing.
The copper tubing was repaired and the diesel
generator returned to service within the time limits of the
Technical Specifications.
See (f) for corrective action.
f.
(Closed)
LER 81-007
"Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater Pump due
to contractor worlanan actions." An auxiliary operator discovered
that the overspeed trip device for the turbine-driven auxiliary
feedwater pump was in the tripped condition.
The operator re-
stored the pump to operability by resetting the overspeed trip.
The condition is believed to have existed for one hour.
The
plant believes the overspeed trip device was accidently bumped
by a contractor worker who was in the auxiliary feedwater pump
room an hour before the discovery.
The plant has revised indoc-
trination training for contractor workers to stress necessity
to exercise caution when working in vital areas and added a
weekly contractor meeting to schedule/control the activities of
contractor workers.
6.
IE Bulletin Followup
For the IE Bulletin listed below, the inspector verified that the
written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin,
that the written response included the information required to be re-
ported, that the written response included adequate corrective action
connnitments based on information presentation in the bulletin and the
licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the
written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives,
that information discussed in the licensee's written response was
accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as
described in the written response.
a.
IE Bulletin 80-10, "Contamination of Nonradioactive System and
Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of
Radioactivity to Environment."
The inspector verified the only
item remaining open following a previous inspection?-/ (addition
2__/
IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/81-05
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of service air system to routine sampling program)
had been
implemented.
The system remains free of contamination.
This
item is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Spent Fuel Pool Mqdifications
During this inspection, activities relating to completion of a
facility modification involving replacement of the original spent
fuel storage racks with new high-density storage racks were observed/
reviewed.
Portions of this activity were previously examined.~/ before
work was suspended to accomplish the most recent refueling and other
activities.
This inspection included examination of a new rack for proper venting
(Reference Part 21, Report 78-0Sl); observation of new rack cleaning,
handling and installation; and observation of rack alignment and
seismic securing using a diver.
Final documentation review will be completed during a future inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Independent Review
On May 1, 1981, the inspector received information that contaminated
materials had been stored in the onsite overflow parking lot - an
unrestricted area.
Independent surveys of the area were immediately
performed using an NRC -
owned radiation detection instrument, and
two SS-gallon drums were identified which showed above normal radiation
levels.
The licensee's health physics staff was contacted and
accompanied to the area for verification using their instrumentation.
The above-background readings on two barrels were confirmed, so the
barrels were immediately returned to the licensee's restricted area.
Subsequently, comprehensive surveys of the area and stored materials
(by the licensee) identified two additional items, both SS-gallon
barrels, which also showed above-background radiation levels and which
wete, therefore, immediately returned to the licensee's restricted
area.
Radiation levels from these barrels were low in each case; well below
the levels established as regulatory limits for radiation levels in
unrestricted areas.
Contamination on three of the barrels could be
characterized as trace amounts.
One barrel, however, contained
quantifiable activity (approximately 4.3 microcuries, primarily Cs-137)
contained in about three liters of water in the barrel.
The overflow parking lot is a fenced area which is normally unattended
and which was found unattended on May 1, 1981, with the area gate open.
!!._/
IE Inspection Report No. S0-2SS/79-0S
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Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20.207 prohibits storage
of licensed materials in unrestricted areas unless attended or secured
from unauthorized removal.
Storage of licensed material in the form
of contaminated containers as described above is an item of noncompliance
with 10 CFR 20.207.
9.
Management Interview
A management interview (attended as indicated in Paragraph 1) was
conducted after the conclusion of the inspection, on May 4, 1981.
The
following items were discussed with licensee response as indicated.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized.
The two instances of apparent noncompliance were specifically
identified and discussed.
The licensee briefly described exist-
ing systems for processing and control of company-owned materials
such as those stored in the onsite overflow parking lot. (Para-
graphs 2 and 8)
Preliiuinary licensee evaluations concerning how and when con-
taminated materials may have been placed in storage in the over-
flow parking lot were discussed.
Incongruities identified in maintenance package review were
identified.
(Paragraph 3)
Examples of errors and omissions identified in completed sur-
veillance package review were stated, with the inspectors ex-,
pressing concern for the apparent weakness of the licensee's
earlier reviews.
(Paragraph 4)
IE Bulletins and Licensee Event Reports to be closed on the
basis of reviews conducted during this inspection were identi-
fied.
(Paragraphs 5 and 6)
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