ML18038B383

Provides Suppl Info Re BFN Unit 3 Conformance w/NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation Dependability & 10CFR50,App J, Primary Reactor Cl Testing. Informs of Minor Corrections to Corresponding Unit 2 Se,

ML18038B383
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	08/03/1995
From:	Salas P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-TM TAC-M74615, TAC-M74616, NUDOCS 9508100209
Download: ML18038B383 (14)

Text

PRXORXTY 1 (ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSZNG)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR.9508100209 DOC.DATE: 95/08/03 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g

FACIL:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 P

50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SALAS,P-Tennessee Valley Authority R

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

I

SUBJECT:

Provides suppl info re BFN Unit 3 conformance w/NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2p "Containment Isolation Dependability" 10CFR50,App J, "Primary Reactor CL Testing.".Informs of minor corrections to corresponding Unit 2 SE,dtd 910322.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

A017D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR J ENCL I

SIZE:

k'ITLE:

OR Submittal:

Append J Containment Leak Rate Testing NOTES:

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3 WILLIAMS,J.

INTERNAL: ACRS NRR/DE/ECGB

. OGC/HDS3 EXTERNAL: NOAC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

0 1

1 6

6 1

1 1

1 1

1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3-PD FILE CENTE 01 RR DSSA SCSB RES/DE/SEB NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECZPZENTS-PLEASE HELP US 'TO REDUCE WASTE!

CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL

DESK, ROOM OWFN 5DS (415-2083)

TO ELZMZNATE YOUR NAME FROM DZSTRZBUTZON LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DONsT NEED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 16 ENCL 15

~ h

~

i

Tennessee Valfey Authority, Post Office Box 2000. Oecatur. Alabama 35609 August 3, 1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos.

50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

UNITS 2 AND 3 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CONFORMANCE WITH NUREG-0737'TEM II.E.4' AND 10 CFR 50I APPENDIX J (TAC NOS M74615 AND M74616)

This letter provides supplemental information regarding BFN Unit 3 conformance with NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation Dependability, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing.

TVA is also informing NRC of minor corrections to the corresponding Unit 2 Safety Evaluation, dated March 22,

1991, for the Control Air System, Main Steam Line, Radiation Monitoring System, and Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water containment isolation valves.

The actua plant configuration of these containment isolation valves should not invalidate the previous staff conclusions contained in the Unit 2 Safety Evaluation.

NRC requested information regarding Unit 3 compliance with NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, in its May 5, 1992, letter to TVA.

TVA initially responded by letter dated September 1,

1992, by providing the anticipated containment isolation configuration at the time of the restart of Unit 3 and committed to notify NRC of any changes.

This letter completes that commitment.

The preliminary information was the basis for the NRC's January 6,

1995 Safety Evaluation that addressed the differences between Units 2 and Unit 3.

<<GGQ39 950810020'P tst50803 PDR ADOCK 05000260 P

PDR

4k

.r

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2

August 3, 1995 The enclosure contains a summary of differences between the containment isolation configuration for BFN Unit 3 not previously cited in the Unit 3 Safety Evaluation and the Unit 2 configuration previously reviewed by NRC.

For each

system, a summary of the Unit 2 configuration is provided and differences between Unit 2 and the Unit 3 configuration are identified.

Changes to the Unit 2 containment isolation configuration performed subsequent to NRC review under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 are also noted.

There are no new commitments contained in this letter. If you have any questions, please contact me at (205) 729-2636.

Sincere y

Salas Manager of Site Licensing cc (Enclosure):

Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Mark S. Lesser, Acting Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637

Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. J.

F. Williams, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

~ V+

I ~

g

~

~

ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

UNITS 2 AND 3.

SUPPLEMENTAL ZNFORMATZON FOR CONFORMANCE 'WZTH NUREG-0737'TEM ZZ.Eo4.2 AND 3.0 CFR 50'PPENDIX iT BACKGROUND On May 5, 1992 (Reference 1),

NRC requested information describing the differences in containment piping penetration design and testing between the three BFN units.

TVA initially responded by letter dated September 1,

1992 (Reference 2), by providing the anticipated containment isolation configuration at the time of the restart of Uni;t 3 and committed to notify NRC of any changes.

This letter completes that commitment.

In view of the comprehensive review performed in support of Unit 2., the NRC's January 6,

1995 Safety Evaluation of Unit 3 (Reference 3) was limited to the differences between Units 2 and 3.

The following is a summary of differences between the containment isolation configuration for BFN Unit 3 not previously cited in the Unit 3 Safety Evaluation and the Unit 2 configuration reviewed by NRC as documented in their Safety Evaluation Reports (Reference 4, Enclosure 2, Section 3.2 and References 5 and 6).

For each system, a summary of the Unit 2 configura'tion is provided and differences between Unit 2 and the Unit 3 configuration are identified.

Changes to the Unit 2 configuration that were performed subsequent to NRC review under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 are also noted.

In addition, a

correction is provided to the Unit 2 Safety Evaluation, dated March 22, 1991, for the Control Air System containment isolation valves.

UNIT 2/3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CONFIGURATION COMPARISON AUXILIARYBOILER SYSTEM In the NRC reviewed configuration for Unit 2, the Auxiliary Boiler System, Penetration 210A, was classified as a

non-essential system.

Penetration 210A had two simple check valves and a block valve, all located outside containment, as isolation barriers.

These valves were Appendix J tested.

Since that time, the Auxiliary Boiler System was modified for both Units 2 and 3 to remove the check valves and install a cap on the system.

The Auxiliary Boiler System no longer requires Appendix J testing.

4k 4i

CONTAINMENT INERTING For Unit 2, Hydrogen sample, Penetrations

'52C, 229D and 229K, are classified as a non-essential system.

Penetrations

52C, 229D and 229K have two outboard solenoid operated gate valves as isolation barriers.

These valves close upon receipt of a Group 6 isolation signal.

These valves are Appendix Z tested.

For Unit 3, the same valve types, failure modes, isolation

schemes, power supplies, and Appendix J testing methods are used for the Hydrogen sample line.

However, Unit 3 used new Penetrations X-229N and X-229P instead of Penetrations X-229D and X-229K, respectively.

CONTROL AIR SYSTEM For Unit 2, the Control Air System, Penetration 48, is classified as a non-essential system.

This system has two air operated plug valves in series, located outside of containment.

The March 22, 1991 Safety Evaluation states that these valves utilize an air supply to open and a spring to close.

Further reviews have determined that these isolation valves utilize air to open and an integral air accumulator to assure valve closure on loss of air or loss of electrical power.

The valves receive a Group 6

isolation signal and are Type A and Type C tested.

For Unit 3, the same valve types, locations, failure modes, isolation schemes, power supplies, and Appendix J testing methods are used.

MAIN STEAM LINE/DRAIN For Unit 2, Main Steam Line, Penetration 7A-D, and Main Steam Drain, Penetration 8, are classified as non-essential systems.

The Main Steam Lines have two air-operated globe valves on each

line, one inside and one outside of containment.

The March 22, 1991 Safety Evaluation states that these valves utilize an air supply to open and a spring to close.

Further reviews have determined that these isolation valves utilize an air supply to open and air and a spring to close.

Upon loss of the air supply, the force generated by the closing springs will close the Main Steam Line valves.

The Unit 2 Main Steam Drain isolation valves are motor operated valves and fail "as is".

The power supplies for these normally closed valves are separate and diverse.

The isolation valves for the Main Steam Lines and Main Steam 'Drains receive a Group 1 isolation signal and are tested in accordance with Appendix J guidelines.

E-2

41

~

~

e For Qnit 3, the same locations, failure modes, isolation schemes, and power supplies are used.

However, flexible wedge gate valves are used on the Main Steam Line Drain valves compared to solid wedge gate valves on Unit 2.

The Unit 3 Main Steam Line Drain valves will be leak rate tested by applying the tes't.pressure between the wedges (compared to Unit 2, which is tested by applying pressure in the reverse direction against the solid wedge).

RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM For. Unit 2, Drywell Continuous Air Monitor, Penetrations 50A and 50D, are classified as a non-essential system.

The containment isolation valves close upon receipt of a Group 6 isolation signal and are Appendix J tested.

The Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) states that Penetrations 50A and D have two outboard motor operated ball valves as isolation barriers.

As shown below, Penetrations 50A and D each have a single inboard valve and a common outboard valve.

As Described in SER Actual Penetrations 50A and 50D have also been mod'ified to use solenoid operated gate valves instead of ball valves as isolation barriers.

For Unit 2, Drywell Continuous Air Monitor discharge, Penetration 50C, is classified as a non-essential system.

Penetration 50C has also been modified to use solenoid operated gate valves instead of ball valves.as isolation barriers.

These valves close upon receipt of a Group 6 isolation signal and are Appendix J tested.

For Unit 3, the same valve types, locations, failure modes, isolation schemes, power supplies, and Appendix J testing methods are used.

E-3

4l

~

J

~

~

li

~

~

P REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER'RBCCW),

For Unit 2, the RBCCW system, Penetrations 23 and 24, is classified as a non-essential system.

These valves are Appendix J tested.

The NRC's Unit 2 Safety Evaluation states that Penetration 23, RBCCW return, has an outboard remote-manually operated gate valve and Penetration 24, RBCCW

supply, has an outboard check valve.

The penetration numbers should have been reversed.

The RBCCW supply line uses, Penetration 23.

The RBCCW return line uses Penetration 24.

For Unit 3, the same valve types, locations, failure modes, isolation schemes, power supplies, and Appendix J testing methods are used.

REFERENCES 1 ~

2 ~

3.

NRC letter to TVA, dated May 5,

1992, Request for Additional Information to Review Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1

and 3, Compliance with NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2 and 10 CFR. 50, Appendix J TVA letter to NRC, dated September 1,

1992,

Response

to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Units 1 and 3

Conformance With NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J NRC letter to TVA, dated January 6,

1995, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 3 NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation Dependability NRC letter to TVA, d'ated March 22,

1991, Issuance of Amendment and Compliance,Revi.ew of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J and TMI Item II.E.4.2.1-4 5.

NRC letter to TVA, dated May 11, 1992, Safety Evaluation Pertaining to Discrepancies in Previous Safety Evaluation for Amendment 193 6.

NRC letter to TVA, dated April 10,

1991, Issuance of Amendment (TS 284)

E-4

II

~

0.

'4