ML18038A249
| ML18038A249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1987 |
| From: | Beratta J, Mangan C, Volza P NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| (NMP1L-0145), (NMP1L-145), PROC-870413-01, NUDOCS 8704200354 | |
| Download: ML18038A249 (258) | |
Text
REGULATORY -GRADATION DISTRlBUTION SY l') (R IDB)
ACCESSION NBR: 8704200354 DOC. DATE,: 87/03/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-220 Nine Nile Point Nuclear Station. Unit 1> Niagara Pave 05000220 AUTH. NANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION VQLZA, P. Niagara Nohawk Power Corp.
BERATTA> J. P. Niagara Nohawk Power Corp.
CANCAN> C. U. Niagara Nohawk Power Corp.
REC IP. NAI'1E RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUB JEC: Emer encg action procedure ii re 1 5 emergency plan mentin ro educe 20'e 9 DISTR I UT I DE: A001
-g-COPIES 7 R D: LTR < ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Submittal: General Distribution NOTES:
I I REC P ENT COPIEB RECIPIENT COP IEB ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/MANE LTTR ENCL PD1-1 l A 1 0 PD1-1 PD 5 5 KELLY' 1 1 INTERNAL: ARN/ARcF/LFNB 1 0 NRR/DEBT/ADE 1 NRR/DEBT/ADS 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/TBB 1
- ILRB OGC/HDB1 1 0 REO F LE 1 1 01'PDR EXTERNAL: EQQQ ERUEKE S 1 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 TOTAL NUNBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTl R 19 ENCL 16
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Y NIAGARA NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWER CORPORATION/301 PLAINFIELDROAD, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13212/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 10CFR50, Appendix E, Section V April 13, 1987 (NMP1L 0145)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Docket No. 50-220 DPR-63 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is an uncontrolled copy of each of the following emergency procedures relating to the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station:
Emergency Action Procedure 1, Revision 5 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 20, Revision 9 These emergency procedure revisions are submitted as required in Section V to Appendix E of 10CFR Part 50. Two controlled copies have been provided to the Region I office and one controlled copy has been provided to the Resident Inspector under separate cover.
Very truly yours, NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION j'.
V. Mang Senior. Vice President CDH/pns 0477b-1 .
Enclosure xc: Regional Administrator, Region I Mr. J. Zwolinski, Project Director Mr. W. A. Cook, Resident Inspector Mr. T. Chwalek t
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NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO. EAP-1 ACTIVATION AND DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY PLAN DATE AND INITIALS APPROVALS SIGNATURES REVISION 5 REVISION 6 REVISION 7 Supervisor Radiological Support P. Volza
'" (zy f Station Superintendent NMPNS Unit 1 T. W. Roman Station Superintendent NMPNS Unit 2 GtlR5)
R. B. Abbott General Superint de Nuclear Genera~
T. J. Perkin Summar of Pa es REVISION 5 (Effective 3/19/87 )
PAGE DATE 1 March 1986 i,2-26 January 1987 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION THIS PROCEDURE NOT TO BE USED AFTER March 1989 SUBJECT TO PERIODIC REVIEW.
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8704200354 870319 PDR *DOCK 05000220 F
EAP-1 ACTIVATION AND DIRECTION OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE
2.0 REFERENCES
3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.0 PROCEDURE 3 SSS 4.2 Site Emergency Director PZGURES SSS Checklist 2 Site Emergency Director Checklist - TSC 10 s Emergency Announcements 18 4 Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan 21 (Flowchart and Table)
Site Emergency Director's Checklist EOF or AEOF EAP-1 -i January 1987
f
~ ~
EAP -1 ACTIVATION AND DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY PLAN 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide the person with overall responsibility for emergency events at the NMpNS, namely the Site Emergency Director, with the necessary instructions and guidance to adequately and effectively control the emergency response effort .
Since this procedure provides guidance it is not necessary that all steps be performed in precisely the order listed as long as they are performed in a reasonable and prudent time frame.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
2.2 EPP-1 "Radiation Emergencies" 2.3 EPP-2 "Fire Fighting'PP-3 2.4 "Search and Rescue" 2.5 EPP-4 "Personnel Injury or Illness" 2.6 EPP-5 "Station Evacuation" 2.7 EPP-6 "Inplant Emergency Surveys" 2.8 EPP-7 "Downwind Radiological Monitoring" 2.9 EPP-13 "On-Site Emergency Facilities Operations"
- 2. 10 EPP-15 "Health Physics Procedure" 2'.ll EPP-19 "Site Evacuation Procedure"
- 2. 12 EPP-20 "Emergency Notifications" 2.13 EPP-22 "Damage Control" 2.14 EPP-25 "Emergency Reclassification and Recovery"
- 2. 15 EPP-26 "Protective Action Recommendations"
- 2. 16 EAP-2 "Classification of Emergency Conditions" 2.17 EPMP-3 "Review and Revision of Site Emergency Plari and Procedures" EAP-1 -1 March 1986
3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES In order to ensure the complete and appropriate handling of an emergency condition, the following position listing provides associated assignment responsibilities:
3.1 Site Emer enc Director 3.1.1 Evaluates plant conditions and declares emergency condition(s).
3.1 ~ 2 Implements the NMPNS Site Emergency Plan.
3.1.3 Responsibilities that the site Emergency Director may not delegate are:
- a. Classification of the emergency event as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.
b, Determining the necessity for a site evacuation.
c ~ Authorizing emergency workers to exceed normal radiation exposure limits.
3.1.4 Directs emergency response organization and assumes overall authority for control of the emergency situation until relieved by the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager.
3.1.5 Maintains responsibility for actual operation and control of the station, including tracking of initiating conditions. However, the following responsibilities are transferred to the Corporate Emergency Director/Recover Manager when this position is manned in the activated EOF:
a~ Making the decision to notify off-site emergency management agencies.
- b. Making protective action recommendations (PAR's) as necessary to off-site emergency management agencies.
3.2 Station Shift Su ervisor Affected Unit 3.2.1 Assumes the role of Site Emergency Director, until properly relieved.
3.2.2 Initiates the classification of emergency conditions based on available information.
3.2.3 Initiates and maintains communications with off-site authorities until TSC or EOF is staffed.
3.3 Unit 1 SSS 3.3. 1'f 2,
an emergency the Unit 1 condition exists which will effect both Units 1 and SSS shall be made aware of this condition and shall assume the role of Site Emergency Director, until properly relieved..
These initiating emergency conditions may include natural phenomenon such as earthquakes, floods, tornados and hurricanes. It may also include aircraft activity, explosions, radioactive off-site spills and/or transportation accidents involving radioactive material's, etc.
EAP-1 -2 January 1987
3.3.2 When the Unit 1 or Unit 2 SSS is notified that the JAFNPP has declared an alert or higher emergency, classification, they shall declare a sympathetic alert at their respective units. In this situation, the Unit 1 SSS shall become the Site Emergency Director for NMPNS, and Uni.t 1 shall be the lead in making all required offsite notifications; except that both Units 1 and 2 shall make initial notifications of the. sympathetic alert to the NRC.
4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 SSS Affected Unit (See EAP-1, Figure 1, "SSS Checklist" )
4.1.1 The Affected Unit Station Shift Supervisor, when informed of an emergency situation, is responsible for performing the assessment of the emergency (e.g., plant systems, reactor core and drywell status, '
and radiological conditions) of his/her respective unit.
4.1.2 The SSS shall evaluate what SOPs/EOPs need to be initiated to ensure the safe operation of the plant.
4.1.3 The SSS should use the Affected Unit Assistant SSS to aide and advise him on matters pertaining to the safe and proper operation of the plant with regards to nuclear safety. Performing the duties of a Shift Technical Advisor, the Assistant SSS should maintain independence from normal plant operations evaluations of plant operations and to advise or assist plant
'o make objective supervision in correcting conditions that .may compromise'he safety of operations.
4.1.4 The SSS shall assume the role of Site Emergency Director until relieved by the General Superintendent-Nuclear Generation, Acting General Superintendent-Nuclear Generation, or designee.
NOTE When the Unit 1 or Unit 2 SSS is notified of an Unusual Event emergency condition at JAFNPP which does not necessitate the activation of the NMPNS Emergency Plan, he P shall record all transmitted data and notify appropriate station management as necessary.
If the Affected Unit declares an Alert or higher emergency classification, the Unaffected Unit(s) will declare a Sympathetic ALERT. The Unaffected Unit(s) will make all notifications required by the Alert emergency classification, including the NRC. However, after the NRC is notified of the initial event, no continuing notifications (updates, follow-up) to the NRC is required.
(See EAP-l, Section 3.3.2 for actions if the JAFNPP declares an alert or higher emergency classification).
EAP-1 -3 January 1987
4.2 Site Emer enc Director (See EAP-l, Figure 2 "Site Emergency Director's Checklist TSC")
NOTE: During off-hours when the station is inaccessible, the arriving Site Emergency Director will proceed to the EOF or Alternate EOF (AEOF) and perform the steps shown in EAP-1, Figure 5, "Site Emergency Director's Checklist EOF or AEOF".
4.2. 1 Implement the appropriate portions of the Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures for the conditions at hand using EAP-1 Figure 4 "Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Implementation".
4.2.2 Classify and declare the emergency as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency using EAP-2 Attachments 1 and/or 2 Action Level Criteria for the Classification of Emergency Conditions. Make appropriate notifications to off-site organizations within approximately 15 minutes of the classification.
4.2.3 Have CSO sound station alarm (for an Unusual Event and Alert) or the station evacuation alarm (for a Site Area Emergency and General Emergency) in the merge mode, and announce in the merge mode, the emergency condition using announcements provided in EAP-1, Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements".
NOTE: Disregard alarm and announcements if already accomplished per Section 4.2.1.
4.2.4 If the station evacuation alarm is sounded or a precautionary staffing of the TSC, OSC and Control Room is underway, ensure proper staffing of emergency facilities and obtain qualified alternates per the approved personnel lists of EPMP-3 if necessary.
4.2.5 Determine whether protective actions for the general public should be recommended to State and local officials using EPP-26 within 15 minutes of classifying the event and periodically thereafter.
Determination should be based on information available at that time.
4.2.6 The Site Emergency Director or his designee will complete the Fact Sheet Part 1 (EPP-20, Figure 4a, Part 1 Notification Sheet) and will initiate Fact Sheet Parts 2 and/or 3 (EPP-20, Figures 4b, 4c and/or 4d), filling in on these sheets as much information as is available and appropriate.
NOTE: Part 2 and/or 3 of the Fact Sheet should be updated as information entered on the sheet changes and/or becomes available from the Affected Unit.
EAP-1 -4 January 1987
Notify Communications Coordinator to commence emergency contacts per EPP-20. If the designated Communications Coordinator is not immediately available, the Site Emergency Director will assign another individual to that position or will assume the duties himself until relieved by the designated 'individual.
NOTE: The Site Emergency Director is the only individual authorized to declare an emergency. The Site Emergency Director or the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager recommends protective actions to off-site authorities. The Communications Coordinator may relay these items of information from the Site Emergency Director or Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager . to
-off-site authorities.
Provide appropriate alarms and announcements to station personnel as necessary using EAP-1, Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements" in the merge mode.
NOTE: In addition to the normal escalation/de-.escalation alarms and announcements, provide status updates to station emergency personnel at an interval deemed appropriate.
Dispatch survey/sample teams through the Survey/Sample Team Coordinators if available, or assume duties until relieved-Evaluate plant status, survey results and effectiveness of emergency actions. As appropriate, redirect emergency actions and escalate, de-escalate or 'lose out emergency class per EPP-25, "Emergency.
Reclassification and Recovery".
Determine whether a Site Evacuation is appropriate and direct site
.evacuation activities per EPP-19.
Transfer overall emergency management authority to the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager (if available).
NOTE: The Site Emergency Director shall maintain overall responsibility for the operation and control of the station and of the actions performed by members of the on-si.te emergency organization (Staffing Level 2 of the Emergency Response Organization). He shall coordinate his activities with the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager.
In consultation with the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager (if available), periodically evaluate and assess the status of the emergency and effectiveness of emergency actions. As appropriate redirect emergency actions and/or escalate, de-escalate or close out the emergency class (refer to EPP-25, "Emergency Reclassification and Recovery" ).
EAP-1 -5 January 1987
If the emergency situation will be protracted or if extensive recovery operations will be required, consult with the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager to determine orgaqizational requirements. Consult with staff to assure a sufficient number of qualified personnel are available to staff key positions on a rotating basis. If more personnel are needed, arrange for such personnel through the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager from corporate headquarters, JAFNPP, INPO, contractors, etc. '(Refer to EPMP-3 for lists of qualified personnel.)
EAP-1 -6 January 1987
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION EAP-l, FIGURE 1 ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN SSS CHECKLIST Date SSS/SED Unit 1 Unit (circle one)
Initial/Time NOTE: This checklist assumes an off-hours emergency situation, in which all steps shall be performed (or at least reviewed for applicability). During normal. hours, the first eight (8) steps shall be performed; the remaining steps shall be performed (or at least reviewed for applicability) only if not immediately relieved as Site Emergency Director; the remaining steps should at least be reviewed with the Site Emergency Director after relieved.
1~ Evaluate the alarm(s) received with respect to other Control Room indicators.
2 ~ Direct initiation of any Special Operating Procedures or Emergency Operating Procedures required.
3 ~ Implement appropriate portions of the Site Emergency Implementing Procedures for the conditions at hand using EAP-1, Figure 4, "Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan"..
4~ Have CSO "merge" the Unit 81 and Unit 82 gaitronics system and announce condition to Station Personnel in accordance with emergency implementing procedures or EAP-1, Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements" as appropriate.
5~ Dispatch as appropriate teams for investigation, corrective actions, or observations, per emergency procedures (e.g.,
EPP-6, Inplant Surveys; EPP-7, Downwind Surveys; EPP-22, Damage Control).
- 6. Perform initial evaluation of conditions:
( ) If investigation/surveys/observations indicate conditions to be normal, have CSO make appropriate announcements per EAP-1, Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements" and stop here.
( ) If extent of emergency is not yet known, proceed with Step 7.
( ) If emergency is immediately identifiable, perform Steps 7, 8 and 9 and proceed with Step 13.
Assign an operator to act as your Communications Aide, if available.
EAP-1 -7 January 1987
EAP-1, FIGURE 1 (Cont.)
ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN SSS CHECKLIST Initial/Time
- 8. Check adequate volume of plant radios.
9 ~ Assign personnel ta perform surveys (inside and outside the station), and/or other investigations as necessary to provide for evaluation of conditions. Use appropriate
-protective clothing and respiratory equipment. (See EPP-6, 7, 15 and 22.)
- 10. Evaluate (or re-evaluate) conditions:
( ) Normal Conditions:
If the results of surveys, investigations, etc. indicate the corrective actions, activities to be local and easily corrected.
AND If instrumentation indicates an accidental release rate of less than Hi-Hi Alarm setpoints (Unit 1) or High Level Trip (Unit
- 2) ~
THEN Isolate local area (as necessary) and return station to normal operation. Notify Security and all contacts of termination of emergency situation. Announce termination using the Gaitronics in merge mode to Station personnel using EAP-1, Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements.
( ) Abnormal Conditions:
If the results of the surveys, investigations, corrective actions, etc. and Control Room instrumentation indicate a condition which is not readily corrected by operator action.
OR If the dose rate at the downwind unrestricted area (fence line) is greater than 2 mr/hr.
OR If there are indications of an accidental release rate greater than Hi-Hi Alarm setpoints (Unit 1) 'or High Level Trip (Unit 2), then proceed with Step 13.
EAP-1 -8 January 1987
EAP-1, FIGURE 1 (Cont.)
ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN SSS .CHECKLIST Initial/Time Evaluate Emergency Classification:
( ) Determine emergency classification using appropriate EAP-2, Figure, Action Level Criteria for Classification of Emergency Conditions.
(EAP-2, Figure 1 for Unit 1, or EAP-2, Figure 2 for Unit 2).
( ) Have CSO sound the station alarm (for an Unusual Event. or Alert) or the station evacuation alarm (for a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency) and announce the condition over the GAItronics in the merge mode per EAP-l, Figure .3, "Emergency Announcements". (Disregard this step if already accomplished per Step 4 or update if necessary.)
- 12. If a Station Evacuation is necessary:
( ) Instruct CSO to commence a station evacuation.
( ) Account for plant personnel and visitors using EPP-5, "Station Evacuation". Initiate EPP-3, "Search and" Rescue", if required.
( ) If notified that the computer accountability system is inoperative, instruct the CSO to make the appropriate 'AItronics announcement identified in EAP-1, Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements"', 83. "Computer Accountability System Inoperative".
r
( ) If notified by Security that the accountability report printout has been initiated, instruct the CSO to make the appropriate GAItronics announcement identified in EAP-1, Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements", 84. "Accountability Re P ort Printout Initiated".
- 13. Have an Operator initiate Control Room and Laboratory Counting Room Emergency Ventilation System, if appropriate/necessary.
- 14. Proceed with actions specified on EAP-1, Figure 2, "Site Emergency Director's Checklist-TSC" commencing with Step 8 until relieved as Site Emergency Director.
- 15. When relieved as Site Emergency Director, continue assessment and corrective actions as directed by and/or in consultation with the Site Emergency Director. Ensure the Control Room Communications Aide maintains an open line of communication with the TSC to assist in performing these functions.
EAP-1 -9 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 2 SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST TSC NOTE: The following is a listing of tasks that may need to be completed by the Site Emergency Director depending on the nature and severity of the emergency situation. The Site Emergency Director shall keep a running log of his activities in order to keep track of requests for assistance, actions taken, assignments given, completion of tasks, etc. This log should be kept utilizing the "Emergency Response/Recovery Action Log (EPP-13, Figure ll) however, a note pad it may be used. An accurate Js recording of actions must be maintained as may be vitally important to later review of emergency response/recovery activities.
Date SED Affected Unit s : Unit 1 Ungt 2 (circle as appropriate>
Initial/Time 1~ Contact SSS/SED for status report and turnover.
2 ~ Implement appropriate portions of the Emergency Implementing Procedures for the conditions at hand using EAP-1, Figure 4, .
"Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan".
3 ~ Evaluate conditions, then classify and declare the emergency as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency using EAP-2, Figure 1 and/or 2, "Action Level Criteria for Classification of Emergency Conditions" (for Unit 1 or Unit 2 respectively). If appropriate classify event as a Sympathetic Alert.
- 4. Have CSO "merge" the- Unit 1 and Unit', GAItronics systems.
Sound the station alarm (for an Unusual Event and Alert) or the station evacuation alarm (for a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency). (Disregard'f alarms"accomplished in step 82 above).
- 5. Have CSO announce the emergency condition and classification over the GAItronics per EAP-1 Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements. (Disregard this announcement if already accomplished in step 82 above).
6 ~ If Station Evacuation alarm has sounded or precautionary staffing of TSC, OSC and Control Room(s) is underway, ensure )
proper staffing:
a~ Technical Support Center staffed to appropriate level for emergency (per EPP-13, Figure 2 or 3 organization chart):
( ) Unusual Event .Site Staff only
'( ) Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency or Sympathetic Alert Site and Corporate Staff
-10 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 2 (Cont.)
SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST TSC Initial/Time
- 6. (Cont.) b. Operations Support Center Staffed by:
) OSC Coordinator
) OSC Communicator
) Personnel Accountability Coordinator
) Chemistry and Radiation Protection Team Coordinator .
) Damage Control Team Coordinator
) NMP Fire Department Coordinator
) OSC IGC Coordinator
) Stores Coordinator
- c. If all positions are not filled, obtain alternates through OSC Coordinator (using EPMP-3, Attachment 2 approved personnel lists).
- 7. If a radiation problem exists:
- a. Initiate survey of Technical Support Center, i.e.,
CAM/VAMP,(if not already accomplished) - evaluate conditions:
( ) TSC Radiation levels >100 mr/hr or.
airborne activity >10xMPC (9E-8 nCi/cc).
Evacuate TSC or initiate emergency ventilation OR
( ) TSC Survey OK - continue below
- b. OSC survey initiated (if not already done) evaluate conditions.
( ) OSC Radiation levels >100mr/hr or airborne activity >10xMPC (9E-8 pCi/cc).
Evacuate OSC.
( ) OSC OK
- c. Contact Security to verify that the North and South gates between Unit 1 and 2 are open.
- d. Step-off pad and monitor established at Unit 1 Administration Building employee entrance for employee monitoring.
- 8. Determine whether protective actions for the general public should be recommended to state and local officials using EPP-26. . Determination should be based on the information available at that time.
EAP-1 -11 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 2 (Cont.)
SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST TSC Initial/Time
- 9. Complete the Fact Sheet Part 1 (EPP-20, Figure 4a, Part 1 Notification Sheet) and initiate Fact Sheet Parts 2 and/or 3 (EPP-20, Figure 4b, 4c and/or 4d). Provide these sheets to the Communications Coordinator (or Aide) or his designee.
- 10. Ensure Communications Coordinator has all communication lines manned.
Control Rooms contacted. Determine status of safeguards and notifications which have been completed by the Control Room(s) .
- 12. Notify Communications Coordinator of:
- a. Protective actions to be taken by Training Center, EIC personnel and visitors (evacuate, go indoors, only visitors evacuate, etc.).
- b. Assistance required from JAFNPP, if any.
- 13. Notify Communications Coordinator to commence emergency contacts required pgr EPP-20; Figure 5a-Sp "Emergency Contact List
- 14. Off-Houxs: Have Communications Aide notify Security (x2405) of emergency condition and to make necessary contacts required per Security Off-Hours Emergency Contact List (EPP-20 Figure 3). Ensure the following information is relayed to Security. (For an Unusual Event, only items a through h are xequired).
- a. This (is/is aor) a drill
- b. Affected Unit:
C ~ Emergency Classification:
- d. Type of Incident:
- e. Status of Safeguards:
- f. Protective Actions for EIC:
- g. Protective Actions for Training Center:
- h. Radioactive Release (has has not occurred.
i ~ Wind Speed:
Wind Direction from :
- 15. Provide appropriate alarms and status announcements to station personnel as necessary using EAP-1, Figux'e 3j "Emergency Announcements" or others as appropriate.
EAP-1 -12 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 2 (Cont.)
SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST - TSC Initial/Time
- 16. If station evacuation in progress, ensure for via personnel, visitors and contractors are accounted EPP-5 "Station Evacuation".
17 'echnical Data Coordinator has assigned personnel for data plotters and assistants. Obtain two Site Emergency Director assistants from OSC using EPMP-3, Attachment 2, List of Qualified Personnel.
- 18. Radiological Assessment Manager, Environmental Survey/Sample Team Coordinator and Station Survey/Sample Team Coordinator positions staffed and in contact with Survey Teams.
- 19. Dispatch survey/sample teams directly or through the Radiological Assessment Manager a n/drothe appropriate Survey/Sample Team Coordinators (as required).
- 20. Communications Coordinator reports calls (EPP-20, Figure 5a-5p) made to the following (as appropriate):
System Power Control (Shift NRC Resident Inspector Supervisor Power EIC Operations) Training Center Oswego County EOC Oswego County Sheriff (County Warning Point) Coast Guard (Buffalo)
NYS Emergency GE Operations Center DOE (FRMAP)
(Warning Pt) INPO JAFNPP Control Room ANI NRC. Emergency Operations Center Fulton District Operator Contact Affected Unit(s) SSS: Determi'ne corrective actions to secure equipment in plant.
EAP-1 -13 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 2 (Cont.)
SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST TSC Initial/Time
- 22. Contact Survey/Sample Team Coordinators through Radiological Assessment Manager for Survey Team'esults inplant and environmental (downwind).
Inplant survey data received Environmental (downwind) survey data received Radiological Assessment Manager informed of environmental survey data
/ d. Determination o f downwind 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and total projected child thyroid dose commitments at the site boundary and at 2, 5 and 10 miles requested from the Radiological Assessment Manager.
- 23. Evaluate plant status and effectiveness of emergency actions. As appropriate, redirect emergency actions and/or escalate/de-escalate, or close out emergency class (refer to EPP-25, "Emergency Reclassification and Recovery" ).
- 24. If problem is radiological, evaluate conditions:
( ) Normal Conditions:
If surveys results indicate the conditions to be local and easily corrected and if instrumen-tation indicates an accidental release rate of less than Hi-Hi Alarm setpoints (Unit 1) or High Level Trip (Unit 2) then isolate local area and return station to normal operation. Terminate the emergency per EPP-25 and announce per EAP-1 Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements", No. 8.
( ) Abnormal Conditions'.
If survey results indicate a condition which is not readily corrected by operator the dose rate at the downwind protected area action or if fence is greater than 2 mR/hr or if an accidental release rate greater than Hi-Hi A1arm setpoints (Unit 1) or High Level Trip (Unit 2) is indicated, proceed with the remaining checklist items
- 25. Initiate Control Room(s), Technical Support'enter and Laboratory Counting Room Emergency Ventilation (if appropriate and not already accomplished).
EAP-1 -14 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 2 (Cont.)
SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST TSC Initial/Time
- 26. Contact Control Room(s) update situation, as appropriate.
- 27. Contact Radiological Assessment Manager; obtain updated information on on-site and off-site whole body and thyroid doses/dose rates.
NOTE0 Ensure that appropriate off-site authorities (Oswego County Emergency Operations Center, NYS Emergency Operations Center and NRC) are kept fully informed of the emergency status and actions in progress. Furthermore, ensure that.
followup messages are transmitted in a timely manner (approximately at 30 minute intervals) and the information required per Fact Sheet 'ontain Parts 1, 2 and/or 3 (EPP-20, Figures 4a-4d).
- 28. Instruct Radiological Assessment Manager or the appropriate Survey/Sample Team Coordinator to direct environmental (downwind) and inplant survey teams to additional areas.
- 29. Evaluate EIC and Training Center survey data and direct Communications Coordinator to inform EIC Director and Training Superintendent of required action.
- 30. Determine whether a Site Evacuation as per EPP-19, "Site Evacuation", is appropriate. If ordered:
- a. Instruct Technical Data Coordinator to determine number and type of personnel that should be retained on-site.
- b. Instruct Personnel Accountability Coordinator to proceed to the Security Building and prepare to account for personnel during the Site Evacuation.
- c. Evaluate evacuation routes and assembly areas with the Radiological Assessment Manager per EPP-19. Is
- d. Instruct Environmental Survey/Sample Team Coordinator to coordinate the survey of personnel and cars leaving including those leaving the Energy Information Center',
Training Center and Unaffected Unit(s). IS EAP-1 -15 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 2 (Cont.)
SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST TSC Initial/Time
- 30. (Cont'd) e. Direct Maintenance Coordinator to dispatch personnel to provide hose washdown for any contaminated cars at the EIC, Training Center and Unaffected Unit(s) (as necessary).
- f. Instruct CSO to make a site evacuation announcement in the merge mode per, EAP-l, Figure 3, "Emergency Announcements".
- g. Instruct Communications Coordinator to relay an evacuation order to .Security, the EIC, the Training Center and Unaffected Unit(s).
- h. Instruct Communications Coordinator to contact appropriate remote assembly area(s) and notify them of the impending arrival of site personnel.
- 31. Provide appropriate alarms and announcements to station personnel as necessary using EAP-1, Figure 3 "Emergency Announcements", or others as appropriate.
- 32. NYS Emergency Operations Center, Oswego County Emergency Operations Center, NRC contact maintained; inform of .
changes in station or weather conditions using Fact Sheet Parts 1, 2 and/or 3 (EPP-20, Figures 4a-4d); transfer responsibility to EOF when manned by their representatives and as directed.
- 33. Continue corrective actions as required to minimize severity of incident. Dispatch Damage Control Teams directly or through the Maintenance Coordinator or I&C Coordinator.
- 34. Update the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager (when/if designee arrives in EOF).
- 35. Formally transfer overall emergency management authority to the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager (when and if ready) and make appropriate announcements at the station and in the TSC.
EAP-1 -16 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 2 (Cont. )
SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST TSC Initial/Time NOTE: The Site Emergency Director shall maintain overall responsibility for the operation and control of the station and of the actions performed, by members of the onsite emergency organization (Staffing Level 2 of the Emergency Response Organization). He shall coordinate his activities with the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager.
- 36. In consultation with the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager (if available), periodically evaluate and assess the status of the emergency and effectiveness of emergency actions. As appropriate, redirect emergency actions and/or escalate, de-escalate or close . out emergency class (refer to EPP-25, "Emergency Reclassification and Recovery" ).
- 37. In consultation with the Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager (if available) and staff, review organizational requirements and assure sufficient qualified personnel are available for 24-hour coverage. Arrange schedules and obtain extra personnel as necessary (refer to approved personnel lists in EPMP-3).
EAP-1 -17 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 3 EMERGENCY ANNOUNCEMENTS (REPEAT ALL ALARMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS TWICE)
- 1. Initial Announcements NOTE: Ensure Unit 1 and Unit 2 GAItronics systems are "merged" for all emergency announcements.
a) UNUSUAL EVENT Station Alarm "Attention. Attention. This is/is not a drill. The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit (1 or 2) is experiencing an Unusual Event (provide further specific information if appropriate). All personnel should continue with normal duties and stand by for further announcements. I repeat, this is/is not a drill."
b) ALERT Etattaa Alatm "Attention. Attention. This is/is not a drill. The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit (1 or 2) is experiencing an Alert emergency condition (provide further specific information if appropriate).
Supervisory personnel having emergency functions in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility are instructed to proceed to these locations.
All other personnel should continue with normal duties and stand by for further announcements. I repeat, this is/is not a drill."
c) SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY Station Evacuation Alarm
- 1. If Station Evacuation is in effect:
Station Alarm is/is not a drill. The Nine Mile Point
'ine "Attention. Attention. This Nuclear Station Unit (1 or 2) is experiencing a Site Area (or General) Emergency (provide further specific information if appropriate).
- 2. If Station Evacuation is not in effect:
Station Evacuation Alarm "Attention. Attention. This is/is not a drill. The Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit (1 or 2) is experiencing a Site Area (or General) Emergency ~provide further specific information if appropriate).
EAP-1 -18 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 3 (Cont.'d)
. EMERGENCY ANNOUNCEMENTS (REPEAT ALL ALARMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS TWICE)
- 2. Station Evacuation Announcement Station Evacuation Alarm "Attention. Attention, all personnel. This is/is not a drill.
A (state condition necessitating the evacuation, i.e., high airborne levels, high radiation levels or emergency classification) (has been detected/exists) at (location or Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station).
All personnel evacuate to their designated assembly areas. All
~
persons entering the Unit 81 Administration Building from the outside are instructed to monitor at the employee entrance. I repeat, this is/is not a drill."
3- Computer Accountabilit S stem Ino erative-- Station Alarm "Attention. Attention, all personnel. This is/is not a drill. The computer accountability system is inoperative. Please initiate manual accountability procedures."
4; Accountability Re ort Printout Initiated Station Alarm "Attention. Attention, all personnel. This is/is not a drill. All personnel who have not yet carded in at an assembly area should card-in now and notify the Personnel Accountability Coordinator at extension 2662.
S. Site Evacuation Announcement Station Alarm "Attention. Attention, all personnel. This is/is not a drill. This is a site evacuation notice. All personnel not having specific emergency duties shall leave the site through the Security Building and proceed to the (specify remote assembly area and/or EAP-1 -19 January 1987
EAP-1 PIGURE 3 (Cont'd)
EMERGENCY ANNOUNCEMENTS (REPEAT ALL ALARMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS TWICE)
- 6. Status Announcement Station Alarm NOTE: Ensure Unit 1 and Unit 2 GAItronics systems are "merged" for all emergency announcements.
"Attention. Attention, all personnel. This is/is not a drill. The following is an emergency, status. announcement.
(Provide brief description of current plant status and emergency actions underway.) I repeat, this is/is not a drill."
- 7. De-escalation Announcements Station Alarm "Attention. Attention. This .is/is not a drill. The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit (1 or 2) has de-escalated to a (specify emergency status'. All personnel are instructed to stand y for further instructions. I repeat this is/is not a drill."
- 8. Emer enc Termination Announcement Station Alarm "Attention. Attention. This is/is not a drill. The emergency condition at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station has been terminated. (Provide further instructions as necessary.) I repeat this is/is not a drill."
EAP-1 -20 January 1987
EAP I FIGURE 4 FLOUCHART ACTIVATION AND DIRECTION OF EMERCENCY PLAN RADIOLOciCAL EMERGKHC I es CORPORATE POLICY INITIATINC CONDITIONS EMERGENCY DIRECTOR RESPONSE PROCEDURES SSS SITZ E.D. PROCEDURE INITIATINC CONDITION
- SITE E.D. EPP-I RADIATION EMERGENCIES
<<CORP ~ E.D./RECOVERY MANAGER EPP-2 PIRE PICHTINC RESPONSIbILITIES EPP 3 SEARCH 6 RESCUE SITE PLANo SECTION 5 ~ 2 ~ I 6 5 ~ 2 ~ Sa EPP-4 PERSONNEL INJURY OR EAP-3> ENCLOSURE ) ILLNESS EAP Io FICURE ) (SSS/SED CHECKLIST) EPP-24 NUCLEAR TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS EAP Io FIGURE 2 (SITE KD CHECKLIST)
KPMP-7 SIREN SYSTEM CPP 4I ENCLOSURE 1 (CORP ~ KD/REC MCR) FALSE ACTIVATION SPECIFIC KMERG. 4 OPERATING PROCEDURES PROCEDURES TO ee IMPLEMENTED EAP-I, FIGURE 4 fLOVCHART/TABLE CLASSIFICATION CORRECTIVE OFFSITK PROTECTIVE ONSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ACTIONS ACTIONS EAP 2, Figure 4.la or KPP-6 EPP-8 KAP-2, Figure 4 . Ib EPF-26, Figure I -EIC Initially, then -Training Center EPP-26, Figure II -Unaftected Unic NOTIFICATIONS EPP-20 CPP-I Corp. Not(I. DOUNWIND SURVEY TEAMS STATION SITE
- Systen Pover Concroi epp-7 EVACUATION EVACUATION KPP 5 EPP- I 9 Nev York Stace
- Osvego County NRC EMERGENCY RADIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS epp-)4 KPP-15 FACII,ITIES EQUIPMKNT CORO)NICATIONS EPMP 5 ON CALL PROC ~ DAMAGE REPAIR TEAMS IMPLANT SURVEY TEAMS STAFFING.
EPP-22 EPP-6 ALERTS SITE AREA 4 GENERAL NORMAL HOURS FACILITIES FACILITIES CR Stacion Kvacuacion CR TSC during nornaI hours TSC > ALL EMERGENCIES OSC or by direction of OSC > ALERT OR AEOVE energency Direccor KOF JNC EQUI PMKNT EQUIPHENT EPMP 2 EPMP 2 COMMUNICATIONS EPP I7 COMMUNICATIONS EPP-)7 STAFFING STAFP INC EPP-I3, Figure 2 EPP-l3; Figure 3 EPMP-3, Attachnent I EPMP-'3, Attachnent 2 (PHONE LISTING) (fOR QUALIFIED PERSONNEL)
EPMP 3, ATTACHMENT 2 EMERGENCY STILL
~ OFP BOURS CONTINUED ASSESSMENT IN PROGRESS FACILITIES RECLASSIPICATION CR EPP-25 (I! neeaea)
~
- OSC
~ EQUIP. ePMP-2 ESTIMATION OF CORE DAMAGE COD(. EPP-17 EPP-9 EMERGENCY
- STAFFING TERMINATED
- EPP-I3, Pigure I RE ENTRY EPP-12 EPMP 3, Actachnenc I 4 Actathnenc 2 ENVIRONHKNTAL HONITORINC EPP-25 RECOVERY EAP-1 -21 January 1987
EHERCENCY PREPAREDNESS MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES NOT USED IN EMERCENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION EPHP-I Maine of Emergency Preparedness EPHP-2 Emergency Equip. 6 Inventories EPHP-4 Emergency Exercises/
Drills EPMP-6 Haint of Corp. Plan/
Procedures EPHP-8 Maine/Tesc/Operacion of Osuego County Prompt Notification Equipmenc PROCEDURES RELATED TO PROCEDURES RELATED OSC/TSC PACIl ITIES IO THE EOP PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION PRDURDURE 'RRCRRPPPDE EPP- l3 Facility Activacion/ CPP-2 Activacion of EOF CPP-6 Public Affairs 6 Operation Corp. Communication EAP-3 CPP-3 Operation of EOP Procedure Primary Personnel/
Responsibilities CPP-4 EOF Primary Personnel/
Responsibilities CPP-5 Corp. Depcs Thee Provide Support CPP-7 Corp. Engineering Support HAP-1 -22 January 1987 .
EAP-1, FIGURE 4p TABLE ACTIVATION AND DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY PLAN Emergency Plan Implementation Directions:
- 1. Determine ~Znitfatin Condition(s) requiring implementation of Emergency Plan from column one below.
- 2. prom column two below determine the ~Emer enc ~Res ense actions to be taken, as appropriate.
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 Initiating Emergency Condition ~Res ones Conditions EAP-1, Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan Necessitating EAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions Increased Awareness EPP-26, Protective Action Recommendations on the part of EPP-20, Emergency Notifications Local, State and Federal Authorities High Radiation EPP-1, Radiation Emergencies or High Airborne . EPP-6, Emergency Inplant Surveys in a Local Area, EAP-1, Activation and Direction of 'Emergency Plan EAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP-26, Protective Action Recommendations EPP-20, Emergency Notifications High Radiation EPP-l, Radi'ation Emergencies or High Airborne EPP-6, Emergency Inplant Surveys in a General EAP-1, Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan
. Area EAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP-26 , Protective Action Recommendations EPP-20 Emergency Notifications EPP-5, Station Evacuation EPP-71 Downwind Radiological Monitoring EPP-8, On-Site and Off-Site Dose Assessment Procedure Fire Other than EPP-2, Fire Fighting Tower, EIC or EAP-1, Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan Training Center EPP-5, Station Evacuation EAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP-15, Health Physics Procedure EAP-1 "23 January 1987
EAP-1, FIGURE 4, TABLE (Cont.)
ACTIVATION AND DIRECTION OF EMERGENCY PLAN COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 Initiating Emergency Condition R~es esse Other Conditions EAP-1, Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan Necessitating EAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions Station EPP-2, Fire Fighting Evacuation EPP-5R Station Evacuation EPP-26 Protective Action Recommendations (e.g., Severe Fire, EPP-20 , Emergency Notifications Natural Phenomenon) EPP-6, Inplant Emergency Surveys EPP-7, Downwind Radiological Monitoring EPP-8$ On-Site and Off-Site Dose Assessment Proc.
Search and Rescue EPP-3, Search and Rescue EPP-4, Personnel Injury or Illness EPP-15, Health Physics Procedure Personnel Injury EPP-4, Personnel Injury or Illness or Illness EAP-1, Activation and Directions of Emergency Plan Major EPP-15, Health Physics Procedure EAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP-20, Emergency Notifications Toxic Chemical EAP-1, Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan Release, EAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions Equipment Mal- EPP-2, Fire Fighting function or Ex- EPP-5, Station Evacuation plosion Possibility 'EPP-'26, Protective Action Recommendations EPP-20, Emergency Notifications Security Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan Compromise'AP-1, EAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions EAP-20, Emergency Notifications Station, Physical, Security and Plan EAP-1 -24 January 1987
EAP-1 FIGURE 5 SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR'S CHECKLIST EOF OR AEOF ccrc e one Date SED Affected Unit(s): Unit 1 / Unit 2 (circle as appropriate)
Initial/Time Establish contact with Control Rooms.
- 2. Affected Unit(s) SSS Status Report received. Determine:
( ) On-Site Conditions
( ) Direction of Release
( ) Emergency Classification Level per SSS or EAP-2, Attachment 1 or Attachment 2g 5 Classification of Emergency Conditions.
- 3. Check off the TSC staff members as they arrive:
Title Name Arrival Time Site Emergency Director Communication Coordinator Technical Data Coordinator Maintenance Coordinator Rad Assessment Manager Offsite Dose Assessment Manager Env. Survey/Sample Team Coord.
Station Survey/Sample Team Coord.
Reactor Analyst Coordinator Instrumentation and Control Coord.
TSC/EOF Liaison Security Coordinator TSC/NELD Coordinator Others:
NOTE: If persons are not present to personnel fill all positions, lists).
obtain an alternate (per EPMP-3, approved 4, Initiate EOF (or AEOF) survey, if not already started.
EAP-1 -25 January 1987 s
f
EAP-1 FIGURE 5 (Cont.)
SITE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR'S CHECKLIST EOF OR AEOF Initial/Time Contact Control Room(s) (and, off-hours, Security) to ascertain which contacts have been made.
Instruct Communications Coordinator to continue with emergency contacts not already made using EPP-20, Figure 5 "Emergency Contact List" (and, if off-hours, Figure 3, Security Off-Hours Emergency Contact List).
Send out Environmental (downwind) Survey Team(s).
Send out Re-entry Survey Team, and notify Sheriff (if initiated from Alternate EOF).
Establish radio contact with teams.
NYS Emergency Operations Center, Oswego County Emergency Operations Center and NRC contact maintained; inform of changes in station or weather conditions.
NOTE: Ensure that proper bff-site authorities (Oswego County Emergency Operations Center, NYS Emergency Operations Centers 8 NRC) are kept fully informed of the emergency status" and actions in progress.
Furthermore, ensure that'ollow-up messages are transmitted in a timely manner .(approximately at 30 minute intervals) and contain the information required as .noted on Fact Sheet Part 1 (EPP-20, Figure 4a, Part 1 Notification Sheet); and Fact Sheets Part 2 and/or 3 (EPP-20, Figures 4b, 4c and/or 4d) as appropriate.
If at AEOF and Re-entry possible Transfer emergency activities to Technical Support Center (or EOF).
Contact Re-entry Survey Team for report.
Evaluate survey data and direct Communications Coordinator to inform Control Rooms and/or Security of required action.
Re-evaluate plant status and survey data for if appropriate reclassification of action level, per EAP-l, Figure 1, "SSS Checklist".
Once TSC personnel are present (at TSC or EOF), commence actions required per EAP-l, Figure 2, "Site Emergency Director's Checklist-TSC" and modify steps accordiugly.
EAP-1 -26 January 1987
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO. EAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS DATE AND INITIALS APPROVALS SIGNATURES REVISION 8 REVISION. 9 REVISION 10 Supervisor Radiological Support P. Volza Station Superintende NMPNS Unit I T. W. Roman Station Superintendent NMPNS Unit II R. B. Abbott General Superintendent Nuclear Generation ~(( p5 T. J. Perkins Summer of Pa es Revision 8 Effective 3/23/87 PAGES DATE i,ii,l-34,36-60
- 35 February 1987 March 1987 (Reissue)
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION THIS PROCEDURE NOT TO BE USED AFTER MarCh 1989 SUBJ T TO PERIODIC REVIEW.
- Changes made per section 11.5, AP-2.0 ~>l'h'7 Signed Date
c>
fr P
J cF Oa' P
l
EAP-2 4 SECTION CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CONTENTS PAGE liO PURPOSE
2.0 REFERENCES
3 ' RESPONSIBILITIES 4,O EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS 5.0 PROCEDURE 5 ' Station Shift Supervisor 5~2 Site Emergency Director Attachment 1 Classification of Emergency Conditions for NMPNS Unit 1 Figure 1.A Action Level Criteria for Classification of Emergency Conditions for NMPNS Unit 1 Figure 1.B Two and Thirty-Minute Site Area Emergency Source Term Values for NMPNS Unit I Stack Release 20 Figure 1.C 'wo and Thirty-Minute Site Area Emergency Source Term Values for NMPNS Unit I Ground Level Release 21 Figure 1.D Fire Related Emergency Action Levels (Unit 1) 22 Attachment 2 Classification of Emergency Conditions for NMPNS Unit II 35 Figure 2.A Action Level Criteria for Classification of Emergency Conditions for NMPNS Unit II 36 Figure 2.B Two and Thirty-Minute Site Area Emergency Source Term Values for NMPNS Unit II Stack Release 49 EAP-2 -i February 1987
0 EAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS SECTION CONTENTS PAGE Figure 2.C Two and Thirty-Minute Site Area Emergency Source Term Values for NMPNS Unit II Ground Level Release 50 Figure 2.D Fire Related Emergency Action Levels (Unit II) 51 Table 2 Fire Releated Emergency Action Levels (Unit II)
Table 2 60 EAP-2 -ii February 1987
EAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to describe the criteria employed by the Site Emergency Director to classify emergencies based on the occurrence of specific events or combinations of events which may reduce the overall safety of the station.
2' REFERENCES 2.1 NUREG-0654 "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
2.2 EAP-1, Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan 2.3 EPP-25, Emergency Reclassifications and Recovery 2.4 Nl-CSP-7V, Stack Effluent Sampling, Analysis 6 Record Keeping 2.5 N2-CSP-7V,'aseous Radioactive Waste Chemistry Surveillance at Unit 2 8 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES In order to ensure the complete and appropriate handling of emergency classifications, the following position listing provides associated assignment responsibilities.
3.1 Station Shift Su ervisor
- a. Assumes the role of Site Emergency Director until properly relieved.
b'. Initiates the classification of emergency conditions based on available information.
3.2 Site Emer enc Director Evaluates and performs emergency classification or reclassification as necessary.
4.0 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS An emergency is defined as any situation outside of routine operational events or minor equipment malfunction which could lead to a radiological .hazard affecting the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public, or result in significant property
. damage.. P EAP-2 -1 February 1987
4.0 (Cont'd)
The initial classification of an emergency is made as quickly as possible after the occurrence to ensure that the proper protective and corrective actions are taken and that appropriate off-site authorities are promptly notified.
Continual surveillance and assessment of plant conditions may warrant revising the emergency classification as conditions change in order to be 'consistent with established criteria and-. to ensure that protective actions initiated, taken, or recommended are commensurate
'with the situation.
Four classes of emergencies and one non-emergency class have been established to categorize emergency conditions' These classes in increasing order of severity are: E Operational Event Unusual (or Sympathetic Alert) /8 Event'lert Site Area Eme'rgency General Emergency The rational behind this. classification is to provide early and prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences given equipment failure or operator error, or which might be indicative of more serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. A graduation of levels is provided to assure fuller response preparations for more serious indicators and to allow for a de-escalation of response once the incident has been stabilized. The evaluation or (re-evaluation) of emergency action level classification and subsequent action required is the'esponsibility of the Site Emergency Director or his alternate as specified'in EAP-3.
5.0 PROCEDURE 5.1 Station Shift Su ervisor 5.1.1 Assume the role of Site Emergency Director and., activate the NMPNS Site Emergency Plan per EAP-l.
.5 ~ 1 ~ 2 When informed of an emergency situation, assess the emergency (e.g.,
plant systems, reactor core and drywell status, 'adiological conditions)-.
5.1.3 Evaluate conditions against the action levels delineated in EAP-2 Attachments 1 and/or 2, "Action Level Criteria for Classification of 8 Emergency Conditions" (Use EAP-2, Attachment 1 for a Unit I condition or EAP-2, Attachment 2 for a Unit II" condition). Based on this evaluation classify and declare the emergency as an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.
K~-'l,,* EAP-2'2 .February 1987 ID
5.2 Site Emer enc Director 5.2.1 Activate the -Emergency Plan per EAP-l.
5.2.2 When informed of an emergency situation, contact the SSS and receive a status report and relieve the SSS of Site Emergency Director responsibilities.
5.2.3 Evaluate conditions and evaluate (re-evaluate) the emergency classification against the action levels delineated in EAP-2, [
Attachment 1 and/or 2, "Action Level Criteria for Classification of I Emergency Conditions" for a Unit I condition or Unit II condition, respectively.
5.2.4 If not already done, classify and declare the emergency as an Unusual Event, Alert (or Sympathetic Alert), Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.
5.2.5 Periodically reassess emergency conditions, in consultation with the SSS and, if available, Corporate Emergency Director/Recovery Manager. If appropriate, upgrade, downgrade or terminate the emergency classification (utilizing EAP-2, Attachment 1 and/or 2 "Action Level Criteria for Classification of Emergency Conditions" and EPP-25 Emergency Reclassification and Recovery", for guidance).
EAP-2 -3 February 1987
EAP-2 ATTACHMENT 1 Classification of Emergency Conditions for NMPNS Unit I CONTENTS'igure 1.A Action Level Criteria for Classification of Emergency Conditions for NMPNS Unit I Figure 1,B, Two and.Thirty-Minute Site Area Emergency Source Term Values, for NMPNS Unit I Stack Release 20 Figure Two and Thirty-Minute Site Area Emergency Source Term Values for NMPNS Unit I Ground Level Release 21 Figure 1.D. Fire Related Emergency Action Levels (Unit I) 22
,, EAP-2 .;4 February 198'I
0 ACHE IH1H {RIIHUAHR EAP-2 CIASS 1 FIQRE 1.A OF BHKPNCY GIDITIQ6 HR NB5 UNIT I
~th~ ~thx I Site Area Emexgezcy I
IOf&nozanl Events IEvents Qd.ch Izdicate IEvents Mich Involve IEveats Rdeh Involve Actual IShhh CouM Tzdicate lan Actual Degzadation IActual or Lily Nn jar lor Iaadnent Substanttal Core Ia Potential Degzada- lof the level of Safety IPhiizzxes of Hant Puac- IDegzadatim or Melting with Itica of the level of lof the Plant Iticas Needed for Pro- lpotenthI for loss of Can-ISafe of the Hant I Itection of the Puhlic ltaizznent In IRadioactive EfQuent located by the I Indicated by the IMicated by zne or more Indicated by cae or auxe I faiiowizzg: lof the followiag: of the following:
I (Applicable I ze1ease to sny points(s) lazd zesulting fram I
I ~ Alazm(s) oa stack or In I
~
IHig&5gh Alszms ca lizBdd lsetpoint on stack or ten the Nigh~a)
I I~fluent maaitozs l levels detect cozzazpontling to Relearn cozzespcads
>1000 mzem/hr to Qmle to Iany initiathlg event) Iefftueat IKGitor(8)y with I thnas the I~Bgh Alazms I>5Gnr/hr for I/2 hr, or Body or >5,000 mzem/hr I cznQxanttoa by the lsetpdnt oa liquM effluent I>50{hr/hr QxQe hdy to child thyzzdd at site I{headstxy Iabozatozy, that Iazaitjar(s), with coafizznz- I for 2 adznztes (or five bouadaxy under actual I Tech. Specs. Iind.ts have Ithxz by the (headstzy IUmes these levels to the meteomlogy as ccafizmed Ibsen exceeded when aver- llsbazatozy, that Tech. lzhymid) at the site boun- by field sample or lab laged aver a perIad of cae ISpecs. Emits have been Idazy for advezse zzeteoz aaalysis.
t~ ~~~ f I (I) hour inclzxiiag any or exczaded when averaged over I oIagy as izdicated by:
a period of cae (1) hour IEfftuent axnitozs detect - See dose rates aze pm-IMt I eaargeacy coaden- including any or all czxz- stack xelesse rates in jected based oa plant paza-II ser, Unit azd the J.A. tributica fmn the lhit I Attachment 1, Figure 1.B, aetexs or axe aeasuzed in Fitzpatrick Nuclear Pznar aarseacy coadezzser,lhit II Data sources (surveys p the anrizzns.
Haute azd the J.A. Fitzpatrick monitors, etc.) izdicate I Nuclear Paar Hant. lgzoad level release Of&aite dose due to event l~ lhit I znnezgjeacy Ideaser vent monitor can- I I&en Times the Unit I I rates in Attzuhmeat 1, IFIgure 1.C.
is pmjected to exceed 5 xem to whole body or 25 Ialazm(8) szd ctxlfizmntion lanezgeacy zanier vent I zem to the child thymid at I I is made by the (headstzy Imonitor alazm(s) and I- ihese dose rates are site bauzahzy uzder actual Iiabozatozy that Tech- Iccafizaatfan is aude by Ipmjected based ca piant meteomlogl' I Specs. Hmtts have been Ithe (headstzy laboratory I parameters or are lexceeded Men these limits I that Tedr5pecs. limits Ianasuzed in the envtxazzs.
laze averaged over the Ihave been exceeded I I pmjected longest emerg- lwhen these limits are I- EfQuent aaaitozs detect Iency caade zser vent lavezzed aver the pmjected llevels such that pmjected I release. llcagest emezgzany cczdeaser Iaccuzulsted dose is >1 I Ivzat release. IxemwhaIe bady or > 5 I I Item child thymLd at the I-Routine or special. Mnp- I+Nztha or special saaples I site bouadazy for actual lles or surveys. lor surveys. {um stack lmetexalogr.
that Tech Spec Md'iadicate Imaaitor(s) alarm(s) is/aze Ihave been exceeded. (Ihe lect at a lower value than I stlk mtxlitor(s) alaxm(s) I the TedrSpec. Iiadt.)
lis/axe set at a lower Ivalue than the T~pec.
Iiimit.)
I EAP-2 5 ; February 1987
FAP-2 AXTAQMENZ 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACIXN IBEf. GtZERIA HR CLASSIFlQZKN OF 86RGENCtt'DIXIG% HR NMBS UNIT I Site Area Eneraency Indicated by one or Indicated by one or Indica one or mire more of the foiLladng: more of the folladng: of the follndng:
Two or more area rad- -3m or more area radi-iation monitors reach actica monitors or cca- Release corresponds to their alarm points thmous air monitors >1000 mrem/hr to whale body (not incluBng the TIP indicate greater than or >5000 nnms/hr to child man monitor or a an- 1000 tfmes background thyroid at site boundary nitor in alarm due to under actual meteorology as a planned evotlution) airborne clxlfirllled by field sample (NVE Redundant radiation monitors that monitor the 1000 xMPC. (~
actLvity greater than ground for all area or lab analysis;
'lhese dose rates are pro-scme system or area radiation mcaitors jected based on plant para-should be considered will be noted in the meters or are measured in, as one ARM.) Ccatrol Roan.) the ulnas; ConHzrned building Of&site dose due to event is ventLlatLon duct air- projected to exceed 5 rem to borne activity indi- whole body or 25 rem to the cates in excess of child thyroid at site MPC values boundary under actual Bnteozology o SSS decides radiation conditLon in the station dictates the need for a general area evacuatica.
Indicated by one or Indicated by one or axlze of the falling: narc of the falling:
Reactor system actLve-vity elzeeds 25
~tor system active-vity exceeds 300 gCL/g pCL/g QO total iodine. When When both of&gas both ~H20 total iodine.
both of&gas monitors trip on Not Applicable
.monitors trip on high tdgrhigh alarm alarm EAP-2 -6 February 1987
EAP-2 ATTACHMENT URE 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I I
I Initiating Condition I Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
lS ent Fuel Dama e Indicated by'ne or Major damage'to spent Indicated by one or more Imore of the following: Ifuel with release of J of the following:
I Iradioactivity. This I-Fuel pool water level Icould be 'indicated Release corresponds to I decreases below low Iby high radiation >1000 mrem/hr to whole body level alarm setting lalarms on the refuel- or >5000 mremlhr to child ling Platform High thyroid at site boundary
-Fuel damage accident IRange Area Radiation under actual meteorology as Not Applicable I 'with release of radio- IMonitor. confirmed by field sample I activity to Reactor or lab analysis; I Building. This could I be indicated by These dose rates are pro-I radiation alarms on jected based on plant para-I ARM-17 (low range) meters or are measured. in the environs; Off-site dose due to event "is projected to exceed 5'em to whole body or 25 rem to the child thyroid at site boundary under actual meteorology.
EAP-2 -7 February 1987
EAP-2 ATTACHMENT 1, FIGURE 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I ti it i iting Condition
~
I Unusual Event I Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
"-;;-~ t o: Coolant. IReactor system leak IReactor system leak I Loss of coolant accid- I Indicated by one or more of
'."m l~nte ric Irate exceeds 5 gpm Irate exceeds 50 gpm Ident which exceeds the I the following:
Ifrom an unidentified Ifrom an unidentified lmakeup pump capacity Isource or total of 25 Isource as indicated las indicated by all Loss of 2 of 3 fission Igpm as identified by Iby rate of use or Ithe following: product barriers with a Idaily RCS leakage lintegrator readings low water level potential loss of the third; Ievaluation alarm, Any initiating event that I high drywell makes release of large pressure alarm, amounts of radioactivity of high floor drain probable, i.e.
level alarm, HPCI activation 1. LOCA with failure of alarm, ECCS. Loss of contain-Main steam line ment imminent, i isolation valve 2. LOCA with failure of I closure. containment. Potential for loss of ECCS, I 3. S/D occurs, but decay heat removal systems fail, I 4. Transient occurs plus I failure of requisite core I I S/D systems (Scram and l Standby Liquid Control Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable System).
Rum Seizure Leadin I
I t.i> Fuel Failure - Loss of plant control I occurs.
I I- External events which could I cause massive common damage I I to plant systems leading to I any of the above.
I I
FAP-2 -8 February 1987
~
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EAP-2 ATTACHMENT 1 RE 1.A. (Cont 'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I I !nitiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency IReactor system IIndicated by one or more of
,r e as ur e Ipressure exceeds Not Applicable Not Applicable Ithe following:
I l1218 psig. I I
I I- Loss of 2 of 3 fission I
I I product barriers with a I I potential loss of the third; iini!.iation of ECCS IIndicated by one of I lcoincident with Ithe following: I- Any initiating event that i posTtive findin that I makes release of large
- initiation is not I- Manual initiation Not Applicable Not Applicable amounts of radioactivity
! --.!>>rious and dis- I of Core Spray System I probable, i.e.
.ci!:!rgr to vessel I- Automatic initiation I I of Core Spray System I 1. LOCA with fa ilure o f of contain-1 i I with verification I ECCS. Loss using redundant in- ment imminent; strumentation. 2. LOCA with failure of containment. Potential
! for loss of ECCS;
!Io:s of containment ISame as initiating 3. S/D occurs, but decay I!>>! e *rit re uirin levent heat removal systems i =-->>utdo~wn b Tech- I fail; l>>ical S ecifications I 4. Transient occurs plus I failure of requisite core l I S/D systems (Scram and I Not Applicable Not Applicable Standby Liquid Control I System).
I I I I Loss of plant control I I occurs.
External events which could I I I I cause massive common damage I I to plant systems leading to I I any of the above.
I I EAP-2 -10 February 1987
Me EAP-2, ATTACHMENT 1, URE 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I i8 initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency Failure of a Reactor IFailure of a Safety I llndicated by one or more of IValve would be indic- Ithe following:
Relief Valve to late by all of the I I reseat (exceedin Ifollowing: - Loss of 2 of 3 fission normal leaka e) product barriers with a
- Annunciator H3-4-5, potential loss of the third; will annunciate, Drywell pressure Any initiating event that will rise, makes release of large
- Verification with amounts of radioactivity acoustic monitor probable, i.e.
IFailure of a Relief 1. LOCA with failure of IValve would be indic- ECCS. Loss of contain-late by all of the ment imminent; I I foilowing: Not Applicable Not Applicable 2. LOCA with failure of I containment. Potential )8 Drop in electrical for loss of ECCS; I output, 3. S/D occurs, but decay I Drop in steam flow, heat removal systems I No change in reactor fail, I pressure and temper- 4. Transient occurs plus ature, failure of requisite core Slight decrease in S/D systems (Scram and reactor level, Standby Liquid Control Verification with System).
acoustic monitor.
I- Loss of plant control occurs.
I- External events which could l cause massive common damage to plant systems leading to any of the above.
EAP-2 -ll February 1987
EAP-2 ATTACHMENT 1 URE 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I I
I Initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
I IMain Steam Line Break ISteam line break out- ISteam line break out- I Indicated by one or more of I lside the drywell with beside the drywell with I the following:
I Iproper MSIV function. lfailure of the MSIV.
I IThis could be indi- IThis could be indi- Loss of 2 of 3 fission I Icated by one or more Icated by one or more product barriers with a I lof the following: lof the following: potential loss of the third; I Any initiating event that I Steam flow/feed- Steam flow/feed flow makes release of large I flow mismatch, mismatch, amounts of radioactivity I Decrease in reactor Decrease in reactor probable, i.e.
I pressure, pressure, I Decrease in gener- Decrease in gener- 1. LOCA with failure of ator output, ator output, ECCS. Loss of contain-MSIV closure, High radiation ment imminent, Turbine building alarms in turbine 2. LOCA with failure of Not Applicable CAM alarm, building, containment. Potential Main steam line Decreasing reactor for loss of ECCS, tunnel temp. and level, 3. S/D occurs, but decay radiation alarms. Main steam line tun- heat removal systems Main steam line nel temp. and radia- fail, break alarm. tion alarms, 4. Transient occurs plus Main steam line failure of requisite core break alarm, S/D systems (Scram and MSIVs indicate not Standby Liquid Control closed. System).
Loss of plant control occurs.
External events which could cause massive common damage to plant systems leading to any of the above.
EAP-2 -12 February 1987
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EAP-2 ATTACHMENT GURE 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I I initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
I I Loss of En ineered Same as Initiating IIndicated by one or more of Isafet Feature or I Event. Ithe following:
I Fire Protection I
I- Loss of 2 of 3 fission I re uirin shutdown I product barriers with a
. Ib Technical S ecifi- I potential loss of the third; Ications. e. . because Not Applicable Not Applicable I- Any initiating event that lof malfunction I makes release of large Ipersonnel error or I amounts of radioactivity j I rocedural inade uac ) I probable, i.e.
I I LOCA with failure of I
ECCS. Loss of contain-ll,oss of Indicators ILoss of indicators ILoss of All Control IEither one of the .ment imminent, IAnnunciators or lor alarms on process IRoom Alarms Ifollowing occurs: 2. LOCA with failure of IAlarms lor effluent parametersl(Annunciators). containment. Potential Inot 'functional in Loss of all alarms for loss of ECCS, IControl Room to an for >15 min. with 3. S/D occurs, but decay lextent requiring plant not in cold S/D,l heat removal systems Ishutdown by Technical fail, I ISpecifications. Plant transient occurs 4~ Transient occurs plus I occurs while all failure of requisite corel alarms are lost. S/D systems (Scram and Standby Liquid Control System).
Loss of plant control External events which could cause massive common damage to plant systems leading to I any of the above. I I
EAP-2 -14 February 1987
EAP-2 ATTACHMENT 1 E 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I I
. I Initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
I I Fire IFire not under control IFire confirmed and IFire confirmed resulting Indicated by one or more of I Iwithin ten minutes or Ipotentially affecting lin the loss of function Ithe following:
.I Irequiring assistance Isafe shutdown systems lof a safe shutdown I-Loss of 2 of 3 fission I lof off-site fire dept. las indicated by: Isystem path as indicated Iproduct barriers with a I Ito extinguish I Iby Attachment 1, Ipotential loss of the third:
l IA) Fire resulting in IFigure 1.D. I-Any initiating event that I I' the loss of function Imakes release of large I of a channel of a lamounts of radioactivity I safe shutdown system Iprobable, i.e.
I or I I IB) Fire in any fire ll. LOCA with failure of zone(s) that could I ECCS. Loss of contain I impact redundant I ment imminent, I channels involving l2. LOCA with failure of I safe shutdown cables I containment. Potential I or equipment I for loss of ECCS, I l3. S/D occurs, but decay I (See Attachment 1, I heat removal systems I Figure 1.D.) I fail, I 14. Transient occurs plus I I failure of requisite core I I S/D systems (Scram and I I Standby Liquid Control I I System).
I I I I-Loss of plant control I I-External events which could I I cause massive common damage I I to plant systems leading to I I any of the above.
I I EAP-2 -15 February 1987
EAP-2 ATTACHMENT 1, E 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I I>> iI i:iting Condition I Unusual Event Aler t Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
I I
Ir( ut i~tv ISecurity threat or IOngoing security IImminent loss of IIndicated by one or more of i'nripr omise lattempted entry or Icompromise in accord- Iphysical control of Ithe following:
i, Isabotage in accord- lance with Site Ithe plant.
lance with Site ISecurity Plan. Loss of 2 of 3 fissi.on ISecurity Plan. product barriers with a potential loss of the thirds; Any initiating event that
".it,<<r~l Phenomenon IAny earthquake felt IEarthquake > 0.08 g IEarthquake > 0.11 g makes release of large I irI)iquake lin-plant or detected Iwhile plant not in coldlwhile plant not in cold amounts of radioactivity lon Station seismic Ishutdown and a valid Ishutdown and a valid probable, i.e.
linstrumentation by lalarm trip of Station lalarm trip of Station I Ivalid alarm trip. Iseismic instrumentationlseismic instrumentation 1. LOCA with failure of I I I I FCCS. Loss of contain-I I I ment imminent, I I I I 2. LOCA with failure of I I I containment. Potential It I' ijn<I, tsunami, ILake water level level TLake water TLake water level T for loss of ECCS, l>>irricane surge, lexperienced or pro- lexperienced or pro- lexperienced or pro- 3. S/D occurs, but decay I ~niclie ljected beyond usual ljected near design ljected greater than heat removal systems I
i I levels. I levels. Idesign levels fail, I I I or 4. Transient occurs plus I Idamages vital equip- failure of requisite core I Iment at lower levels. S/D systems (Scram and I I Standby Liquid Control I I ir>>ado on-site TAny tornado experi- TSustained winds in ex- T System). I lenced or projected Icess of 100 mph.
lon-site. Loss (a of plant control I I occurs0 I I I I External events which could I i
I cause massive common damage I l 'I>>rricane IAny hurricane experi- IExperienced or pro- ISustained winds in to plant systems leading to I I lenced or projected Ijected hurricane lexcess of 100 mph. I any of the above. I l Iwithin the 10~lie Iwinds approach I I I EPZ. ll00 mph. I I
FAP-2 -16 February 1987
0 EAP-2 ATTACHMENT 1, 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I I( iJ i () )n). Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
) ll t') ~
( 'll< ~ IExperienced or proj- ITurbine failure IIndicated by one or more of I lected turbine failure Icausing penetration. Ithe following: I Icausing rapid plant IThis would be indi- I Ishutdown. Icated by one or more Loss of 2 of 3 fission I I lof the following: product barriers with a I I -Turbine overspeed, Not Applicable potential loss of the third; I 8 I
Rapid loss of con- Any initiating event that I denser vacuum, makes release of large I amounts of radioactivity I Loud unusual noises. probable, i.e. I I
- 1. LOCA with failure of I i ~)~l((s)on or Missile IExplosion or missile IExplosion damage to IExperienced or pro- ECCS. Loss of contain-
) 6'l)~.l(' s limpact experienced or Ifacility affecting Ijected severe damage ment imminent, Iprojected within 2 Iplant operation or Ito safe shutdown 2. LOCA with failure of Imiles of the site. Imissile impact on lequipment and plant containment. Potential I Ifacility. Inot in cold shutdown. for loss of ECCS,
(
I 3. S/D occurs, but decay heat removal systems
( ir( (.(ft IEither one of the I Either one of the IAircraft crash causing fail, Ifollowing occurs: Ifollowing occurs: Idamage or fire in one 4. Transient occurs plus I I lor more of the failure of requisite core I- Experienced or pro- I- Aircraft projected Ifollowing: S/D systems (Scram and I jected unusual air- to strike a station I Standby Liquid Control I craft activity over structure. I- Drywell; System).
I the facility, Aircraft strikes a I- Control Room;
( I- Aircraft crashes station structure. I- Reactor Bldg; I- Loss of plant control I on-site. I- Waste Bldg; I occurs.
)
I I- Turbine Bldg; I- External events which could I I I- Screen House. cause massive common damage I to plant systems leading to I(>x) c or IToxic or flammable gas IExperienced or proj- IExperienced or pro- any of the above.
I )'Inmm;able Gases Ireleases experienced ljected entry into ljected entry into lor projected within 2 Ifacility environs. I vital areas and I Imiles of the site IPresents habitability Irestricts necessary I I Iproblems, which are laccess.
I I Iverified by portable I linstruments.
EAP-2 -)7 February 1987
EAP-2 ATTACHMENT GURE 1.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT I Initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency ITransportation of IIndicated by one or more of IContaminated ingured Not Applicable Not Applicable Ithe following:
lindividual from site Ito off-site hospital. Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third; IAn emergency situation Any initiating event that
~seer enc Not Applicable lof an Alert classifica- Not Applicable makes release of large Ition or above at NMP amounts of radioactivity IUnit II or JAFNPP. probable, i.e.
- 1. LOCA with failure of Failure to Initiate ITransient requiring ECCS. Loss of 'contain-or Com lete a Scram IFailure of the reactor loperation of shutdown ment imminent, Iprotection system to Isystems with failure 2. LOCA with failure of Iinitiate and complete I'to scram. Continued containment. Potential la scram. This would Ipower generation (but for loss of ECCS, Not Applicable Ibe indicated by all Ino core damage 3. S/D occurs, but decay lof the following: I immediately evident) heat removal systems Posi'tive readings on land initiation of fail, the SRM, IRM, LPRM, lliquid poison system. 4. Transient occurs plus APRM instrumentation failure of requisite core systems above shut- S/D systems (Scram and down levels. Standby Liquid Control System).
Loss of Plant ILoss of capability ILoss of capability Loss of plant control Control .Ito initiate and/or Ito initiate and/or occurse Imaintain cold shutdown Imaintain hot shutdown External events which could las indicated by all las indicated by cause massive common damage Not Applicable lof the following: lail of the following: to plant systems leading to any of the aboves
, I-Shutdown Cooling Loss of all high I System not functional pressure pumps, I-Inability to sustain Loss of all low I natural circulation pressure pumps, I and RCS temperature Failure of the Reactorl I increases to >212'F coolant boundar . I EAP-2 -18 February 1987
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RAP-2 Attachment 1 Fi ure 1.B.
Two and Thirt -Minute Site Area Emer enc puree Term Values for NMPNS Unit I Stack Release Mind Direction from Site Boundary Q30 Distance ~(Ci/sec) ~(Ci/sec)
(Meters) (Miles) 168.75 191.25 122 1.58E-2 6.48+I 6.4E+6 191.25 213.'I5 152 9.45E-2 6. 1E+'I 6 '8+6 213.75 236,25 183 1.148-1 5. 8E+'I 5.8E+6 236.25 258.75 884 5.49E-1 4.8E+8 4. 8E+'I 258./5 281.25 1920 1.19 3.1E+9 3.1E+8 281.25 303.75 2042 1. 2'I 4.0E+9 4.0E+8 303('/5 326,25 2/89 1. '/3 1.3E+10 1.38+9 326 25 348./5 22/1 1.41 5.9E+9 5.98+8 348./5 11.25 2758 1 71
~ 1.38+10 1.3E+9 1 1.25 33.'15 1/98 1.12 2.4E+9 2 'E+8 33 '15 56.25 1411 8.81E-l 1.2E+9 1.28+8 56.25 78.'15 892 5.548-1 5.0E+8 5. OE+'I
'/8. 'l5 101.25 221 1.378-1 5. 98+ I 5.98+6 101.25 123.75 137 8.51E-2 6.3E+7 6.3E+6 123./5 146.25 114 7.088-2 6.58+7 6.5E+6 146.25 168 '5 107 6.658-2 6. 7E+I 6.6E+6
- 1. Atmospheric conditions assumed for stack (107 m high) release are unstable (A) conditions and wind speed of 1 m/sec (2.24 mph).
- 2. Q values are calculated based on the characteristics of a fictional isotope with an average gamma energy of 0.'I MeV/dis and half-life of 30 minutes.
- 3. Q2 is based on 500 mr/hr exposure for 2 minutes and the Q30 is based on 50 mr/hr exposure for 30 minutes.
- 4. The Q2 and Q30 values in the table were corrected For the radioactive decay during the plume travel time from the release point to the receptor under consideration.
EAP-2 -20 February 1987 s
EAP-2 Attachment 1 Fi ure 1.C.
Two and Thirt -Minute Site Area Emer enc Source Term Va'lues for NMPNS Unit I Ground Level Release Wind Direction from Site Boundary QZ Q30 De ree Ran e Distance ~(Ci/sec> ~(Ci/sec)
(Meters) (Miles) 168,15 191.25 122 7.588-2 1.3E+6 1. 3E+5 191.2S 213.75 152 9.45E-2 1.'IE+6 4
- 1. '/8+5 213.75 236.25 183 1,148-1 1.9E+6 1.98+5 236.25 258,/5 884 5.49E-1 1. OE+'1 1.08+6 258e75 281.25 1920 1.19 2.88+1 2.88+6 281.25 303./5 2042 l. 2'I 3.1E+7 3 'E+6 303 '5 326 '5 2/89 l.'/3 5. 2E+I 5.2E+6 326.25 348e/5 22/1 1.41 3. 8E+'1 3.8E+6 348. 75 11. 25 2158 1.71 S.18+7 5.18+6 11.25 33.75 1/98 1.12 2. 5E+'I 2.5E+6 33.'/5 56,25 1417 8 '18-1 1, 8E+I 1.8E+6 56e25 18.75 892 5 '48-1 9.8E+6 9.8E+5
- 78. 15 101. 25 221 1.31E-l 2.38+6 2.38+5 101.25 123.75 137 8.51E-2 1.5E+6 1.5E+5 123.75 146.25 114 1.088-2 1.2E+6 1.2E+5 146.25 168.75 107 6.658-2 1.1E+6 1.1E+5
- 1. Atmospheric conditions assumed for a ground level release are stable (F) conditions and,wind speed of 1 m/sec (2.24 mph).
- 2. Q values are calculated based on the characteristics of a fictional isotope with an average gamma energy of 0.'/ MeV/dis and half-life of 30 minutes.
- 3. QZ is based on 500 mr/hr exposure for 2 minutes and the Q30 is based on 50 mr/hr exposure for 30 minutes.
- 4. The QZ and Q30 va'lues in the table were corrected for the radioactive I
decay during the plume travel time from the'elease point to the receptor under consideration.
EAP-2 -21 February 198/
8 EAP-2 Attachment 1 Fi ure 1.D.
FIRE RELATED EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Unit I CROSS REFERENCE'NDEX ETECTION FIRE PAGE DETECTION FIRE PAGE DETECTION FIRE PAGE ANEL ZONE NO. PANEL ZONE NO. PANEL ZONE NO.
A-2013N T2A 28 DA-2161E B1A 31 DA-4076E R1A 32 A-2013S T2A 28 DA-2161E BlB 31 DA-4076E Rlc 32 A-2022N T2B 28 DA-2161E T3B 31 DA-4076W R1B 32 DA-2022S T2B 28 DA-2161M T3B 31 D-4086 Rl 25 DA-2031 T2D 29 DA-2162W T3B 31 DA-4116E R2A 32 DA-2041N D1B 29 D-2224 B2A 23 DA-4116E Rlc 32 DA-2041N Dlc 29 D-2224 B2B 23 DA-4116W R2B 32 DA-2041N D1D 29 D-2224 T4B 23 DA-4116W R2C 32 DA-2041S DlA 30 DA-2234 T4A- 31 D-4156. R3A 26 DA-2051E T2B 30 DA-2234 T4B 31 D-4156 R3B 26 DA-2051W T2B 30 D-2345 T6A 23 D-4166 R3A 26
, DA-2081S T3A 31 D-2395 T6B 23 D-4197 R4A 26 DA-2083M T3A 31 D-2395 T6C 23 D-4197 R4B 26 DA-2083N T3A 31 DX-3011A Cl 34 DX-4217A R4A 34 DA-2092E T3B 31 DX-3011B Cl 34 DX-4217B R4A 34 DA-2092MG T3B 31 DX-3031A C2 24- DA-4237 R5A 32 DA-2092W T3B 31 DX-3031B C2 24 DA-4237 RSB 32 DX-2113A D2D 33 D-3031PL C2 24 D-4267 R6A 26 DX-2113B D2D 33 D-3054 C3 24 D-4267, R6B 26 DX-2123A D2C 33 D-4016 RlB 24 D-5013 Sl 27 DX-2123B . D2C 33 D-4026 R1A 24 D-5023 S2 27 DA-2141 D2B 32 D-4027 R4A 24 D-8151 Fl 27 DX-2141A D2B 33 D-4027 R4B 24
. DX-2141B D2B 33 D-4036 R1B 24 D-2151 D3 23 D-4046 RlD 24 DA-2151 D2A 32 DX-215 1A D2A 33 DX-2151B D2A 33 EAP-2 -22 February 1987
8 F3RE REIAIIg) URGENCY ACTION MKS (Unit I)
I For purposes of this Figure 1D, a safe shutdown system for Unit consists of any aae of the following decay heat removal paths; 1) Eezgency Condenser Control Rod Drive Panp (After 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />), and Reactor Shutdown Coalant System, 2) Co're Spray, Autanatic Depzessuzization System and Contaizxent Spray Torus CoaUng.
DEIICIKH FIRE ZONE Z(5E D3 18 DG 103 Cable Tray Missle Pfre confirmed resulting in:
Shield
- 2) lass of function of PB 102 17A Fire ccaQzmed 1n one division Bat Rm Fire canfianed resulting in llBat Rm resulting in the loss of function of loss of process variable any channel of a safe shutdown system indication due to:
due to the fciLladng:
- 2) Iass of-DG 102 or DG 103 2) Loss of Control Room In-OR stznntatian and Remote
- 3) Loss of PB 102 or PB 103 Shutdown Panel Instru-OR = aentation,
- 4) loss of PB 16B or PB 17B AND
- 3) Failure to make the con-T4B T.B. 277' P.B. 101 Area Fire calmed in 1Mdne building nection fram the security fire zcae that involves safe shutdown UPS system w1thin 15 min-cahles or equipnent utes (alteznate 115 VAC power source to Remote Shutdown Panel ll).
NOTE: Fire area losses and s are ahiressed 1n IEP-5.
T B 305' S
~
1 Fan Area Bldg ze T.B. 300'ast Contzal Not Applicable VentQation Area 5 T.B. 300'outh EAP-2 -23 February 1987 ~
EAP-2, Attacln~t 1, Figure 1.D. (Cent'd)
FIRE REMKD BGEGENCY ACIDS IPKS (Unit I)
IOCA'.IKN Aux. Ccatrol Rm. Fire confirmed in fire zme that Fire ca~ad resulting in loss invo1ves safe shutdown cables or of function of a shutdown systems EKplipnent o due to:
NOIR: Fire area losses and repairs la) Isolation of both emergency are addressed in IX&8 condenser loops, AND lb) toss of shutdown cooiLing, OR 2a) Loss of all four (4) core spray loops, AND 2b) Loss of all six (6) electro-matic relief valves Rx Bldg., 198'.W. 1) Fire conHaned resulting in loss Corner of functiaa of a darnel (1/2 of a of a safe shutdown system (Gill or 26 Rx Bldg., 198'.E. am)
Corm+ OR
- 2) Fire ccaQnned in two (2) fire zones that involves safe shutdown cables or Rx Bldg., 298'.E. equipnent in both zones as follows:
27 Corner a) Fire breaching a Fire Break R4B Rx Bldg., 298'.W.
Corner ~
(e.g. b t GR RIA ~ RIB)
Zone b) Fire in opposite channel zones (e.g. between R1A and R4B)
Rx Bldg., 198'.W.
Corner Rx Bldg', 198'.E.
Corner EAP-2 -24 February 1987
1.D.(Ccat'd)
FIRE REMS) B9EGBKY ACZKH ZEUS (Unit I)
SZE ARFA &ERGHKY Fire ccaHaaed resulting in loss of function of a channel (I/2) of a safe dartdown system due to the followirg.')
Ihe status of the dr~e11 being in a nm~rted cooditica, OR 2a) Ioss of a shutdown cooling suction, Not AppLLcable or discharge valves)
.AND 2b) loss of any two (2) core spray disdmrge valves, OR
- 3) lass of any three (3) electrcnatic relief valves.
- 4) Fire ccafiraed in the fire zme that involves safe shutdown cables 01 EÃpIipDBnto FAP-2.
.25 February 1987
1.D. (Cont'd)
PIRE REIAK) RMEGENCY ACIXN INKS (Unit I)
SZIZ ARFA BGR22KY Rx ~, 281'ast 1) Fire conBrmed resulting Pire conQnuxi resultizg in loss Rx Bldg., 281'est loss of unction of a of a safe shutdown system due to channel (1/2) of a safe la) Loss of shutdown cooling shutdown system due to AND aae of the falledng lb) Isolatfon of both emergency a) Loss of PB 16B or 17B ccGdBQs&x'oops OR OR b) Loss of shutdown coo1fng 2a) Ioss of shutdown cooing CR AND c) Loss of any two (2) core 2b) tuss of al1 four (4) spray discharge valves coze spray discharge valves R AND d) Loss of any three (3) 2c) Toss of all six (6) electro eleetrcaetic relief elves natic relief valves OR (e.g. ~
- 2) Fire conHnoed in any two (2) redundant chaarM Qre zones of a a zone) that 9nvolves safe shut-down cables or apd pnent M166 R3A Bldg., 281'East Fire confirmed resulting in the loss af PB 17B R4A ~ 298'.E. Side RB Bldg. 298'.W. Side Not Applicahle I&)267 ~ 340'ast R6B Bldg. 340'est 26 February 1987
ZAP-2 Attachnent 1.D. (Cont'd)
N IEVES (Unit I)
IOCATION SZK ARFA %MEGGY Sl 1) Fixe caafinxd resulting in loss Fire confirmed resulting in the loss of of function of a channel (1/2) a safe shutdown system due to'.
of a safe shutdown system due to cae of the fallowing: la) loss of DG cooing water a) Loss of an em rgeacy service AND water pumps lb) Failure to make the spool piece tie OR fran the fire pxnp system to the b) Loss of any two (2) ccatainnent emaqymcy service water system snd spray raw water pumps'R to the diesel generator cooing water system c) Ioss of a diesel generator OR coaLfng water pump (102 or 103), 2a) Loss of nornal & enerymmy service GR pIGps d) Loss of diesel generator 102 or AND 103 2b) Loss of all normal inventory makeup GR capability to the vessel,
- 2) Fire ccafixmed in fire zone that AND involves safe shutdown cables or 2c) Failure to nake the spoal piece tie equipment to the feedwater system from fire pLRlp system ~
MHR: Spool piece ties are addressed in procedures:
- 1) NlP-18 (Bnerg. Serv. Wtr.)
- 2) NIL-21 (Feedwater)
- 3) NLWM5 (Diesel Gen. )
S2 14 'iesel Fire Pump Rm ZAP 27 February 1987
0 FIRE MA'IED KEEGBKY ACZKN LEKS 1.D. (Cont'd)
(Unit I)
DIKXZION ZCNE 6 T.B. 250'.E. Caad. Fire canfiraed in fire zcae that involves DA-2013N'A-20I3S Stor. Tank safe shutdown cables, T.B. '250'. Side E. OR Fire resulting in the loss of function of a chamM (1/2) af a safe shutdown system due to the falhxdng:
-1) Loss of PB 16B or PB 17B GR
- 2) Loss of PB 102 or PB 103 GR
Not Applicable IR-2022N T.B. 250'.W. Corner 1) Fire calmed resulting in the loss IR-2022S T.B. 250'. Side - of function of a chanrM (1/2) of a safe shutdown systen due to the folhmfng:
a) Loss af PB 102 GR b) Loss of PB 16B, GR
- 2) @re ca~d in fire zone that involves safe shutdown cables 01 ExpipDBnt e MHK: Fire area losses and repairs are addressed in IEP 82.
FAP-2 -Ã February 1987
EAP-2, 1.D. (Cent'd) 1 FEE RIKATH) BGMBKYACIXN MKS (Unit I)
T.B. 250'orth of Cable 1) Fire confirmed resulting in loss of Spreading Room function of a channel (1J2) of a safe shutdown system due to the fallowing:
a) Loss of DQ 103 OR b) Loss of PB:17B OR c) Inss of PB 102 OR
- 2) Fire ca~ed in fire zcae that Not Applicable involves safe shutdown cahles or HplipDBnto NZE: Fire area losses and repair's are addressed in IEP 81 D1C 20 DG 103 EL. 1) Fire ccnfiriad resulting in loss of function of a channel (1/2) 250'rea under PB 102 & 103 DQ 102 Foundation of a safe dmtdown system due to the following:
a) Loss of PB 102 OR b) Loss of DG 102 OR
,c) loss of DG 103 ',
- 2) Fire cmBmied in any two (2) retundant chmnels or fire zones that imralves safe shutdown cahles or apd.pnent EAP-2 - 29 February 1987
1.D. (Cont'd)
FIRE 1EfA'LED IMERGEHCY ACIXN MHS (Unit I)
FIRE
?ATE SZK ARFA M1$ENCY 19 DG 103 Foundation Fire confhxmd resulting in the loss of function'of DG 103.
1 Not Applicable T.B. 250'. Side E. Pire confirmed in fire zone that T.B. 250'. Side W. involves safe shutdown cables .
or equipneat t NHK: Fire area losses and repairs are addressed in IRP 82.
FAP-2 .30 Februar'y 1987
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PAP-2 Attachaeat 1.D. (Cont'd)
FIRE REMZD PUNGENCY ACIXGN MKS (Unit I)
PIRE SZK ARFA PiPRGHKY ZQZ
-2141 22, . Fire conBraed resulting in loss of function of DG 102 19 DG3103 Room Fire ccafinaed resulting in the loss Not Applicable af function DG 103 M76E R.B. 237'o 340'.E. N/A Stair~
Fire ccnfirmed resulting R.B. 237'. Side Fire ccaQrmed resulting in loss loss of functicn of a shut of functica of a channe1 (1/2) of dam system due to:
core spray system. la) Loss of shutdown cooling, AND R.B. 237'. lb) Isolation of both eaer-gency condenser loops, OR M<116E R1C R.B. 237'o 340'.E. . Not Applicable 2a) Loss of shutdam Staizwell cooing, AND R.B. 261'. Side Fire confirmed resulting in loss 2b) Loss of all four (4) of PB 171B core spray loops, AND 2c) Iuss of all six (6) electraratic relief R.B. 261'. Side Fire ccafirasd resulting in loss valves af PB 161B RB 31Se E R.B. 317'. W. Storage Not Applicable FAP 2 - 32 February 1987
EAP-.2, Attachment 1.D.- (Cant'd)
FRE RE[A'KD BKRGENCY ACZKN IEVEIS (Unit I)
D2D 24 PB 103 Roan F$ re conBrmai resulting in loss of, function of PB 103 PB 102 Roan Fire confirmed resulting in loss of function of PB 102 IK-2141A 22 D.G. 102 Roam Fire caafiraed resulting in loss DX-2141B of function of DQ 102 19 D.G. 103 Roam, Hre caafianed resulting in loss of function of DG 103
-$ 3 Febr'uary 1987
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EAP-2 ATTACHMENT 2 Classification of Emergency Conditions for NMPNS Unit II CONTENTS:
Figure 2.A. Action Level Criteria for Classification of Emergency Conditions for NMPNS Unit II Figure 2.B. Two and Thirty-Minute site Area Emergency Source eel*
Term Values for NMPNS Unit II Stack Release Figure 2.C, Two and Thirty-Minute site Area Emergency Source Term Values for NMPNS Unit II Ground Level. Release Figure 2.D. Fire Related Emergency Action Levels (Unit II) oil*
Table 2 Fire Related Emergency Action Levels (Unit II) eel*
Table 2 EAP-2 -35 March 1987..
EAP-2 Attac 2 Fi ure 2.A.
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II Initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency Off-normal Events Events Which Indicate Events Which Involve Events Which Involve Which Could Indicate an Actual Degradation Actual or Likely Major Actual or Imminent Sub-a Potential Degrada- of the-.Level of Safety Failures of Plant Functions stantial Core Degrada-tion of the Level of of the Plant Needed for Protection tion or Melting with Safety of the Plant of the Public Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity.
Radioactive Effluent Indicated by the fol- Indicated by the fol- Indicated by one or more Indicated by one or more lowing: lowing: . of the following:, of the following:
(hpplicable to any release points(s) -High Alarm(s)'n st'ack,, -Ten times High Alarm(s) -Effluent monitors detect -Release corresponds to
,~nd resulting from vent, or liquid effluent setpoint on stack or levels corresponding to >1000 mrem/hr to Whole any in'itiating event) monitor(s), with confir- vent or ten times the >50mr/hr for 1/2 hr, or Body or >5,000 mrem/hr mation by, the Chemistry High-High Alarm(s) or >500 mr/hr whole b'ody to child thyroid at site Laboratory, that Tech. setpoint on liquid for 2 minutes (or 5 times boundary under actual Specs. limits have been effluent monitor(s), these levels to the thy- meteorology as confirmed exceeded when averaged with confirmation by roid) at the. site bound- by field sample or lab over a period of one (1) the Chemistry Laboratory ary for adverse meteo- analysis, hour including any or that Tech. Specs. limits rology as indicated by, all contribution from have been exceeded Effluent monitors detect -These dose rates are Unit II, Unit I and the when averaged over a stack release rates projected based on plant J.A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear of one (1) hour'eriod in Attachment 2, Figure parameters or are meas-Power Plant. including any or all 2.B.,Data Sources (surveys ured in the environs, contribution from Unit monitors, etc.) indicate
-Routine or special II, Unit I, and the J.A. ground level release rates -Off-site dose due to samples or surveys. Fitzpatrick Nuclear in Attachment 2,Figure 2.C event is projected to Which indicate that Tech. Power Plant. -These dose rates are body exceed 5 rem to whole Spec. limits. have been projected based on plant body or 25 rem to the
, exceeded. (The stack -Routine or special parameters or are measured child thyroid at site and vent monitor alarm samples or surveys. in the environs~ boundary under actual
'is set at a lower value (The stack and vent -Effluent monitors detect meteorology.
than the Tech. Spec. monitor alarm is set levels such that projected liERit.) at a lower value than accumulated dose is >1 rem the Tech. Spec. limit.) whole body or >5 rem child thyroid at the site bounds for actual meterology.
EAP-2 -36 February 1987
0 EAP-2, 'Attachme Fi ure 2.A.
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II Initiating Con ition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency Hi h Radiation Levels Indicated by one or Indicated by one. or Indicated by one or more of the more of the following: more of the following: following:
Two or more area rad- Two or more area radi -Release corresponds to iation monitors reach action monitors or con >1000 mrem/hr to whole body their alarm points tinuous air monitors or >5000 mrem/hr to child (not including the TIP indicate greater than thyroid at site boundary room monitor or a moni- 1000 times background, under actual meteorology as tor in alarm due to Confirmed airborne confirmed by field sample a planned evolution),
Confirmed building activity greater than Not Applicable or lab analysis, 1000 x MPC.
ventilation duct air- -These dose rates are projected borne activity indi- based on plant parameters or cates in excess of are measured in the environs, MPC values, SSS decides radiation -Off-site dose due to event is condition in the statio projected to exceed 5 rem to the dictates the need for child thyroid at site boundary.
a station evacuation.
l~ael Dama e Indicated by one or Indicated by one or more of the following: more of the following:
Reactor system active- Reactor system active-ity exceeds 4.0 uCi/g vity exceeds 300 uCi/g H20 dose equivalent H20 total iodine.
I-131 Not Applicable
'Annunciation 851253, "Process Gas Rad. Mon.
Activated" and both
.off-gas monitors RE13A and RE13B trip on high alarm.
S ent Fuel Dama e Indicated by one or Major damage to spen more of the following: fuel with release of Fuel pool water level radioactivity as decreases below low indicated by high Not Applicable level 'alarm setting, radiation alarms on Fuel damage accident 2RMS-RE-111 and/or with release of radio- 112 AND SGTS auto activity to reactor initiates.
building as indicated by radiation alarms on EAP-2 -37 2EMS-RE-lll and/or 112.
February 1987
je EAP-2, Attachment ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION ure 2.A. (Cont'd)
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II I Initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency Reactor S stem Reactor system leak Reactor system leak Loss of coolant accident -In icate y one or more o tn~hte rfh rated exceeds 5 gpm rated exceeds 50 gpm which exceeds the make- the following:
from an unidentified from an unidentified up pump-capacity as in-source or total of 25 source as indicated dicated by all the Loss of 2 of 3 fission gpm as identified by by any one of the following: product barriers with a any one of the following: - Reactor low water potential loss of the third; following: -Alarm 873111 Drywell , level Ll alarms, Any initiating event that Any verified pressure floor drain tank high drywell makes release of large boundary leakage, level high-high pressure alarm, amounts of radioactivity Drywell floor drain AND high Drywell or , probable, i.'e.
leak rate high (>5 -Reactor building floor Reactor Building gpm average over 24 drain level high. floor drain tank hours),
Drywell floor drain level alarm, 1. LOCA with failure of HPCS, LPCS, RCIC and/ ECCS. Loss of contain-leak'rate high (>1 or LPCI auto active-ment imminent, gpm above normal). tion alarm, with failure of LOCA Main Steam line containment. Potential isolation valves for loss of ECCS, closure. 3. S/D occurs, but decay heat removal systems fail,
- 4. Transient occurs plus failure of requisite core S/D systems (Scram and Standby Liquid Control System).
Reactor Circulating Not Applicable Not 'Applicable Not Applicable P<<m Seizure Leadin Loss of plant'ontrol t.o Fuel Failure occurs.
External events which could h
cause massive common damage I
to plant systems leading to anyhof the above.
EAP-2 -38 February 1987
EAP-2 Attach , Fi ure 2.A.
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II initiating Conditi.on Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency
~he reded Core With Possible Loss of
- l. Indicated by all of the Indicated by one or more of the following: following:
Failure of control rods to -Loss of 2 of 3 fission product fully insert on a scram or product barriers with a shutdown as indicated on potential loss of the third; full core display panel; Any initiating event that Upscale readings on local makes release of large power range monitor (LPRM) amounts of radioactivity adjacent to not-fully- probable, i.e.
inserted rods; Not Applicable Not Applicable Very high coolant activity 1. LOCA with failure of ECCS.
as determined by sample Loss of containment imment, analysis (greater than or 2. LOCA with failure of Equal to 300 uCi/gram containment. Potential for equivalent of I-131). loss of ECCS, OR 3. S/D occurs, but decay heat
- 2. Indicated by all of the removal systems fail, following: 4. Transient occurs plus failure of requisite core S/D systems Reactor water level at or (Scram and Standby Liquid below top of active fuel Control System.
core height as indicated by reading on fuel zone Loss of plant control occurs.
level indicator; External events which could Very high coolant activity cause. massive common damage as determined by sample to plant systems leading to analysis (greater than or any of the above.
equal to 300uCi/gram equivalent of I-131).
EAP-2 -39 February 1987
EAP-2, Attachment ure 2.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II initiating Condition I Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
IReactor S stem (RS) IReactor system IIndicated by one or more of Ipressure exceeds Not Applicable Not Applicable Ithe following:
ll200 psig.
Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third; ITnitiation of ECCS IIndicated by one of Any initiating event that Icoincident with Ithe following: makes release of large I ositive findin that I amounts of radioactivity dis-IManual or automatic Not Applicable Not Applicable probable, i.e.
I~snurious and linitiation of:
char e to vessel High Pressure Core 1. LOCA with failure of Spray System or ECCS. Loss of contain-Low Pressure Core ment imminent, Spray System Low Pressure or 2. LOCA with failure of Coolant containment. Potential Injection Cooling for loss of ECCS, with verification of 3. S/D occurs, but decay flow established to heat removal systems the Reactor using fail, Redundant instrument 4. Transient occurs plus action. failure of requisite core
' S/D systems (Scram and Standby Liquid Control T System).
I I~as of containment ISame as intitiating I ante rit re uirin levent Loss of plant control Inkcal S ecifications Not Applicable Not Applicable occurs'xternal events which could I cause massive common damage I to plant systems leading to I any of the above.
I I
EAP-2 -40 February 1987
EAP-2 Attachment ure 2.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EHERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II initiating Condition I Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
Ipailure of a Reactor IFailure of a Safety/ IIndicated by one or more of I stem Safet IRelief Valve would be Ithe following: I lindicated by all of thel I reseat (exceedin lfollowing: I- Loss of 2 of 3 fission Inorma~lleaka e product barriers with a I- Annunciator 601537, potential loss of the third; "ADS Valves/Safety Any initiating event that Valves Leaking" makes release of large actuates. Not Applicable Not Applicable amounts of radioactivity probable, i.e.
Suppression Pool Temperature will 1. LOCA with failure of I rise ECCS. Loss of contain-I Verification with ment imminent, I acoustic monitor. 2. LOCA with failure of I containment. Potential I Drop in electrical for loss of ECCS, output, (Approx. 70 3. S/D occurs, but decay MWe), heat removal systems fail, Slight decrease in 4. Transient occurs plus reactor level, failure of requisite core S/D systems (Scram and SRV discharge tail- Standby Liquid Control pipe temperature System).
increases.
Loss of plant control S'team Flow/Feed Flow I occurs.
mismatch. External events which could cause massive common damage to plant systems leading to I any of the above.
I I
EAP-2 -41 February 1987
EAP-2, Attachment 2 re 2.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II Ini.tiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency IHain Steam Line Break ISteam line break out- ISteam line break out- Indicated by one or more of Iside the drywell with lside the drywell with the following:
)proper MSIV function. Ifailure of the MSIV.
IThis could be indi- IThis could be indi- Loss of 2 of 3 fission Icated by one or more Icated by: product barriers with a lof the following: potential loss of the third; Main Steam Flow Rate Failure of both Any initiating event that I High, MSIVs in the broken, makes release of large Reactor Pressure line to close or amounts of radioactivity Not Applicable decreases, Main steam isolate as probable, i.e.
tunnel indicated by posi-ambient temperature tion indication 1. LOCA with failure of high, accom anied b one ECCS. Loss of contain-Main steam tunnel or more of the ment imminent, differential temp- 1>> 2. LOCA with failure of erature high, Main steam flow rate containment. Potential Main steam tunnel high, for loss of ECCS, j I radiation high. Reactor pressure 3. S/D occurs, but decay decreases, heat removal systems
~1 'ain steam tunnel fail, I ambient temp. high, 4. Transient occurs plus I Main steam tunnel failure of requisite core I differential temp. S/D systems (Scram and I high, Standby Liquid Control I Main steam tunnel System).
I radiation high.
I Loss of plant control occurs.
External events which could cause massive common damage to plant systems leading to any of the above.
EAP-2 -42 February 1987 4
0 EAP-2, Attachment ure 2.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF EHERGEHCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II Initiating Condition I Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
ILoss of all off-site Ilndicated by either Ilndicated by one or more of I ower=or loss of on- lone of the following: Ithe following:
Isite AC ower I I~ca abf lit I- Loss of both 115 KV Not Applicable Not Applicable I- Loss of 2 of 3 fission feeders, product barriers with a I" Loss of Div. I and potential loss of the third; I Div. II on-site Any initiating event that I diesel generators. makes releases of large I amounts of radioactivity probable, i.e. I ILoss of all off-site Ilndicated by both of ILoss of on-site and I ower and loss of Ithe following: loff-site AC power (as 1. LOCA with failure of lail AC on-site ower Idefined by the ALERT) ECCS. Loss of contain-
~ca abflft Loss of both 115 KV lexceeds 15 minutes. ment imminent, Not Applicable feeders, 2. LOCA with failure of Loss of Div. I and containment. Potential Div. II on-site for loss of ECCS, diesel generators 3. S/D occurs, but decay with scram of the heat removal systems reactor. fail,
- 4. Transient occurs plus failure of requisite lI,oss of On-site Ilndicated by either ILoss of DC power boardslLoss of DC power (as core S/D systems (Scram IVital DC Power lone of the following: l2BYS*SWG002A and Idefined by the ALERT) and Standby Liquid l2BYS*SWG002B would be Isupplies exceeds 15 Control System).
I- Loss of Div. I and jindicated by annun- Iminutes. Loss of plant control Div. II emergency licators on Panel f852: occurs' system control Alarm 852108 Div I External events which could power, Emergency 125VDC cause massive common damage I
Loss Alarm 852208 Div II , to plant systems leading to I of control Emergency 125VDC any of the above.
I power to safety/
I relief valves I
I EAP-2 -43 February 1987
EAP-2 Attachment ure 2.A.(Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION 0 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II r
)Initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency Lnss of En ineered Same as Initiating Indicated by one or more of Event the following:
I:ire Prot'ection Loss of 2 of 3 fission re uirin shutdown product barriers with a
.b Technical S ecifi- potential loss of the i 8
r at'ions 3.0-3 (e. Not Applicable Not Applicable third because of malfunc" Any initiating event that t,inn ersonnel error makes release of large
'nr ~rocedutal amounts, of radioactivity inarle~uac probable, i.e.')
LOCA with failure of Pire confirmed and ECCS. Loss of contain-potentially affecting Fire confirmed result- ment imminent, Pire not under con- safe shutdown systems ing in the loss of a 2) LOCA with failure of trol wi:thin 10 minutes as indicated by: safe shutdown system containment. Potential i'lre or requiring assistance A) Pire resulting in as indicated by for loss of ECCS, of an off-site Fire the loss of func- Attachment 2, 3) S/D occurs, but decay Dept. to extinguish tion of a division Figure 2.D. heat removal systems of a safe shutdown fail, system, or 4) Transient occurs plus B) Pire in any fire failure of requisite core zone(s) that could S/D systems (Scram and impact two (2) re- Standby Liquid Control dundant divisions System).
involving shutdown Loss of plant control occurs cables or equipment. External events which could (See Attachment 2, cause massive common damage 8 Figure 2.D.) to plant systems leading to I any of the above.
loess of Indicators Loss of indicators or Loss of all Control Either one of the fol-Annunciators or alarms on process Room Alarms (Annun- lowing occurs:
Alarms or effluent para- ciators) meters not functional Loss of all alarms in control room to an for > 60 min. with extent requiring shut- plant not in cold S/
down by Technical Plant transient oc-Specifications curs while all alarm are lost EAP-2 -44 February 1987
EAP-2, Attachment ure 2.A. (Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATIO EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II I
I InitIating Condition Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency I
I Secocicv ISecurity threat or IOngoing security IImminent loss of I Indicated by one or more of ro~m romise Iattempted entry or Icompromise in aecord- Iphysical control of I the following:
I Isabotage in accordance lance with Site Ithe plant.
Iwith Site Security ISecurity Plan. I Loss of 2 of 3 fission I Plan. product barriers with a potential loss of the third; Any initiating event that I NesturaI Phenomenon IAny earthquake felt IEarthquake i0.075 g IEarthquake >0.15 g makes release of large I Fextbquake ISn-plant or detected l(>OBE) as noted by l(>SSE) as noted by a amounts of radioactivity I Ion Station seismic Ivalid actuations of: Ivalid aetuations of: probable, i.e.
I linstxumentation by IAlarm Annunciation IAlarm Annunciation I Ivalid trip of Alarm l842121 on 2CEC-PNL842 I842121 on 2CEC-PNL842 1. LOCA with failure of I I842121 on 2CEC-PNL 842. IAND of the amber light IAND of the Red light on ECCS. Loss of contain-I I lon response spectrum Iresponse spectrum an- ment imminent, I IAnnunciator RSA3A AND Inuniator RSA3A AND plantl 2. LOCA with failure of I I Iplant not in cold shut- Inot in cold shutdown. containment. Potential I
\
ldown. for loss of ECCS, I Flood, Tsunami, I ILake water level 3. S/D occurs, but decay I Uurricane Surge, ILake water level ILake water level lexperienced or pro- heat removal systems Igeicbe lexperieneed or pro- lexperienced or pro- Ijeeted greater than fail, I Ijected near design Ijected near design Idesign levels or 4. Transient occurs plus I Ilevels. Ilevels. Idamages vital equip- failure of requisite core I I lment at lower levels. S/D systems (Scram and I Tornado 'n-site IAny tornado experi- !Tornado striking the I Standby Liquid Control I lenced or projected Ifacility. ISustained winds in ex- System).
I lon-site. Icess of design levels I I lof 100 mph.
I I Loss of plant contxol I I occurs.
I I External events which could I i'<irrieane IAny hurricane experi- IExperienced or pro- ISustained winds in cause massive common damage Ienced or projected Ijeeted hurricane lexcess of design levels to plant systems leading to Iwitbin the 10-mile Iwinds approach lof 100 mph.. any of the above.
I FP7 .. I100 mph. I I I I EAP-2 - 5 Fe ruary
'kgb bye Qp /yeah EAP-2 Attachment i ure 2.A.(Cont'd)
ACTION LEVEL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATI EHERGENCY CONDITIONS FOR NMPNS UNIT II Initiating Condition Unusual Event Alert ISite Area Emergency General Emergency Indicated by one or more of Turbine IExperienced or pro- ITurbine failure causing Ithe following ljeeted turbine failure Ipenetration. This would Icausing rapid plant Ibe indicated by one or Loss of 2 of 3 fission Ishutdown. Imore of the following: product barriers with a I Not Applicable potential loss of the third;
,I- Rapid loss of condenserl Any initiating event that =
vacuum, makes release of large I- Turbine overspeed, amounts of radioactivity Loud unusual noises. probable, i.e.
I 1. LOCA with failure of IHissile or IExplosion or missile IExperienced or pro- IExperienced or pro- ECCS. Loss of contain-IEx losion lexperienced or pro- ljected known missile ljected severe damage ment imminent, Ijected within 2 miles lor explosion damage Ito safe shutdown 2. LOCA with failure of I lof the site. Ito facility affecting lequipment and plant containment. Potential I I plant operation. Inot in cold shutdown. for loss of ECCS, I I 3. S/D occurs, but decay I heat removal systems IAircraft . IEither one of the IEither one of the IAircraft crash causingl fail,.
Ifollowing occurs: Ifollowing occurs: Idamage or fire in one 4. Transient occurs plus lor more of the failure of requisite core Experienced or pro- Aircraft projected Ifollowing: S/D systems (Scram and jected unusual air- to strike a station Standby Liquid Control craft activity over structure. Drywell; System).
the facility, Aircraft strikes a Control Room; Aircraft crashes station structure. Reactor Bldg; Loss of plant control on-site. Waste Bldg; occurs'xternal Turbine Bldg; events which could Screen House. cause massive common damage to plant systems leading to IToxic or IToxie or flammable gas IExperienced or projected IExperienced or pro- any of the above.
I Flammable Gases Ireleases experienced lentry of toxic or flam- ljected entry into lor projected within 2 Imable gas into facility Ivital areas and Imiles of the site. lenvirons. Presents habit-Irestricts necessary I lability problems, which laccess.
I lare verified by portable I I linstruments. I EAP-2 -46 February 1987
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tl4llvll LsvcJJ 45.LIVIA FOK CLAvusa a.v Init ating Condition I Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergen IControl Room Evacuation of Control IEvacuation of Control I Indicated by one or more of I Evacuation IRoom anticipated or IRoom as determined by the following:
Irequired as determined Ithe Site Emergency I Not Applicable Iby the Site Emergency IDirector, and control Loss of 2 of 3 fission I IDirector, with control lof shutdown systems not product barriers with a I lof shutdown systems lestablished from local potential loss of the third; I lestablished from local lstations in 15 minutes. Any initiating event that I Istations. makes release of large I amounts of radioactivity I probable, i.e. I I All other Plant IOther plant conditions IOther plant, conditions IOther plant conditions I Anomalies l exist, as determined lexist, as determined lexist, as determined 1. LOCA with failure of Iby the Site Emergency Iby the Site Emergency Iby the Site Emergency ECCS. Loss of contain-IDirector, that warrant IDirector, that warrant IDirector, that warrant ment imminent, lincreased awareness Iprecautionary active- lactivation of 2. LOCA with failure of lon the part of the Ition of the Technical lemergency centers and gontainment. Potential Iplant operating staff ISupport Center and Imonitoring teams or for loss of ECCS, lor State and/or local Iplacing Emergency la precautionary 3. S/D occurs, but decay loff-site authorities. IOperations Facility lnotification to the heat removal systems IThese conditions may land other key emer- Ipublic within the 10- fail, linclude plant shutdown Igency personnel. Imile EPZ. 4. Transient occurs plus
. Iunder T.S.require- failure of requisite core Iments or involve S/D systems (Scram and lother than normal Standby Liquid Control Icontrolled shutdown System).
- Loss of plant control IRadioactive Off-site I Transportation accident I occurs.
IS ills and/or Trans- Iwith the release of Not Applicable Not Applicable External events which could I ortation Accident Iradioactive material to cause massive common damage IInvolvin Radioactive Ithe environment. to plant systems leading to I Material bein Shi ed lenvironment. any of the above.
Ito or from NMPNS I I
EAP-2 -48 February 1987
, EAP-2 Is Attachment 2 Fi ure 2.B.
Two and Thirt -Minute Site Area Kmer enc Source Term Values for NMPNS Unit II Stack Release Wind Direction from Site Boundary Q2 Q30 Distance CPS Ci/sec CPS Ci/sec (Meters) (Miles) 168.75 191.25 75 4.66E-2 1.93 K+4 2.42 E+6 1.93 E+3 2.42 K+5 191.25 213.75 75 4.66E-2 1.93 K+4 2.42 E+6 1.93 E+3 2.42 E+5 213.75 236.25 91 5.03E-2 1.93 K+4 2.42 E+6
, 1.93 E+3 2.42 K+5 236.25 258.75 107 6.64E-2 2.05 E+4 2.S7 E+6 2.05 K+3 2.57 E+5=
258.75 281.25 1555 9.66E-l 2.20 K+5 2.76 K+7 2.20 K+4 2.76 E+6 281.25 303.75 1S55 9.66E-1 2.15 E+5 2.69 E+7 2.15 E+4 2.69 K+6 303.75 326.25 1600 9.94E-l 2.15 K+5 2.69 E+7 2.15 K+4 2.69 K+6 326.25 348.75 2134 1.33 2.78 K+5 3.49 E+7 2.78 K+4 3.49 E+6 348.75 11.25 2256 1.40 2.85 K+5 3.57 E+7 2.85 E+4 3.57 E+6 C
11.25 33.75 1936 1.20 2.55 K+5 3.20 E+7 2.S5 K+4 3.20 E+6 33.75 56.25 1615 1.00 2.16 K+5 2.71 K+7 2.16 K+4 2.71 E+6 56.25 78.75 405 2.52E-1 6.84 E+4 8.S7 K+6 6.84 K+3 8.57 K+5 78.75 101.25 117 2.27E-2 2.23 K+4 2.80 E+6 2.23 E+3 2.80 E+5 101.25 123.75 98 5.46E-2 1.93 K+4 2.42 E+6 1.93 K+3 2.42 E+5 123.75 146.25 81 4.66E-2 1.93 E+4 2.42 K+6 1.93 E+3 2.42 K+5 146.25 168.75 75 4.66E-2 1.93 K+4 2.42 E+6 1.93 E+3 2.42 K+5 Atmospheric conditions assumed for stack height of 131 meters for releases.
2 ~ values are calculated based on the characteristics of the AT=0 hrs.
post-LOCA distribution of isotopes at the main stack gaseous effluent monitor.
3 ~
Q2 is based on 500 mr/hr exposure for 2 minutes and the Q30 is based on 50'mr/hr exposure. for 30 minutes.
The Q2 and Q30 values in the table were .not corrected for the radioactive decay during the plume travel time from the release point to the receptor under consideration.
The Q2 and Q30 values shown are calculated using the most conservative X/Q for each sector. The Site Boundary Distances shown correspond to this X/Q. See Unit II FSAR Table 2F-1 for a summary of Site Boundary Distances.
EAP-2 -49, February 1987
EAP-2 Attachment 2 Fi ure 2.C.
Two and Thirt -Minute Site Area Emer enc Source Term Values for NMPNS Unit II Ground Level Release Wind Direction from Site Boundary Q2 Q30 Distance CPS Ci/sec CPS Ci/sec (Meters) (Miles) 168.75 191.'25 192 1.92E-1 2.25 E+3 2.37 K+5 2.25 E+2 2.37 E+4 191.25"- 213.75 207 1.29E-1 5.13 K+3 5.40 E+5 "5.13 K+2 5.40 K+4 213. 75 236.25 285 1.77E-1 1.28 K+4 1.35 K+6 1.28 K+3 1.35 K+5 236.25 258.75 419 2.60E-1 2.40 K+4 2.53 K+6 2.40 E+3 2,40 K+5 258.75 281.25 1686 1.05 1.03 E+5 1.09 K+7 1.03 E+4 1.09 K+6 281.25 303.75 1686 1.05 1.55 K+5 1.63 K+7 1.55 K+4 1.63 E+6 303.75 326.25 1743 1.08 1.55 E+5 1.63 K+7 1.55 K+4 1.63 E+6 326.25 348.75
, 2094 1.30 2.65 K+5 2.80 K+7 2.65 K+4 2.80 K+6 348.75 11.25 1945 1.21 7.99 E+4 8.43 E+6 7.99 K+3 8.43 K+5 11.25 33.75 1695 1.05 1.58 K+5 1.67 E+7, 1.58 K+4 1.67 K+6 33.75 56.25 1381 8.58E-1 9.41 K+4 9.92 K+6 9.41 K+3 9.92 E+5 56.25 78.75 988 6.14E-1 6.19 K+4 6.53 K+6 6.19E+3 6.53 K+5 78.75 101.25 402 2.50E-1 7.66 K+3 8.08 K+5 7.66 K+2 8.08 E+4 101.25 123.75 293 1.82E-1 3.80 K+3 4.02 K+5 3.81 K+2 4.02 K+4 123.75 146.25 227 1.41E-1 2.48 K+3 2.61 E+5 2.48 K+2 2.61 K+4 1146.25 168.75 187 1.16E-1 1.62 K+3 1.70 K+5 1.62 E+2 1.70 E+4
- 1. Atmospheric conditions assumed for vent height of 57 meters for releases.
- 2. Q values are calculated based on the characteristics of the AT=0 hrs.
post-LOCA distribution of isotopes at the radwaste/reactor building vent gaseous effluent monitor.
e
- 3. Q2 is based on 500 mr/hr exposure for 2 minutes and the Q30 is based on 50 mr/hr exposure for 30 minutes.
- 4. The Q2 and Q30'alues in the table were not corrected for the radioactive decay 'during the plume travel time from the release point to the receptor under consideration.
- 5. The Q2 and Q30 values shown are calculated using the most conservative X/Q for each sector. The Site Boundary Distances shown correspond to this X/Q. See Unit II FSAR Table 2F-1 for a summary of Site Boundary Distances.
EAP-2 -50'ebruary 1987
Attachm , Fi ure 2.D.
FIRE RELATED EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (UNIT II)
CROSS-REFERENCE INDEX DETECTION FIRE PAGE DETECTION FIRE PAGE DETECTION FIRE PAGE PANEL ZONE NO. PANEL ZONE NO PANEL ZONE NO ~
PNL 101 201SW 45 PNL 123 806NZ 45 PNL 128 333XL 45 PNL 101 203SW 45 PNL 123 802NZ 49 PNL 128 332NW 47 PNL 101 204SW 46 PNL 123 803NZ 49 PNL 128 334NZ 47 PNL 101 212SW 46 PNL 123 807NZ 49 PNL 128 343NZ 47 PNL 101 202SW 46 PNL 123 361NZ 51 PNL 128 340NZ 48 PNL 101 211SW 48 PNL 123 362NZ 51 PNL 128 336XL 49 PNL 101 213SW 49 PNL 123 363NZ 51 PNL 128- 339NZ 49 PNL 101 205NZ. 49 PNL 125 402SW 45 PNL
'28 342XL 49 PNL 101 206SW 50 'PNL 125 403SW 49 PNL 128 337NW 50 PNL 101 207SW 50 PNL 125 404Sw 49 PNL 128 338NZ 50 PNL 101 208SW 50 PNL 125 401NZ 52 PNL 128 335NZ 51 PNL 101 214SW 50 PNL 126 301NW 46 PNL 128 341NZ 51 PNL 103 221SW 45 PNL 126 302NW 46 PNL 128 331NW 51 PNL 103 222SW 46 PNL 126 303NW 46 PNL 129 352NW 47 PNL 103 223SW 49 PNL 126 305NW 47 PNL 129 371NW 47 PNL 103 224SW 50 PNL 126 306NW 47 PNL 129 360NZ 48 PNL 104 232SW 46 PNL 126 -304NW 51 PNL 129- 380NZ 48 PNL 104 231SW 48 PNL 126 309NW 51 PNL 129 359NW 51 PNL 104 239SW 49 PNL 126 312NZ 51 PNL 129 377NW 51 PNL 104 238SW 50 PNL 127 236NZ 47 PNL 129 351NZ 51 PNL 105 243SW 46 PNL 127 321NW 47 PNL 129 378NZ 51 PNL 105 245SW 49 PNL 127 322NW 47 PNL 129 353SG 52 PNL 104 256NZ =52 -PNL 127 325NW 47 PNL 129 354SG 52 PNL 106 252SW 46 PNL 127 327NW 49 PNL 129 356NZ 52 PNL 106 253XL 51 PNL 127 323NW 50 PNL 129 357XG 52 PNL 106 255SW 51 PNL 127 324NW 50 PNL 129 358XG 52 PNL 107 271SW 48 PNL 127 326NW 50 PNL 129 362SG 52 PNL 107 272SW 51 PNL 129 373NZ 52
.PNL 108 ~
273SW 48 PNL 129 374SG 52 PNL 108 274SW 51 PNL 129 375SG 52
'NL 108 281NZ 51 PNL 129 376XG 52 PNL 129 381SG 52 EAP-2 February 1987
EAP-2 Attachnent 2, 2.D. (Cant'd)
FIRE REIAG9) BfEMMYACQQN ISELS (BGT II)
For II pa~ca of this FIgure 2.D.. a Safe Shutdown System for Uoit consists of any one of the fal1owing decay heat raix)val paths; 1) HHS, S/RV/ADS, 1UR Poal Cooling, MR Shutdown Coaling, 2) RCIC, S/RV/ADS, 1UR Pool Coaling, 1UR Shutdown Coaling.
Fire confirmed in fire zaoe Fire confirmed resulting in .
AND loss of function of a safe with either (A) OR (B) listed below: shutdown system listed below:
(DIV 1)
( OR B la) Ioss of HPCS (for more than 30 mIn.)
Resulting in A secad Qxe OR the loss of ccaBnned involving lb) Loss of RCIC function of SSD cables or (for more th 30 mIn.),
one division ettuipnent (in both AND of su~tern zcnes) in any one 2a) Loss of A or B loop of RIR listed be1ow: . of the fallowing poal coaling (for more fire zones: than 45 min.),
OR 2b) Loss of A or B loop of RHR shutdown coaling (for more than l20 adn.).
Mv. 1 Mv. 1 (KG-1) 403SW (HX 1) R or Shov74A, C&E FA17 Mv. 1 Rm Div. 1 DC 336XL M 123 FA61 SP Rm B SWPA, C&E 802HZ,803NZ,807NZ, ENL 101 iv 1 LPCS 206SW,207SW,208SW, Mv 1 MR&
M 103 Ax Bay N. E1. 215 Mv 1 MR-A 237NZ,323NW,324NW, 326NW,337NW,338NZ, 253XL,255SW,304NW, 309%1,312%,335NW, 359NW, or 377NW EAP-2 -52 February 1987
EAP-2 Attachment 2 re 2.D. (Cont'd)
FIRE RELATED EHERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (UNIT II)
(DFTFCTION FIRE FIRE FIRE ZONE ALERT SITE AREA PANEL . ZONE LOCATION EHERGENCY Fire confirmed in fire zone Fire confirmed resulting in AND loss of function of a safe with either (A) OR (B) listed +low: shutdown system listed below:
(DIV 1)
A OR (B la) Loss of HPCS (for more than 30 min.)
Resulting in A second fire OR the loss of confirmed involving lb) Loss of RCIC function of SSD cables or (for more than 30 min.),
one division equipment (in both AND sub-system zones) in any one 2a) Loss of A or B loop of RH listed below of the following pool cooling (for more fire zone: than 45 min.),
OR 2b) Loss of A or B loop of PNL 101 Div. 1 204SW FA2 RCIC P RER 175'x RCIC shutdown cooling (for mor 212SW FSA Bldg. Gen area Pool Lv or Temp 213SW,223SW, than 120 min.).
N. 175/196'HR indications 239SW,245SW, 202SW FA1 Hx Rm A or 205NZ,404SW, PNL 103 222SW FSA34 Rx Bld . N. 215'X LPCS 327NW,339NZ, PNL 104 232SW FSA34 Bld . N. 240 or 342XL,403SW, PNL 105 243SW FSA34 Rx Bldg No 261 RHR-A 336XL,253XL, or 255SW,304NW, RCIC 309NW,312NW, or 335NW,359NW, ADS or 377NW PNL 106 252SW FSA34 Rx Bld . N. El. 289 Div 1 RHR-A
,PNL 126 301NW FA8 Elec Tnnl N El 214 or 302NW FA7 Elec Tnnl NW El 210 Div 1 RCIC 303NW FA10 Elec Tnnl SW El 214 EAP-2 " 53 February 1987
EAP-2 Attachment 2 re 2. D. (Cont'd) ,f8 FIRE RELATED EHERGENCY ION LEVELS (UNIT II)
DETECTION FIRE FIRE FIRE ZONE ALERT SITE AREA EHERGENCY
,PANEL ZONE AREA LOCATION I
I Fire confirmed in fire zone Fire confirmed resulting in AND 1 loss of function of a safe th either (A) OR (B) listed below: shutdown system listed below:
(DIV 1)
A OR B la) Loss of HPCS (for more than 30 min.)
esulting in the A second fire OR loss of function confirmed involving lb) Loss of RCIC of one division SSD cables or (for more than 30 min.),
of sub-systems equipment (in both AND isted below: zones) in any one 2a) Loss of A or B loop of RH the following pool cooling (for more
'f fire zones: than 45 min.).
OR PNL 126 305NW FA17 Div 1 cable chase 214', 2b) Loss of A or B loop of RH FA16 Div 1 cable chase 21 shutdown cooling (for mor PNL 127 236NZ FA48 Elec TNL Vert 237'iv than 120 min.).
21NW 1 cable chase 2 0 22NW FA17 Div 1 cable area PNL 128 325NW 332NW FA22 FA16 1 cable chase 24 Div 1 cable chase 237'iv or RCIC B'rattached C'r D'See 33 NZ 'A17 1 Bat Rm 261'SS 306'HR-A 261'iv table 82) 343NZ FA44 Rm A 261'iv PNL 129 352NW 1 cable chase 277'iv 371NW FA16 1 cable chase EAP-2 - 54 February 1987
EAP-2 Attachment 2 re 2. D. (Cont'd)
FIRE RELATED EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (UNIT II)
DETECTION FIRE PIRE ZONE SITE AREA EMERGENCY PANEL ZONE LOCATION Pire confirmed in fire zone Fire confirmed resulting in AND loss of function of a safe with either (A) OR (B) listed below: shutdown system listed below:
(DIV 1)
(A OR - (B) la) Loss of HPCS (for more than 30 min.)
in the A second fire OR loss of function confirmed involving lb) Loss of RCIC of one division SSD cables or (for more than 30 min.),
of sub-systems equipment (in both AND 306'esulting listed below: zones) in any one 2a) Loss of A or B loop of RHR of the following pool cooling (for more fire zones: than 45 min.).
OR PNL 101 211SW FAl Auz Ba N 2b) Loss of A or B loop of RH shutdown cooling (for more 198'A1 t'NL 104 231SW Auz Ba N Rz Bld ~ NW 32 Not Applicable Not Applicable than 120 min.).
240'SA3 PNL 107 271SW PNL 108 273SW FSA34 Rz Bld . NW 328'A22 PNL 128 340NZ HVAC Rm 261 PNL 129 360NZ FA25 HVAC Rm CB Corridor 288'A76 80NZ EAP-2 << 55 February 1987
EAP-2 Attadnent 2 2.D. (Cont'd)
FIRE MEAGER) BKRGEXCY ACZMN MUKS (UNIT 11)
IEIHZMN SITE AREA PANEL BfERGENCY Pire cmBmaed in fire zone, Fire confirmed. resulting in AND loss of functim of a safe with (A) OR (B) listed below: shutdown system listed (DIV 2) below.'a)
(A) -- OR (B) Loss of HHS (for more than 30 min. )
in A second 'fire OR the loss of cm~med involving lb) Ioss'of RCIC function of SSD cahlm or (for more than 30 min.),
on division equipnent (in both AND sul~tems zones) in any one 2a) Ioss of A or B loop of RHR listed below: of the fallowing pool cooling (for more fire zones than 45 min.),
OR 261'esulthg .2b) Ioss of A or B loop of RHR 403SW FA29 Dv 2 DG Rm 261'B Div 2 (EDG-3) , shutdown cooling (for more 336XL FA19 Rm 402SW,333XI than 120 min.).
Area 261'ntake 802HZ FA71 224'WP 806NZ,'212%i, Rm A 224'WP Div 2 SWP (B,D,&F) 222SW,232SW, Rm A 224'x 243SW, or A or ENL 101 Bldg General Rx Lv, Pool Lv & BorC Area So temp indicatica, (see attached MR '& HPCS 175'/195'KS table R) 205HZ FA4 Rm 404'A30 175'v 3 EDG-2 Rm ENL 127 HECS (hble Area 244'v PNL 128 3 Bat Rm 261'HS Rm PNL 103 RX Bld So Lv & Pool tern'p F or D ENL 104 Ba So 215'ux 240'x 261'ool aaScati~ (~ a~d ENL 105 245% ESA35 Bldg So. table 82)
EAP-2 :56'ebruary 1987
EAP-2 Attachment 2 re 2.D. (Cont'd) /s FIRE RELATED EHERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (UNIT II)
>>FTEC r ION FIRE FIRE FIRE ZONE ALERT SITE AREA
>>hNEL ZONE AREA LOCATION EHERGENCY Fire confirmed in fire zone Fire confirmed resulting in AND loss of function of a safe with (A) OR (B) listed below: shutdown system listed below:
(DIV 2),
A - OR B la) Loss of HPCS (for more than 30 min.)
in A second fire OR.
the loss of confirmed involving lb) Loss of RCIC function of SSD cables or (for more than 30 min.),
one division equipment (in both AND 215'esulting of sub-systems listed below:
zones) in any one of the following 2a) Loss of A or B loop of pool cooling (for more RH fire zones: than 45 min.),
OR 2b) Loss of A or B loop of RH PNL 101 206SW FA3 Ax B So RHR HxRM B 175 shutdown cooling (for more 207SW FA3 Ax B So 175 RHR P Rm B than 120 min.).
208SW FA3 Az B So 175 RHR P Rm C 21 SW FA6 Ax B So 19 PNL 103 224SW FA3 Ax Ba So PNL 104 238SW FSA35 Rz Bld 240'iv RHR B, C A+ C PNL 127 323NW FA19 2 Cable Area (See attached 237'iv 324NW FA18 2 Cable Area 240'iv table f2) 326NW FA23 2 Cable Area PNL 128 337NW FA18 Chase E 244'able 261'SS 338NZ FA34 Rm B 261e February 1987
EAP-2 Attachment ure 2.D. (Cont'd)
PIRE RELATED EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (UNIT II)
DETECTION FIRE PIRE ZONE SITE AREA PANEL ZONE LOCATION EMERGENCY ire confirmed in fire zone Fire confirmed resulting in AND loss of function of a safe ith either (A)I OR (B) listed below: shutdown system listed below:
(DIV 2)
A - OR B la) Loss of HPCS (for more than 30 min.)
in A second fire OR the. loss of confirmed involving lb) Loss of RCIC unction of SSD cables or (for more than 30 min.),
n division equipment (in both AND ub-systems zones) in any one 2a) Loss of A or B loop of RHR isted below: of the following pool cooling (for more .
328'sulting fire zones: than 45 min.),
OR 2b) Loss of A or B loop of RHR PNL 106 253XL FA81 Rx B N 289 600V Sw r Rm shutdown cooling (for more 255$ W FSA35 Rx Bldg. ST than 120 min.).
PNL 126 RHR B, C 289'lec 304NW PA 9 Tunnel 1 SE FA1 Div 2 Cable chase 21 or HPCS A or B or D 312NZ PA16 2 Cable chase 214'iv
'iv or C or P PNL 128 335NZ FA14 2 Bat Rm (See attached 261'iv PNL 129 359NW PA18 2 Cable chase table S2) 288'iv 377NW FA18 2 Cable chase 306'z PNL 107 272SW FSA35 Bld S.W.
PNL 108 274SW PSA35 Rz B Gen Area E 328'z 281NZ PSA35 B N 253'i ot Applicable Not Applicable PNL 123 361NZ PA55 e Tunnel 245' 362NZ PA55 Pi e Tunnel 2 NE 363NZ FA55 Pi e Tunnel 245' PNL 12 3 1NZ FA23 CB Div 2 HVAC Rm 261 PA17 DG-CB Corridor 261'B PNL 129 51NZ FA72 Corr & Inst Sho 288'B 378NZ PA72 Dv 2 HVAC 306'8 February 1987
0 EAP-2 Atta 2 Fi ure 2.D.
FIRE RELATED EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (UNIT II)
DETECTION FIRE FIRE FIRE ZONE ALERT SITE AREA AREA LOCATION EMERGENCY PANEL ZONE PNL 105 256NZ Drywell Fire confirmed involving SSD Fire confirmed resulting in (Div I, II, III)
& cables or equipment loss of function of a safe shutdown system listed below:
PNL 125 401NZ FA28 Diesel Generator Fire confirmed in a fire zone FA29 Control Room resulting in the loss of function la) Loss of HPCS FA30 (Div I, II, & III) of any DG (for more than 30 min.)
OR OR Fire confirmed in any 2 of lb) Loss of RCIC 3 fire areas involving SSD (for more than 30 min.)
cables or equipment AND 2a) Loss of A or B loop of RHR PNL 129 353SG pool cooling (for more 354SG than 45 min.),
FA24 Relay Room Fire confirmed involving SSD OR 356NZ (Div I, II, & III) cables or equipment 2b) Loss of A or B loop of 357XG OR shutdown cooling (for more 358XG Fire confirmed resulting in than 120 min.).
362SG the evacuation of the control room 373NZ Main Control Room 374SG FA26 (Div I, II, & III) 375SG 381SG EAP-2 59 February 1987
4 0 FAP-2, Attachment 2, 2.D. Table 2 FIRE REML?D BfKGENCY ACIXON IEV8XS (UNIT II)
DIVISION A LKS 1URW (Div AC Per) 2ISW, 203SW, 221SW, (402SW, 333XL)
B 1URW & RCIC 202SW, 252SW, 302%, 302NW, 303NW, 305NW, 306NW, 236NZ, 321NW, Rx Lv Pool Lv & T indication RCIC & LKS F SWP Div 1 (A, C, F)
Lv & Temp cation RCIC~,GU)
- 222SW, 232SW, 2 3SW NA 21LSW 271SW 27 2 A'URH, C & (Div II AC PHB 206SW, 207SW, 208SW, 214SW, 224SW, 238SW, 238SW, 237NZ, 323NW, 324NW 326NW, 337NW, 338NZ, (403SW, 336XL)
B'KS 205NZ, 404SW, 327NW, 339NZ, 342XL D'xRHRPB, C & HHS Lv, Pool-Iv & T indication 255SW~ 304Nt?1 ~ 309NW j 312NW~ 335NW j 359NW~ 377NW G'A RHR & HPCS E'WP F'ool II Div Lv & T B D F hdication 272SW, 274SW, 281NZ, 361NZ, 362NZ, 363NZ, 331NZ, 341NZ, 256NZ, 2 Both Divs.
th Divs.
DG l Relay 2 &-.3 Room Control Rms 353SG, 354SG, 355NZ, 356NZ, 357XG, 358XG, 362SG Bo Diva. Control Room EAP-2 60 February 1987
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN AND, PROCEDURES PROCEDURE NO. EPP-22 DAMAGE CONTROL DATE AND INITIALS APPROVALS SIGNATURES EVISION 1 REVISION 2 REVISION 3 Chemistry & Radiation nagement Superintendent W. N. Leach Maintenance Superintendeng K. A. Dahlberg Station Superintende NMPNS T. M. Roman Wc. f rtg
/
General Superintendent Nuclear Genera t ion Cha irman of S . 0 . R . C .
l a T. J. Perkins ii ': .
Summary of Pages REVISION 3 (Effective 4/23/84).
PAGE DATE i, 1-15 January'954 NIAGARA MOHAWK POVER CORPORATION THIS PROCEDURE NOT TO BE USED AFTER APRIL 1986 SUBJECT TO PERIODIC REVIEW.
I
/
EPP-22 DAMAGE CONTROL TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Contents ~Pa e 1.0 Purpose 2.0 Reference 3.0 Responsibilities 4.0 Equipment 3 5.0 Damage Control Team Composition 3 I 6.0 Procedure 3 6.1 Damage Control Teams 3 I l
6.2'.3 Damage Control Team Coordinator 4 Maintenance Coordinator t 6.4 Xnstrumentation and Control Coordinator 6 6.5 OSC Instrumentation and Control Coordinator 8 I
7.0 Guidelines for Personnel Safety During Damage Control Operations.
~P2 res Emergency Damage Control Summary Sheet List of Damage Repair Procedures Attachment 1- Nl-DRP-1 Zone Map for Turbine Bldg. El.
2- Nl-DRP-2 Zone Map Turbine Bldg. El.
250'or 3- Nl-DRP-3 Zone Map Turbine Bldg. El.
250'or Offgas Tunnel 250'or Nl-DRP-4 Zone Map Turbine Bldg. El.
250'PP-22
-i January 1984
0 EPP-22 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to define the actions necessary to provide for the assessment, repair and maintenance of equipment/components during an emergency.
2.0 REFERENCES
2 ' EAP-1 "Activation and Direction of Emergency Plan" 2.2 EAP-3 "Emergency Personnel Action Procedures" 2.3 EPP-15 "Health Physics Procedure" 2.4 Damage Repair Procedures Nl-DRP-1 thru Nl-DRP-7 2.5 EPNP-2 "Emergency Equipment Inventory and Checkli.sts" 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 2
3 ' Station Shift Supervisor
- a. Assumes the role of Site Emergency Director, until properly relieved by a ranking site supervisor.
- b. Evaluates the cons'equences of a radiological emergency, as pertains to nuclear safety'nd the overall operation of the it plant; including the use of Damage Control Teams to minimise, control, or terminate the emergency condition.
3.2 Y>aintenance Coordinator The Haintenance Coordinator is responsible to the Site Emergency Director for the management of efforts to'.
a) Repair equipment during an emergency; b) Haintain equipment during an emergency; c) 'nstall emergency structures, systems, and componerts; d) 'Perform mitigation and clean up activities during an emergency'hese
, responsibilities also include providing technical and administrative direction to the Damage Control Teams per EAP-3, Enclosure 7.
EPP-22 -1 January 1984
3.3 Instrumentation and Control Coordinator The Instrumentation and Control Coordinator is responsible to the Site Emergency Director for the management of efforts to:
a) Repair I&C equipment during an emergency.
b) Maintain I&C equipment during an emergency.
c) Install emergency I&C components d) Perform mitigation and clean up activities during an emergency.
These responsibilities also include providing technical and administrative direction to the Damage Control Teams per EAP-3, Enclosure 4.
3.4 Dama e Control Team Coordinator The Damage Control Team Coordinator is responsible to the Operations Support Center Coordinator for:
3.4.1 Providing techn1cal and admin1strative direct1on to Damage Control Teams as directed by the OSC Coordinator and/or the Maintenance Coordinator.
3.4.2 Providing an assessment of any damaged equipment and necessary personnel or equipment needs to effect emergency repairs.
3.4.3 Keeping OSC personnel appriased of Damage Control and Repair activities.
3.5 OSC Instrumentation and Control Coordinator The OSC I&C Coodinator is responsible to the Operations Support Center Coordinator for:
3.5.1 Providing technical and administrative direct1on to the I&C members of Damage Control Teams as directed by the OSC Coordinator and/or the I&C Coordinator.
3.5.2 Coordinating +1th the Damage Control Team Coordinator on assessment of any damaged I&C related equipment and necessary repairs.
3.5.3 Keeping OSC personnel appraised of I&C Damage Control and. Repair activities.
3.6 Dama e Control Team The Damage Control Team is responsible to the Maintenance Coordinator and/or I&C Coordinator for conducting assessment, repair, and maintenance operations during an emergency.
EPP-22 -2 January l984
~
I
4.0 EQUIPMENT The equipment which may be used to perform damage control actions can be found in the following kits/locations:
Communications Equipment - OSC Equipment Cabinet Fire Kits Locker Room 261' Elevation Turbine Bldg Elevation Elevation 237'61'mergency 261'77'00' Elevation Off Gas Bldg 261' Elevation Reactor Bldg Elevation Elevation Inplant Survey Kit OSC Emergency Equipment Cabine t Protection Gear OSC Emergency Equipment Cabinet Rescue Kit Maintenance Shop Tools Maintenance Shop Damage Repair Supplies Storeroom, Screen Hous e The complete description of the, equipment contained within these ki'ts can be found in EPHP-2 "Emergency Equipment Inventories and Checklists". In addition, equipment may also be made available from the, Haintenance Shop> Storeroom or other station equipment storage area.
5.0 DAMAGE CONTROL TEAM COMPOSITION Damage Control Teams during normal working hours will typically consist of a Haintenance Supervisor or Chief Mechanic/Electrician, a Chemistry and Radiation Protection Technicia~n, and necessary
, Maintenance, Operations and Instrumentation & Control personnel.
During off hours the team shall consist of two (2) oper-tors, a Radiation Protection Technician and any available Maintenance. or I&C personnel.
II 6.0 PROCEDURE 6~1 Damage Control Teams
- 6. 1.1 Obtain a briefing from the Site Emergency Directcr, Maintenance I
Coordinator, I&C Coordinator, Damage Control Team Coordinator or the OSC. I&C Coordinator regarding:
a) Required damage assessment and repair activities b) Anticipated levels of radiation and contamination en route c) Suggested routes d) Required protective gear e) Exposure limits allowed for work.
f) Tools and equipment required EPP-22, -3 January 1984
6.1.2 Obtain needed emergency equipment from the OSC emergency cabinets, Maintenance Shop, Storeroom or from normal station supplies. This equipment should include:
a) Appropriate tools for the task/mission.
b) Appropriate Respiratory Protection Equipment c) Appropriate Protection Clothing d) Communications Equipment (radios should be used on Channel P2) e) Necessary Damage Repair Equipment 6.1.3 Prior to leaving equipment storage location, perform a check on equipment to ensure their operability.
6.1.4 Review the Radiation Work Permit and Work Procedure (if applicable) that have been written for the mission.
6.2 Dama e Control Team Coordinator
- 6. 2.1 In con)unction with the Maintenance Coordinator, select personnel needed to complete identified tasks and coordinate the staffing of such teams per Section 5, Damage Control Team Composition.
6.2.2 Brief Damage Control Teams on their mission and record on Figure l.
- 6. 2.3 Provide technical and administrative direction to Damage Control Teams as required. I
'6. 2. 4 Assist Damage Control Teams in performing a "dry run" mission prior to being dispatched, if required.
6.2.5 Dispatch Damage Control Teams when appropriate and record on Figure l.
6.2.6 Provide an assessment of any damaged equipment and necessary personnel or equipment needs to effect emergency repairs.
6.2.7 Inform OSC personnel and the Maintenance Coordinator of Damage Control activities.
6.2.8 Distribute Figure 1 as follows:
- a. Forward first (original) copy to the Maintenance Coordinator after the form is completed.
- b. Retain second copy.
6.3 Maintenance "Coordinator ~
- 6. 3.1 Confer with Site Emergency Director and other staff members in TSC to determine Damage Repair and Inspection Needs. I EPP"22 -4 January 1984
Define the missions or tasks to be completed and document on Fig. 1 "Emergency Damage Control Summary Sheet".
Establish communications with the OSC Coordinator and/or the OSC Damage Control Team Coordinator. Assess the availability of personnel for staffing Damage Control Teams.
Select or have the OSC Damage Control Te'am Coordinator select personnel needed to complete the tasks identified and coordinate the staffing of such teams per Section 5. Document the Damage Control Team members on Figure l.
NOTE: Ensure that training, qualifications, number needed. and remaining authorized exposure are addressed when selecting personnel.
Identify and document the tools, equipment and supplies required to complete the mission on Figure 1, especially items that would not normally be found in a mechanic's or electrician's tool box. If the mission requires entry into or through a hazardous area, ensure coordination with the Radiological Assessment Coordinator or the Sta)ion Survey/Sample Team Coordinator.
In ! consultation with the Radiological Assessment Coordinator or Station Survey/Sample Team Coordinator initiate a Radiation Work Permit to cover the task or mission. In this document define preferred and alternate ingress and egress routes. If available, provide maps or plant maps or plant drawings showing such routes.
Review, modify, ~rite and/or implement any procedure(s) to be used for, the mission in light of current condition's. Figure 2 provides a list of speci'fic Damage Repair Procedures that can be utilized.
Ensure that the mission and any special or modified procedures are approved, reviewed and appropriate personnel notified as indicated on Figure 1 NOTE: NRC and QA review may be deferred until after the mission.
Brief or ensure Damage Control Team is briefed on their mission and recorded on Figure l.
Distribute Figure 1 as follows:
I a) Retain third copy of triplicate form b) Forward first and second copy to OSC Coordinator c) Ensure the first (original) copy is returned to TSC after form is completed Direct the Damage Control Team to carry out a dry run of the mission, if such is deemed necessary as determined through the review and approval process.
EPP"22 -5 January 1984
6.3.12 Direct the Damage Control Team to carry out their mission via the OSC Coordinator or Damage Control Team Coordinator.
NOTE.: Communications with the Damage Control Teams will be initially through the OSC Damage Control Team Coordinator or OSC Coordinator (via telephone or TSC"OSC dedicated line). Once Teams have been dispatched; communications should be maintained directly with the Teams preferentially via radio.
6.3.13 Contamination Control Activites Whenever the actual repair or damaged equipment is not practical or fea sible during the course of a declared emergency, or following severe plant contamination, the approach in Steps 6.3.1 thru 6.3.12 may be used to develop a "Contamination Control Mission".
Examples of such a mission are:
- 1. Isolation of the offending system, subsystem or component.
- 2. Manually assuring containment isolation.
- 3. Isolation of a severely contaminated room.
4., Performance of radiological clean"up operations.
- 5. Pumping of spills to radwaste system.
- 6. Contingency for dealing with exceeding the capacity of the radwaste system.
NOTE'nsure that all contamination control activities are coordinated with and documented in the Radiological Assessment . Cooriinatorgs or Station Survey/Sample Team Coordinator's Log.
I
- 6. 3.14 Installation of S ecial Structures Systems, and Com onents Whenever the installation of special structures, systems, and components is required during the course of a declared emergency, the approach in Step 6.3.1 thru 6.3.12 may be used to develop an "Installation Mission".
Examples of such a mission are:
- l. Installation of additional Radwaste Demineralizers and Filters.
- 2. Construction of temporary shield walls.
NOTE: Ensure that all installation activities are documented in the Maintenance Coordinator's Log.
6.4 Instrumentation and Control Coordinator 6.4.1 Goofer with gite Emergency Director and other staff members in TEC to determine 1&C Damage Repa'ir and Inspection needs.
EPP-22 -6 January 1984
6.4.2 Define the missions or tasks to be completed and document on Figure 1, "Emergency Damage Control Summary Sheet."
6.4.3 Establish communications with the OSC Coordinator and/or the OSC Instrumentation and Control Coordinator. Assess the .availability of personnel for staffing Damage Control Teams.
6.4.4 Select or have the OSC 16C Coordinator select personnel needed to complete the tasks identified and coordinate the staffing of such teams per Section 5. Document the Damage Control Team members on Figure 1. I I
NOTE: Ensure that training, qualifications, number needed and remaining authorized exposure are addressed when selecting personnel.
6.4.5 Identify and document the tools, equipment and supplies required to complete the mission on Figure 1, especially items that would not normally be found in a technician's tool box, If requires entry into or through a hazardous area, ensure coordination the mission with the Radiological Assessment Coordinator or the Station Survey/Sample Team Coordinator.
6.4.6 In consultation with the Radiological Assessment Coordinator or Station Survey/Sample Team Coordinator, initiate a Radiation .Work Permit to cover the task or mission. In this document, define preferred and alternate ingress and egress routes.
provide maps or plant maps or plant drawings showing such routes.
If available, I
6.4.7 ~
Review, modify, write and/or implement any procedure(s) to be used for the mission in light of current conditions. Figure 2 provides a list of specific Damage Repair Procedures that can be utilized. I 6.4.e Ensure that the mission and any special or modified procedures are reviewed and approved as indicated on Figure 1.
NOTE: NRC and QA review may be deferred until after the mission.
6.4.9 Brief or ensure Damage Control Team is briefed on their mi'ssion.
6.4.10 Distribute Figure 1 as follows:
a) Retain third copy of triplicate form b) Forward first,and second copy to OSC Coordinator c) Ensure the first (original) copy is returned to TSC after form is completed 6.4.11 Direct the Damage Control Team to carry out a dry run of the mission, if such approval is deemed necessary process.
as determined through the review and EPP-22 -7 January 1984
6.4.12 Direct the Damage Control Team to carry out their mission via the OSC Coordinator or OSC 1&C Coordinator.
NOTE: Communications with the Damage Control Teams will be initially through the OSC 16C Coordinator or OSC Coordinator (via telephone or TSC-OSC dedi.cated line).
Once Teams have been dispatched, communications should be maintained directly with the Teams preferentially via radio.
6.5 OSC Instrumentation and Control Coordinator In con5unction with the Instrumentation and Control Coordinator, select personnel needed to complete identified tasks and coordinate the staffing of such teams per Section 5, Damage Control Team Composition.
6.5.2 Brief Damage Control Teams on their mission and record on Figure l.
6.5.3 Provide technical and administrative direction to Damage Control Teams as required.
6.5.4 Assist Damage Control Teams in performing a "dry run" mission prior to being dispatched, if required.
6.5.5 Dispatch Damage Control Teams when appropriate and record on Figure 1.
6.5.6 Provide an assessment of any damaged 16C equipment and necessary personnel or equipment needs to effect emergency r'epairs.
6.5.7 Inform OSC personnel and the Instrumentation and Control Coordinator of Damage Control activities.
I 6.5.8 Distribute Figure 1 as follows:
- a. Forward first (original) copy to the Instrumentation and Control
~ Coordinator after the form is completed.
- b. Retain second copy.
7.0 GUIDELINE FOR PERSONNEL SAFETY DURING DAK4GE CONTROL OPERATIONS 7.1 Fire Wear the proper protective clothing.
- b. Use the proper extinguishing material for the material that is burning.
C ~ Wear self-contained breathing apparatus.
EPP-22 -8 January 1984
7.2
- a. High Radiation Levels
- l. If the degree of urgency permits, thoroughly survey the area to be entered to determine radiation leivelp.
- 2. Wear a TLD and 0-5 R direct-reading dosimeter.
- 3. Minimize time, mazimize distance, and mazimize shielding g from the sourceI whenever possible to minimize exposure to ~
damage control personnel.
- 4. If beta radiation levels are high, wear heavy protective clothing and eye protection, shielding.
if not already being worn, for
- 5. If personnel exposures are expected to exceed 10CPR20 limits refer to EPP-15 for emergency exposure criteria and control.
- b. High Airborne Radioactivity Concentrations 1~ If the degree of urgency permits, take air samples in the area to be entered to determine airborne radioactivity concentrations.
- 2. Wear protective clothing, as required.
- 3. Wear respiratory protective equipment commensurate with the airborne concentration in the area. If the concentration in the area is unknown, wear self-contained breathing apparatus.
- c. High Surface Contamination Levels
- 1. If the degree of urgency permits, survey the area to be entered to determine the surface contamination levels.
- 2. Wear protective clothing commensurate with the contamination levels known or expected to exist in the area.
- 3. Wear respiratory protective equipment if levels are unknown or significantly exceed about 25,000 contamination dpm/100 cm2.
7.3 Toxic Gas or Chemicals a.
I If the degree of urgency permits, survey the area to be entered to determine the type (if unknow') and concentration of toxic gas ~
- b. Wear protective clothing as required.
I z
- c. Wear respiratory protective equipment, as required.
EPP-22 -9 January 1984
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V> An rorellNotiffcatfonlkcrjev In LtLal/Tine Approved> Maintenance Coordinator Radiological Asscssncat Coordfaator Site Encrtcncy Director
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EPP-22 FIGURE 2 LIST OF DANLGE REPAIR PROCEDURES DAMAGE REPAIR
SUMMARY
OF FIRE DETECTOR PROCEDURE NO. POTENTIAL DAHAGE ZONE DESCRIPTION ZONE ZONE NO.
Nl-DRP-1 A fire could cause loss Turbine Building El 250'-0" T2A DA-2013S of both Emergency Diesel (Figure 2, Attachment 1) DA-2013N Generators 102 & 103 Nl-DRP-2 A fire could cause loss Turbine Building El 250'-0" T2B DA-2051E of both Emergency Diesel (Figure 2, Attachment 2) DA-2051W Generators 102 & 103 DA-2022S DA-2022N Nl-DRP-3 A fire could cause loss Turbine Building El 250'-0" T2C No of both Emergency Diesel Off-Gas Tunnel (Figure 2, Detector Generators 102 & 103 . Attachment 3)
Nl-DRP-4 A fire could cause loss Turbine Building El 250'-0" T2D DA-2031 of both Emergency Diesel (Figure 2, Attachment 4)
Generators 102 & 103 Nl-DRP-5 A fire could cause loss Turbine Building above DA-2234 of bot'h Emergency Diesel El 250'-0" DA-2081S Generators 102 & 103 DA-2161E DA-2083N DA-2224 I
Nl-DRP-6 A fire could cause loss Cable Spreading Room Cl DX-3011A of Emergency Diesel Dx-3011B Generator 103 & 102 Nl-DRP-7 A fire could cause loss . Screen and Pump House Sl D-5013 of both Emergency Diesel
! Generator 102 & 103 EPP-22, -ll, January 1984
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0' NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES PROCEDURE NO. EPP-15 HEALTH PHYSICS PROCEDURE DATE AND INITIALS APPROVALS SIGNATURES REVISION 7 REVISION 8 REVISION 9 Supervisor Radiological Support q"k~ ~
P. Volza Station Superintende NMPNS Unit 1 T. W. Roman (
Station Superintendent NMPNS Unit 2 R. B. Abbott General Superintendent Nuclear Generation Qll L+
T. J. Perkins ZP Summar of Pa es Revision 7 (Effective ~ ~ )
PAGES DATE 17,22,23,26, 28 52 April 1986 20 December 1986 (Reissue) i,1-16,18,19,21,24, 25,27, 53-60 March 1987 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION THIS PROCEDURE NOT TO BE USED AFTER M~Y1989 SUBJECT TO PERIODIC REVIEW Proprietary information removed from page 14.
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EPP-15 HEALTH PHYSICS PROCEDURE Section Contents ~Pa e 1.0 Purpose 2.0 References 3.0 Responsibilities 4.0 Emergency Exposure Control 5.0 Emergency Dosimetry Control 6.0 Emergency Respiratory Protection Control 7.0 Radioprotective Drug Distribution 8.0 Personnel, Equipment and Area Decontamination ll 11 8.1 Obgective 8.2 Personnel Decontamination Guideline 11 8.3 Procedure-Personnel Decontamination 13" 8.4 Equipment, Tool, Floor and Area Decontamination 15 8.5 Contamination Control Limits 16 Figure 1 Emergency Exposure Guidelines for Planned Actions 17 Figure 2 Emergency Exposure Authorization Form 18 Figure 3 Respirator Selection-Emergency Periods 20 (80 Hour Week) 4 Potassium-Iodine Determination Curve 21 'igure Figure 5 Potassium Iodide (KI) Patient Package Insert 22 Figure 6 Potassium Iodide (KI) Issue Record 23 Figure 7 Personnel Decontamination Methods 24 Figure 8 Skin Contamination Record zv Figure 9 Decontamination Methods 28 Figure 10 Unit I Radiation Zone Map 31 Figure ll Unit II Radiation Zone Map 42 Figure 12 Uni.t II Personnel Doses and Dose Rates for Vital Areas 53 Figure 13 Contamination Control Guides 59 EPP-15 -i March 1987
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EPP-15 HEALTH PHYSICS PROCEDURE 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure describes the health physics requirements to be followed by Station personnel, visitors and contractors during an emergency. It specifically details personnel actions and responsibilities for providing radiological controls in the following areas:
a ~ Emergency Exposure Control
- b. Emergency Dosimetry Control c ~ Emergency. Respiratory Protection
- d. Radioprotective Drug Distribution
- e. Personnel, Equipment and Area Decontamination 2:0 REFERENCES 2.1 10CFR20 Standards for Protection Against Radiation 2.2 NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, November 1980.
2' NUREG-0041.
2.4 US NRC Regulatory Guide 8.15.
2,5 EPA-520/1-75-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, September 1975.
2.6 NCRP Report No. 55, Protection of the Thyroid Gland in the Event of Releases of Radioiodine.
2.'7 ANSI N13.12, Control of Radioactive Surface Contamination on materials, Equipment and Facilities to be Released for Uncontrolled Use.
2.8 AP-7.1, Procedure For Control of the Use and Transfer of Organic Materials.
2.9 EPP-4, Personnel Injury or Illness 2.10 EPP-8, On-Site and Off-Site Dose Assessment Procedure 2.11 S-RP-l, Access and Radiological Control EPP-15 -1 March 1987
cc
- 2. 12 S-RP-3, Performance of Radiological Surveys 2.13 S-RP-5, Radiation and Radioactive Contamination Control 2.14 S-RTP-61, Procedure for the Selection of Respiratory Equipment 2.15 S-RTP-62, Respiratory Equipment Assembly, Test 6 Inspection, Storage 2.16 S-RTP-63, Laundering of Respiratory Equipment 2.17 Nuclear Energy Services, Inc, "Shielding Design Review for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1".
2.18 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR, Section 12.3.1.3 "Post-Accident Access and Shielding Design Review".
- 2. 19 Correspondence, W. R. Yaeger to R. B. Abbott, NMP2-287, February 19, 1987.
3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 Site Emer enc Director
.a. Coordinates the implementation of the NMPNS Site Emergency Plan and Procedures.
- b. Authorizes the use of emergency:
1h Exposure control limits 2~ Respiratory protection limits 30 Radioprotective drugs 4 ~ Contamination control limits 3.2 Radiolo ical Assessment Manager The Radiological Assessment Manager (RAM) is responsible to the Site 7 Emergency Director for:
- a. Managing the radiological monitoring and assessment aspects of the station's emergency response.
- b. Managing activities to control radiation.
C ~ Providing technical and administrative direction to emergency personnel relative to the following areas:
- a. Emergency exposure control
- b. Emergency dosimetry control C ~ Emergency respiratory protection
- d. Radioprotective drug distribution
- e. Personnel, equipment and area decontamination EPP-15 -2 March 1987 H ~ 'h lhch>
4.0 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONTROL 4.1 ~Ob ective a This section provides guidance and criteria for emergency
~
situations when it may be necessary for an individual or established quarterly and annual radiation individuals to exceed exposure limits to save a life or to minimize the possible consequences of an emergency situation.
- b. The Site Emergency Director (directly or through the RAM) is the only individual authorized, at his discretion, to waive or modify the established station exposure control criteria and methods in accordance with the provisions of this procedure.
This may occur exposures in if excess of necessary normal operations require personnel guides or limits, or if normal station access control and radiological control work practices may result in unacceptable delays. In any case the personnel exposures authorized should not exceed the planned radiation exposure criteria established in this procedure.
4.2 Emer enc Ex osure Criteria 4.2.1 EPP-15, Figure 1 summarizes the emergency exposure criteria for entry or re-entry into areas for the purposes of undertaking protective or corrective actions. Two classifications of emergency exposure are identified: corrective actions and lifesaving actions.
4.2.2 Lifesaving actions include actions such as rescue, first aid, personnel decontamination, medical transport, and medical treatment services, when such actions are immediately necessary to save a life.
4.2.3 Corrective actions include surveillance and/or assessment actions and plant operations necessary to minimize further deterioration of the level of plant safety or to mitigate the consequences of the accident, if failure to perform these actions could result in a significant increase in off-site exposures.
- 4. 2.4 Personnel exposures received performing emergency measures, other than those identified above, shall be limited pursuant to 10CFR20.
4.3 Procedure 4.3.1 General
- a. The provisions of this procedure are applicable only in actual emergency situations, and are applicable only to NMPNS personnel, contractors and off-site emergency response personnel performing emergency tasks.
- b. The radiation exposure to emergency personnel shall be maintained, if possible, as low as reasonably achievable and should be maintained within the NMPNS administrative exposure guides and/or less than the radiation exposure limits in 10CFR20. (See NMPNS Radiation Protection Procedure RP-l.)
EPP-15 -3 . March 1987
(Cont.)
C ~ To maintain personnel exposures within established guides and limits, administrative methods used during normal station operations to control and minimize exposures, such as radiation work permits, exposure clearances and ALARA measures, should remain in force during an emergency condition to the degree consistent with timely implementation of emergency measures.
7
- d. The Site Emergency Director (directly or through the,RAM and his staff) shall be responsible for the transfer of exposure and dose information between emergency centers.
Emergency Pre-exposure Evaluation The following prerequisites shall be satisfied, time permitting, by the Site Emergency Director or the RAM prior to authorizing entry into .an affected area.
- a. To the degree possible, the probability of success of the proposed action requiring emergency exposure shall be weighed against the pro)ected element of risk.
- b. Personnel receiving exposures which may or will exceed 10CPR20 limits shall be volunteers.
1~ Volunteers should be more than 45 years of age.
2 ~ All volunteers shall be briefed on potential biological consequences prior to receiving such exposure.
3 ~ Emergency exposures should be limited to one occurrence in a lifetime.
4 ~ Women of child-bearing age shall not .be permitted to receive exposures which exceed 10CFR20 limits.
C ~ Personnel shall not be permitted to enter any area where dose rates are unknown.
d0 Dosimetry equipment capable of measuring the anticipated maximum exposure and type of radiation(s) shall be worn by personnel receiving emergency exposure per EPP-15, Section 5.0.
Reasonable measures shall be taken to minimize skin contamination and the intake of radioactive materials.
- e. A review of the Unit I and Unit II Radiation Zone Maps (EPP-15, Pigures 10, 11 and 12 respectively) shall be performed to assess its applicability in determining personnel access to critical plant areas.
Dose calculations for a postMesign basis accident, have shown that access to the Unit II Radwaste Control Room may be prohibitive for approximately one hour following the accident.
This period may be used for planning purposes but current ARM, process monitor and survey readings should be utilized prior to entry.
EPP-15 -4 March 1987
Emer enc Ex osure Documentation The following actions shall be performed to document emergency radiation exposure. Although it is preferable to perform these steps before the exposure is received, the Site Emergency Director may, at his discretion, verbally authorize the emergency exposure with documentation to be completed at a later time.
- a. Time permitting, a RWP shall be completed for any e'mergency survey or damage control operations using the normal station issuance process. If this may result in an unacceptable delay in emergency response, the normal RWP processing may be modified as directed by the Site Emergency Director. Furthermore, pre-exposure surveys may be waived when a survey team accompanies damage control teams during emergency activities..
b ~ The Site Emergency Director or the RAM shall complete or have 7 completed per a designee Section A of the Emergency Exposure Authorization Form (EPP-15, Figure 2).
C ~ The individual who will receive the emergency exposure shall complete Section B of the form (EPP-15, Figure 2). )7 d~ Prior to entry into the affected area, the individual shall be briefed on the radiological conditions and other conditions known or expected to exist in the area, the task(s) to be performed, ALARA measures applicable to the task(s), and any contingency measures.
- e. Following the exposure, the Site Emergency Director, RAM, or their designee shall complete or have completed Section C and D of the form.
Any dose received during the emergency shall be added to the workers occupational dose history.
Emer enc Post-ex osure Evaluations a~ Individuals receiving emergency exposure shall be restricted from further occupational radiation exposure pending the outcome of exposure evaluations and, if necessary, medical surveillance.
- b. An exposure evaluation shall be performed per procedure(s) to determine a dose equivalent of the emergency exposure. This evaluation shall be based on measured area dose rates, airborne radioactivity measurements, dosimetry results and contamination surveys including surface/skin contamination measurements, body cavity smears, and invivo and invitro analyses as applicable.
C ~ If an individual's dose equivalent exceeds 10 rem for the whole body, 60 rem for the skin, and/or 150 rem for an extremity (two times the annual dose equivalent limits), the details of the exposure shall be brought to the attention of a physician. The physician shall determine the degree of injury through clinical, biological and/or biochemical examinations of the injured individual. Based upon the results of these tests additional treatment will be developed for the personnel involved.
EPP-15 -5 March 1987
4.3.4 (Cont.)
'I NOTE: Whole body includes: head and trunk; active blood forming organs; lens of eyes; or gonads.
Extremity includes: hands and forearms; feet and ankles.
Skin is the skin of the whole body.
d~ If an individual's dose equivalent exceeds 25 rem for the whole for an extremity (5 body, 150 rem for the skin, and/or 375 rem times the annual dose equivalent limits) the individual shall be examined by a physician. The physician shall determine the need for, extent and nature of any clinical, biological, or biochemical examinations and any necessary medical surveillance.
NOTE: The dose equivalent is equal to the total risk to the organ of interest, be it from internal exposure, external exposure or both.
5.0 EMERGENCY DOSIMETRY CONTROL 5.1 Ob ective a ~ This section provides guidance and criteria for the selection, use and distribution of dosimetry during emergency situations.
- b. The Site Emergency Director (directly or through the RAM) is responsible for determining (or having determined through the Site Dosimetry Coordinator) the proper dosimetry to be worn by emergency personnel.
5~2 Personnel Dosimetry Guidelines
- 5. 2.1 Dosimetry equipment capable of measuring the anticipated maximum exposure and types of radiation shall be worn by personnel receiving emergency exposure.
5 ~ 2.2 Survey instruments accompanying emergency workers shall not substitute for any personnel dosimetry but shall be considered complimentary.
- 5. 2.3 The types of dosimetry available for use on-site include:
Film badges Self-reading pocket dosimeters (0-500 mr, 0-1 R, 0-5R, 0-50R and 0-200R)
Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD's)
Neutron dosimeters (Neutrak-ER, a combination of Neutrak 144 and albedo dosimetry) for detection of thermal and fast neutrons Audible Alarming Dosimeters Extremity Dosimeters (ring TLDs) 5.2.4 The type of dosimetry to be used shall be selected so as to accurately measure all types of radiation expected (e.g., gamma, beta X-ray, neutron).
EPP-15 -6 March 1987
5.2.5 Extremity dosimetry will be issued on corrected dose, rates as described in S-RP-1, Section 5.4.
5.3 Procedure 5.3.1 The RAM shall direct a designated staff member (preferably the Site Dosimetry Coordinator) to set up a dosimetry issue area in the Operations Support Center (or where designated by the RAM). This dosimetry area should contain the following items:
- a. TLD's (whole body and extremity)
- b. Film badges
- c. Self-Reading Pocket Dosimeters (all ranges)
- d. Emergency Exposure Authorization Forms (EPP;15, Figure 2)
- e. Pencils and/or pens A sign explaining the steps for issuing dosimetry
- g. Automatic or manual TLD reader NOTE: Until this dosimetry area is set up, sufficient numbers of self-reading pocket dosimeters are available in the OSC emergency cabinets to handle immediate needs.
I7 5.3.2 As inplant dose rates are made available and/or estimated per EPP-8, the RAM will ensure that this information is transmitted to the
~
Dosimetry Coordinator. This information and that provided on RWP's
~
will be used by the Dosimetry Coordinator to determine the type and range of dosimetry to be provided to survey and damage control teams.
5.3.3 The Site Dosimetry Coordinator shall utilize current NMPNS Radiation Protection Procedures for controlling dosimetry issuance, maintenance and record keeping during emergencies.
6.0 EMERGENCY RESPIRATORY PROTECTION CONTROL 6.1 Ob ective
- a. This section provides guidance and criteria for the selection and use of respiratory equipment against airborne contaminants during an emergency condition.
EPP-15 -7 March 1987
6.1 (Cont)
- b. The Site Emergency Director (directly or through the RAM) is the only individual authorized, at his discretion, to waive or modify the established station Respiratory Protection Program in accordance with the provisions of this procedure. This may occur if necessary operations require limits or personnel if normal exposure in respiratory excess of normal guides or protection work practices may result in unacceptable delays.
6.2 Emer enc Res irator Protection Guidelines
- 6. 2.1 The NMPNS Respiratory Protection Program, which is responsive to US NRC Regulatory Guide 8.15 and NUREG-0041 shall apply to all usage and distribution of respiratory protection equipment during emergency conditions (see NMPNS S-RTP-61, 62, and 63).
6.2.2 Three exceptions to the normal respiratory protection practices which may be instituted by the Site Emergency Director'r the RAM are as follows:
a ~ Extension of Normal Uptake Limits
- 1. Exposure limits and respirator selection shall be based on potential 80 hours per week usage, similar to controls applied during outage periods (see EPP-15, Figure 3 "Respirator Selection Emergency Periods" ).
- 2. Under these provisions internal exposure is controlled such that the total dose commitment due to internal and external exposure does not exceed the emergency exposure limit established in EPP-15, Figure 1.
- b. Use of Iodine Sorbent Canisters in Res irators
- 1. During emergencies, an iodine sorbent canister may be used in full face filter respirators with credit taken for a protection factor of 50.
- 2. If Iodine-131 airborge activity in the occupied area 4.5 E-7 Ci/m~ (uCi/cc) or if airborne activity exceeds was not documented, a post-exposure evaluation shall be performed in accordance with EPP-15, Section 4.3.4.
- 3. As a minimum, any individual using an iodine sorbent canister and exposed to an iodine-131 airborne activity greater than 10xMPC (9E-8 Ci/m3) should have a whole body count performed by the Chemistry and Radiation Management group, time permitting.
C ~ Use of Thyroid Pro hylaxis 1~ Potassium iodide (KI) is provided for use by emergency workers who must remain in an affected area and for whicQ other means of respiratory protection are not available, practical or sufficient.
- 2. Potassium iodide shall be administered per the requirements and guidance set forth in EPP-15, Section 7.0.
EPP-15 -8 March 1987
7.0 RADIOPROTECTIVE DRUG DISTRIBUTION 7.1 ~Ob
'c t ive
- a. This section provides guidance for determining when potassium iodide (KI) should be issued to NMPNS personnel, contractors and corporate emergency support personnel on a voluntary basis for thyroid blocking in order to minimize Iodine-131 uptake by the thyroid.
- b. The Site Emergency Director or the RAM, in consultation with the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation medical consultant (EPP-15, Section 8.3.12, if available) and in accordance with the provisions of this procedure, shall be responsible for the administration of KI at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station during an emergency condition. The Emergency Planning Coordinator shall ensure an adequate inventory of potassium iodide tablets is maintained in the NMPNS First Aid Room for emergency use.
7.2 Potassium Iodide Distribution Guidelines 7.2.1 Unless medical personnel are available to administer potassium iodide (KI), the Site Emergency Director shall designate an individual to administer KI to emergency personnel from its storage location in the
.Unit 1 Administration Building First Aid Room, 261'levation.
7.2.2 KI shall be administered only when the thyroid dose is estimated to be 10 rads or greater based on estimated or measured I-131 airborne concentrations or if airborne I-131 concentration is estimated. or measured to be greater than 9E-5 yCilcc.
NOTE: 9E-5 uCi/cc is the maximum level of activity for which a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) provides adequate protection.
7.2,3 Only one 130 mg KI tablet shall be administered daily to each individual involved.
7.2.4 After KZ administration has been initiated for an individual, daily KI administration shall continue for the individual for at least 6 additional consecutive days but in no case shall the total length of administration exceed 10 consecutive days (for a total iodide dose of about 1 gram).
7.2.5 The maximum efficiency for thyroid blocking is achieved if KZ is administered before an I-131 uptake occurs or within two hours after an I-131 uptake occurs. KI administration is of some value for thyroid blocking as long as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after an I-131 uptake occurs but is of little value thereafter.
7.2.6 The administration of KI must be documented.
7.2.7 KI administration to emergency personnel shall be on a voluntary basis.
7.2.8 Followup medical surveillance is required for individuals who take KZ.
EPP-15 -9 March 1987
7.3 Procedure 7.3.1 Determining the Need for KI Distribution The Site Emergency Director or the RAM shall determine the need for KI administration prior to a planned uptake or after an uptake has occurred, as follows:
- a. Determine by estimation or actual measurement the I-131 airborne concentration in the area of interest.
- b. Divide the I-131 airborne concentration by the protection factor (PF) of the respiratory protective equipment used. If respiratory protective equipment is not used, the PF l.
NOTE: 9E-5 uCi/cc is the maximum level of activity for which a self-contained . breathing apparatus (SCBA) provides adequate protection. At this level, KI will be administered regardless of residence time and the following steps.
- c. Determine the residency time of the individual(s) in the area.
- d. F ind the time determined in EPP-15, Step 7.3.1c on the vertical "Minutes" axis of the graph in EPP-15, Figure 4, Potassium-Iodine Determination Curve.
- e. Find the I-131 concentration determined in EPP-15, Step 7.3.1b on the horizontal "1-133. CONCENTRATION (pCi/cc)" axis on the graph in EPP-15, Figure 4 and follow the line vertically until it intersects the time line located in EPP-15, Step 7.3.ld
- f. If the point of intersection is to the left of the curve on the graph in EPP-15, Figure 4, the projected dose to the thyroid is less than 10 rad and no further action is required as thyroid blocking is unnecessary.
- g. Using the graph in EPP-15, Figure 4, if the - point of intersection lies on the curve or the right of the curve, the pro)ected dose to the thyroid is 10 Rad or more and thyroid blocking is necessary. Review EPP-15, Section 4.2 for additional guidance..
7.3.2 Administerin KI A person designated by the Site Emergency Director or the Radiological Assessment Manager shall administer KI to emergency personnel as follows:
- a. Instruct individual that the KI is being distributed on a voluntary basis and hand him a copy of the patient package insert (see EPP-15, Figure 5).
- b. Enter the name and social security number of each individual who will receive a KI tablet on a KI Issue Record form (see EPP-15, Figure 6).
EPP-15 -10 March 1987
7 '.2 (Cont.)
- c. Enter the date of the first administration and the initials of the individual who is dispensing the KI tablets in the first column on the form.
- d. Give one KI tablet to each individual requiring KI.
- e. Continue to dispense one KI tablet each day to each individual on the form for at least 6 additional consecutive days but in no case for greater than a total of 10 consecutive days.
7.3.3 Medical Surveillance Medical surveillance is required for any individual(s) administered KI. The surveillance program will be established by the Chemistry and Radiation Management Department through the NMPC Medical Consultant.
8.0 PERSONNEL E UIPMENT AND AREA DECONTAMINATION 8.1 ~et ective The following section provides guidelines for the decontamination of any individual, equipment and/or- areas contaminated by radioiodine or other particulates as a result of an emergency condition at the NMPNS. ~
~
8.2 Personnel Decontamination Guidelines 8.2.1 Decontamination Facilities:
- a. On-Site Direct or assist the person who is found to be contaminated from the restricted area to a decontamination room. One room is located near the main exit near the Unit I Radiation Protection Office. Other rooms are located at the Unit 2 Elevation 306 Turbine Bldg. and Elevation 250 Turbine Building. In addition, supplementary decontamination supplies are available in the OSC emergency cabinets.
EPP-15 -ll March 1987
(Cont.)
2~ Decontamination of large numbers of personnel (>10) whether at Unit I or II, will be performed in the employee locker room immediately adjacent to the Unit I Radiation 7 Protection Office. Decontamination supplies to assist in this effort are available from the normal decontamination facility and the Station Storeroom. Prior to the commencement of decontamination activities in this facility the Radiological Assessment Manager or his designee shall request the Maintenance Coordinator to assure that a(7 sufficient volume exists in 'he non-controlled shower hold-up tanks. If not, tanks should be pumped down. In to prevent the addition, the pump should be de-energized inadvertent pumping of'he liquids to the sewage treatment facility so that the liquid wastes generated from these operations can be contained.
3 ~ The volume of the liquids in the shower hold-up tank shall 7 be monitored to avoid overloading the shower hold-up tanks. The liquid wastes shall be analyzed and routed to its normal discharge path or the radioactive waste processing system as determined by the Radiological Assessment Manager. The volume of liquids used during large scale decontamination operations must be kept small to avoid overloading the liquid waste processing system.
- b. Off-Site 1 ' Personnel decontamination equipment and supplies are 7 available at the primary off-site assembly area (Volney Service Center). In addition, a portable decontamination kit is available in the OSC emergency cabinets for distribution to alternate off-site assembly areas. A complete description of decontamination equipment and supplies is contained in EPMP-2, Emergency Equipment Inventories and Checklists.
2 ~ When decontaminating personnel off-site, waste liquids shall not be permitted to discharge into a public sewer system or other disposal system unless approved by the Site Emergency Director or the Radiological Assessment Manager.
Waste liquid that cannot be immediately released shall be collected in temporary holdup containers (e.g., buckets, tanks, drums) and brought back to the NMPNS for analysis and proper disposal.
The actual method or combination of methods to be used for personnel decontamination can be evaluated only after the specific conditions of the contamination occurrence are known. The general approach to personnel decontamination should be to use the simplest, mildest method first before proceeding to harsher methods. EPP-15, Figure 7, Personnel Decontamination Methods describes decontamination methods in increasing order of severity and complexity.
EPP-15 -12 March 1987
8.2.4 Personnel monitoring prior to and during decontamination should be adjusted according to the number of individuals involved. This may include:
- a. Performing an initial frisk to establish contamination levels.
- b. Segregating individuals per gross levels.
- c. Full whole body frisk prior to release.
8.2.5 The use of absolute numerical values for acceptable levels of decontamination may not always be practical. In some cases even after repeated decontamination efforts, the acceptable levels of contamination specified in this procedure may not be attained. In these cases, it may be necessary to release an individual with higher levels of contamination after an evaluation of the potential dose to the individual and risk to others. The Site Emergency Director, with guidance from the Chemistry and Radiation Management Staff shall make this determination as well as the need for medical advise or assistance. (This may also be necessary in cases where decontamination would have an adverse or highly undesirable effect, or upon the individual's ob)ection to further treatment.)
8.2.6 Should additional supplies and/or manpower be necessary to support decontamination operation, the Radiological Assessment Manager or his designee shall contact appropriate individuals at the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant or the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station for assistance.
8.3 Procedure-Personnel Decontamination 8.3.1 Prior to commencing decontamination inspect for minor wounds such as cuts and abrasions. If they are found, refer to EPP-4 for decontamination of injured personnel. If no wounds are found, decontaminate using one of the approved methods listed in EPP-15, Figure 7.
8.3. 2 Decontamination of localized contamination should be performed carefully to prevent the spread of contamination to lesser contaminated or uncontaminated areas. High activity areas should be decontaminated first.
8.3.3 Any decontamination agent or method which appears to cause skin reddening or irritation should be discontinued immediately.
NOTE4 Any chemical/material that is to be used for decontamination and may enter into the station water system is to be on the approved list'(AP-7.1).
8.3.4 Exercise caution during the decon process to prevent decon liquids from entering body cavities.
- 8. 3.5 The temperature of the water used with decon solutions and for rinsing should be slightly warm to prevent opening skin pores.
8.3.6 Protective clothing should be worn as appropriate for the degree of contamination involved.
EPP-15 -13 March 1987
Care should be taken anytime contaminated skin is rubbed to prevent imbedding, the contamination in the skin.
OT Contaminated skin areas should be surveyed frequently during decon efforts, using a count rate instrument with a thin window GM detector (such as an HP-210), to determine decontamination effectiveness. All such surveys should be made in a low background area and preferably in an area when the liquid decontaminate may be collected or drained into the Ra'd Waste System.
If contamination levels after decontamination cm2 do probe not exceed 100 cpm area) no further above background (1000 dpm on a 15 action is required.
All decontamination should be documented on a Skin Contamination Record form (see Sample EPP-15, Figure 8).
For cases of severe and/or persistent personnel contamination, medical advice and/or direct assistance may be necessary to assure effective safe decon. The need for medical advice and/or direct assistance shall be communicated to the Site Emergency Director or his designee by the individual responsible for personnel decontamination.
The Site Emergency Director, Radiological Assessment Manager or their designee shall call the follbwing physician/medical consultant for medical advice and/or direct assistance.
Office Phone Home Phone
>On off-hours this number is answered by an answering service.
If unable to contact medical consultant and are requested to leave a message, ask that the medical consultant call the Control Room (either Unit I or Unit II, as appropriate) at:
Unit I Control Room or Unit II Control Room i Further decon efforts will follow the advice of the physician/consultant or will be performed with direct assistance by the physician/consultant. If necessary, follow-up bioassays will be performed in accordance with established station procedures.
EPP-15 -14 March 1987
8.4 E ui ment, Tool, Floor and Area Decontamination General Guidelines a ~ Techniques used for the decontamination of equipment, tools, floors and areas shall vary with the level and extent of contamination. The general approach to decontaminating these items should be to use the least expensive but effective method avail'able. In addition the method chosen should minimize the spread of contamination if possible. EPP-15, Figure 9 describes various decontamination methods which may be employed during emergency conditions.
- b. Decontamination should proceed from areas of least to greatest contamination to reduce the chance of spreading contamination.
C ~ For high level contamination it may be advisable to cut levels down to a manageable level by cleaning areas of greatest contamination first, then proceed from areas of least to greatest contamination.
- d. All waste generated during the decontamination process should be collected and disposed of as radioactive waste.
- e. The volume of liquids used during decontamination should be minimized to avoid overloading the liquid waste processing system. Any chemical/material that is used for decontamination and may enter into the station water system is to be on the approved list (AP-7.1).
Procedure-Equipment and Tools '.4.2
- a. Equipment and tools may be decontaminated at the work locations or they may be brought into the equipment decontamination area, time and contamination or radiation levels permitting.
- b. Whenever possible equipment may be decontaminated utilizing installed decontamination connections or piping, if available, by flushing demineralized water or service water through the piping or equipment to assist in reducing the amount of radioactive material deposited on internal surfaces C ~ A typical technique for equipment and tool decontamination would be:
- 1. Place plastic sheeting under the equipment to be decontaminated. This sheeting should be extended two to three feet in each direction to assure that the floor is not contaminated.
- 2. Soak a bundle of 12 atomic wipes with water; squeeze out excess water. Sprinkle wet pads with a detergent to cut oily film if present.
EPP-15 -15 March 1987
8.4.2 Using an individual pad, rub an area approximately 6" x 6" and then place the used pad in a plastic bag.
NOTE: This technique of wiping small areas reduces the chance of spreading contamination from areas of high contamination to areas of low contamination.
- 4. Using a dry pad, wipe up the detergent~ater residue and then place the used pad in the plastic bag.
- 5. Repeat 3 and 4 in a new area. (Intermittent surveys with an appropriate radiation-detecting instrument will show which areas must be cleaned again.)
8.4.3 Procedure-Floors and Areas
- a. During the decontamination process, floor areas should be segregated and roped off to prevent recontamination until cleared by Chemistry and Radiation Protection technicians.
- b. If possible, high traffic areas should be cleaned and cleared first to allow the movement of personnel through this area without interfering with the cleaning process.
C ~ For low level contamination of large areas, a scrubbing machine or mop is used with water and. detergent. In addition a masslin cloth used with a sweeping pad may be used for decontaminating large areas.
- d. For high level or .spotting contamination, techniques employed should avoid spreading the contamination to clean areas.
8.5 Contamination Control Limits EPP-15, Figure 13'rovides the contamination control limits and shall 7 be applied by the Site Emergency Director or Radiological Assessment Manager at his discretion if normal station radiological delay in contamination controls would result in an unacceptable performing emergency actions.
EPP-15 -16 March 1987
EPP -15 FIGURE 1 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE GUIDELINES FOR PLANNED ACTIONS Protective or
~Or an Corrective Actions Lifesavin Actions Whole Body 25 rem 75 rem Hands and Forearms (includes whole body exposure) 100 rem 300 rem Thyroid 125 rem No Limit4 NOTES:
Planned actions are actions which are performed intentionally. The degree of planning may be a simple decision to perform the action ranging to detailed planning, as time permits. The term planned actions is not meant to infer 'administrative actions .such as ALARA.
. reviews, radiation work permits or other similar work planning actions.
2~ Protective or corrective actions are actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of the emergency such as to eliminate the further release of effluent or to control fires.
3~ Lifesaving actions are actions related to the search for and rescue of ingured persons, or corrective or protective actions to mitigate conditions which could result in imminent injury or substantial overexposure to numbers of individuals.
4, No limit is specified for thyroid exposure for lifesaving action s because the complete loss of a thyroid may be considered an acceptable risk for saving life. However, thyroid exposure should be minimized by the use of respirators and/or thyroid prophylaxis.
J EPP-15 -17 April 1986
EPP-15 FIGURE 2 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE AUTHORIZATION FORM SECTION A Name of Individual to Receive Exposure:
SSN:
Film Badge/TLD Badge No:
Employer/NMPC Department:
Date of Authorization:
Authorized Exposure Limit:
Radiological Assessment Manager: Date:
(Signature 444 Site Emergency, Director: Date:
Signature SECTION B I have volunteered to 'perform the task(s) during which I will receive the emergency exposure and I have been briefed on the potential biological consequences of the .proposed emergency exposure.
Individual to Receive Exposure: Date:
(Signature)
SECTION C (Attach Exposure Evaluation Records)
Film Badge/TLD/Direct-Reading Dosimeter Results:
EPP-15 -18 March 1987
~ ~ 4/vhff 4' I . 4+ 4 9 44" >
EP 44 ffi g'4 I4 ~ ( +$ 44fff ff5 'g'4 v 4 4 '\ '
EPP-15 FIGURE 2 (Cont.)
EMERGENCY EXPOSURE AUTHORIZATION FORM SECTION C (Cont.)
Bioassay or Whole Body Counting Results:
Medical Evaluation/Action:
Dose Equivalent Assigned to Individual:
Radiological Assessment Manager: Date:
Signature SECTION D Disposition (Allow additional exposure, restrict access, etc.):
ace Radiological Assessment Manager: Date:
(Signature)
EPP-15 -19 March 1987
! 'c w oecw ' Ce t vr'ceno\ca ~
eeoc tc ~ yaw t'c 'sea'c I p* ~ ~ ~ 'c ~ *' ~ ' ~ ' I+
EPP-15 FIGURE 3 RESPIRATOR SELECTION EMERGENCY PERIODS (80 HOUR MEEK)
Contaminant ~P.S. S an Res irator Re uirement Particulate <0.25 No mask required 0.25-0.5 1/2 Mask with HEPA Cartridge 0.5-25 Full Mask with HEPA Canister 25-1000 Air-line mask in P.D. Mode>
Supplied Air Hood
>1000 Scott SCBA in P.D. mode only Iodine. <0.10 No mask required 0.10-0.25 1/2 Mask with sorbent cartridge 0.25-0.50 Full mask with sorbent canister>>
0.5-1000 air-lined mask in P.D. Mode Supplied Air Hood
>1000 Scott SCBA in P.D. mode only 02 Deficiency <19.5'2 Scott
'I SCBA in P.D. mode only Particulate/Iodine Varies wi.th Based on P.F. of the component Combination Concentration of requiring the greatest protection, Particulate Com- as long as PF of the other ponent vs. components and the sum of all Iodine Component components is satisfied.
Any deviations to the above guidelines will be approved by Chemistry and Radiation Management Supervisor.
Scott SKA-PAK may be used for entry to and exit from an area as long as the air line mask is used in the area.
During emergency conditions when the use of air-line masks and Scott SCBA are inappropriate due to lack of supplies, space or time, a protection factor of 50 will be used for respiratory protection.
EPP-15 -20 December 1986 (Reissue)
EPP-15 FIGURE 4 POTASSIUM-IODIDE DETERMINATION CURVE 100,000 Y' I fr '
Jt ~ rf Irk>> I g')I r~ jl IY rr I 'I '11 (I>> 'I' Y '. ')j eg -~gr. ~tf 10,000 ~
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~ r>>'>>I:I!' Z)~ r'
~ Yf I I ' Irt Yt g
~ . I ~ . ~ I 1,000 t << 'I' Co t 24~-.)tf t (I tf>>r tl tfrt rtW Ir I+at ~ tl .t ~ lt I >>1>>
kk 10 RAD ==---=-'-'- .-=--==.:
C, 10 RAD P
2 100 jtj )Ir I \>>) I, r), lt \ I u ll 'I I I lrtllrt
~
l '4Qtdtt 2 t I V tlrWi+p )XLI t1 T r%
t ~ J'~%p u '% ~ Sr, J'I "';I'tuf
~
t'ill'! ll' ' t,! ~ rft 10
)
t':t M'lrr)
~ tu>>I, 'I' 'IX 'I 4' IJI)t r r 1)
~ ~ ~
'>>I 111 I t,
ltut! ~ ~
I>> 'I, '%J,ttt Ir f 'I. >> .-II tll.l-u '= ~ I t I.. ~ lrrf )i"'t-ttt I . r .
~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' '
-- *--~ ~ ~ ~ .-
~ ~
1'E-'5
~ ~ ~
1E-9 1E-8 1E-7 1EM 1E 3 I-131 CONCENTRATION (yCi/cc)
Epp 15 21 . March 1987
EPP-15
~FE ure 5 Potassium Iodide KI Patient Packa e Insert Patient Package Insert For HOW POTASSIUM IODIDE WORKS Certain forms of iodine help your thyroid gland work right. Most people get the iodine they need from foods, like iodized salt or fish. The thyroid can store" or hold only a certain amount of THYRO-BLOCK' iodine.
In a radiation emergency, radioactive iodine may be released in (POTASSIUM IODIDE) the air. This material may be breathed or swallowed. It may (pronounced poe.TASSe.um EYEwhdyed) enter the thyroid gland and damage it. The damage would pro.
(abbreviated: KI) bably not show itself for years. Children are most likely to have TABLETS and SOLUTION U.S.P. thyroid damage.
If you take potassium iodide, it will fillup your thyroid gland.
This reduces the chance that harmful radioactive iodine will enter the thyroid gland.
TAKE POTASSIUM IODIDE ONLY WHEN PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS TELL YOU. IN A RADIATION WHO SHOULD NOT TAKE POTASSIUM IODIDE EMERGENCY, RADIOACTIVE IODINE COULD BE The only people who should not take potassium iodide are people RELEASED INTO THE AIR. POTASSIUM IODIDE (A who know they are allergic to iodide. You may take potassium FORM OF IODINE) CAN HELP PROTECT YOU. Iodide even ifyou are taking medicines for a thyroid problem (for example, a thyroid hormone or antithyroid drug). Pregnant and IF YOU ARE TOLD TO TAKE THIS MEDICINE, TAKE IT nursing women and babies and children may also take this drug.
ONE TIME EVERY 24 HOURS. DO NOT TAKE IT MORE OFTEN. MORE WILL NOT HELP YOU AND MAY IN- HOW AND WHEN TO TAKE POTASSIUM IODIDE CREASE THE RISK OF SIDE EFFECTS. DO /t/OT TAKE Potassium Iodide should be taken as soon as possible afp.r THIS DRUG IF YOU KiVOW YOU ARE ALLERGIC TO public health officials tell you. You should take one dose every 24 IODIDE. (SEE SIDE EFFECTS BELOW.) houis. More willnot help you because the thyroid can "hold" on-ly limited amounts of iodine. Larger doses will increase the risk of side effects. You willprobably be told not to take the drug for more than 10 days.
INDICATIONS SIDE EFFECTS THYROID BLOCKING IN A RADIATION EMERGENCY Usually,.side effects of potassium iodide happen when people ONLY. take higher doses for a long time. You should be careful not to take more than Che recommended dose or take it for longer Chan DIRECTIONS FOR USE you are told. Side effects are unlikely because of the low dose and only as directed by State or local public health authorities in the short time you will be taking the drug.
'se the event of a radiation emergency. Possible side effects include skin rashes, swelling of the salivary DOSE glands, and "iodism" (metalHc taste, burning mouth and throat, Tablets: ADULTS ANDCHILDREN 1 YEAR OF sore teeth and gums, symptoms of a head cold, and sometimes AGE OR OLDER: One (1) tablet once a stomach upset and diarrhea).
day. Crush for small children. A few people have an allergic reaction with more serious symp-BABIES UNDER 1 YEAR OF AGE: toms. These could be fever and joint pains, or swefling of parts of One. half (1/2) tablet once a day. Crush the face and body and at times severe shortness of breath requir first. ing immediate medical attention.
Solution: . ADULTSANDCHILDREN1YEAROF Taking iodide may rarely cause overactivity of the thyroid AGE OR OLDER: Add 6 drops to one. gland, underactivity of the thyroid gland, or enlargement of the half glass of Hquid and drink each day. thyroid gland (goiter).
BABIES UNDER 1 YEAR OF AGE:
Add 3 drops to a small amount of Hquid WHAT TO DO IF SIDE EFFECTS OCCUR once a day. If the side effects are severe or if you have an allergic reaction, For all dosage forms: Take for 10 days unless directed otherwise stop taking potassium iodide. Then, if possible, call a doctor or by State or local public health authorities. pubHc health authority for instructions.
Store at controlled room temperature between 16'nd 30'C (69'o 86'F). Keep container tightly closed and protect from light. HOW SUPPLIED Do not use the solution ifit appears brownish in the nozzle of the THYRO.BLOCKTMTABLETS (Potassium Iodide, U.S.P.) bot bottle. ties of 14 tablets (NDC 00374472-20.) Each white, round, scored tablet contains 130 mg potassium iodide.
WARNING THYRO-BLOCK'SOLUTION (Potassium Iodide Solution, Potassium iodide should not be used by people allergic to iodide. U.S.P.) 30 ml (1 fh oz.) light. resistant, measured-drop dispensing Keep out of the reach. of children. In case of overdose or allergic units (NDC 00374287-26).'Each drop contains 21 mg potassium reaction, contact a physician or the public health authority. iodide.
DESCRIPTION WALLACE LABORATORIES Each THYRO.BLOCK~M TABLET contains 130 mg of Division of potassium iodide. CARTER WALLACE, INC.
Each drop of THYRO.BLOCK'SOLUTION contains 21 mg of Cranbury, New Jersey 08512 potassium iodide.
CW 107915 10/79 Issue 10/79 EPP-15'22 'pril 1986 if% VIV Q ~
' V F
POTASSIUM:IODIDE KI ISSV+ R:"CORD KI Aommistration 5 6 IQ ate Date Date Date I Date Date Date I Da,te Date Date l
Init Init.
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In" I Ini Init. Init
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'SS Ho.: I i I Name: I I SS ?io.:
Name: i I SS No.:
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S Vo.: I I iame: I I I I I I I I S Flo: I I I I I l I
- arne: I I I I I I S Ho.: I I I ( I i arne:
~ No.: I I I I arne I I I I
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i No.: I I I I I EPP<<l5 -23 April
EPP-15 FIGURE 7 PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION METHODS Method" Surface Action Technicene A~dvanta ea Disadvanta es Soap and Skin and Emulsifies and Wash 2-3 minutes and Readily available Continued washing water hands dissolves con- monitor. Do not wash and effective for will defat the skin.
taminant. more than 3-4 times. most radioactive Indiscriminate washing contamination. of other than affected parts may spread contamination.
Soap and Hair Same as above. Wash several times.
water If contamination is not lowered to acceptable levels, shave the head and apply skin decon-tamination methods.
Waterless Skin and Emulsifies and Wash several times. Good for grease.
handcleaning Hands dissolves Less irritating cream contaminate. than scrubbing methods.
Use Lanolin hand cream between washes. Apply to prevent skin irritation from heavy scrubbing.
~Begin with the first-listed method and then proceed step by step to the more sever'e methods, as necessary.
t EPP-.15 24 Marconi 1987
EPP-15 FIGURE 7 (continued)
PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION METHODS a
Method< Surface Action ?~echni ue A~ducats es Disadvanta es Detergent Skin and Emulsifies and Make into a paste. Slightly more Will defat and abrade (plain) Hands dissolves Use with additional effective than skin and must be used contaminate. water with a mild washing with soap. with care.
scrubbing action. Use care not to erode the skin.
Flushing Wounds Physical removal Wash wound wi'th large Quick and efficient May spread contamination by flushing amounts of water and if wound not severe. to other areas of body if spread edges to sti- not done carefully.
mulate bleeding, if not profuse. If pro-fuse stop bleeding first, clean edges of wound bandage, and if 7 any contamination remains, it may be removed by. normal cleaning methods, as above.
"Begin with the first-listed method and then proceed step by step to the more severe methods, as necessary.
EPP-15 -25 March 1987
EPP-15 FIGURE 7 (continued )
PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION METHOD S Method+ . Surface Action T~echni ne Advanta es Sweating Skin of Physical removal Place hand or foot Cleansing action If glove or booty is elbows, knees by sweating in plastic glove or is from inside not removed shortly and feet booty. Tape shut. out. Hand does after profuse sweating Place near source not dry out. .starts and part washed of heat for 10-15 with soap and water minutes or until immediately, contami-h'and or foot is nation may seep into sweating profusely. the pores.
Remove glove and then wash using standard techniques or gloves can be worn for several hours using only body heat.
Flushing Eyes, ears, Physical removal Roll back the eyelid If used immediately When using for nose nose and by flushing. as far as possible will remove contami- and mouth, contaminated mouth flush with large nation. May also be individual should be amounts of water. used for ears, nose warned not to swallow If isotonic irrigants and throat. the rinses.
are available obtain them without delay .
Apply to eye continually and then flush with large amounts of water.
Further decontamination should be done unde r medical supervision .
J
+Begin with the first-listed method and then proceed step by step to the more severe methods, as necessary.
- Last resort method. Seek medical supervision.
EPP-15 -26 April 1986 t
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FIGURE 9 DECONTAMIN TION METHODS Method 'A~dveete es Miscellaneou s Manual Cleaning -Effecti've in removing low or -Time consuming in some instances Can be used in conjunction (i.e. wiping, or moderate levels of contami- with water, detergents, scrubbing, contamination. solvents, chelating agentsP mopping etc.) -Presents minimal airborne and other chemicals.
and surface contamination control problems.
Mechanical Cleaning
- 1) Vacuuming, -Effective in removing loose -Vacuum systems must be properly -Frequently used as an initial wet or dry particulate contamination. filtered to prevent the spread decontamination step in pre-of contamination to surrounding paration for manual cleaning.
areas and to reduce'he hazard of airborne contamination .
-Concentration of radioactive material in vacuum system may.
create an unusual radiation exposure source to personnel not emptied in a timely fashion.
if
- 2) Jet Cleaning -Effective in attaining -High pressure jet cleaning has -High pressure steam and water high decontamination the disadvantage of spreading can be used alone or mixed factor. contamination over a large area. with chemicals and detergents.
-Ideally suited for remote -More effective when used in a operation and for cleaning cave or cell designed to mini-large surface areas. mize spread of contamination.
r
- 3) Soaking and -Spraying has the advantage -Both methods make use of -Used extensively for decon-Spraying of combining mechanical as chemical solutions and may tamination of small and well as chemical action. require support features such moderate size material and
-Soaking provides good access as catch tanks, liquid recycle and equipment.
to surfaces. ability, and filtered ventilation
-Together very effective in systems.
removing contamination. -In some cases the shape of the object being sprayed prevents cleaning action on all surfaces .
-Soaking by itself does not provide good mechanical action.
EPP-15 -28 April 1986 .0
6 EPP-5. 5 FIGURE 9 (Cont.)
DECONTAMINATION METHOD S Method Advanta es Miscellaneou s Mechanical Cleaning
- 4) Ultrasoriic -Combines the advantage of Cleaning chemical action and mech-anical energy for cleaning.
-Offers advantage of remote operation.
.-Rapidly decontaminates objects with irregular shapes and crevices .
Grinding -Effective means of decon- -Wears down surface being cleaned. -Usually limited to small taminating metal and con- -Inherently leaves residual con- objects or isolated spots of crete surfaces. tamination on the surface of the contamination where all the
-Produces a high decon- object which must therefore require surface is reasonably smooth.
tamination factor. final cleaning by some other method (i.e. vacuuming, wiping etc.)
-Frequently produces partihulat e airborne activity and is generally not economical for large surface areas .
Abrasive Blasting -Very rapid means of removing -Usually generates high airborne -Abrasive blasting makes use contamination. .contamination and spreads surface of a large variety of
-Effective on metal and concrete contamination. istics'~
abrasives (sand, shells, surfaces. glassheads, metal, etc. )
-Provides a high decontamination with velocity, shape and size factor. of the abrasive influency
-Effective on irregular shaped surface removal character-surfaces.
-Can be used on large areas. -Airborne and,surface con-tamination problems can be minimized by wet blasting techniques, vacuum systems, or filtered enclosures .
EPP-15 -29 April 1986
EPP-15 FIGURE 9 (Cont.)
DECONTAMINATION METHODS Method A~dvaata ea Miscellaneou s Destructive -Harsher chemicals may be used. -Changes surface characteristics -Physical removal of con-Decontamination possibly resulting in removal of taminated parts or sections surface defects of analytical value. with little or no effort made to clean the parts prior to disposal as waste.
-Containment and other radio-logical controls qssociated with destructive clearly dependent on contamination levels, the nature of the con-taminant, and the physical characteristics of the parts being removed .
EPP-15 -30 April 1986
EPP-15 PIGURE 10 K<IT I RADIATION ZONE MAP NUCLEAR ENERGY SERVICES,WNC.
3.5.0 Pre aration of Radiation Zone Ma s The Radiation Zone Maps were constructed to show both known danger areas and areas which could become dangerous. Any area labeled as restricted access would not normally contain any large source of radiation. Such areas have the possibility of becoming inaccessible through additional equipment failure, e.g., leakage at the main steam or feedwater isolation valves). Restricted areas must be regarded as potentially dangerous until surveyed and proved otherwise.
The zone maps are plant elevations divided into three 'ones: prohibited access, restricted access, and unrestricted access. These areas are defined as follows:
Prohibited Access Extensive Health Physics sampling and surveys are required prior to entry.
Restricted Access Potential degradation of equipment requires periodic Health Physics sur veys in post-LOCA conditions.
Unrestricted Access Area dose rates are not anticipated to exceed 15 mr/hr. Periodic Health Physics surveys are recommended.
Epp 15 31 April .1986
EPP-15 FIGURE 10 UNIT I RADIATION ZONE MAP DOSE RATES TO AREAS OR ITEMS IDENTIFIED FOR ACCESS (Excluding airborne doses) t =30' =20hrs Dose Point Location Location Source (Rem/Hr), (Rem/Hr) 'z C
n I. Power Boards Reactor Bldg. Elev. 26l'hutdown HX, pumps, l6l-A 8( 161-B and associated piping 100 m 322'0.6%
13.3" X m
A Reactor Water Reactor Bldg. Elev. 261'eactor Water 0.3 1.09 Vl Sampling Station 010mRem/hr" 105mRem/hr" m
- 3. Power Boards: Reactor Bldg. Elev. 28 l'ontainment Spray Lines O
- a. l55 836 353 m
- b. l67 109 JJ5 2:
O Stairwell SE Reactor Bldg. Elev. 281'ontainment Spray Lines 323 135 Power Board 16 Reactor Bldg. Elev. 281'ontainment Spray Lines 667 280 IP ~ Boron Tank Reactor Bldg. Elev. 298'rywell 13mRem/hr c 1 mRem/hr I~ H2-02 Monitoring Panel Turbine Bldg. Elev. 291'rywell Air Without containment spray With containment spray BOOTES:
Dose rates for these access items were not calculated for times after 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> since their access will probably precluded by airborne dose rates, Dose rate calculations were performed at the IJorst case point about a foot away from the access item, Dose rate calculations were per formed only for those items which are located in the direct line of a source; other dose rates.
items not listed in this table are hampered frown access by the airborne EPP-15 Z April 1986
000-33 FIGURE 10 4
UNIT I RADIATION ZONE HAP i 0 )')
DOSE RATES FROM REACTOR OUILDING EMERGENCY VENTILATIONFILTERS ELEVATION 289'oose
%1TH CAD (Rem/Hr) point Location t = 30 min. t = 20 hr. ~t= 2 da t~3da ~t= 1 da t~tt da ~t= 30 da t~t00 da
- 8. l 8" fro)r) midplane of 157 021300 87 500 123 000 1681000 1521000 38 100 230
~ ..1)a rcoa l f i I ters
.). Eye t 1'.19 level below harcoal filters on E I. 26 753 1,560 2,190 2,980 2,710 678 0. 10 I '). <<:reenhouse-Turbine- 1.17 125 258 363 095 I 12 0.68 Aux. Oldo. doorway 3:. "aste Oldg Control 0.27 61.6 127 179 200 222 55 0 0.30
!anom Door WITHOUT CAD (Ram/Hr) l).-.d point Location t = 30 min. t = 24 hr. ~t= 2da ~t= 3 da ~t= 2 da ~t= l l da ~t= 30 da ~t= l00 da
". ! 8" from midplane of
',88 161 011200 70,700 88,000 89,500 68,200 )12,100 70.2
- h.lrcoal filters
). I'.ye level below 732 1,260 I',570 ~ 1,600',210 210 1.32 harcoal filters on
- j. 26 I
! 3. ~::rnenht use-Turbine- .08 121 209 261 260 201 35.0 0.22 6ldt. doorway
- aste Old. Control .20 59. 7 103 129 131 99.1 I? '0 0.1 I 0 li..r)) I)et lr PPP IS 33 Apz~l 1986
FIGURE 10 UNIT I RADIATION ZONE HAP
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-35 April 1986
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>>>l ~ I>>te ~~~~ I ~ r>>tr< ~ IOIHI~ ~ il~ I ~ I ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ >>00 ~ \ ~ ~ as i ~ ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ Il~ 1MO ~ ~ I H I~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ I ~ II~ I ~ ~ ~ I~ I>> ~ \ eli ~ ~ I ~ 00 ~ Iei ~ 0>>ts iii\~ ~~ ~ >>p- ~ 00 ~ ~ ~ ~ 'le ~ I ~ ~ 44 4l 4 I'1 4 4 <cctot [g 414 t II C 1 I 4 <CCttc TtfACTOA AVt 04th Ft. 4>>totSTAIC'tt4 Ttcth Alta ECMP'AFA A. TT SIT C Occtt ~ EPF-1 40 Apzfl 1986 EPP-15 1 6 FIGURE 10 (cont.) UNIT I RADIATION ZONE MAP 4e'I 1 Iotac f'I I ~0 0 Pa I Cega) H>>HI I( fl l1).jg LB fg I I I ~ (e3 )CV )i el ( I te) -t rr V I e ~ 0 av 8 P=.ls.h:;i ft. Q "tj-"' Qr Qs Qe-.. Oz th . Ioatk Qe 0,. - d-I aa el I) eseaH.II >> ~ l aH 0 I.seh 10ltta ~ J- ra ~e lc Hr'ea ease M I lgt ~ ~ I ~ Itt~ ~ Ihte ~ I ~ lstlisl ~ ~ ~ loleest ~ I ~ ~ I ~ 0 ~ I ~ I ~ I ~ ~ 0 ~ I ~ ~ ~ IIIII Qi - i <<e sa tarte e>> re ti ~ I~ east ~ I ital ~ I~ ~ ~ ii ~ ~ 0 ~ I ~ oi ~ ~ I~ I~ ~ 0 ~, 00 ~ I ~ tre ~ ~ est ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ lasers ~ I ~ I ~ ~ Ia ~ ~ ~ 0 eae ~ I lwi~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ia ~ ~ I ~ ~ 0 ~ I ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ teaIHI ~ I ~ ~ I ~ I ~ IHa ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ I ~ I ~ i~ I ~ ~ ot ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ IHI~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ II~ I ~ I ~ I~ lsetsl ~ I otl ~ Iota ~ I ~ ~ ~ foie ~ f ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ Iree ~ eet tst ~ It ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ tea ~ Ht ~ i)< ~e~ ft ~ . ~, I ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ II~ ~ 0 ~ I ~ oe' ~ IHO ~ I ~ ~ ~ s ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ Ia ~ I ~ I tf it ~ lea ~ ~ ~ islets ~ ~ Qe ~I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 HHI I ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0~ ~ ~ I I ~ ~ tH ~ ~ ~ ~ I~ I I ~ I ~ it~ 0 ~ ~ I~ Iloit ~ I ~ fel ~ tel ~ ~ I ~ II~ HI I ~ ~ ( I Qi ~ I ~ I ~ I ~ II~ lee l ~ ~ >>II ~ ~ I ~ I ~ II~ \ ~ caffe ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ teeel I ~ I ~ Ii~ I ~ I ~ I~ ~ I ~ ~, ~ ~ I ~, ~ ~ ~ I I ~ Ie ~ o If~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I~ el> ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ Ise ~ I ~ Iae I ~ I ~ I ~ a ~ eat ose I ~ ~a ~ I~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ OOHa ~ e ea I ~ ~ aH 0 ~ ~ ia ~e ~ ~ ] f.'J W ~ I Iei ~ ~ ~ I ~ tati eae ~ ~ alas , ~ 'I Lh ~ ~ aa ~ ~ ~ I ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ I ~ I ~ leos ~' ~ ~ ~ I ~ 10>>I ~ IICO O I OCCtt ~ 2 I I ~)i~ ee ~ ~ ~ ( h:TC N 1TOT1ICTCO OCCt1 1 REIICTCII Aletleftl 'T A. TOO'Cia 111t ~ TOICTC ~ TICIO. OahG Tl. IT. 3W Ia'M'iaa ta ]69'0' tcctt ~ EPP-15 -41 April 1986 EPP-15 FIGURE 11 UNIT II RADIATION ZONE MAP Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 12.3.1.3 Post-Accident Access and Shield Design Review A post-accident access and shield design review was per-formed in accordance with NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2 to ensure personnel accessibility to vital areas following a design basis accident (DBA). The DBA considered in this analysis is the loss-of-coolant acc'ident (IOCA) . The source terms used are those specified in Regulatory Guide 1.3 and discussed in Section 15.6.5.5.2. Amendment 20 12.3-11 Jul 1985 EPP-15 -42 April 1986 <<0 EPP-15 FIGURE 11 UNIT II RADIATION ZONE'AP Nine Mile Point Unit 2 CESAR The plant is designed so'that access after an accident is essential in only a limited number of areas. All Unit 2 post-accident vital access areas are. listed as follows: Main control room control building, el 306 ft
- 2. Relay and computer room - contr'ol building, el 288 ft 6 in
- 3. Health physics/counting room Unit 1 turbine building, el 261 ft Amendment 20 12.3-11al July 1985 EPP-15 -43 April 1986
EPP-15 FIGURE ll UNIT II RADIATION ZONE MAP Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment 20 12.3-1lbl July 1985 EPP-15 -44 April 1986 EPP-15 FIGURE 11 UNIT II RADIATION ZONE HAP Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR
- 4. Radwaste sample room (post-accident sampling) turbine building, el 261 ft Online isotopic monitors - turbine building, el
'I 5. 306 ft and main stack, el 261 ft
- 6. Radwaste control room - turbine bui'lding, el 279 ft Technical support center (TSC) - Unit 1 adminis-p 7.
tration building
- 8. Chemistry laboratory Unit 1 turbine building, el 261 ft
- 9. Associated connecting access paths Other post-accident vital access areas suggested them by NUREG-0737 either do not apply to Unit 2, or access to is not required at Unit 2.
The doses re'ceived by individuals working in or traveling . between the various vital areas in performing necessary tasks are presented in 'Table 12;3-3. The tasks to be per-formed in the area, the occupancy'imo. s in the area in-cluding travel time to and from the area, and the doses received in performance of each task are presented for each vital area. The following radiation sources contribute to the doses received for each task:
- 1. Direct shine from secondary containment
- 2. Airborne releases (described in Section 15.6.5.5.3)
- 3. Air-scattered radiation from secondary containment (sky shine)
Additional dose contributions from localized sources (e.g., post-accident samples) are accounted for on a case-specific basis. Dose rates as a function of time at various areas requiring possible occupancy following an accident are presented in Table 12.3-4 and on Figure 12.3-69. The calculated doses received in performing vital post-accident functions were determined based on the following:
- 1. Unless otherwise specified, tasks are assumed to be performed at the time post-accident at which the Amendment 13 12.3-1la August 1984 EPP-15 -45 April 1986
~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ '0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ 0- ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 - 0 0 . ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 - 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ EPP-15 FIGURE 11 UNIT II RADIATION ZONE HAP Nine I Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR 1E(2. Main Control Room/Relay and Computer Room Together, these two areas make up the control room emergency zone. Continuous occupan'cy for 30 days is required to execute safe -shutdown of the plant. Shielding and ventilation system designs ensure habitability for 30 days'ithin the. dose limits of GDC 19. See 'Section 6.4 for details of this habitability analysis.
- 3. Health Physics/Counting Room - Intermittent oc-cupancy is required to perform routine health phys-ics functions and analyze radioactive grab samples.
Since a specific stay time in this area is not defined, the maximum dose is calculated based on full-time occupancy for a standard 8-hr workday. 4Ec8. Radwaste Sample Room/Unit, 1 Chemistry Lab - Inter-mittent occupancy is required to obtain, transport, and analyze post-accident samples. The samples are assumed to be taken at t=l hr post-LOCA. See Section 1.10, Item II.B.3, for details of the sam-pling and anylysis procedure. 5a. "Turbine Building Online Isotopic Mon'itor - One-time access could be required at 22 days post-LOCA to replace the 160 liter liquid nitrogen supply dewar that feeds the three small dewars on the monitor skid. The stay time at the monitor location is as-sumed to be 15 minutes. 5b. Main Stack Online Isotopic Monitor - As above, one-time access could be required at 22 days to replace the 160 liter liquid nitrogen dewar. Also, due to the increased radioactivity concentration in the stack effluent after an accident, access could be required as frequently as every 6 hr throughout the accident to refill the sample cartridge supply hoppers. It is assumed that the person servicing the stack monitor will drive from the adminis-tration building to the stack to perform these functions. Assuming both tasks must be performed during the same trip, the stay time is 15 min plus 5 min for the cartridge refill, for a "otal of 20 min. 6a. Radwaste Control Room One-time access is required to turn off reactor building equipment and floor drain pumps in order to prevent. the discharge of post-LOCA fluids to the radwaste building. Al-though this task will probably be performed early Amendment 13 12'.3-11c August 1984 EPP-15 -47 April 1986 EPP-15 FIGURE'l UNIT II RADIATION ZONE MAP Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR in the accident, the dose is calculated using worst-case dose rates to provide a conservative dose. The stay time for this task is assumed to be 5 minutes. I 6b. Access is also required at t=l hr and again at t=12 hr post-lOCA to service the emergency response facility (ERF) computer system. Again, one dose is calculated using worst-case dose rates to provide a conservative dose. The stay time for each'task is 15 minutes.
- 7. Technical Support Center - Continuous occupancy for 30 days is required.to:
- a. Provide plant management and technical support to plant operations personnel during emergency conditions
- b. Relieve the reactor operators of peripheral duties and communications not directly related to reactor system manipulations
- c. Prevent congestion in the control room
- d. Perform emergency operations facility (EOF) functions for the alert emergency class, the site emergency class, and the general emergency class events until the EOF is functional.
- 9. Associated Connected Access Paths All pathways used to perform vital post-accident functions are shown on Figure 12.3-69. Calculated doses, except for those continuously occupied areas, include the dose. received for a round trip between the OSC and the vital area based on the average dose rate for the path at the appropriate time post-LOCA.
Amendment 13 12.3-11d August 1984 EPP-.15 -48 April 1986 EPP-15 FIGURE 11 UNIT II RADIATION ZONE YiAP ~ Ie vf v'r 'I ~ ~ VV Il ~ ww llew (2 V4 WV I ele se Ie 7 Iec ,~av ~ P ~ I.. I. I VV~ vf, L eea llafe C~g lv I I Iwaw L- weN ~ ewe ~ veae I ~e Iecw L7 L7) 79 ~ aVW ~ 4 I ~ Il ~ 'I I ~I I eseoc weel vvv aav 7 41 1i."".--I -'- .i;-'. .; ~ 4 V<<V4 III ece asa vvsvv~ 4 <<t "L 7 4 ~ 11 ~ w ~a g Vhs 4 lee sew w awe la av 1, (00- LCICN Nle eels A0 ~ Ia a,eea e ~;7 .aft;: ) ~ WsI a ~ ~ e II Naif ~ II4e f 47 v ~ ~eefww lffW eswa ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ooc I I~ aae 4 ev ~ owe Lao vwv~ ale ~ Vs V 11 "87~a~" " wo v v C ~ ~ evalef V4 eesvl v IN ~ 4 ew w W ~ INV4 Neelwl4 vw wN ~ ~ fvwe ~ ~ vtws v IN ~ ~ Nc scca II wow v ~ I WNefla ~o ~ ~ ee I ~ ~ la I e v IIIINv& ~ ~ vv ~ ~ II>> ~ ac Ive III I I I I I l I ~ I I VII'sfsj17ffsfff'lfr,wrNP I Pwvc c ~ 4 OOoeo wr FIGURE 123a69 POST ACCIDENT VITAL ACCESS AREAS SHEET 1 OF 4 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT13 EPP-15 -49 Apri1 1986 AUGUST 1964 EPP-15 FIGURE ll UNIT II RADIATION ZONE aaP 9e II !I"' II II aa ~ ~ aa afa ~ !!. aaa ~ I gaea ae<<a'a :/ I,: a M aaaee ~la<<acr aaa ~H m" m g I Ialelee CL ~ IA ~ H il \ ~ oaca aacao NcV <<-.=-M-M>> ea = <<Ps=-.k=.==~ f(-.. p 0 ' Oo leOEC5 ~ ~ e ~ ~ floaec aaOa4 ~ ~ ~a ae' ~ ~a laa<<4 ~ weeaa ~ a- 'glle ae e ~t=M ~~e ~ aa ~ 'aaaa ~ a<<a<<1 ~ ea ae L i aa aaa aaee g So.at% a.a ~ ee ~ ~a eaI <<a ~a 0 ..k aa'a' FIGURE 12.3-69 I' a POST ACCIDENT VITAL a 51TI ACCESS AREAS ~ W PLAt <a t~o I ~ al b SHEET 2 OF 4 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION e) NINE MILE POINT- 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS AMENDMENT13 AUGUST 1984 EPP-15 -50 April 1986 EPP-15 FIGURE ll 0 UNlT II RADIATION ZONE MAP ~ ' IK ~ K alla ll ~ 0000KI ~ 0001000 0000 ~ laaatt 000+It 0 I KKtaa IPL KW>> IKIII 0000 ~ CI E3 ',.Oo ~ I IIIII ILIIILV al100 ~ aataat Ia La balll'I lt Q taOIIS KU 'I Ã <<I aavt ~ alt 1 IQ ~ Laat I aatK \00 I V ~ at- . Ia Klav Will I IKLV W aaaaKL 00llKawtatL IL IIV ~ 4000 ~ ~ Ka alai at taa ~ tat ~ ~WII~ UM ~L IK' FIGURE 123-69 POST ACCIDENT VITAL ACCESS AREAS SHEET 3 OF 4 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT EPP-15 -51 April 1986 AMENDMENT13 AUGUST 1984 EPP-15 FIGURE ll UNIT II RADIATION ZONE MAP cl' eDI Il err.t I~ ~lit 001 00% f hid Lan CN014lt CII" a@alla 001 tlONAC 0 n aaaa'l00~ IV'Oal 0100 ~ I 100'\, CQ =- Qo 405 IlkhWL ta(N -Ka tl rltII 1100 II'+0r0, It'll0t'0 'Ctl ClaOe lgls I& ~ ~ N0055 Ic ~ N cr <<II(CIN~NK~IIIIAEk 0 CO~ IIOCN 51141~0 FIGURF 12.3-69 POST ACCIDENT VITAL ACCESSAREAS SHEET4OF4 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT- 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS -52 AMENDMENT13 AUGUST1984 EPP-15 prowl 1986 7 FIGURE 12 Hine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 12 3-3 PERSOHHEL DOSES FOR REQUIRED OCCUPAHCYiCIHES IH VITAL AREAS Vi~al QIed g~~eggg~me ~Occ ~cX /~ac ~osB j'/~a Notes Hain control room Execute the safe shutdovn Continuous for 1 15+0 30-day average dose rate = and relay and of the plant 30 days 1.60 mRea/hr computer rooa Health physics/ Perf orm routine health 8 hr 1 46+0 Dose based upon continuous countinq roon physics functions and occupancy for an 8-hr Unit. 1 analyze radioactive grab vorkday at the time of-'. saaples maxiaum dose rate Radvaste sample rooa/ a) Obtain and perfora general 55 min 1 09+0 Hhole body Unit 1 chemistry lab isotopic and Boron analysis 1 24+0 E ztreait y {PASS) ~ < 1 of dilute reactor coolant saaple<<1 b) Obtain and perform isotopic 1 hr 1 40+0 Hhole body analysis of containaent 2 63+0 Eztremity atmosphere sample<>> c) Determine level of dis- 2hr, Sain 5 89-1 Hhole body solved gases {e.g~ Ha) 5 93-1 Extreaity in reactor coolant d) Obtain and perfora chloride 1 hr, 30 ain 2.47+0 Hhole body analysis of undiluted 1 66+1 Extreaity reactor coolant sample<<> Turbine building online Replace large liguid nitrogen 1or 2 min 2 79+0 Dose includes dose received isotopic monitor devar~>> for one round trip betveen the OSC and the monitor location Hain stack online isotopic Replace large liguid nitrogen 24 min 2.74+0 Dose includes dose received monitor devar and refill saaple car- for one round trip betveen tridge feed hoppers>> the OSC and the aonitor location Radvaste control rooa a) Turn off reactor bull/ing 12 min 8. 26-1 Dose includes dose received eguipment and floor drain for one round 'trip betveen pumps the OSC and the radvaste control rooa Aaendment 13 1 of 2 August 1984 EPP-15 -53 hfarch 1987 EPP-15 FIGURE 12 (Qo~r.) Bine Nile, Point Un i2 FS h 8 ThBLE 12 3-3 (Cont) Vj,~hF~e Qgp<LREpcy game Qo~se ~r Ja bootes b) Service ERF coaputer system 22 min 1. 18i0 Rouh d tr ip bet veen the For information only 6 min 1 60+0 OSC and the control room emergency xone Technical support center Per HOREG-0696 Continuous for Later 30 days <>>t = hr source terms used. See Section 1.10, Item II.B.3, for specific information on the post-accident 1 sampling system and Table II B.3-1 for a breakdovn of the tasks and reguired occupancy tines. ~>>Dose includes exposure received for one round trip from the OSC, to the radvaste sample room, to the Unit 1 ches lab, and back to the OSC. <>>This assumes that the spare devar is stored at the monitor location. hmendment 13 2of2 hugust 1984 EPP-15 -54 jl 1987 EPP-15 FIGURE 12 (Cont.) Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 12.3-4 DOSE RATE (REI/HR) AT LOCATION:+ Tine Post-LOCA 39zl 1 2. 85i0 3. 16i0 3. 49' 3.93aO 4. 29' 4. 86iO 5.14' 5.32iO 5.31+0 3 3. 17<0 3.75i0 4. 48' 5 43iO 6. 15+0 7. OliO 7 46iO 7.90iO 7.75+0 6 4. 29+0 5.03iO 6.01+0 7.03+0 7.73' 8. 9140 9 4940 1 01<1 1.00i 1 9 4 3540 5 30+0 6.32iO 7.47+0 8. 07+0 9-5140 1 02+1 08+ 1 1.05i 1 12 4 6140 5.78iO 7.01iO 7.99iO 8.99iO l. 05+1 1 13+1 1 181 1 1 14+1 18 5. 2640 6 36+0 7. 82AO 9. 23' 1 01+1 1.20' 1 26+1 1 33+1 1 30+1 24 5.90+0 7. 30i0 8 77+0 1. 03+1 1. 12' 1. 284 1 1 44@1 l. 46+ 1 1 4511 30 6.09iO 7. 50iU 8.98iO .1.0441 l. 14+1 1 32+1 1.4441 1. 46+1 1.46' 50 6. 69+0 8 11+0 9.69iO 1. 11+1 1 21+1 1 4241 1 44@i l. 57' 1 46tl 75 7.36i0 8. 69' 1.03il 1. 21+1 1 2611 1 441 1 1 56+1 l. 69+1 1.58' 100 8. 06iO 9. 72iO 1.17' 1 38+1 1 484 1 1. 67+ 1 1.69+1 1 82+1 1.71+ 1 200 9.53i0 1 1641 1.37+1 63+1 1 73+1 1.93+1 2.07+1 2 10+1 2 09+1 400 8.23+0 9.79iO 1 17+1 1 37+1 1 47+1 1.66' 1 79+1 1 81+1 1.71' 550 5.84+0 6 90iO 8. 31+0 9 57+0 1. 05i 1 1 161 1 1.24' 1. 28+ 1 1 21+1 720 4.27iO 4 '410 5. 54+0 6 27+0 6.77iO 7.59+0 8.02iO 8 1440 7.80' 1 4. 87iO 3. 17i0 2. 51iO 3.41iO ~ 3. 61iO 5. 05i 0 5.74iO 6 33+0 6.23iO 3 7.31iO 4. 10iO 2.92i0 4.37iO 4 87+0 7. 46' 8 30+0 8 48+0 8.28iO 6 8.79iO 4. 66+0 3.18iO 5. 20i0 5 80+0 8.91+0 1 0441 1 03+1 1.02+ 1 9 9.20iO 4. 1 liO 2.63i0 5.13' 5 83+0 9.20iO 1 10+1 1 03+1 1.00' 12 1 02tl 4. 53iO 2.79iO 5. 59' 6.49+0 1.02' 1 1811 1 13+1 1 1ltl 18 1 16+1 4. 78iO 3 16+0 6.46+0 7 66+0 1 1641 1 3441 1 27+1 1 25+1 24 1. 22' 5.05iO 3.19iO 6.88iO 8.0810 1 22tl 1. 47+1 1 44+1 1.34' 30 1 27+1 5.06iO 3. 29' 7.09+0 8 59+0 1. 27+1 1. 4741 1.44' 1. 34' 50 1.3241 5. 18iO 3.30iO 7.60i0 9.30iO 1. 32' 1. 58' 1 44+1 1.44' 75 1 44+1 5 32+0 3. 46+0 8 26+0 9. 86iO 1. 44+1 1.60' 1. 56+1 1 56+1 100 l. 57+1 5.62+0 3.65i0 9.25i0 1 07+1 1. 57' 1 83+1 1 69+1 1.69' 200 1 83+1 6.62>0 4.38iO 1 12+1 1 25+1 1. 83' 2 11tl 2 07+1 2 07+1 400 1 4601 5. 48' 3.63iO 9. 43' 1 0741 1 46+1 1 82<1 1. 79+1 1 69+1 550 1.06il 3. 94' 2.59 i 0 6. 69+0 7.69+0 l. 06+1 1 26ol 1 23+1 1.23' 720 7.09iO 2 66+0 1.78i0 4 38+0 5. 18iO 7. 09i 0 8.09iO 8.02iO 7 9210 ~Refer to Figure 12 3-69. Asendnent 27 lof4 July 1986 EPP-15 -55 March 1987 EPP-15 FIGURE l2 (Cont;:) Sine 8ile Point Unit 2 FSAR ThBLE 12-3-4 (Cont) Tine Post-LOCh /ger 1 6.33iO 6 15v0 5.98iO 4.9 liO 3.95iO 3. 81' 4.59v0 3.54iO 3 8 38+0 7;76iO 7.44+0 96v0 3. 64' 3.43i0 6.49i0 4.71i0 6 1.03' 9 87+0 8 81+0 6 11vo 4.04io 3.71' 7.82iO 5.64+0 9 1 01+1 9 70+0 8 06+0 4.99+0 2. 57' 1 93+0 8.02i0 5.64' 12 1. 13' 1 08+1 9.08iO 5.27iO 2.80iO 2. 36' 9.03i0 6.39iO 18 1 26vl 1 21vl 1.01i 1 6.05iO 3. 13' 2 68iO 'l. 03 i 1 7. 46' 24 1. 44+1 1 31+1 1 13vl 6.89iO 3. 45iO 2. 89' 1.09i2 7.89iO 30 1. 44+1 1 32+1 1 14+1 7.10' 3 65vO 2 99v0 1. 14+1 8.29i0 50 1 44+1 1 42+1 1 21vl 7 71+0 3 85iO 2. 98iO 1. 23 4 1 8.90iO 75 1 56+1 1. 54+1 1 26vl 8 29+0 4 29+0 3. cled 0 1.25' 9 56+0 100 1 69+1 1 67+1 1.48+1 9 22+0 4.75i0 4. 16' 1 37+1 l. 05i 1 200 2 07+1 2. 03v 1 1.73 4 1 1 llvl 5.72i0 4.50i0 1~ 62+1 1. 25' 400 1 79+1 66+1 1 47+1 9 39iO 4.93iO 4.05i0 1 37+1 1.0 4v 1 550 1 24+1 1 20+1 1 05+1 6.60iO 3. 58' 2. 94' 9.74' 7.49i0 720 8 02+0 7 69+0 6.77iO 4.54+0 2. 24iO 45vO 6 46vO 4.98+0 hn 1 2 62+0 2.49+0 4 39+0 3.37iO 3.58iO 3. 07+ 0 3.04v0 2.81i 0 2 87+0 3 3.01iO 2 69+0 6.06+0 4 10v0 4. 46iO 3.61i0 3. 55iO 3.29iO 3.43+0 6 3. 24iO 2 82+0 7.29iO 4.62' 5.03iO 3.95i0 3. 88iO 3.59iO 3 77v0 9 2 64+0 .2 02+0 7.42+0 4 01v0 4.45i0 3. 18v0 3. 10vO 2 91+0 3 10+0 12 2.79iO 2. 13iO 8 33+0 4 '740 4.62+0 3. 36' 3. 28iO 3.09iO 3.29iO 18 3.16' 2. 28vO 9.58' 4.36iO 4 84v0 3.60i0 3.50' 3. 29' 3.50i0 24 3.19iO 2. 35iO 1 02vl 4 46+0 5.05+0 3. 71+0 3.62i0 3. 39iO 3.62iO 30 3 29+0 2 36+0 1.05i 1 4 38+0 4.97+0 3.73iO 3. 63+0 3 41+0 3.63i0 50 3.30+0 2. 38iO 1 14+1 4.41+0 4.90iO 3. 77' 3.67+0 3 44vO 3.67i0 75 3 46+0 2. 52iO 1 21+1 4.59+0 11' 3.99iO 3 88v0 3 64+0 3.88i0 3.75+0 2.72i0 1.27' 4.86iO 5. 41iO 4. 31+0 4. 19vO 3.93iO 4. 19+0 100 200 4 38+0 3 22v0 1. 52+1 5.64v 1 6. 37' li
- 5. 1 0 4 97v0 4.66+0 4.97+0 400 3 63i0 2.68iO 1 27+1 4 7liO 5. 35' 4.24iO 4. 13iO 3.87iO 4 13+0 550 2 69+0 1. 94iO 9 24+0 3.42+0 3. 85' 3.08i0 2.99+0 2 81+0 2.99iO 720 1.78+0 1 26vO 6. 16iO 2 23vO 2.50i0 1. 99' 1.94iO 1. 82' 1.94+0
~Sefer to Fignre 12 3-69. kaendaent 27 of 4 July 1986 EPP-15 6 Harch 1987 EPP-15 FIGURE 12 (Cont.) Nine Nile Point Vnit 2 FSAR TABLE 12.3-4 (Cont) Tine .Post-LOCh DHrl AK Ao 1 2.92iO 2. 84iO 2.76+0 2 58+0 2 4140 2. 18tO 2.04+0 2.04' 3 3.49i0 3. 38' 3.24iO 2.93iO 2. 63' 2.47+0 2 2240 2.2200 6 3. 84iO 3.73i0 3.55iO 3.16iO 2.79iO 2. 66' 2.34iO 2. 34' 9 3 18+0 3. 11+0 2. 92+0 2. 49+0 2. 08' 2 07+0 1.72' 1.72i0 12 '.37i0
- 3. 29iO 3.09+0 2.63+0 2. 19iB 2. 19iO 1 8110 1 8110 18 3.60iO 3. 51iO ~ 3.30iO 2 81+0 2.34i0 2.33+0 1. 92' 1 92+0 24 3 71+0 3 62+0 3.39 i 0 2 89+0 2. 40' 2.40+0 1 97+0 1.97iO 30 3.73+0 3.63+0 3 41+0 2 90+0 2 4040 2 40+0 1 ~ 9840 . 1.98iO 50 3.77iO 3 67+0 3.44+0 2 93iO 2. 42' 2.42iO 1 99+0 1.99' 75 3.99iO 3.88iO 3 64+0 3.10i0 2. 56iO 2.56iO 2 10+0 2 1010 100 4 31+0 4. 19i0 3.93+0 3. 35' 2.76iO 2. 76' 2.26iO -2. 26' 200 5 11+0 4. 97iO 4.66iO 3. 97iO 3. 27iO 3. 27+0 2 6840 2 68+0 400 4 24+0 4. 13iO 3.87iO 3.30iO 2.71' 2. 71+0 2.23iO 2. 23+0 550 3.08iO 2. 99' 2 81+0 2. 39i0 1.97iO 1.97iO 1. 61iO 1. 61+0 720 1 99+0 1 94+0 1 82+0 1. 55+0 1.27iO 1 27+0 1.04iO 1.0 4 i 0 Tine Health Physics/ Turbine Building Post LOCA Counting Badvaste Saaple Online Iso >pic Bain Stack Online
&Jul AS 800'. Roon Nonitor ~sotoplc Ko~ni or 1 2.04+0 1.9 li0 25-2 2.76-1 4 1910 1.78iO 3 2.22+0 1.94i0 3 19-2 2 40-1 5.79iO 2 52+0 6 2 34+0 2. 04+0 2 61-2 2 09-1 7.02+0 3 69+0 9 1 72+0 1 41i0 4 38-4 6 74-2 7.22+0 2.9240 12 1. BliO 1.45iO 3 45-4 5 99-2 8 03+0 2 99+0 18 1 9240 1 50+0 2i30-4 4 76-2 9 28+0 3.17iO 24 1.97iO 1.55iO 1~ 68-4 3 88-2 9 85+0 2 41+0 30 1.98' 1.53iO 7 07-5 3.25-2 1.03+1 3.31+0 50 1. 99' 1 51+0 3 45-5 2 24-2 1 10+1 3.24iO 75 2 10+0 1 57+0 2. 21-5 1 84-2 1 17+1 3.37+0 100 2 26+0 1 67+0 7 72-6 1 71.-2 1. 25' 3.66iO 200 2.68+0 1.97iO 5 07-6 1 73-2 1. 52' 4.08iO 400 2.23i0 1 64+0 3 51-6 1~ 48-2 1. 26' 2.90i0 550 1 61@0 1.19iO 2. 50-6 1 11-2 9.04+0 2.01+0 720 1. 04+0 7 84-1 1 64-6 7 34-3 6 0610 1.66' ~Nefer to Figure 12.3-69. Aaandnent 27 3 of 4 July 1986 EPP-15 -57 March 1987 FIGURE 12 (Cont.) Nine Nile Point Unit 2 PsAR TABLE 12 3-4 (Cont) Tiae Post-LOCA Jg~r 1 ~tl Badvaste Control 1 6~ 43+0 Unit 9 1 Cheaistry Lab 00-2 3 1 89+0 6 87-2 6 2.08+0 5 65-2 9 1 96+0 3. 17-3 12 1.95iO 2 62-3 18 1 93+0 1 84-3 24 1.90iO 1. 36-3 30 1 87+0 9 41-4 50 1 73+0 5 15-4 75 72+0 3 58-4 100 1 83+0 2. 85-4 200 2.09iO 2. 58-4 400 1 71+0 2 24-4 550 . 1.26iO 1 69-4 720 8. 15-1 1 13-4 ~seXer to Pignre 12.3-69. Aaendaent 27 4of4 July 1986 EPP- -58 March 1987 7-, FIGURE 13 CONTAMINATION CONTROL GUIDES NORMAL. STATION EMERGENCY STATION CONTROL LEVELS CONTROL LEVELS nrestricted Areas and Transferabl'e <LOOdpm 8- v per 100cm (disc smear) <3.000dpm 8- y per 100cm (disc smear Release of Material, uipment, Tools, <L000dpm 0- v per t (wipe) <10,000dpm 8-. y per ft (wipes) ehicles,.etc. to CLOdpm a per 100cm (disc smear) <LOdpm a per 100cm (disc smear) Unrestricted Areas Fixed No activity above background <1 mrad/hr (Background must be <300cpm) estricted Areas Transferable <400dpm 8- v per 100cm (disc smear <4000dpm 6- y per 100cm (disc smear <4000dpm 8- v per ft (wipe) <40,000dpm 8- y per ft (wipe) <Mdpm a per 100cm (disc smear) ~0 dpma per 100cm~ (disa smear) Fixed <5mrad/hr at contact <5mrad/hr at contact estricted Area Transferable <400dpm 8- v per 100cm (disc smear) <4000dpm 8-, y per 100cm (disc smear Equipment and Tools <4000dpm 8- y per ft2 (wipe) <40,000dpm 6-' per ft 2 (wipe) <40dpm a per 100cm (disc smear) <AO dpma per 100cm2 (disc smear) Fixed <5mrad/hr at contact <Smrad/hr at contact espiratory Equipment Transferable <400dpm 8- v per 100cm (disc smear <400dpm 6- y per 100cm (disc smear (except hoses and ~ anifolds see <40dpm a per 100cm2 (40 dpna per 100cm (disc smear) "Equipment and Tools" ) Fixed <800cpm, 1.4-2.0mg/cm 'probe <800cpm, 1.4-2.0mg/cm prob e'PP-15 59 March 1987 EPP-15 FIGURE ll CONTANINATION CONTROL Gl!IDES (Cont. ) NORHAI. STATION EHERGENCY STATIO N CONTROL LEVEi8 CONTROL LEVELS Personnel Decontamination <100 cpm or 1000 cpm/15cm (probe area) <L000 cpm or 10,000 dpm/15cm (Personnel Clothing, Shoes) (probe area) (Background < 500 cpm) (Background < 500 cpm) NOTES: 1. During emergency situations, down below normal if decontamination is warranted station control levels. and possible contamination levels should be 'rought
- 2. Once the emergency has been terminated, all tools, equipment and areas released under emergency guidelines shall be resurveyed and decontaminated (if necessary) to be brought back into compliance with normal station control levels.
EPP-1,5 Harch 1987 II ~