ML18045A443

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Forwards Current Evaluation of SEP Topics III-10.A,III-10.B, VI-7.F,VIII-3.B,VIII-4 & XV-16.Requests Notification If as-built Facility Differs from Licensing Basis Assumed in Assessment
ML18045A443
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/11/1980
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Hoffman D
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
TASK-03-10.A, TASK-03-10.B, TASK-06-07.F, TASK-08-03.B, TASK-08-04, TASK-15-16, TASK-3-10.A, TASK-3-10.B, TASK-6-7.F, TASK-8-3.B, TASK-8-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8008060107
Download: ML18045A443 (30)
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Docket.No. s*o-255-

.- ~.

, *jorsTRIBUT*** I.ON:

J)o~~et.

~

NRC PDR Local PDR

  • .TERA*

NSIC

z.

.:1. kilJL'( _:* l*l_ 19SO

.QRB#5 R~ading* '

  • DEi sen hut Mr. David P. Hoffman Nuclear Licen*sing. AdndnistratQr JOl shi nski.. **
  • RPurple Consumers Power Company RTedesco Hsmith 212 West Michigan l\\venue
  • TNbvak OELD Jackson, Michigan 49201 JHeltemes OI&E(3)'

GLainas ACRS (16)

Dear M~. Hoffm~n:

DCrutchfield SEP Chief

  • .RE:. _SEP TOPICS II;-10.A, 1'1.l-10.8~- v1-1:F~ VIII-3!~~mi~fihVIll-4.
  • Pali sades

. \\..,\\..

.. Enclosed is a copy of our'C:urrent evaluation of ~ys.tematic Evaluation Pro9r~m Topics III-10.A, *Thennal~Overload Protection for Motors of Motor-Operated Valves; III-lO.B, Pump Flywheel Integrity; VI-7. F,

  • Accumulator Isolation Valves Power and Control System DesJgn Vlll-3.B, DC Power System Bus Volta_ge Monitoring and Annunciation;~f'Rl

... -4, Electri~al.

Pen*etrations of the Reactor Containment; and XV-16, Radiological Conse-quences of Failure of Small.- Lines CarryingPri~ry Coolant Outside Containment *. "

The.se assessment~ compare your facility*~ as *described in pocket* No.

50-255 with the criteri.a curr~ntly used by the regu_latory staff :for licensing new fac111ties.

Please infQnn iJs if your "as-built facility differs from the 1i tensing basis assumed 1n our ass~ssment. w1 thi_n 90

. days of receipt of this letter.**

These evaluations *W'fll be *a basic input **t~.the integrated safe_ty assess..

. :ment for your facility unless you identify changes'.:needed to reflect the

. as-built conditions oat your facility. These topic ~ssessments.ma}cbe revised in the.future if your. facility design is changed of* 1f NRC'

  • criteria relating to this.. topic a*re modified before the i~tegrated assessment 1 s
  • c~p 1 eted.
  • ~ *

Enclosures:

Completed SEP.Topics.

~

s'1ncere lv'.... '... '

Original s~gned*bY.

D~nnis M. Crutchfield.

"Dennis* M. Crutchff e 1 d, Chief.

".,'Operating Reactors Branch #5 D1vfs1~." of Lkens1ng.* *..**~...

cc:

See next *page

. 8008060101-f

-.~.

. OFFOCE~,i~~~* ~~~~id........ *.....*..., ****.**.**.*************......, ********** ***.********.*******

'"":::r: ?(i lisD * * * * * *

  • 7JJtJso * *.. * ** * * * *... * * * *..*.. * * *****. ** * ******* ***** *** **** * * * *.* *** * * *. * * * * * ***.*.* * * *.. ** * *.. ***** * * *

.-*--tru.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 197~*2B9-369

. UNITED STATES.

    • e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.**
  • -.Nuclear Licensing.Admi~istrator
  • Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan A~en~e.

JaCkson, Mtcht gan

  • 49201

Dear. Mr. Hoffman:

Julyll,1980 RE:

SEP TOPI:CS r:rr~1ci.A~ In-10:B, vr.:.7:F, VIII-3.B, AND VII(-4.

Palisades Enclosed i.s a copy of our current.evaluation of Systematic Ev~luation Program Toptcs tll-*10.A, Thermal-Overload Protection for Motors of*

Motor-Operated Valves; Il!'-10.B, Pump Flywheel Integrity; VI-7.F,

  • Accumulator Isolation Valves Power and* Cohtrol System*Design~ VIII-3.B, DC Power System Bus Voltage Monitoring and Annunciation; VI II-4, El ectri ca 1 Penet~atidns of.the Reactor Containment; and.XV-16, Radiological Conse-quences of Fai.lure of Small lines Carrying* Primary Coolant Outside Containment.

Th.ese assessments compare yolJrfactiity,*a*s de~cribed in Docket No~.

50-255 wi.th the criteria currently used by the regulatory siaff for licensing new faciljties.

Please inform us if your as-built facility dtffers from.the licensing basis assumed i~ 6ur assessment within 90 days of 're.ceipt of this letter.

  • These* eva.l uations wi.11. be a basi ~- input to the. integrated safety assess-ment for your faci.l i:ty unless you i:denti:fy changes needed to reflect the as~bui.lt conditions at your facility. *These topic assessments may be rev.ised in the future if your.facility design is changed or.if NRC criteria relattng, to this topic are modified before the' integrated
  • . assessment is -completed.

Enclosures:

Co_mpl eted SEP Topi cs cc: *See riext page J;;l'/Jl.....

Dennis M. Crutchfield, hief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing

. ~r

'Mr. L'avid*P.* Hoffman.

. '*\\'

. cc w/enclosure:..

M. I. Hiller, Esquire Isha~, L{ncolri & Beale Suite 4200 e

One First National Plaza*

  • Mr. Paul A *.Perry, Secretary. *.

Consumers Pawer CofTllany 212 West Michigan Avenue Jacksoh~ Michigan 49201

  • Judd L *. Bacon, Esquire

. Consumers Power* Co~any

  • 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Mi~higan 49201 Myron. M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501
  • One IBM Plaza..

Chicago, Illinois 60611 Ms. Mary P. Si nc 1 air.

Great Lakes Energy A 11 i ance 5711 Surrnnerset Drive Midland, Michigan 48640 K*alamaioo' Public Library 315 South Rose Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006

. Township Supervisor

  • Covert Township Route 1, Box 10 Van Btiren Coun~y, Michigan. 49043 Offi~e of the Governor (2)
  • Room 1 - tapitol Building*

Lansing, Michigan 48913

    • Director, Technical.Assessment

. Division Office of Ra di at ion Programs

.. (AW-459)

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Crystal Mall *12 Arlington~ Virginia 20460 *

. - *2 *-

  • . Jufn*,1980 u~ *~. :Envir~nmental Protection*

Agency Federal Activities Branch.**

Region V Off i c*e An~ :

E rs COORDINATOR. '...

  • 230 South Dearborn Street*

Chicag.o, Illinois. 60604. *.

Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chai nnan

. Afoini c Safety.and Licensing Board

  • Panel

.. U

~- S. Nuclear Regulatory.Comni SS ion Washington, O. C.

  • 20555 Dr. George C_., Anderson Department of Oceanography Universitj of Washingtbn.

Seattle, Washington 98195 Or. M. Stanley Livingston.

1005 Calle Largo

.Santa Fe, New Mexico

  • 87501 Re~ident Inspector c/o U. S. NRC *

. P. o. Box 87 Sou~h Haven, Michig~n 49090 pal i sades p la nt ATIN:

Mr. J. G~.Lewis Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043.*

William J. Sc~nlon, Es~uire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Mic~igan 48~03

.Mr. Richaro E. Schaffstall

  • KMC, Incorporated 1747 Pennsylvanii Avenue, N; W.

Washington, 0. C.

20006

    • *'.*.i

>t

  • .*.. I
      • i
  • ... I
    • e**

sE:P n:cH~r~Ar. :::v.~L::..;.:;:o~r

"".1. Q'O.L.;, C. T 'i T:.,. 1 *)'. '

~

TRE~'1..U.-OVE:al.OAD. ?RC~c::o~i. ?*:R :;~o~o~s :

  • OF :-!OTOR-O?E:R..~::::: *'.n.~:.-::_3

. PAi.tsAJE:S 1Ja:*1es.

assurance thae *.the appli-cation of -the:-::i.al.:.ov~:-load p;ocac:i6n..ie*r:.ces t~ ::ofo:-s associated *..;1.c:h sa.:e~y:-::elated ootot'*-o?eraced *1alves d,o ::.oc r:s:.il: i:i *needles~ 'ni:lcirance* of the' v_al ves. to ;:ierfor::i. C:heir s,afecy func c:io'ns ::

In.accordance wic:h this *objectiv~, e::e-..,a?p:.i:a.c:i;:in*of either one of

  • the c*.10 :-eco!cmendations concained in Regulac:cr=:*~ Gi;i.:ie 1. ioo, "The=m'al-

. Ove= load. ?ro cec cion for :::lee tric _:1ot:oq en :-!o:or.;.Operat:~d Valves~" is ade-quate.* These. recoc:::cendations are as

  • foEows:

-(11 ~P~ovided chat che compl~tibtl'of c~e s~f:ty f~n~cion is not jeopardized or,that: Ot:her safee:: sysCe!IlS,ate no!:

( 2)

. deg:-ade~, (a}*~c:he. thenal-overloaci** ;n:*6c:ction: devio;e~

should be continuously bypassed and.te:D.?oraril.y ;:iiaced in force ortly *when the. valve ~ot*~rs are undergbing *

  • periodic or :nairitenance
  • cestirig,== * (~) t:tosa :her::::al-over load procection devices cha: :.ra :lonally.i.::i force during,.pl.ant operacioci. should 'oe * ~:;?assed under ace~-

d~rit condi c:l.ons.~,

The c:-ip *set?obt of Ch~* the:"lia:::.~v::-load ?rote~tion devices shouid 'je established, w.i.c:n aL: U."lCe:'Ca~nt.ias..

. ;..~solv0_d. l 0

l=avor.. *o*f *.com... 1 ~t;_.g. -'-*e

"'-:~~..,;_-el. a.. e* d.

. ~c..~ -~..,...

ac cion *.. ~*. ~*

1'1 l-.n raspec.. co

hose **.;.nce=t.al:i.t1es, cons lder-at ion shouid :ie gi*;en. eo (a). n:-iacion.s in c:he a-::i:iient
  • Ce:np.::-;a_t-...ra at :he. installed loca:icn o: the overload l

ij

.. f' pro*te<:,.tion cevi=*es and the v;a>:~, :nocor.s' (~) *i.nac~:.lra

~{es: b mocor heating *data anci' :he.~ver:na ?rOtec.tion d.evice t::i,?,ch.aracteriscic.s and :he :::a::ii~g o: these

  • t*..-o ::i~~*~s*, -,~::d (~

.. )

1 *se*~?oi:lc. dl:-'i::,

r:i* o:-c:e:- _to a!'1s~:-;

co~ti:-iued ~.... ~cc10nal reli~oib.:/ ~nd. :he ;.ccur-acyof..

the trip. pobt*, che thenal~overload ?ro:e*::ion.device sho~ld~ b~ periocii=ally.~ested.:

In addition; che :urre:u: licensing criteria reQu1:-e that:

(3)

.In MOV de.signs thac: us~ a torque s;ritch :*o licit c:.he 1

  • o; t'-

vai.,.,

......,, _,,,,. ___,..;:.:. *O""'n:..,?

  • openi. *.-g or. c.... osl:.* g

.... 1e.. _v_,.'":...... -~1..-.-..c.'---. -:--*-**co o'r Closing s:pal should be :;se~ in conj~nc:i.on *..;it:"l a cotresponding li:nit switch.

. JISCUSS!ON

,On :-far~h 3,

  • 1980,.the licensee suboi::eci a l1sc of. safe:y-:ra_lac:.ed

. 4

nocor-operated valves and che elecc:.rical s=he~a:i~s f~r ~nose va~ves.

!hei::al-overload de,;ices ar*e used only fo:r.overloa:i \\tdi'cati~on or alarm;.

' 5-9 t::-tey do :::.ot C"emove power f-::9m the *1.alve l:lotor or *conc:-ol ci:*c.. nts.;.

  • Valve O?en coa:mands' which include all automatic nl.*;e operat:ions' are te:-:ninac:.ed ':ly limit switches; valve close com::iands (all ;nanuaL).. are !:er-oinated by torque switches:

?:VALUATION Thenial-over load p-ro*tec ti on for motors of t:io c:.or-o?erate.d. valves at:

?alisacies :ieets currenc licensing criteria *.. The=-.:ia~.... overload devi~es are used for, alani/indica:ion only, and automatic va~ve O?e:-ations are

.te:-::iinai:ed by limit swit~hes.

2 I..

  • e-**
  • . REFER.ENCZS
l.

EEE.. Staridard 179-l9.71* 1, "Criceria. for ?-:-o~ec:i~n Sys tams for :'luclaar

?owerGer:.erating Stac:i.6ns.. "

2.

Branch Technical ?osition

  • ElCSB.-27,

'-'wesi~:i Cri~?ria for Ther:ial Over-load Pro C:ec ticiri. :.::ir ~o tors. of Mo tor-Operated ;., al ~e*s. "

3.

Regulatory Guide. 1.106, "Ther:al Over Load ?ro tac i:icn for E:lec i:ric Moto:-s.on Motor~Opera:ad Valves.-"

4.-

. : s.

Letter, Consumers Power* Company (Hofz:ian) :o :n.. ~ {Zia::ia1-i), dac:ed

. March 3~ 1980.

Palisades Dtawing E-2~2, Sheet _2, Revi~ion 7 1 no date *

6.

P'alisades Dra;i'ing :.-242, Sheet 3, Re*li3i..:n '3 1 da::ec 9-14-73.

7.

Palisades* DrawingE-243, Sheet 1, Revision 4, dated 4-3-79.

8.

Palisades D::a;wing E-244, Sheet 1, Ra,risicn. o, dated. 10-.5-78.

9.

Palisades Drawing E:.2!1.4,. Sheet 3, No R.evis ion, dated 3-31-78.

3

SYSTEi-i.l\\TIC EVALUATIOii PROGRAM

. PLANT SYSTE~S/MATERIALS

  • PALI SADES PLANT Topic III-10~8 Pump Flywheel Integrity Th~ safety ~bj~cti~e of this review is to assure th~t the 1ntegrity~of the
  • prir.~ry reactor coolant pump flyv1heel is maintained* to prevent failure at normal operating speeds-and speeds that might be ~eached~under ac~ident
  • cond.it ions and thus preclude the generat fon qf miss i 1 es-.

Info~mat~on for this a~~essment was obtain~d fr6m t~e FSAR, the Technical Specifications for the.Palisades Plant, and a Supple~ent to the ACRS Report dated r:ovember 18, 1969.

The basis for the re~i ew is the degree of compliance wit_h the recomme_ndat ions -

of R:gulatory Guide 1-.14, 11 ReaC:tor Coolant Pump-Flyv1heel. Integrity 11 Regulatory_

Guide 1~14 describes and recommends a method acceptable to the.NRC staff of implementing General _D~sign Criterion 4~

11 Env.ironmental and Missile Design_

8ases 11 of Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50, with regar.d to minimizing the potential for failures of the fly\\'1heels of the reactor coo_lant pump motors.

There are two p~rts to tbe recommendations of Regulato~y Guide 1.14~ The first part is related to the evaluatioo of materials of ccnstructiOn, design, fabrica-tion, proof testing, and pre-service inspection of the pump flywheels for cons~ruction permit submittals docketed on or after January 1, 197.6.

The

_ secoi°;d part -is*.concerned \\*:i th _the __ eva 1 uat ion of procedures used for the inservice inspection of pump flywheels for. all plants.after January 1, 1976~

The reguhtorypositionfor the inser~ice 'inspectfon of the reactor pump fly-

\\*.'heels for the Palisades plant is that the inservice inspection of each fly\\':heel should be performed in compliance with the.recommendation of Section D.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.14 as follows:

a.
h.
c.

_d.

In-place volumetric exa~ination of areas of higher stress con-centration 'at approximately 3-year intervals.

Surface examination cif all exposed surfaces and a complete

  • volumetric examination at approximately 10-year intervals.

The examination orocedures should co~plywith Subarticle H!A-2200 (ASME Section XI).

Acceptance criteria should be that the lowest critical speed is calculated to be twice the normal op~rating speed, and Should the examination indicate an increase in flaw size greater than pr~dicted for the service life,_the results should be sub-mitted to the re5ulatory staff for evaluation.

  • I

- 2*

The integrity of th*e fly\\':hee 1 s of the. primary reactor cool ant pumps was addres~ed. in.a Supplement to the Acrs Report by the AEC Division bf Reattor Licensing on November 18, 1969~ in resporise to expressed concerns ih safety related areas for the Palisades pl~nt~ The salient points of the Supplement on Fly\\','heel: Integrity are as follO\\.,,s:

The primary system pump motor fly\\'1hee 1 s are r;;ade up of 'three discs shrink fitted to.the motor ihaft~ Unlike all previously reviewed designs, the flywheel cannot be removed for volumetric inservice inspectfon *. The disc material is SAE 1017,.Type.1020, LowCarbon Steel with_a minimum yie)d strength of 27,000 psi. Other flyv:heels we have reviewed recently were made of higher quality material,

  • either A 5338 or A516 GR £5 with yield strengths of-50,000 and 65,000 psi, -respectively.* T\\'/O of the three discs have a diameter of ~bout 52 inches.

The third, and Uppermost disc, has a diameter of 72 inches.

The motor operating speed.is only 900 rpm for the Palisades installa-tion, in comparison to 1200 rpm for other P~R pump installations~

This results in a redtiction of the energy available to a potential missile from a failed disc.

In view of this, and the energy absorbing capability_of the mechanical structure enclosing the two.

smaller dists, we have concluded that the probability for missil.es generated from these discs to escape from the motor structure is sufficiently low to.warrant rejection of this event as a design basis co~sideration~

The applicant has performed a* seismic ~n~lysis of 'the pump-motor assembly which inditates the capability 6f the assembly, including the flyv:heel and main bearings, to withstand seismic forces in combination with other applicable loads.

The minimum yield stress of the fly1*:heel upper disc 1tJill not be reached unless a 200% overspe~d is attained. *The ~otor is designed to pre~ent an_overspeed conditiQn through a self-.*

braking action.* The available margin is, ho*.. :ever,. less than for other designs we have reviewed.

Note:

The self-braking action is caused by the rotor of the motor yislding, much before 200% overspeed is reached, expanding against the stator, thus braking the reactor coolant pump.

In vie1-1 of the use of material of lo\\'1er quality than that provided in other designs, arid of the lower margin to failure, we hav~

concluded that a more stringent inservice inspection pro.gram should be required for the flyv:heel upper disc than that required for other facilities. *We intend to require the inspection program*

to include the following:

a.

100% volumetric (UT) baseline fnspection of the 72-inch disc, including the disc-shaft interfate. *

b.
  • 100% volumetric (UT) inservice inspection of the 72-inch disc including the disc-she.ft intei*face 2.t e:ach refuelfr1g shutdc\\*111.

- a, :

c. A ~is~al inspe~tion, to the extent' practical and using optic~l means ~here required, of all three discs,each time a UT irispettion of the upper disc is performed.

The appl~cant has informe~ us ~hat an ultrasonic inspettion of the

. ~ppermost disc can be performed by providing openings in the top cover *

..;n:.~ridment No. 34 to the ProviSional Operating L iC:ense (DPR-20) amends the

.Technical Specifications for the Palisades Plant and identjfies the Sur-veillance Program \\'1hich will be. conducted during* the inservice inspection,,

of the. primary pump fly\\'/heels.

Referring to Table 4.3.2 of the A.'Tlendment, the upper flywheels will be volumetrically inspected during eacn refueling

  • outage.

\\*!e conc,lude from our review that a more stdngent Inservice Inspection Program than re~ornmended by Regulatory Guide 1.14 ~hould be instituted ~t the Palisades Plant to compensate for the. lower strength material in the reactor coolant pump flywheels.

In addition to the 100% volumefric inspection of the upper fly~heel at each refueling.outage, we recommend, in compliance with our ACRS Report commitment, that a visual examination be perforii1ed on all three. flyv1heel discs each time a volumetric.in~pection of the upper disc is performed *. In addition, in compliance with the re~ommendations of Regulatory Guid~ 1.14,

\\*:e recommend that a surface examination of the upper flyv1heel be performed at each 10-y~ar inspection interval.

  • l' SEP TEC!ill!CAb Ev.:U.~ir:JN TOPIC VI-7.;.

ACC1.i~L~!OR ISOU.!!ON VALV'ES

?O'.'i::R.!1iD CONTROL s~s:~ J::s:GN' PALISADES

l. 'J I~!3.0DUCT!ON The objecdve of :his* revie<..r is ::o cieta!"~::e if ::he accuou!.ac:or isol:a::ion valve power and control syste~ is.in cooplia~ce wic:h cur-:.ent lic~nsing criceria.

T:i.e specific requi:-e:nencs for aci:umulacor isolation *1alve power and control sys::a:n desig:i derive from IZ~ 279-:971, *..;hi;::n sta:'es thac

he bypass of a procecti'1e fonccion will be :*:-ai:ioved aur:om.atical:.y when-e'v*e:- per=iissi*1e condi:ions are noc. :nee and *.;nic'.1 also assu:-es chac a sing!.e elect~ical failure or operacor e:ror ~ill not res~lc: in loss of capability of the acc':.!mulac9= co ;:ie:-::oni ics sa.:ecy fu~cdon.

1 The c:-i:eria are further Cefi:ied i:i 3ranch Tec:-iriiCal ?osicivns *I.'::53 ~

2 and ICSB 183.

  • 2.0 CRITERL:.\\.

Cur.enc. licac.sing c:-i::eria from ICSB 4 are:

l.

Automatic opening of :he valves ~hen either p:-i~ary coolant sysce~ pressure exceeds a ?reselecc:ed value (to be s?ec i.fied in.::he Technical Spec iEcacions),

or a sa:ety injec c:ion signal is preseni:.

Boch primary coo.lane: system pressure and satecy i.:ijec-tion signals should 'e provided :o ::ie valve opera~or. *

2.
  • visual indication i:i Che cont=ol room of c:he open or closed stat:.ls of the valv*.
3.

An audible and visu,al alarm, ince?e-:icent of item 2.

above, ::hac is acc:ua:ed 'oy* a sensor on ::ie..,alve when the valve is i10:: in c:he fo:.1.y-;;,?e:i ?Osi:ion.

4.

U:ilizat:ion of a sa.:-aty injecti.::n s:.gna.:. co re:nove auco:na::ically (over":":.de) any oy?.i:3S :ea::.l=e ::hac 1

may _be,provided to allow an i_sola:ion *1a:!.*1e. to ~e c i osed for s ho :-c ~periods of t i::i~ *.;her-. : ::e :-e a.c: 5r

coolanc svste:::::t is ac oi~ssure (.i:i. accordiri~e ~ich p~ovisi~n~ of ti-le "Technical Sped.ri*:a cio:i.s).-
  • Curren:. licensing en.Ce rl.a from icsa 18 are:

L 2 **

Failur~-s in.both the "fail co fu~ction" sense and

. the "ulidesi:-ab le.. func t:ion" sensa of com-.:onents i:i. ~

  • el.ect:rical*syscems including valves and. ocher fluid svstem *componec:~s should 'oe considered in designing against a singl'e failure, even c:ho.ugh c:ie valve or-ocher fluid sy.scem componerit: ma:' :iot be caEed upon co fonc ti cm* in a given. safecy O?erat:ional. seque-:ice.

Where it is ciece::-;:iined that: fail*.lre of an electri-cal.system c:n~ponent.can cause *,;ndesi=ed 'mechanical motion.of a *1alv.e or ocher-fluiC. syste!!l compone::c

.-and chis moi:i'on resulC.s in loss of cne sysce:n $4f.:..

ety function, i.t is accepcable, i:l lieu :;f desi~n changes chat: als~ :::::tay b~ accepcable, co disconnect power._ co the *alee t:ric syste~.ot che *:al*;e or other.

fluid syst:e:::::t component.

The ;il.a'l: :ec::::ical S?eci-

  • fications should* i;:ic lude a :list of a.E e lee :rically:-

operaceci valves, and c:he reqtii:eci ?Osicions Jf these. valves 1 to 'Jhich the require:::en t :.:;r relll0'.1aJ.

  • of electric ?Owe:-. is applied in _orde: ::o sa:is_f7 t:he single failure ~ri:erion.

3; Electrically-op~;aced valves chat are classified as.

"active" valves ' i.e.' are req*.!ired :o ope:l..:;r.. **

close in var{ous safety*.system cpera:i.onal *sequen-ces, but are manually:-cont!-o llec,

  • sho_1,;ld be ope:-a-ted from :the :nain control room.

Such valves* :nay n.ot. be* inc 1.ucied a:::iong those ~*alves fro':l *.. "hi.ch power.

is reI:loved ii.:;rde:- :o ;:;ieet che single faibre_

criterion '..lD.less (a) electrical ?o,...er can ':le =e-stored to c:ie valves.from ::ie :na.i:i. *cont:rol i:'ooi:l,

'(b) *.valve operacion is* not oecessary for at: _:;.east ten minuce.s. following occurrence. of ::i.e even: =e-qui:ing, such operation, md (c) i: is ~:I:cns~=aced *.

  • chat* there is reasonable assura:::.ce t~a.t:.il.L ::eces-sar:1 opera t.:;r ac c:ions

~.. -i 11 be. ?e= ::o~ :ieci '1':i :Si:i che

  • Ci.Zle sho<Mtl t:o *be *acieqllate )y c:ie analysis.
':le plant Technical Spec ifica:ions should i::.c lu.de a.

. list of.the -:equi:.:ed ;:iosicions of i!lanua.ll:1:-.

controlled, eleccrically-operaced *ial*:es an.d. s.hould l"den-:;:y -1..,*ose *1al*1es --o *.;n*;:.*n....._e*-.,;.,,,:_,.;,...e..,,.. ;:or l

- -~----.......

rel:lOvai bf e:.ec:ric ?O~er is a??i.ieci i:l or~er CO sa~isfy the si::.g:.e failu:e criter~Qn.

2

. j r!

~ ;

ii

  • 1

\\J 4 *.. When the si:igle :ailure criterion is satisfied by.

. removal of elec::=ical pow-er.f:-om valves cescribec

. in 2. and 3. above,* ::hese valves should have :-edun-

  • . dant. posi::ion indication in the Jiain cont:-ol room and "the po*icion indi~a::ion sys:~c shouldi i:self,
  • meet the single :ailure criterion~
  • s..

The phrase, "electrically-opera::ed val'ies," includes both valve~ gperated di~ectly ~y an elec:::-ical device (e.g., a motor:..ope:-ated val~e.:ir a solenoid-operat:ed valve) and. thos.e valves operated.indireccly' by an e lee t:r ical device. (e.g.;. an air-opera t:ed valve whose air supply l.S COnt:=olled by an elec fri:_

'cal sol~noid ~alve).

J.O DISCUSSION AND EVilUAI!ON 3.1: Discussion.

The Palisades plant: uses four Safety L"ljeccion

  • C~ccumulai:or) tanks;. each of which has a motor-o-oera:ed isolation 4

.J.

valve.

These valVes are MO 3041, MO 3045, MO 3049, and xo:z632.

Each valve has a single positon indication.

The Palisades Technical Specificat:io~s require that, prior to ac::aini:ig reactor ~ri:icality, the Safety Injection !ank Isolation 1lalves mus: l:le opened ac:i :hat power ::o the val*.re moto:-s ::iust _be removed;

[!let~od of removal Copen.

breaker, :-ack-out breaker, or disconnect [!lotor power caoles) is not specified. 3 Re!lloval of valve motor power does :ior. disable valve pos(d.on indication, "1hich is powered from a separa::e 125 V DC bus.~

The valves are spec i.:ied by function rather than by 1.ra lve number.

The Technical Speci.ficat:ions also allo1o1 any one SI t.ank to be ou~ of ser-vice for no more than one hOU:' during ?CWe:' Operation Without: going tO hot shutdow-n.

3. 2 Evaluation.

.The ?a lisades accumulator i.so l.ation valve ?OWe:-

. and cont:-ol syste:n design ~eets the requi:-ement of ICSB 18, par~ 2, with the exception* c~at plant Technical Specification~ do noc list the isolation valves by nw:tber*.

The. design does :iot, howeve:-, tneiat: the requirecent of rcs:a 18' ?art 4, which ~st be complied '.tit~ wen removal of valve mot:or power l.S used to :eet the singie failure c:-i~e:ri.on; onl:r one position indication per valve is avail~ble ~:i. che conc:-ol room, a.

sc~:ne *.;hich is i:iherently single-failure pi.:ir.e.

3

4. 0. SU~.ARY

. ~

-Th¢ Palisades_ accl.!!:lulacor isolacion valve ?vi:.:e:- ana con:::-ol sys:e::i

\\.

  • desig:i_does noc comply.*.;i::i cu:-::-e!:'".:.ll.c~nsl.~g :::-::.:e::-::.a. :iecause \\a*; ?J.an:

Technical.Spec_izicadons :io.i.6r: specify by valve.n*.:.:nber.*.;hi:=-. vabe_s

-c:iusc be opened arid deene:-~ized and (b) conc:-oi :-oo= :1al 1.;e pO:>i::i.cn indicacion is :le.i:her. red.ucdant nor. single-faiii.:.re :-:-ee.*

  • 5.O* REFERENCES.

i.* * --I.::EE' S:andard 279, "Cri:eria for Procec d.on _ Syste:::s for ~uc ::.ear i ?ower, Geqeraci:i.g S:acions."

2.
  • .Branch Technical Posi:ion ICSB 4, Requirecoen:s o*r ~ocor-O'?e:-aced Valves in che. ECGS Accwiiulacor Lines~"-

3..

Branch Technical ?osi:ion ICSB 13, "Applicacion of the Single Failure Criterion co :1~i1ually-Cont:-oiled Electricall:1.-0pe:-a:ed Valves....

4.

3echcel-Palisades Dra*Jing 5935 :1-203, Revision I.,

J.-1 da:ed l-14-77;

5.

"Technical Specificadons for :he Pai~sades Plant,ii Amend.wen: 31, dac~d 11-1~77, par~graph 3.3.l.i;

. 6.

Bechte l-?alisades D-::awiag E-243, sheet 2, -No ?..evision, daced 4-3-79'.

4

  • -.i
l. 0 nrrRODUCTION

. SEP TECRNICAL iV.UU.~I!ON. e TOPIC VI!!-3 *.B DC POWER SYSTE.'1 3US VOL:'AGZ MONITOR!~G AND A.'i~:JNCIA!ION *. *.

PALISADES

  • The objecl:ive of this review is :co *deter.:iine if the DC power.sys~.
em bus vol~age monitorin~*and annunciation ~re in compiiance ~ith cu~ent. licensing criteria for Class. IE:. DC ~ower systems.

The specific require:ients for *Dc *power syste::i ::ionitoring derive from the general require::ients ec.bodied b Sections 5.3.i(4), S.3.3(5),

and 5.-i.4(5) of IEEE Standard 308-19741,and in, Regulatory Guide l.47 2

  • I:i su::imary, these general :-equiremen::s sbply s::a:e.that the DC system (batteries 1 *diSt:'i.butlOtl Systems I and. cha:-ge=S) Shall be 'ClOUitored to
he extent that it is shoi.'U co be ready to perfoni its intended function.*

2.0 CRITERIA As a crinimu.m, the following indications and. ala~s of the Class IE DC ?~er system(s) stacus. shall be provided in t:he control room: 3

.Battery current (a=ner:er-charge/di.scharge)

Battery charger out.put current (a=eter)

DC bus voltage (voltmete:-)

.Battery charge:- ou::put voltage (vo !.t::ieter)

Battery high cischarge :-ate.alar:n DC bus undervo ltage and over-lo ~tage ala~

DC bus*.ground alar:J (fo?: ungrounded syst:e:n) 3atte:-y *brea~e::(s) or Euse(s) ope::i alar:i

1.
    • i*

.. Battery c.er ~u"t?ut. b:-eaker{s).:>r fose(-open

  • . ala:-:n 3at::ery charge:- ::rouble ala:'!ll (o':.e a:.~:-= for. a nut::~er

.of aononial concii::ions *..;hich a....

\\.!sea:~:' i.:idica::ed locally).

3.0. DISCUSSION

.~iD ::.7.-\\:.UATION 3.1 Dis~tissfo~;.*:7~o 12~ V ba::t~rfes, fo~i bat:ery chargers, arid t*.;o *DC buses comprise the Palisades Class I:: DC poYer :syste:::i~.

Coc.t:rol

-oom i:::dic.ation
  • cocsists of **Charger Under-.:o l::age ala:-:ns. and 125 V DC Bus Trouble alarms.
-~e Bus Trouble. alar:s ac:uac:e en bus ground or **

. 4 bus u:nde:-vo ltage.

.!.o c a1 (ba.:te:-y room) bdica::ion consists of charger at=::leters arid vo*lt::ieters, bus.al:!lr:ete:-s and vol.t:.:leters, and bus ground recorders~.

3.2 EvalUa.c:ion.

The Palisades control rooo has no _indication of bat-c:e:-y cur:-e:i.i:, high discha:-ge :-ate, or b-iea~er/fuse status; battery cha:-ge:- cur:-ent,.output voltage, o:- breake:-/!use status; or JC bus voltage or:.overvoltage.

Therefore, the ?alisades DC pove:- systetl moni-toring is not i:n compliance..,ith current licensing criteria.

4.0.

SUMMARY

Of 11 parameters cur=eritly requi:-ed to be indicated or alarmed in the control room, only tvo are alar:ned ic the Palisades control roo:.

~erefore, the ?alisac!es DC poYer systems are not ::::ionitored in compli-ance 'lolith current licensing criteria.

5.O RZrRENCES

l.

I~E. Stan~a:-d 308-1974, "Sc:andard Cri:e:-ia *for Class. U: Power Sys ::ems for ~ucl.ear ?ewer G~ne:-a::ing S ::ations."

2.

Regulatory Guide l. 74., "SJPassed and tnope:-ab le S::.aus Indi:ca-2

3.

NRC Me:o.~:::i, ?SB (Rosa) to SE?S (Cr'..!::.ctleld), "DC Syste:i

~onito::ing and Annunciation," dated October 16, 19(9.

4.

Let:ter, Consut:ie=s ?ower Co.* (:Sixe!J to ~;RR (Ziemann), "SEP Iopi~ V!Z!-3.3; DC jow~~ Syste: 3us Vol:age Mdnitoring and

. Annunc:.at1cn 1 dated July 23, 1979.

3.

e e

  • !/

SEP TECHNICAL EVALUATION

. TOPIC VIII-4 ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT PALISADES NUCLEAR STATION Consumers Pow.er Company Docket No. 50-155

CONTENTS l.O INTRODUCTION

2. 0 CRITERL-\\.

3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 3.1 Typical Low Voltage (0.-lOOOVAC) Penetration 3.1.1 Low Vol~age Pen~tration Conclusion

  • 3.2..

Typi~al Medi\\.im Voltage (>1000 VAC) Penetration.*

3.2.1,Medium Voltage Penetration Evaluation 3.3 Typical Dire~t Current Penetration*

3.3.1 Direct Penetration Evaluation 4.0 SUNMARY

5.0 REFERENCES

ii

\\

.1 2

3 4

5 5

6 6

7 7

8

SEP TECHNICAL EVALUATION e*

TOPIC VIII' ELECTRICAL PENE!R~TIO~S OF TH.E RE.ACTOR CONTAI~NT PALISADES NUCLEAR STATION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This review is part of the Systematic Ev_aluation Program (SEP),

Topic.VIII-4._ -Consumers Power Company (CPC) has provided information (Reference 1) describing typical penetrations, typical in-containment

-"loads, and fault currents.

They did not provide an analysis of their suitability in Reference l. _ The objective of this review i.s to deter-mine the capabili_ty of the overcurrent devices to prevent exceeding the -

design rating of the electrical penetrations through the reactor con-taimnent during short circuit conditions at LOCA temperatures.

General Design Criterion _50, "Containment Design Basis" of Appen-dix A' "General Design c"ri teria for Nuclear Power Plants" to 10 -CFR Part 50 requires that penetrations be designed so that the containment

~tructure can, without exceeding the_desig0 leakage rate,- accommodate the calculated_pressure, temperature, and other enviromnent:al condi-tions resulting from any. loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). -

I.EEE Standard 317, "Electric Pene~ration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations", as a~gment:ed by Re-gulatory Guide.l.63, provi~es a basis of electrical penetrations

-_acceptable to the staff.

Specifically, this review will examine the protection of typical electrical pe-oetrations in the containment stTucture to deter.nine the ability-of the protective-devices to clear the circuit during a short circu~t condition prior tb exceeding-the containment electrical pene-tration test or design ratings at an initial LOCA-temperature.

l

.. 1'

- i

2 ~O. CRITERIA IEEE Standard 317, * "Electri~ Penetration Assemblies*. iri Ccntainment:

S t:-uctures* for Nuclear E'ower Genera~in-g Stations~' as supplemented by

    • Nu~lear Regulatory Commission Regulatory 'Guide 1.63,. '.'Electr1c Penetra.:..

tion Ass~mblies iri..Containment Structures. for Light-Water-_Cooled Nuc-lear Power Plan~*s" prov~des _the basis acceptable.:o the NRC staff.

The*

follo~ng criteria.are. ~sed, in this report to determine. compl~-ance with current licensing requi~ements: *

(l)

IEEE Standard.. -317,,Par~graph 4.2.4 "The.rated short*cir-cuitcurrent and duration shali. be the maximum short circuit cun-en.t in amperes that. the conductors of_ a ~ircuit can ca~y for.a specified du;ation (based ~on the operating tim~ of the primary overcurrent protective device or apparatus of-the circuit). follo:wing continuous operation at rated continuous current without the te:cperature*of the.conduct,ors exceeding their short circuit design limit with all other.cnnductors in the assembly carrying their rated c:ontinuous current under the specified normal environmental.conditions."

This pa;r:agra{Jh is augmented by Regulatory Guide L63, Para-graph C"."l ~ "The electric penetration assembly shoulci be designed to Withstand, without lo~s of mechanical integrity,.

the maximum possible fautt:* current versus time conditiori:s that co~ld occ-~r given sirrgle' ranJom fail~res ~r Circul.t overload-protection.devices."

.-(2)

IEEE.Standard 317, Pa~agraph 4.2.5 -

"The rated maximum duration of rated short cir~uit ~~rrent shall. be: the maximt.Im

. time th~t _the condi:ictors of.* a. circt.li t can carTy. rated short.

circuit current: based oO. the operating time of the backup protective device. or apti.,,ratus' during which the. electrical integrity may be lost, but fot' whicli the penetration assembly Shall. maintain COntairiment. int"eg+/-i ty *II

  • .I. I.

.,l

e

3. 0 DISCUSS ION AND EVALUATION*

In this evaluation,. the results of typica 1 containment ?enetra-tions b.eing at LOCA te::i~eratui:-es. concurrent ~ith a tandem failure of the circuit protective dev.ices will be analysed.

Consumers. Power *c~mpany (CPC) has provided i.~formation (Refer-*

ence l} on typical penetrations in the. Palisades. plant.

  • All were manu-
  • f actured by Viking Industries, Inc.

CPC ~ubmit ted manufacturer-s~pplied.

"rated* short* circuit data" for* the penetrations.

Verificat.ion.test data was not available for t'WO Of the penetrations.

nie penetrations consist* of carbon 'steel pi.pe.canisters with stain--

less 'steel-headers welded to each end.

Header.flanges are later welded to the. containment liner.

Identical hermetically glass sealed multipin connectors are ~elded *to each header for the low voltage AC and the DC penetrations.

The. medium voltage penetrations :.*use. hermetically sealed ceramic bushings welded to eac~ *header for a *single cond.uc tor to. pass*

through.* Each penetration is sealed at each* of tiJo *header plates pro-*

viding a double barrier against leakage..

Tne het:"'!Xletically gla~s sealed multipin connectors are qualified to service to 57S°F (302°C) for 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> per MIL-C-5015. 1. This temperature is the limiting te:nperature used in sections 3.1 and 3.3.

The medium voltage AC penetrations were tested by Bechtel (Refer:-

ence 6).

A three-phase, 2400 VAC source supplied 61,000 rms symetrical amperes for bet-ween six and ten eye les to the penetra tiori without dam-

. age.

However, the butyl rubbe:-. insulation of the wire passing through th.e ceramic bushing provides a limiting temperature.

This insulation

  • will melt at approxUiately 2so°F. Cl20°C).. This temperature was assigned as the limiting tempe:-ature used in sectio~ 3.2.
  • In supplying the value of the maximum* short circuit current avail-abl~ (Isc)' CPC ~uppli~d values f6r a bolted fault (three-phase on AC

system); this_ type being able to s_upply the mos.t hea'.t into the*

penetration* *

  • The following forcula (Reference 7) was used r:o determine r::-ie :ime allowed for a* short circuit before the* penetration temperature wo.uld e.xceed it.s qualification value.*

where t

=

I

=

SC A

=

T

=

. l

=

  • [fJ2.*

0.0297. [Tz +

~~:]

t =

log Tl +

0.0297 A 2 ~ *r

+ 2341

.. 2 t =

I2 log T

+ 234 l

SC

  • Time allowed for the short circuit -- seconds Shor.t circuit current -- *amperes C.onducto:r area -

circular mils Maximum operating temperature.(140°c, LOCA condition)

. Maximum short circuit temperature (limiting.

.* temperature supplied by CPCL (For.irilla 1)

This is based upon the heating effect of the short circuit current.

on the conductors.

Under accident conditions, a peak te!!lperature of 283°F (140°c)

  • is expected for* the Palisades plant.

This figure* is used for T 1 in Formu.la 1, accounting for an elevated conductor temperatU-re caused by pre-existing current.flow.and above normal amb{ent 'temperature.

\\

3. l Tv'Oical Low Voltage (0-1000 VAC) Penetration.

This penetra-tion has t!'l2 conductors.*ar.d is rated by the manufacturer. for a full-load*

current of 14 amperes and for a short circuit of 1,500 amperes.for three cycles.

The Circuit identified is power to the motor-operated 4

. pressurizer relief is.olatio~ valve, Mo~1042A-480AC. The. source can*

supply 41,7 ~peres at*the penetration*due to a bolted fault.'

lr: *is CalCulated

  • chac the ti~e for. :he P~.ne:-~acion conductot"s to reach )'02°c from an initial 140°c (assu?.ied connector tei:iperature under a LOCA environment) i.s 1.14 *seconds.

The circuit bre.aker curves supplied by CP.C show that the primary circuit breaker clears the maximum I

  • instantaneously

.019 second SC

. per IEEE* Standard 242:-1.975, Table 33 (Reference 8) ; and ~hat any cur-rents ~bove 12 amperes.* is cleared within this same time.

They also show that. the s*~*condary *circuit. breaker takes a minimum of* 200 seconds to clear the fault should the primary circuit breaker fail; the secon-dary circuit b,reaker doe.s not clear any fault of less than 400 amperes.

3.Ll. Low Voltage Penetration Conclusion.

With an initial

.penetration temperat:ure. of 140°C (the peak LOCA containment:

temperature),* the containment elect:rical_ penet:-ation design for this low voltage penetr?tion is not in confo-nllance wit:h

  • th~ criteria d~scribe~ in Sectio~ 2.0 of t:hi.S ~eport for a three-phase fault.

3.2 Tvnical Medium*Volta2:e (>1000 VAC) Penetrat:ion.

CPC has identified the 4160 V. primary coolant pQ?!lp, P50A, *pe~etrations as typi-cal.

Two penetrations are used in parallel to supply t:he load.

Each penetration is constructed of 1,300 MO! copper conductor w/butyl rubber insulation. through the ceramic bushings described.in Section. 3.

These

  • have been tested (Ri!ference 6) to 6.1,000 amperes for a minimum of six cycl~~.

CPC has identified the total fault current from all ~ources co be 30,319 rms amperes symetrical and 44,870 rms amperes asymetrical.

The breaker curves supplied by CPC show that at the maximum I SC the primary air Circuit breake:- **ill tri? instantaneously (total clear-ing time,.075 second) and the secondary air circuit breaker.n.11 clear the fault indepencient1y in ~33 second.

9 e

3.2.l Medium Voltag~ Penetra::ion Evaluation. With an.initial assum~d conductor*temperature*equal to the peak LOCA contain-me.nt tempe,ratur.e J 140°c), the butyi rubber. ini::l~tion will already have* exceeded the pene era ti on te!:lpe"::"a::u:-e limit since thi~ i~sulati.on. is rated for service t~ l20°C;.the penetra-tions do no_t.. conform to the requirements described in Sec-*

tiori 2.0 of this tepo~t~

  • While parallel conductors are recognized and. al lowed by the National Electric Code, it is not advis*able with these pene-trations.* _Should a line.break occur without. faultin~ 1

. the single remaining. penetration does not then conform* to the criteria d*escribed in Section 2.0 of this report.*

3.3 Typical Direct Current Penetr~tion *. The penetratio~ identi-fied by CPC as typical for this type ha; #1/0 conductors and is par~ of the circuit powering the bearing oil lift.pump, P_81B.

CPC rates the full-load circuit capability of this penetration at 76 amperes, and also supplied the manufacturer rating* of 15,000 short circuit amperes for _three cycles (.05 seco~d) ~, The circuit can siJpply 2405 amperes into-a short circuit at*the penetration; It is calculat_ed that, with an initia~ conductor temperature of 0

140 C (the peak containment te?nperature under LOCA conditions),

.8.95 seconds* elapse between the occurrence of a fault condition and when* the conductor temperature reaches 575°1", the qualification temperature of the penetration.

The circuit breaker* cur.;es* supplied by CPC sh.ow that the.primary circuit breaker* clead the maximum t instantaneously.* 019 second

. SC per IEEE Standard 242-1975, Table 33 (Reference 8).

The curves also show*that the secondary circuit breaker takes between 22 and 72 seconds to clear the same f_aul t current.

Fault currents of les*s :nagnitude show that the secondary circuit breaker ~oes.~ot clear a fault fast enough to prevent damage to the ~enetration seal, and that the primary circuit

6.
e.

e breaker does no.t. Clear a current* of less. that 450. amperes.

Above:

  • . 450 amperes, the primary circuit breaker clears the fault before c:l.amage.

to th~ penetration seal occurs.

3.3.1 Direct Current Penetration Evaluation~ With an initial 0

t'~mperature of the penetradon at 140 C as e:<pectec with a LOCA.condition,.this penetration does r. -,t *conform to. the cri-.

teri~ destribed in Section 2.0 of ~his ~epdrt.

4.0.

SUMMARY

This evaluation. looks at the capability of the circuit protective devices to prevent exc_eedin'g. the design ratings *of the selected penetrations in the event of (a:) a LOCA event,.(b). a fault current through the pen~trati~n, and simultaneously (c) a random failure of the circuit protective devices to clear the fauit.

The environmental qual-ification tests of *the penetrations is the subject *of SEP Topic III-12.

With a LOCA environment inside containment, none of* the p~ne t!.'a-

  • tions conform.to the criteria desc~ibed in*Section 2.0 of this report.

The. iow voltage AC and the DC ;>enetradons *do :not cqmply with the s~e criteria regardless of the initial assumed temperature, as the opera-ting time of th.e backup circuit breakers is excessive.

The peak expec-ted temperature of a LOCA environment exceeds the qualification limit of the medium voltage AC penetration.

Should one penetra~ion of the penetrat{on pair used with the pri-inary coolant pump have an open circuit in* one of its three conductors, the normal operating current for the RCP would cause the *remaining penetration to exceed the conductor temperature limit within 2.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at an initial pene~;ation temperature o~ 6Q 0c:

This condition occurs

  • .because the breaker protective setpoints disregard the* fact that the use of one feeder to supply the RCP will cause conductor and penetra-tion overheating and there is no pro~ision to monitor the integrity of

.the parallel conductors.

7

The review of Topi.c III-12' "Environuiental Qualification," may re.sul t in changes to the electrical penetration des fgn and therefore, the resolution of the subject SE? topic '1lay be def.er':'ed to.the inte-grated assessment, at....... hich ti:ne, any :-e'quirements. i:nposed as a result of this review ~ill t~ke into consideration design changes resulti~g from other topics *

. 5.O. REFERENCES

1.

David P. Hoffman, Docket Nos *. 50-155 and 50-255; Li*censes DPR-6 and DPR-20, Palis~des and Big Rock Point Plants; Electric Penetra-tions of Reactor.Containment, SEP Topic VIII-4, March 19, 1979, CPC letter.

2.
  • General Design Criterion 16, "Containment Design" of Appendix A; "Gen~ral Design Cri tei:ia of Nuclear Power Plant.s ~" 10 CFR Part SO, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Oti lization Facilities."
3.

Nuclear*Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan, Section 8.3.1,

  • "AC Power Systems. (Onsi.teL"
4.

Regulatory Guide 1.63, Revision 2, "Electrical.Penetration Assem-blies in Containment Structures for Light-Wate.r-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."*

5.

IEEE Standard 317-1976,* "IEEE.Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

  • . 6.

Bechtel Test Report,.PO 5935-E-20:..Ac,_ Report No. 7, January 14, 1969.

7.

IP CEA Publication P-32-382, ".Short Circuit Characteristics of Insulated Cable."

8

. e

, PALISADtS XV-16 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF SMALL LINES CARRYING PRIMARY COOLANT OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

  • I. INTRODUCTION.

Rupture of. lines carrying primary c.oolant outside contai.iment can allow primary coolant and the.radioactivity contained therein to escape to.the environment.* SEP Topic X~-16 is intended tc>'revie~ the radiol.ogical_

consequences of such.failures~ *The review_ of this topic. encompassed

  • .those. lines which carry primary co*olant outside containment during.power

. operation.

The scope include~ those lines tha~ are not.normally expected to be open to the primary system but can be opened during power operation (i.e.' reactor coolant sample lines, instrument lines, etc. r~

II. REVtEW CRITERION All_ sma 11 1 i nes carrying primary coo.l ant outside con~ainment were ~evi ewed

,I,

. to ensure that any release. of radioactivity: frorri their postulated failure

.*was a small fraction of the 10 CFR Part.100 exposure guidelines.

Small

    • fraction is defined in th~ SRP to be no more than 10% of the 10 CFR Part
  • 100 exppsure guidelines.

III. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES Lines-which we.re excluded frorirthe review included lines in which interlocks

  • .. prevent openi'ng during power operation such as the PWR res i 9ua 1. heat rernova 1.

lines.* These lines are.covered by two SEP Topics, V-10.B, nRHR System Reliability" and V-11.B,' '~RHR Interlock.Requirements".

The review also did not consider large. pipes carrying primary system fluid outside containment such as the main steam and feedwater lines of-a BWR~ These lines are consid-ered in SEP TopicslII-5.* B, "Pipe Br_eaks Outside. Containment" and XV-18,

  • "Radiological Consequences of Main Steam Line.Failure Outside Containment"~

.2 IV. REVIEW GUIDELINES

. The review ~asconductediri accordance with SRP 15.6.2.

The licensee w~s requested to provide. plant specific information such as the identification o-f lines covered by this.Topic,= the size of these lines, b:.:eak locations and flow; etc.

The licensee responded to-this request in a letter dated May 6,.

1980.

V. EVALUATION.

A review ofthe May 6, 1980, Consumers.Power submittal, as well as an in"".

dependent* review of all lines connecteddireC:tly to the primary system, was' conducted.

The analysis ass.urned that all the.iodine contained in the leak.ed c*oolant was released directly to the auxiliary building atmosphere~ bper-.

ator action to isolate breaks was assumed to occur after a=20 miriutedelay.

The primary coolant. activity was set at the Palisades Technical Specification equilibrium-limits cif lr-Gi/gm I:-131 dose equivalent and gross activity of 100/E.,,..Ci/gm. *The assumed primary coolant loss is within the rilakeLlp*

capability of the ~harging system ~nd th~ time.required to iso)ate the break (20 minutes) is relatively short producing no-significant reactor depressur-ization and no change in power level.

As a result*, no iodine spike.was assum-ed t6 occu~ A flow rate of 133 gpm was selected because it bOUDded the break flows for all the small lines penetrat1ng containment which are connect-ed directly to. the primary system.

The analysis did not take credit for plant features. that could,potentjally result tn much earlier break detection and, therefore; earlier isolation and consequent dose reduction.

For example,.

one cf the li.n~s analyzed for breaks, the letdown line in th~ Chemical

  • Volurr:~ and Control System (CVCS), has an automatic isolation *feature on high letda..{n tem;:ierature as 1-i'ell as eves alarms such as high flo\\'/ or low discharge press~re of flow at the outlet bf the charging pumps which may result in break isolation e~rlier *than assumed..

~ ** ',:.L.:

3 vr.*coNCLUSIONS Using the assumptions out 1 i ned above*, the resultant thyroid and whole body doses, 1. 8 rem and O~ 2 *rem, respectively, are be 1 ow the 10%.of ~he 10 CFR.Part 100 exposure guidelines and, therefore, comply with the SRP criteri.on.

  • .1.

,i

. REFERENCES

1.

Palisades FSAR

2.

Palisades Technical Specificatiori 3.1

. 3.

Letter, O. P. Hoffman to O.

M~ Crutchfield,*dated May 6, )980,**

"R~spons~ to SEP Topic XV-16"

..,

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