ML18046A310
| ML18046A310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1980 |
| From: | Michaels T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Russell W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-02, TASK-03-03.A, TASK-03-04.A, TASK-03-04.B, TASK-03-04.C, TASK-03-06, TASK-03-07.C, TASK-07-03, TASK-15-02, TASK-15-06, TASK-15-19, TASK-3-6, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8101160017 | |
| Download: ML18046A310 (36) | |
Text
,...
Docket No. 50-255 MEMORANDUM* FOR:
THRU:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, 0. C. 20555
- J.
(.')
William T. Russell, Chief*
~-:
1 Systematic Evaluation Program Branch
.... ~.:.::
Division of Licensing
\\ ~gZii Carl H. Berlinger, Section Leader
{~ ~tV ~~~
Systematic Evalu~tion Program Branch\\...*
- i Division of Licensing
~
ZJ Theodore S. Michaels, Systems Section Systematic Evaluation Program Branch Division of Licensing TRIP REPORT - PALISADES NUCLEAR STATION NOVEMBER 17-19, 1980 On November 10, 1980, the Consumers Power Company (CP) was notified by letter (Docket No. 50-255, LS05-80-ll-004) of a visit to the Palisades Nuclear Station by staff of the NRC.
The purpose of the visit was to observe site specific features of the Palisades Nuclear Station relative to the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) structural, electrical and system topic reviews, to obtain information not available to the staff in the Palisades docket, and to discuss open items which were identified based on the staff's seismic review.
CP was provided with a detailed agenda of items that were to be addressed.
Detailed responses to these items were provi~ed in Enclosures A-E.
Each enclosure contains the questions that were asked (Part I), and the responses to these questions (Part II).
The cognizant NRC staff are listed on these Enclosures.
Open items that require a response from CP are summarized in Enclosure F.
As a result of the cooperation of the staff of CP, the meeting was pro-ductive. A tour of the plant was made and specific locations of interest were observed by individual NRC staff members.
The meeting consisted of
-<: c :
a main meeting in addition to side meetings on particular items.
Enclosure G contains a list of atten*dees at the exit interview held on November 19, 1980.
Enclosures and cc:
See page 2 ff;tLIJ Theodore s. Michaels Systematic Evaluation Program Branch Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/enclosures:
D. Eisenhut G. Lainas T. Wambach C. Berlinger T. Michaels H. C. Li H. E. Polk H. B. Holz T. M. Cheng Docket No. 50-255 NRC PDR Local PDR TERA NSIC, J. Buchanan 9*
Mr. David P. Hoffman cc M. I. Miller, Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power ColJl)al'\\Y 212*west Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power ColJl)al'\\Y.
212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60611 Ms. Mary P. Sinclair Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive Midland, Michigan 48640 Kalamazoo Pubfic Library 315 South Rose Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 Township Supervisor Covert Township Route 1, Box 10 Van Buren County, Michigan 49043
- Office of the Governor (2)
Room l - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 Di rector, Techni ca 1 Assessment Division Office of Radiation Programs
{AW-459)
U. s. Environmental Protection Agency Crystal Mall #2 Arlington, Virginia 20460 PALISADES DOCKET NO. 50-255
- u. s. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V Office ATTN:
EIS COORDINATOR 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chainnan Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission Washington, D. c. 20555
.Dr. George c. Anderson Department of Oceanography University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 Dr. M. Stanley Livingston
- 1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 Resident Inspector c/o U. S. NRC P. O. Box 87 South Haven, Michigan 49090
- Palisades Plant ATTN:
Mr. J. G. Lewis Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Mr. David P. Hoffman Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201
-**~. -~-*.....
rnC-RE A - PAR"f I- &- II*
Thomas Cheng 49-28945 Table 6-4 sunmarizes our findings on the sample of mechanical and electrical components and distribution systems that were evaluated to detenn1ne the DRAFT seismic design adequacy of such items required for the safe sh~tdown c;>f. the l
Palisades nuclear steam supply system.
As discussed in Section 6.1 of-this report, the sample includes components the r.eview *team selected, based on judgement and experience, as representative.of lower-bound seismic design capacity of Palisades as well as the grouping_.of components into representative categories.
Based*.upon the design *review and independent* calculations for tht{ SEP seismic
. load conditions, we reconmend that design modifications or reanalysis may be required for particular mechanical and electrical components in order to withstand the 0.2g SSE without loss of struc:t*ural integrity as-required to=**:
perform safety functions.
In general, no infonnation has been provided to date which demonstrates the functional adequacy* of mechanical an~:~Jectrica~* :~
equipment evaluated**on the Palisades Plant. *:f'he particular:mechanH:al and electrical components which require additional evaluation and possible design**modifications *are as follows:
~:
- r~..:**::--.
.* T~P1r-.
- :1lf:_0
- 1. Essential Service Water Pumps : *
... 2. Auxiliary Feedw,ter Pumps
- 3.
Diesel *Generator Oil Storage* Tanks
- 4.
Safety l~jection Tanks 5 *. Motor Operated Valves 6 *. Control Rod Drive Mechanisms
- 7.
8.. Reacto.r Coolant Pumps
- 9.
Reactor Vessel and Internals
- 10.
Battery Racks 11.* Motor Control Centers
- 12. Switchgear
- 13.
Centro 1 Room Pane 1 s
- 14. Transformers
- 15.
Electrical Cable Raceways
~***-:*--;
~. -
- A separate Part II is not provided for Enclosure A since none of the open items listed in Part I have been resolved.
ENCLOSURE A - ~A~T I &. II 7-oP"- iff-6 DRafT
. : ~TABLE 6-4 Zil!i!!t""coNcLqSIONS HEGJ\\ROING EQUIPMENT REVIEW FOR c DESIGN ADEQUACY OF P~LISADES.
"' ---,,~------------------*-------------------------------
- Item
- 1.
2 *..
- 3.
Description Essential Service Water Pump Auxilia,i;y Feedwater Pump f
Io I
- .('
Component.Cooling Heat Exchanger Conclusion and Recommendation O.K. for *structural integrity if discharge head stresses are within code allowables (no.use of cast iron).
Function~l integrity has not been.
evaluated other than in the anchor bolts due* ~
to a lack of design detail.
O.K. for structural integrity.
Functional
. integrity has-not been evaluated due to lack of design detail
- O.K.
N
- 4*.
Component,Cooling S~rgo Tank O.K..
I
- 5. I...
'I
.. 6 *
' ' e. I
- 9.
I
- 10.
\\I t t I"
Diesel Generator Oil storage Tanks f
'I,
'I
'I Boric Aci4 Storage Tank
- Hydrazine Tank sodium *1iydroxide* Tank Safety InJection Tank Motor-Operated Valves i
No evaluation has been performed since no drawings or design calculations are currently avnilable.
I.
O.K.
o.~K
- I O.K. if tan~ support structure is rigid.
Complex euppor~ structuro should ho ovalunted for dynamic characteristics to assure rigidity assumption is correct *.
Generic analysis on motor-operated valves on lines ~ 4 inches should be performed to.show resulting stresses in the pipe are less than 10\\
of the applicable Condition~ (active).or ConditJ D (p'assive) allowable stresses.
Otherwise;
TAbL~'-6-4 Item
- 10.
- 11.
li.
- 18.
ENC(OSURE A~ ~ART I & II
'dJ,.t-co11cLllllieiNS111iE!lARO.i:NG"llQU1PMEN'r* 'llEV~llf1U\\U\\U~~:,'. ~ESi:llll liDEQUACY ' OF 'PALISADES
. Description "I '. *.1 I
. Motor-Operated Valves
. *. t 1° : i \\I I ( ; ' * *
- I.. t ~ '*. !
- 1. ' * '
- .. u**.
~
-~
",j_~.:{
~:t\\!.~1i*.1,*1.\\*;
- .1t1*.
Control*Rod Drive Mechanism Pressurizer
. - ~ : :
I ** *. ~. ; \\ ' ; ~ '
l *; ' '*' I
. : I '* *.. : *..
~. I I Steam Generator
.... i I
.* I.
~
\\
, ~ ;. *.' I Reactor Coolant Pwnp
.". *. I ~*1
.Reactor Vessel Supports and Internals
- BatteJry *Racks*
1 *. \\
\\ :-. :
- 1, *; *: L -~. * ~'.
- r.: d*.
Motor ContrQl Centers
~w:t~~~~~~ ' '" 1\\)~~
- Conc.lusion,~nd Recomrn~~4ati\\<?n,.
- ~tresses induced by valve eccentricity should be inttoduced into*~piping a*1alysis, to verify design adequacy or provide!,~hd implement a procedure whereby a11:*motor'ivalves'. ~ 4' inches be externally supported** *dAlso';' verificatibn Of' structural
- ~
adequacy* and fundti6u11of* vai\\fes themselves have not been demonstrated.
~
- i:L.
ii1i:-
.;l111,;l111.* al.. i11\\1:q1 !1':'*
1**1,i1.-1-.:1..i o.K~!*for* st:ructurai'ihtel]rityl ' 18ased 11on the :*1.
existing ~a1cuiatibns reviewed1 active function cannot be assured.
(1. l*;.
- O.K
- 11.. I:.
Insufficient information provided to verify design
- ... 1" adeijuacy-*. 1.u**l i 11!1*11:_1:;_ 111*1*11 !'I*;' *11111.**'
l!*..
- i !
' :. : t J ! i
< t l
' j' * ~ i I c ~ ! l
,... I 1
- 1. ~ ! ~: !
. :* t ~ l :.
t -
~ _\\
Insuffi~ie~t:iriformation provid~d to-verify design adequacy
- Insufficient information provided to verify *de_ sic:A adequacy.
'9 Racks.'O K.
with the exception of wooden iateral bracin9.whlch shou~d be replaced or strengthened to c_a~ry !~u~1*
1
,s~~~~ib'}:nerti., loads' ;
Anchorage jo-.K~
No information ava.ilable to evailu~te
- rack*struotural adequacy or electrical component functionality.
(,.*1... -. 11;.. 1*\\<1ly: *.1:; 01; ;;i;11:11.-
. *Anchornge o.K.:;*
1:il :ari~hbr bolts _are 7/&*,6, otherw"is*
- possible desi9~~~difications may be nec~ssary. No
- .informa.tion available t.o evalua~e switchgear rack
~ :-~~ru?~~~?!: ~~equacy
- o~' electrical component *
- I
- +:>.
\\
-~~
ENCLOSURE A*- ijM'f I & I I 1
~COl'CLUSIOHS REGARDU:G EQllIPHllNT REVmll FOi\\ SEuib~DESIGN ADEQUACY OF 6-4 Item
. 19~.
20 *.
- 21.
I *I.
PALISADES Description Conclusion and Recommendation Control noom Electrical Panels Licensee to verify seismic design adequacy
- Transformers End units of transformers should be anchored with four 1/2" ¢ anchor bolts.
No informatior available to evaluate structural adequacy or Electrical Cable Raceways*
electrical functionality.
~
Cable tray-support systems should be fo~ii\\Waeiamic loads iAd*"'"'" ty I
evaluated
"* 'Z !J -s:; t:.
ENCLOSU~~* ~
1
~ PART
- PALISADES NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REQUEST Ft.::, ADDI:t°~ONAL INFORMATION
~
/\\dditiona1 infonn~tion is "..:~e_ded for the followin9:
fOP1<-
III-2 WIND AND TORNADO LOADING
~rovid~* th~ tornado ~ressure profi1e used in the design. of the struc-U.tes.
J>rovide the method usejl to account for the reductio~ of* atmospheric
- pressure and _venting-of compartments inside the structure. *Does the...
~tructures rely Qn blow out panels to vent the compartments? Are
-.:any structures* designed to 1ose extern~l* panels in a tornado and if so
- provid~ th~ procedurij ~sed to design the supporting structures *
-~-~::..:
-=:--_ -. I!!-3.~ EFFECT.s o~ ~i~H.~WAT5R LE"tE~ ON STRUCTURES
¢-..~*.. -
. ~*. "."-*-*_
- .'.:.;- *:-=
- Provide dra'fri°ngs:..sho~{ng *efe.vations of the finished grade and the
.=structural~opertil'!;s ;h_at are* near the finis*hed g'."ade.
Provid!
-the -elevat:ion of t.ie.=maximum water 1eve1 predicted for the.site..
'including* the effects of wave runup. Provide the procedure-used to convert water 1evels to structural loads including wave impact.
Provide "the load combination equations. which considered high water with ether loads.
!!!-4A TOP.NADO MISSILES
- t.
~*
j Section 5.1.3.2 (h).of the FSAR shows a list of 5 tornado missiles which
.. *were used in the anal.Ysis of the containment. Appendix A of the FSAA, which
- specifies the missil!!s for other class 1 structures, lists only two of
- the missiles used in.-:the containment analysis (4xl2 wood plank and 4000 lb. ato) but with different velocities. Confirm that this ~*as
+/-he design :.con di tion*s or provide the missile set that was used and
-prov'ide~ ~he calculatjons that show the structural wall withstand the
- .missile. impact.
ln addition, provide the method used to show the
- wa11 s can withstand the impact.
Provide the wall thicknesses and concrete parameters~used for the missile barriers calculations. Spec"ify the
~ oad corr&bi nations that invo1 ved the tornado missile and tornado wind with other structural loads on the missile barriers *.
rU-43 TURBINE MISSILES
- Provide the procedu;e you used to determine the necessary barrier thickness to protect the p1ant from t~rbine mfssi1es.
Include the criteria used.to pre.di ct spa 11 i ng and scabbing.
.*e*
ENCLOSURE B... PART I
. -*--:~-
,....::::,,.... )
-.... ~
\\.:
~.. -
~~*.*=~*
~....
- /<..)f/C. * --
. -* - ~..
-~-. *::-**-. ~
~ *;. : _"**~.. ;._ ___
- llI-7C DELAMINATlOH OF. PRESTRESSEO** CONCRETE CONTA!NfiENT STRUClVRES:.:.
Provide-design and/or a*s:.-built,d*r-awings *of the containment~dome shcn-1ng reinforcing placement. including radial steel. tendon locations wrth*
end. anchorage details, ~oncrete pouring seq~ence and the tendon tens i oni rig procedure. aiij:S __ s*equ:enc~*.
0
- The foforcation prov1 ded d n: ame-niiment..:;..
14 is not detail~d:~*nOtign. ~-Provide the drai,;irigs -\\iihich~~tlc)\\it"the*'se-quence=;:.
tendon by tendon*~ : Provfde =a--copy:'~f *procedures u$"ed:.for.~-d(>me-insp~ttion that would assess "the 1lkel1hood *of discovering delaminations in the concrete. Your response of December 14, 1979 did not address this portion of the ~uestion.
~-*.
2 -
. --*-.---a-------~-
Topic III-2 Topic III-3A ENCLOSURE B - PART II - HAROLD POLK 492-9470 Wind and Tornado Loading Discussion by Steve Sobkowski listed the wind and tornado loading for the plant.
No blowout panels are relied upon to vent tornado differential pressure.
No structures are designed to lose external panels during a tornado.
The safety injection storage tank on the roof of the auxiliary building is not designed for wind and tornado loadings.
CP provided additional information on this subject included in Appendix A of this enclosure. -
High Water The maximum high water level for this site is the combination of 1886 high water level for Lake Michigan of elev. 583.68 feet plus a 6.0 foot seische.
This seische level was observed in Michigan City, Indiana in 1954 but not near the plant site.
Therefore, the maximum water elevation is 589.68 feet.
The plant finished grade is Elev. 590 and doors opening to grade are sealed with watertight doors.
The containment is sealed.
The only items exposed to high water is the windings in the service water pumps which are at 594 1-8 11
- This level is 5 feet above maximum high water.
III-4A III-4B The exterior plant walls were designed to withstand ground water at Elev 585 during construction as free cantilevers with a rectangular hydrostatic pressure instead of the customary triangular.
This loading assumption produced higher loads than the actual high water level.
The water loads were combined with soil loads and dead weight loads.
CP provided addittonal information on this subject* included in Appendix B of this enclosure.
Tornado Missiles The missile spectrum does not match those of SRP 3.5.1.4.
A comparison of the design missile was presented along with the necessary exterior wall information to assess the effects of the missiles.
CP provided additional information on this subject included in Appendix C of this enclosure.
- CP provided a handout that cited the FSAR (Page 14-11), which states that no turbine missiles are postulated to be ejected from the turbine casing.
Half and quarter disk missiles are postulated at an overspeed condition.
It is CP's opinion that this plant configuration if analyzed for turbine missiles using current manufacturer ejection 2
ENCLOSURE B - PART II
III-7C probabilities would satisfy current acceptance criteria.
CP will provide a list of similar plants that have been qualified for turbine missiles.
Delamination of Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures Drawings of tendon placement, post tensioning, sequence and reinforcing steel of the dome were provided.
Concrete pouring sequence of the dome was also provided.
Inspection by Bechtel Enginee~s in September 1970 did not show any evidence of delamination.
The licensee will provide documentation of tendon tensioning and pressure testing dates.
CP provided additional informations on this subject included in Appendix D of this enclosure.
3 ENCLOSURE B - PART II
EN~SURE B - PART II - APPENDIX A ~
Topic III-2 WIND AND TORNADO LOADING
- 1.
Current acceptance criteria versus Palisades design FSAR Current*
Differential pressure 3 psi 3 p s i
( RG 1
- 7 6 )
Wind 300 + 60 mph 290 + 5 to 70 mph (RG 1.76)
- 2.
Calculations No venting calculations were located.
No blowout panels are utilized for tornado venting.
- a.
Containment -
seismic controls (FSAR Page 5-13)
- b.
Auxiliary building -
enclosure of diesel genera-tors, switchgear, cable spreading area, and control room -
0.662 ksf tornado load
- c.
Auxiliary building addition -
0.6 ksf tornado load
- d.
Intake structure -
0.432 ksf tornado load
- e.
Electrical penetration room -
0.432 ksf tornado load
- f.
Auxiliary feed pump enclosure -
no calculations located (This structure is below grade.)
EN~SURE B - PART II - APPENDIX B ~
Topic III-3.A EFFECTS OF HIGH WATER LEVEL ON STRUCTURES
- 1.
FSAR The maximum water level predicted at the site is the 1,886 high, Elevation 583.68 feet (USGS).
If the Michigan City, Indiana, 1954 *6-foot seische (not observed near the plant site) is added to this elevation, there is a maximum transitory water elevation of 589.68 feet at the plant site (reference FSAR Section 2.2.2).
Ther~fore, flooding at the site is not postulated (FSAR Appendix A and Amendment *15, Question 2.4).
- 2.
Calculations A ground water elevation of at least 585 feet was considered in the design of walls of safety-related structures.
This load was considered in conjunction with normal surcharge and soil pressures.
- 3.
Plant Configuration The plant finish grade is at Elevation 590 feet (USGS).
The containment is sealed.
Openings in the auxiliary building and auxiliary building addition at Eleva-tion 590 feet are sealed with watertight doors (Drawings C-45, C-48, and C-326).
Openings in the auxiliary feed pump enclosure are sealed.
The service water pumps in the intake structure are operable to an elevation of 594'-8".
Safety functions are not degraded to a water elevation of 594'-8".
This is a margin of 5 feet over the pos-tulated plant high water level.
I, I
e
- . e ENCLOSURE B - PART II - APPENDIX C Topic III-4.A TORNADO MISSILES
- 1.
- Current tornado missiles versus Palisades design
- 2.
FSAR SRP Wood plank, 4" x 12" 76 lb, 760 fps 200 lb, 442 fps Steel pipe, 3 inches 76 lb, 620 fps 78 lb, 211 fps Steel rod, 1 inch NA 8 lb, 316 fps Steel pipe, 6 inches NA 285 lb, 211 fps Steel pipe, 12 inches NA 743 lb, 211 fps Utility pole NA 1,490 lb, Automobile 4,000 lb, 450 fps 4,000 lb, Flatcar
_40 k, 480 fps NA Locomotive 240 k, *310 fps NA Boxcar 47.3 k, 500 fps NA Calculations Calculations checked for penetration using the modified Petry equation (reference Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.5.3).
This conforms with current SRP accep-tance criteria.
Missile effects were considered to act without other concurrent loadings.
- a.
Containment -
All missiles did not penetrate except for the flatcar below Elevation 649'.
- b.
Auxiliary building below Elevation 649" - did not resist 3-inch pipe, flatcar, ~nd locomotive.
- c.
Intake structure -
reduced velocities to one half of those shown above.
Analysis for the plank, 3-inch pipe, and automobile showed no penetration.
- d.
Auxiliary building addition, containment penetra-tion room and auxiliary feed pump enclosure -
no missile calculations located 1 of 2 211 fps 105 fps
ENCLOSURE B - PART II - APPENDIX C Tornado Missiles (cont'd)
- 3.
Structural properties The following minimum external wall thicknesses and concrete strengths are provided:
- a.
Containment - f'
= 5 ksi, 3'-6" c
Topic III-4,A
- b.
Auxiliary building below elevation 649' - f'
=
3 ksi, l'-6" c
- c.
Auxiliary building addition - f'. = 3 ksi, 2'-0" c
- d.
Intake structure - f'
= 3 ksi, 2'-0" c
- e.
Containment penetration room - f'c = 3 ksi, 2'-0"
- f.
Auxiliary feed pump enclosure -
(This structure is below grade.)
f' = 3 ksi c
2 of 2
e e
ENCLOSURE B - PART II - APPENDIX D Topic III-7.C DELAHINATION OF PRE-STRESSED CONCRETE CONTAINHENT STRUCTURES
- 1.
Design Drawings Reinforcing Placement -
Dwg 5935 C-134 Rev 4 Tendon Locations -
Dwg 21Tll4 PT-58, Dome Tendons Layer Arrangement & Spacing Tendon Installation -
Dwg 21Tll4 PT-5, Tendon Installation Schematic Tensioning Sequence -
Dwg 21Tll4 PT-112, Post Tensioning Seq~ence Dome Tendons*
- 2.
Delamination Discussion There is no radial steel provided.
If delamination were to occur, it would happen when the through thickness tension was a maximum.
This maximum tension occurs when the post-tension-ing force is a maximum.
The post-tensioning force is a maximum when.the tendons are initially stressed.
There.was no evidence of delamination at the initial stressing of the tendons.
After the occurrence of delamination at other plants, two Bechtel employees (TEJohnson and ITindhal) inspected the dome for evidence of delamination (Sept 1970).
No evidence of delamination was found in this inspection.
ENCLOSURE C - PART I
- Topic III-4.C Internally Generated Missiles
.The FSAR addresses*0n1y internally generated missiles for containment.
Special Report No. 6 1 *Analysis of Postulated High Energy Line Breaks.
Outside of Contai nnent* issued by Consumers 's POiler en May 1. 1973 and.revised July 13, 1973 is net con;>lete with respect to missiles.
SRP 3.5.1.1 addresses this sub~ect for areas outside containment
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Arrange a tour cf areas outside containment where protection aga.inst internally generated missiles has been provided.
Discuss or pro~de references for barrier design details and criteria.
Arrange a tour of areas outside containment where pontential missiles.
as described in SRP 3.5.1.1 exist and where no barriers are provided
- Discuss or prov1 de references for the deter::inat ion that missile
. protection is not required.
e ENCLOSURE ( - PART I I SEP 111~4.C Internally Generated Missiles (Outside of Containment)
SRP 3. 5. l.1 Howard HoJ z 49-27648 The Standard Review Plan (SRP 3.5.l.1) is derived in part from GDC 4 (10 CFR 50 Appendix A) with respect to protecting essential system~ and compo-nents against the effects of internally generated missiles outside of con-tainment to maintain their safety function. Other GDC and SRP sections are also involved as required for consistent logic which is to assure that there always exists a way to remove the decay heat from the reactor and its fuel
. storage pool. It is also required that these safety related systems be placed in operation in a timely manner before a mora degrading situation develops. These auxiliary systems for Palisades are:
1.)
Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 2)
Service Water System to and from Lake Michigan (backup system is fire system)
- 3)
Component Cooling Water System to and from Service Water System
- 4)
Fuel Storage Cooling Water System
- 5)
Borated Water System These systems were traced in the as built condition in the plant, insofar as practical, exterior to the containment but within other buildings or using Eng1neering Drawings where assessability in the plant was not practical.
Even though the NRC SRP was released 3 years after Palisades received its operating license, a substantial portion of today's guidance (SRP and Reg.
Guides) is evident in the Palisades as built design. At El. 570 th~ equip-ment arrangement drawings locate the high pressure safety injection pumps, low pressure safety injection pumps and containment spray pumps.
They are clus-tered in a 1 :2 configuration with an 18" thick concrete wall between the two clusters such that a major piping or component failure in one room, which might generate a missile is not likely to cause damage to components or systems in.the other adjacent room.
The small pumps are usually fixed or v~:iable pcisit_ive displacement pumps.
Intermediate size pumps are mostly mixed flow centrifugal?.-and the large service water pumps are vertical high volume low head pumps.
The exception to the above statement is the auxiliary feed-wa~er system pumps.
These pumps generate a high head with an intermediate size flow (hundreds of gpm).
We do not believe any of the electric driven pumps in the systems being evaluated would be likely to exceed synchronous speed for AC motors and retain sufficient kinetic energy to penetrate a thick cast steel case surrounding the rotating elements. The turbine in the auxiliary feedwater system is a Terry Turbine, a single stage, and controlled by a mechanical governer set at'a constant speed of 3400 rpm for either shut off or* with. a pumping load.
Its performance has been satisfactory and no overspeed trips have occurred in the past 5 years of operation.
Enclosure C - Part II We conclude, for the systems identified at the beginning -0f this enclosure, that through discus~ions.with the licensee, the licensee's contractors and physical investigation at the site by NRC representatives that the as built design of the facility has inherent features resulting from the location at:d pl~cement of equipment such that a missile from a single source is unlikely to inundate alternate heat removal paths. Secondly, the kinetic energy in rotating elements nearby the aforementioned heat remo~al paths is insuffi-cient to penetrate its own surrounding str0ctural envelope and that of alttr-nate heat removal paths.
With respect to the main turbine which is not oriented so that the rotating elements are directed a\\vay from the reactor and its heat removal system a low trajectory element would have many barriers in its way before it could reach one critical heat removal path or pump.
The staff concludes that the structures, components and. systems to be protected from internally generated missiles (outside containment) conform to the Commission's regulations as set forth in General Design Criterion 4 and the objectives of SRP 3.5.l.1.
'Enclosure C - Part II
- A ENCLOSURE D - PART I REQUEST W*Je-ADDITIONAL INFORMATION e PALISADES FOR SEP TOPIC VII-~ -
The Information pro~lded In response to our l~tter of February 14, 1980 does not *dequately address GDC 19 requirements for remote shutdown capability. Provide
- description of the facilities provided for* remote shutdown Including the following inf~rmatlons
( 1 >
Identify the systems and Instrumentation and control equipment that are required to bring the-p lant ~.o a !ao.t -~bu.t.d~wn. from_ ~uts l ~e of. tl]e. _ * : _.
control room and the equipment which ls required*
to aalntaln It In this condition.
C2> For all actions ~hich ~re to be performed In a shutdown *from outside of the control room:
(~) Identify where the operation and its associated control and Indicators are physically located
<e.g. Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, "MCC, manual operation of a valve etc.>.
Cb> Provide the drawings which show the location and identification of the control boards and equipment located thereon, and equipment and locations within the cont~ol room that support the description of how General design Criterion 19 ls Implemented in the plant.
Ccl C~nfirm that iroper* p~ocedu~al guidance for modification of controls and Instrumentation that may be mod.ified as act~al abnormal conditions dictate will be prepared.ln advance, upgr*ded as necessary, and avalla~le when required.
(3) Identify ea.eh circuit that contains a transfer switch.
(4) Provide plant layout sketches that show where the switches are* located. *
(5) Describe the method that will be used to seal the transfer switches.
(6) Describe the consequences o~ an Inadvertent.
actuation of one or more of the switches.
(7) Identify and justify each trans~er sw\\tch that Is not wired to the bypassed and Inoperable status Indication system.
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Des~rtbe the methods and lndl~atlons available outside of the control room by which the operator cans (a) verify relief valve operation:
(b) determine reactcr pressure, tem~erature,.~~
- _coolant levelJ Cc> determine containment pressure; an~ *. -
Cd> determine service water flow and tempefature, through the RHR heat exchangers.
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Enclosure D - Part I
ENCLOSURE D - PART II HULBERT LI - 492-9433 The following information was obtained during the site visit:
Topic VII-3 A panel layout of a Local Control Panel C-33, redundant engineered safeguard instruments, which is located on a floor at EL. 590' in the same room that the Safety Systems 480 volts motor control centers No.
~ and No. 8 are located was provided (Main Control room is two floors above this room at EL. 625').
This panel has two sections with a fire barrier inside the pa~el.
Each section has ten indicators on th~ top and 36 valve control switches on the panel.
Each section has a separate power source.
Each section has ten indicators on the top and 36 valve control switches on the panel. There is no pump control capability on. this panel.
The switch circuits on this panel are in parallel with the switches on the main control board.
Therefore, the control functions are not transferred from the main control board to the local panel and vice versa.
The valve positions are indicated on the panel above the corresponding switches.
The licensee stated that this panel will be modified due to TMI-2 action plan requirements.
Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-10 was provided, which deals with control room evaluation.
In addition the licensee provided the following oral response to the remote ihutdown panel questions i~ Part I of Enclosure n.
- 1)
Identified in Emergency Operating Procedure, EOP-10.
- 2)
(a)
Identified. in emergency procedure EOP-10 and local Panel C-33.
(b) See Equipment location drawing M-1 through M-15.
(c) Identified in emergency procedure EOP-10.
- 3)
Local panel C-33 contains switches that can be operated for plant shutdown procedure.
Since circuits for these switches on C-33 are in parallel with the switch circuit on the main control board, it is not transferring the control f~nctio~ from the main control board to the local panel and vice-versa.
- 4)
Not applicable to Palisades design.
- 5)
Not applicable to Palisades d_esign.
- 6)
Either switch can perform the intended function.
There are valve position indications on both panels.
- 7)
There is no automatic bypassed and inoperable status panel (system level indication) in Palisades.
It is done by administrative procedures.
- 8)
(a)
No relief valve indication is provided outside the control room.
(b)
Reactor pressure is on C-33 panel.
Reactor coolant hot leg tempera-ture is on C-33 panel.
Pressurizer level indication is on C-33 panel.
2 ENCLOSURE D - PART II
(c)
No containmen~ pressure indication is provided outside the control room.
(d)
No service water flow or temperature indication is provided outside the control room.
3 ENCLOSURE D - PART II
9.*
ENCL-OSURE E -
PART I *. -
Questions - Palisades Systems
- 1. Discuss the following design modifications with respect to implementation status, setpoints~ and/or technical specification changes a) automatic isolation of main feedwater on,.ow steam generator_pr.essure by closure of main feed regulating and bypass valves b) automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater on low
- suction flow to the main feed pumps or on closure of
- feed pump turbine stop valves
. c). *au.xiliary feedwater flow controller limit and time
- detay _on inttia tio11 d).containment spray modifications to resolve LER 80-003-
- 1.
MSIV closure time
- 2.
resequencing of diesel-loads
- *3 *.
- partial.filling of containment spray piping-Topic XV-2..
- 2.
Briefly explain how auxiliary feed flow controlier works, its XV-2, XV-6 susceptibility to failurer and the effect of failure on auxiHary feed flow delivery ttt generator. considering the cause with **-*
steam or feed line break as well as for an intact system.
- 3.
Is the setpoint *rcrr* MSIV closure on high containment pressure the XV-2 same as for reactor trip. safety injection and containment isolation?
- 4.
Discuss.. normal lineup-.for HPSI system with respect to HPSI header and redundant HPSI header
- a)
Which 'pumps discharge to each header b)
- What are the injection mode positions of valves:
CV3036 MOV3062 CV3037 MOV3064 MOV3018 MOV3066 CV3059
. MOV3068 c)
What is failure positio*n on loss of air or power of:.,..
CV3036 CV3037 CV3059 d)
Which diesel generator supplies each of the following loads.:
HPSI Pump P66A LPSI Pump P668 P66C P67A P678 Containment Spray Pump MOV3007 MOV3009 MOV3011 MOV3013 MOV3062 MOV3064.
MOV3066.
- MOV3068 P54A.
P548 P54C MOV3008*
MOV3010*
MOV3012 MOV3014 XV-2, XV-19 I
j I
e* Note: If preferred, confinn whether the listed drawings are~current, and if not, provide an updated copy. * * * ':
~ :-
E-3 Rev L 1/4/79 E-4 Rev J 1 /4/79 (Sheet 1).
E-5 Rev S. 1/4/79 (Sheet 1)
- \\I*....
e) What is the power source (control and/or motive power) for_*-
- ~V3036, CV3037
- CV3059, and MOV3018?,..,....
- .:r*.
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. ".".""' 7
- Enclosure E - Part I
II
Response
ENCLOSURE E - PART II T. MICHAELS 492-8172 l(a) The logic diagram provided by Consumers Power for control of main feedwater regulating and bypass valves is as follows:
Low Pressure S/G "A" l
2/4 c
Close S/G "A" feed and bypass valves
- Reactor.Trip
- Close MSIV's Low Pressure S/G 118 11 l
2/4 0
Close S/G 118 11 feed and bypass valves From the above diagram, it is seen that low pressure on any two sensors of steam generator (S/G) 11 A 11 would close the SIG 1.1A 11 feed and bypass valves, trip the reactor and close the MSIV 1s.
The same is the case for SIG 118 11
- The setup is not necessarily single failure proof because the signal to close either S/G 11A 11 or 118 11 feed and bypass valves depends on a relay which is located at point c or 0.
However, Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 7 provides a backup in case this relay fails to operate.
Moreover, without offsite power there would be no problem I.
~ :
I
if these. relays failed because the condensate booster.pump would not operate with loss of offsite power.
The setup is safety grade (same as pl ant).
l(b) The logic diagram provided by Consumers Power for automatic initiation of auxiliary feedwater on low suction flow to the main feed pump or on closure of feed pump turbine stop valves is as follows:
Turt:>ine.dri_ven ___ n:iain fP.edwater pumps position
- flow sensors fl ow sensors 0562 0563 0564 -0565 1
4/4 T/D-120 sec Startup Power on station power available And Start P-8A (motor driven aux.
feed pumps) 0709 0710 2/2
/D-150 secs 2
0736 0737 1/2 And Open CV-05228 P-8A Tripped HS-0522 in auto (Aux. steam turbine)
ENCLOSURE E - PART II
This is the setup as it exists today.
If 4/4 of the main feedwater turbine stop valves are closed (0562-0565) or if 2/2 Flow Sensors (FS) (0709, 0710), sense low suction flow to the main feed pumps, the motor driven auxiliary feed pump will be energized after 120 seconds (provided that start up power or station power is avail-able).
The valve to the auxiliary steam turbine will be opened after 150 seconds if the motor driven auxiliary feed pump was not energized (P-8A tripped) or if there is low flow in 1/2 FS sensors (0736, 0737) in the auxiliary feed line downstream of the auxiliary feed pump and the set up was in auto (HS 0522)
Because of a TMI related item the logic will be revised so that sensing for this logic will be low level on the S/G with 2/4 logic.
The motor driven auxiliary feed pump will not be automatically s~quenced onto diesel power.
Open Item Consumers Power is to provide documentation as to whether the auxil-iary pumps can be manually sequenced on to diesel power.
l(c) The auxiliary feedwater flow controller limit is 150 gpm and the delay time on initiation is 120 seconds (electric) and 150 seconds (turbine).
l(d) The MSIV closure time is 5 seconds cold and less than 1 second hot.
3 ENCLOSURE E - PART II I
I I
.c
The resequencing of diesel loads is as follows:
Containment spray pumps HPSI pumps Service water pumps 2 secs (was 9 secs) 6 secs (was 2 secs) 9 secs (was 6 secs)
The containment spray piping will be filled to the 735 level.
Technical specification changes to NRC will be proposed,
- 2.
The auxiliary feed flow controller is a Foxboro controller and its operation is described in the response to IE Bulletin 80-04.
- 3.
The setpoint for MSIV closure for high containment pressure is 5 psi which is the same as reactor trip, safety injection and containment isolation.
4(a) High pressure Safety Injection Pumps P-668 and P-66C discharge to the main header and P-66A discharges to the redundant header.
(b) The injection mode positions of the val~es are shown on Dwg M-204 and are as follows:
CV 3036 - Open (O)
CV 3037 - Closed (C)
CV 3018 - C CV 3059 0
4 MOV 3062 - 0 MOV 3064 - 0 MOV 3066 - 0 MOV 3068 0
ENCLOSURE E - PART II
(c) The failure position of the following valves is as follows:
CV 3036 - 0 CV 3037 - C CV3059 - 0 CV3018 - C (d) The diesel generat~r that supplies the f6llowing loads is as follows:
HPSI Pump LPSI Pump Containment spr:ay Pump HPI LPI HPI LPI HPI LPI HPI LPI HPI 5
P66A 1-2 (bus 1 D)
P668 1-1 (bus 1 C)
P66C 1-2 P67A 1-2 P678 1-1 P54A 1-2 P548 1-1 P54C 1-1 MOV 3007 1-1 MOV 3008 1-1 MOV 3009 1-1 MOV 3010 1-1 MOV 3011 1-1*
ENCLOSURE E - PART II
-HP!
HP!
HP!
MOV 3064 1-2*
- It is noted that a Consumers Power Co. memorandum from R.D. Sherwin to J.R. Yope, Jan~ary 31, 1979, requested that the power supply for these valves be c~anged to the status as shown and that it be made during a refueling outage.
The change has been made but is not reflected in Revis'ion 19 (1-9-80) of Drawing No. E-5.
Updated copies of the following drawings were obtained:
I E-3 Rev 14 E-4 Rev K E-5 Rev 19 9/3/80 6/6/80 2/9/80 e)
The power source and control for the following valves is as follows:
CV 3036 CV 3037 CV 3059 CV 3018
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021, 72-210 021, 72-210 011, 72-110 011, 72-110 ENCLOSURE E - PART II
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ENCLOSURE A ENCLOSURE F OPEN ITEMS All items previously identif1.ed as open are still open (se*e Enclosure A).
- 1 ENCLOSURE B - ITEM IlI-48, T~rbine Missiles The licensee will provide a 10st of similar plants which have been qualified for turbine missiles.
ENCLOSURE 8 - ITEM III-7C, De1amination of Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures The licensee will provide docJmentation of tendon tensioning and pressure testing dates.
ENCLOSURE D
. i
.I The licensee will provide a report on the exercising of Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-10 when the alternate shutdown panel and other fire protection related modifications are completed.
i ENCLOSURE E The licensee will provide documentation as to whether the auxiliary feed pumps can be manually sequenced onto ~iesel power.
r ENCLOSURE G 1:
ATTENDEES, MEETING AT PALISADES SITE R. E. McCa 1 eb Jim Kuemin R. A. Vincent S. Sobkowski Hulbert C. Li
. Haro 1 d Po 1 k Theodore Michaels Thomas E. Leva Paul K. Smith Howard B. Holz Bi 11 Becki us Thomas Cheng Howard J. Palmer, Jr.
W. T. Russel 1 NOVEMBER 19, 1980
- CPCO I
"CPCO
- CPCO
- 1 Bechtel
. :: NRC
- NRC
- NRC
'CPCO 1'..,
.. Bechtel
- NRC
- CPCO I
11NRC I
,:CPCO
NRR/ICSB NRR/SEB NRR/SEP Tech Dept.
Eng.
NRR/ASB NAO/SEP NRR/SEPB Technical Supt.
NRR/SEP