ML18037A418

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Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-259/93-25,50-260/93-25 & 50-296/93-25.Corrective Actions: Initiated WR to Investigate & Repair Limit Switch for 1 Turbine Stop Valve
ML18037A418
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/19/1993
From: Zeringue O
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9308240030
Download: ML18037A418 (8)


Text

ACCELERATED DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCEBRTON NBR:9308240030 DOC.DATE: 93/08/19 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET, ¹ CI4 : 50- 2 5 9 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 5 0- 2 6 0 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 0 50- 2 9 6 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 6 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZERINGUE,O.J.

Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Responds to:NRC ltr re violation noted in insp rept 50-259,50-260,50-296/93-25.Corrective actions:initiated WR to investigate

& repair limit switch for ¹1 turbine stop valve.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-4-PD WILLIAMS,J.

INTERNAL: ACRS t

AEOD/DSP/ROAB AEOD/TTC NRR/DORS/OEAB NRR/DRIL/RPEB NRR/PMAS/ILPB1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 RES/HFB EXTERNAL: EG&G/BRYCEgJ.H.

NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 2

2 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ROSS,T.

AEOD/DEIB AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRSS/PEPB NRR/PMAS/ILPB2 0

EG FIL 02 E

01 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM PI-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 25 ENCL 25

Tennessee Valley AutnornyPost Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609.2000 O. J.

Ike" Zeringue Vice President. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant AUG <9

~gg3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentleman:

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority Docket, Nos.

50-259 50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - NRC ZNSPECTZON REPORT 50 259~

50 260I 296/93 25 REPLY TO NOTICE OF. VZOLATZON (NOV)

The subject NRC inspection report identified a violation for failure to take adequate actions to ensure compliance with a technical specifications requirement.

Specifically, the minimum number of instrument channels for the reactor protection system were not operable with the unit in the run mode and fuel in the vessel.

Enclosure 1 provides TVA's "Reply to the Notice of Violation" (10 CFR 2.201).

Enclosure 2 contains a commitment that will be taken to prevent recurrence of this violation.

If you have any questions regarding this reply, please telephone Pedro Salas at (205) 729-2636.

Sincerely, Zerin ue Enclosures cc:

See page 2

'PAL" 9308240030 9308i9 PDR ADOCK 05000259 8

PDR

/(po

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AUG i9 1993 Enclosures cc (Enclosures):

Mr. R. V. Crlenjak, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900

Atlanta, Geor'gia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637
Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

ENCLOSURE 1

Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)

Reply to Notice of Violation (NOV)

Inspection Report Number 50-259 260 296 93-25 RESTATEMENT OF VIOLATION "During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on June 19 July 16,

1993, a

violation of NRC requirements was identified.

In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below:

Technical Specification 3.1.A, Table 3.1.A (Note 1) requires that if the minimum number of operable instrument channels per trip system cannot be met for one trip system, trip the inoperable channels or entire system within one hour.

Table 3.1.A requires the minimum number of operable instrument channels per system for the turbine stop valve closure reactor protection system (RPS) function to be four.

Contrary to the above, on June 16, 1993, the Technical Specification was not met in that the licensee failed to trip the channel inputting into the 'A'PS trip system within one hour with only three operable instrument channels for the turbine stop valve closure RPS function inputting into each of the two RPS trip systems (A&B).

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I) applicable to Unit 2 only."

TVAIS REPLY TO VIOLATION 1 ~

Reason For Violation The details concerning this violation, the root cause of the event and the corrective actions to preclude recurrence of the event were reported in Licensee Event Report 50-260/93008, and are summarized below.

The primary cause of this event was determined to be personnel error for failing to trip the inoperable channels or entire trip system within a one-hour time requirement specified in the technical specifications (TS).

This action was required when an anticipated half scram was not received during the performance of a surveillance instruction (SI) for the Division II RPS relays.

This condition existed until an Assistant Shift Operations Supervisor (ASOS) identified that the g1 turbine stop valve limit switch also had an input to the Division I RPS relays.

This determination was made during a discussion with a NRC Inspector concerning the corrective actions that were taken to resolve the limit switch failure.

A contributing factor to this event was that Operators did not generally understand that, the g1 turbine stop valve limit switch provided an input to both RPS channels.

At. the time of the event, only RPS Division II was being tested, and Operations personnel believed that this was the only affected division.

Therefore, Operations personnel failed to adequately research the effects of this limit switch failure on RPS Division I.

It should be noted that this unique limit switch configuration only exists for the turbine stop valves and the main steam isolation valves.

2 ~

Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved The Unit Operator notified the Unit 2 ASOS when the anticipated half scram signal was not received.

A work request was initiated to investigate and repair the limit switch for the gl turbine stop valve.

As a result of this condition, Operations personnel removed the fuse for the turbine stop valve closure relays for reactor auto-scram channel B1.

Subsequently, the fuse for the turbine stop valve closure relay for the reactor auto-scram channel A1 was removed to comply with BFN's TS requirements.

The repair on the limit switch was completed, and the functional test was performed successfully.

3.

Corrective Steps That [have been or] Will Be Taken To Prevent Recurrence A description of this event was incorporated into the night orders to inform Operations'hift workers of the potential for exceeding a Limiting Condition for Operation requirement when the SI is performed.

The Operations individual who misevaluated the consequences of the broken component was counseled.

The Unit 2 turbine stop valve and the main steam isolation valve divisional functional SIs were revised to include checks of the relays not being tested in the other RPS division.

Operators will be required to read the details of this event to ensure a heightened awareness to this unique plant condition.

TVA believes that these corrective actions will preclude a recurrence of this type of event.

4.

Date When Full Compliance 'Will Be Achieved Full compliance will be achieved by September 14,

1993, after required reading is complete.

0,

ENCLOSURE 2

Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)

Reply to Notice of Violation (NOV)

Inspection Report Number 50-259 260 296 93-25 COMMITMENTS 1 ~

Operators will be required to read the details of this event to ensure a heightened awareness to this unique plant condition.

This required reading will be completed by September 14, 1993.