ML18043A387
| ML18043A387 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1978 |
| From: | Hunter D, Jorgensen B, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18043A385 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-78-25, NUDOCS 7901120007 | |
| Download: ML18043A387 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000255/1978025
Text
L
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.
50-255/78-25
Docket No.
50-255
Licensee:
Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI
49201
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Plant
License No.
Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI and Consumers Power
Company, Jackson, MI
Inspection Conducted:
October 16-20, 1978
RFW F--
Inspectors:
D. R. Hunter
11-2...'f-?e
RFW ~
B. L. Jorgensen
11-e9. 'B
RFW~
Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2
II- 2'1*7~
Inspection Summary
Inspection on October 16-20, 1978 (Report No. 50-255/78-25)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of licensee actions
on previous inspection findings, plant operations, licensee review
and audit programs, quality assurance items, procurement, maintenance,
independent inspection effort, followup on outstanding inspection
items, and reportable events.
The inspection involved 79 inspector-hours
onsite and in the licensee's corporate offices by two inspectors.
Results:
Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent items of non-
compliance were identified in five areas.
Four items of noncompliance
were identified in the other areas (infraction - failure to implement
procedure - paragraph 3.c; deficiency - failure to perform surveillance-
paragraph 3.d; infraction - failure to complete technical audit program -
paragraph 4c; and deficiency -
improper implementation of quality
assurance requirements for procurement - paragraph 6.b.)
790112000,
1.
DETAILS
Persons Contacted
a.
Corporate Offices
- F. Buck.man, Director, Nuclear Activities Department (NAD)
- D. Noble, Director, Operating Services Department (OSD)
- D. Bixel, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
- L. Hausler, Administrator, Construction Coordination (OSD)
K. Andrews, Supervisor, Laboratory Technical Services
G. Ridge, Supervisor, System Protection
J. Fremeau, Administrator, Operations Quality Assurance
D. Hoffman, Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator
S. Cashell, Licensing Analyst - Palisades
- Present at management interview October 18, 1978.
The inspectors also interviewed several members of the
engineering and technical staffs of the Nuclear Activities
Department, Operating Services Department, Laboratory
Technical Services, and System Protection.
b.
Palisades Plant
- J. Lewis, Plant Superintendent
- H. Keiser, Operations Superintendent
- K. Berry, Technical Superintendent
- G. Hein, Maintenance Superintendent
- J. McVay, Administrative Supervisor
- R. Mccaleb, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- H. Plamer, Senior Engineer
G. Petitjean, Technical Engineer
E. Huss, Plant Stores Supervisor
J. Reinier, Quality Control Inspector
F. Butler, Instrumentation and Control Engineer
R. Vincent, Senior Engineer
E. Thompson, Shift Supervisor
A. Brookhouse, Shift Supervisor
J. Richter, Control Operator
T. Richards, Control Operator
- Present at management exit interview October 20, 1978.
The inspectors also contacted several other members of the
plant technical, operations, maintenance, and administrative
staffs.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items
(Closed) IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-08 - unresolved item:
Qualification of the containment connector seal washers/0-rings.
(Paragraph 8).
3.
Plant Operations
The inspectors reviewed selected facility records and general
plant operating conditions to ascertain the plant was being
operated in accordance with the requirements.
a.
Shift Supervisor Log, October 1978.
b.
Control Room Logbook, October 1978.
c.
Reactor Logbook, October 1978.
(1)
The review revealed that following a plant trip on
October 17, 1978, (due to the loss of a main feed
pump), a reactor system pressure decrease occurred
and the operating crew blocked safety injection
after the "BLOCK PERMISSIVE" was received at 1690 psia
decreasing.
The safety injection system "BLOCK" was
automatically removed after approximately seven (7)
minutes as the system pressure recovered from a
minimum of 1610 psia.
Immediately prior to the reactor trip the reactor
operator emergency borated the RCS for a short period
of time.
After completing the normal operator
response to a plant trip, including verifying all
rods fully inserted, safety injection initiation was
"BLOCKED" as the primary coolant system pressure
continued to decrease below 1690 psia.
The momentary
plant cooldown to approximately 505°F and depressuriza-
tion to 1610 psia was caused by the continuation of
feedwater flow to the steam generators following the
A review of the transient by the licensee and inspectors
determined that with the reactor tripped and all rods
fully inserted at 500°F Tavg, the plant shutdown margin
was approximately 5.5 percent, well in excess of that
required by the accident analysis.
The calculated
shutdown margin at 60°F Tavg with all rods fully inserted
was approximately 2.8 percent, also in excess of the
requirements.
The licensee's approved operating procedures stipulate
when safety injection may be "BLOCKED".
According to
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(2)
procedures AS.9, Plant Cooldown from Hot Standby,
and SOP-1 step 6.1.6, Cooldown of Primary System
from Hot Hot Standby, boration to the cold shutdown
boron concentration is to be accomplished before
blocking the safety injection signal.
Procedure D4.l,
Reactor Trip, does not address blocking the safety
injection signal.
The failure to follow the
approved operating procedures, as required, is an
item of noncompliance pursuant to Technical Speci-
fication 6.8.1 and is an infraction.
(This matter
was discussed at the management exit).
The reactor log review also revealed that the operations
group was encountering difficulty maintaining certain
heat traced points for the chemical and volume control
system above the system alarm points of 135°F.
The
inspectors reviewed the auxiliary operator log sheets
for September and October 1978, and selected strip
charts for the temperature recorder associated with
the critical heat tracing system (TR-200) to insure
that the concentrated boric acid lines were being
maintained above 110°F.
The inspectors noted that
the temperature of the "B" boric acid transfer pump
and associated piping appeared to be routinely between
125°F and 135°F (17 times in September and October, 1978).
The log review revealed that the operators were routinely
operating the "B" boric acid transfer pump to return
the pump and piping to above 135°F.
The inspectors also noted that on September 7-8 and
October 16-17, 1978, the concentrated boric acid
gravity flow line had decreased below 135°F on several
occasions.
The inspectors verified that, during the periods
reviewed, no heat traced lines indicated below a
temperature of 110°F.
All concentrated boric acid
paths appeared to be operable, including the "A" and
"B" boric acid tanks, "A" and "B" boric acid transfer
pumps, emergency borate flow path, and the "A" and
"B" gravity flow paths.
(This matter was discussed
at the management exit).
d.
Selected Plant Recorders and Indications
The review revealed that the secondary rod position typer
had been removed from service during the swing shift
(4:00 p.m. - 12:00 p.m.) on October 18, 1978, and remained
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out-of-service until October 20, 1978.
The secondary typer
was being used in the place of the failed primary typer.
During the period the secondary typer was out-of-service
the comparison of the secondary rod position and the primary
rod position systems was not performed as required by the
Technical Specification, Table 4.1.3, item 3a (Shift Check,
SH-1).
The inspector verified that the rods were within
requirements on October 18, 1978, prior to removal of the
secondary typer.
The control rods had not been moved in the
interim period and no indications were received during opera-
tions from the power range instrumentation or the incore
power monitoring system of a drifting control rod.
The
failure to perform the shift checks, as required, is an
item of noncompliance and is a deficiency.
(This item was
discussed at the management exit).
e.
Plant Annunciators
f.
g.
The inspectors noted the continuation of the "BORIC ACID
HEAT TRACE TROUBLE" alarm and verified the continuation of
the ~hift survrfllance and status of the critical heat
tracing system- .
Control Room Manning and Shift Relief
Safety Related System Status
The inspectors noted that the 1-1 and 1-2 emergency diesel
generator (EDG) control switches were caution tagged to
indicate outstanding maintenance activities concerning the
1-1 EDG day tank and the 1-2 EDG air start motor.
The
inspector verified that both the emergency diesel generators
were operable.
h.
Shift and Relief Turnover
i.
Plant Housekeeping/Cleanliness
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Review and Audit
The inspectors reviewed the activities of the Safety and Audit
Review Board (SARB) as evidenced by SARB meeting minutes for 1977.
In addition, conduct of technical audits of licensed activities
for the SARE was specifically examined.
1/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/77-17.
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a.
*---~-------
SARE activities were reviewed in comparison to Technical
Specification requirements concerning functions, composition
and qualifications, meeting frequency, review items, and
records.
No problem areas were identified.
b.
The licensee's technical audit program is controlled by
Technical Specification 6.5.2.8, which assigns responsibility
for conduct of these audits to the Operating Services Depart-
ment, with review by SARB.
The inspectors noted a revision
c.
of the licensee's Quality Assurance Program Procedure (QAPP)
18-51, Audits, dated December 23, 1977, which reassigns
responsibility for technical audits in some areas to the
Nuclear Activities Department.
This change in the assignment
of responsibility for technical audits requires further review.
The inspectors reviewed selected technical audit reports
for audits conducted in 1977, and discussed audit methods
and findings with those performing selected audits.
The
technical audit program was also reviewed for completeness.
The licensee's procedure (QAPP 18-51, Audits) describes
the auditing program areas which must receive at least one
audit per year.
This program is established to satisfy
Technical Specification provisions and license conditions.
QAPP 18-51 includes, as functional audit areas, both health
physics and reactor physics, among others.
The inspectors
noted no audits of health physics or reactor physics had
been performed in 1977, nor had the licensee formally recog-
nized this oversight and taken corrective action to complete
these audits in early 1978.
Failure to perform the specified
technical audits constitutes noncompliance with Technical
Specification 6.5.2.8.a and is an infraction.
The identified noncompliance was discussed during management
exit interviews at the licensee's corporate offices on
October 18, and at the plant site on October 20, 1978.
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Quality Assurance Items
The inspectors examined the licensee's program for control of
measurement and test equipment as specified in his Quality
Assurance Policy (QAP) and Procedures (QAPP's).
The examination
included a review of assignments of responsibility and authority,
procedural controls, and proper program implementation *
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a.
Control of measurement and test equipment, as it relates to
calibration and testing of portable plant instrumentation
and certain installed plant electrical relaying and trip
devices, is the responsibility of Laboratory Technical
Services.
Engineering development relating to electrical
relaying and trip setpoints is the responsibility of System
Protection.
Both these organizations were visited by the
inspectors; procedures and practices were reviewed and dis-
cussed with appropriate staff; and a brief tour of the
Laboratory Services facilities was conducted.
The review of the relay testing performed for the plant by
the System Protection and Laboratory Services group revealed
that the 480 volt AC switchgear and motor control center
magnetic and thermal overload trip devices had not been
tested, except during maintenance on a specific component,
since plant startup.
These trip devices require special
testing equipment which provides the actual trip current
to the breaker and trip unit.
(This matter was discussed
at the management exit).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Procurement
a .
General
The inspectors reviewed the following relating to procurement
of safety related components:
(1)
Procedures and practice for selection of suppliers
(2)
Processing of documentation
(3)
Receipt, inspection, and storage
(4)
Disposition of nonconforming items
b.
Procurement Document Review
Several procurment packages were reviewed in detail, including
packages relating to electrical, control rod drive, reactor
coolant, and steam systems.
These generally showed complete
conformance to quality assurance program requirements.
One
case was noted, however, where a number of components in a
large order were received onsite without copies of various
test results included as specified in the procurement documents.
Such components were initially held and a nonconforming
material report (NMR) issued for processing and disposition
of the components in question.
Use of the NMR system did
not appear well controlled in this case, resulting in the
following:
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"
c .
(1)
Mistaken acceptance of an item, missing a certified
material test report, on the basis of a dimensional
check having been performed.
(2)
An NMR missing from the procurement package being
referenced as the basis for acceptance of a component.
(3)
Rejection of a certified but undocumented component
based on performance of the required test in the field.
Further, several components (under Purchase Order No. 93282)
were accepted through the NMR system without acquiring test
data specified on the procurement document.
This prevents
an objective evaluation of conformance to acceptance criteria.
Criterion VII of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 requires evidence of
conformance to procurement documents to be available at
the power plant prior to installation or use.
The licensee's
failure to acquire the test data specified on the procurement
order is considered to be in noncompliance with Appendix B
and is a deficiency.
This matter was discussed at the plant
exit interview on October 20, 1978.
Storage of Safety-Related Items
The licensee has relocated his storage facilities in the past
year to space in a new building.
The storerooms were toured
and the inspectors checked proper storage, organization and
cleanliness.
Storage of2¥iping and tubing with ends capped
was specifically check39-
and found satisfactory.
Some
holes were again noted-=-
in the plastic coverings for eves
filter assemblies.
This was corrected and checked prior to
completion of the inspection.
Finally, the inspectors noted
ovens for storage of weld rods intended for use in safety-
rela ted systems were not provided with temperature indicators
to show continuous temperature in the required range.
Since
the licensee has no reheat capability onsite, these ovens are
relied on to maintain moisture control.
(The storeroom items described above were discussed at the
plant management exit interview)
7.
Maintenance
The inspectors reviewed selected maintenance activities to assure
that the activities were conducted in accordance with the require-
ments.
The activities reviewed included:
2/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/77-14.
J/ Ibid.
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a.
77-MSS-106-05, Steam Generator Recirculation System.
b.
77-NMS-102, Removal of NMS Drawer 06 for Overhaul.
c.
77-SWS-28-07, Service Water Valve, CV-0823.
d.
77-SWS-37-06, Service Water Pump Repair.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Outstanding Inspection Items
4/
51
6!
71
81
The inspectors reviewed the following items to insure appropriate
action taken and completed by the licensee:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Containment Penetrations Connector Sealing Washer/0-rings.!:/
The inspectors reviewed the documentation available for cer-
tification of the silicone sealing washers based on materials
and testing performed at Wyle Laboratories (STAN-07-78) and
letters from Bendix dated June 16, 1978, and July 11, 1978.
No further questions are required of this matter at this time
and this item is considered closed.
Fire Protection Supply to Auxiliary Feed Syste~/
The licensee has included the manual flow path from the fire
protection system to the suction header of the auxiliary
feed pumps in the Section XI testing program.
No further
questions are required of this matter at this time.
(This
matter was discussed at the management exit).
Surveillance of the Auxiliary Feedpump Room~/ ]_/
The licensee has established a required inspection each shift
of the auxiliary feed pump room based on the previous inspec-
t ion findings.
This item will remain open pending completion
of the review by IE.
(This matter was discussed at the manage-
ment exit.)
Plant Procedures~/
The inspector reviewed the status of certain plant procedure
revisions which were deemed necessary following certain plant
events (The matter was discussed at the management exit).
(1)
Plant cooldown without primary coolant pumps available.
The licensee is preparing a procedure for boration and
cooldown with a total loss of offsite power.
IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-08.
IE inspection Report No. 50-255/78-13.
Ibid.
IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/78-22.
IE Inspection Report No. 50-255/ 77-14.
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(2)
Loss of feedwater systems.
The licensee is preparing a
procedure for removal of decay heat from the reactor
core via the steam generators utilizing the available
water sources, including auxiliary feedwater, condensate,
and fire protection water.
This matter will remain open pending completion of the procedures
by the licensee.
9.
Reportable Events
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions concerning the
following nonroutine event reports to verify the events were
reviewed and evaluated, corrective actions taken, and plant limits
not exceeded.
The review included selected PRC minutes, records,
and personnel interviews.
a.
LER 78-23, Stearn Generator Tube Differential Pressure of
1380 psi.
An independent review of the event and the licensees
evaluation has been conducted by RIII.
No further questions
are required of this matter at this time and this item is
considered closed.
b.
LER 78-31, CRDM-39 Inoperable.
~
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Management Exit Interview
a.
Corporate Office
A management exit interview (attended as noted in paragraph l.a)
was conducted in the licensee's corporate office on October 18,
1978.
The inspector identified the areas inspected (quality
assurance and review/audit items) and sununarized the findings.
Two items of noncompliance identified in the area of technical
audits (paragraph 4) were specifically discussed.
b.
Palisades Nuclear Plant
A management exit interview (attended as noted in paragraph l.b)
was conducted at the plant following completion of the inspec-
tion on October 20, 1978.
The following items were discussed,
with licensee responses as noted:
(1)
The inspectors sununarized the scope and findings, including
identified noncompliances, for the portion of the inspection
conducted at the licensee's corporate offices.
(Paragraphs
4 and 5)
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.l
'
( *
(2)
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' remarks con-
cerning lack of routine testing of the fixed thermal
and magnetic trip devices in the 480 volt AC electrical
equipment.
The inspectors noted this matter would be
reviewed further by IE.
(Paragraph 5)
(3)
The inspectors stated and the licensee acknowledged the
apparent item of noncompliance relating to the "block"
of safeguards system automatic actuation outside procedural
controls.
(Paragraph 3.c)
(4)
The inspectors stated the apparent item of noncompliance
concerning failure to perform shiftwise comparison checks
of secondary rod position indications against primary
position indication.
The licensee noted the deviation
alarm for single-rod drift had remained available and
that all rods except those in group 4 (controlling) were
maintained at their upper electrical limit.
(Paragraph 3.d)
(5)
Boric acid heat tracing system problems were discussed.
The licensee stated plans are being made to modify and/or
replace the heat tracing system during the next refueling
outage, and that boric acid line, tank and pump tempera-
tures would be maintained during the interim period.
(Paragraph 3. c)
(6)
The inspector stated the apparent item of noncompliance
with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B relating to procurement of
safety-related components and equipment.
(Paragraph 6)
(7)
The inspectors discussed items noted during inspection
of plant stores, including pipe capping, eves filter
protection, and weld rod moisture protection.
The
licensee indicated positive means of assuring continuous
weld rod protection would be considered.
(Paragraph 6)
(8)
The licensee stated preparation of procedures for cool-
down without primary coolant pumps and for loss of
feedwater (pursuant to previous commitments) was nearly
complete.
(Paragraph 8.d)
(9)
The licensee stated valves in the fire protection supply
to the auxiliary feedwater pump suction had been added
to hisSection XI checklist (inservice inspection program)
and the flow path would be verified.
(Paragraph 8.b)
(10)
The licensee stated shiftwise auxiliary feedwater (AFW)
pump room surveillance had been established and was
being documented.
Further, installation of a level alarm
to detect AFW pump room flooding will be considered.
(Paragraph 8.c)
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