ML18036A490

Proposed Tech Specs Re Emergency Diesel Generator Availability for Plant Shared Sys of Standby Gas Treatment & Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys

ML18036A490
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	01/10/1992
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18036A489	List: ML18036A488 ML18036A490
References
NUDOCS 9201210162
Download: ML18036A490 (48)

Text

1 ENCLOSURE 1

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS lg 2g AND 3 (TVA BFN TS-304) 9201210162 920410 PDR ADOCK 05000259.

P

-PDR

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES TVA BFN TS-304 UNIT 1 Index iii Index iv 3.9/4.9-15 3.9/4.9-15a 3.9/4.9-15b 3.9/4.9-15c 3.9/4.9-20 3.9/4.9-21 3.9/4.9-22 UNIT 2 Index iii 3.9/4.9-15a 3.9/4.9-15b 3.9/4.9-15c 3.9/4.9-20 3.9/4.9-21 3.9/4.9-22 UN1T 3 Index iii Index iv 3.9/4.9-14a 3.9/4.9-14b 3.9/4.9-19 3.9/4.9-21

~sect.cn 3.7/4.7 E ~

Je't Pumps

~

~

~

~

~

e

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

F.

Recirculation Pump Operation G.

Structural Integrity H.

Snubbers Containment Systems A.

Primary Containment.

B.

Standby Gas Treatment System C.

Secondary Containment.

D.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves'.

~Pa e Nc.

3.6/4.6-11 3.6/4.6-12 3.6/4.6-13 3.6/4.6-15 3.7/4.7-1 3.7/4.7-1 3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-16 3.7/4.7-17 E.

Control Room Emergency Ventilation 3.7/4.7-19 F.

Primary Containment Purge System G.

Containment Atmosphere Dilution System (CAD) 3.7/4.7-21 3.7/4.7-22 3.8/4.8 H.

Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM)

System H2 Analyzer Radioactive Materials A.

Liquid Effluents B.

Airborne Effluents C.

Radioactive Effluents Dose D.

Mechanical Vacuum Pump 3.7/4.7-24 3.8/4.8-1 3.8/4.8-1 3.8/4.8-3 3.8/4.8-6 3.8/4.8-6 E.

Miscellaneous Radioactive Materials Sources.

3.8/4.8-7 F.

Solid Radwaste 3.8/4.8-9 3.9/4.9 Auxiliary Electrical System 3.9/4.9-1 A.

Auxiliary Electrical Equipment 3.9/4.9-1 B.

Operation with Inoperable Equipment.

3.9/4.9-8 C.

Ope'ration in Cold Shutdown 3.9/4.9-15 D.

Diesel Generators Required For Units 1, 2, and 3 Shared Systems 3.9/4.9-15a BFN Unit 1

IIj

Neeeien

~Pa e No.

3.10/4.10 Core Alterations 3.10/4.10-1 A.

Refueling Interlocks 3.10/4.10-1 B.

Core Monitoring.

3.10/4.10-4 C.

Spent Fuel Pool Water.

D.

Reactor Building Crane E.

Spent Fuel Cask.

3.10/4.10-7 3.10/4.10-8 3.10/4.10-9 F.

Spent Fuel Cask Handling-Refueling Floo I

3.11/4.11 Fire Protection Systems 1

~

~

3.10/4.10-10 3.11/4.11-1 A.

Fire Detection Instrumentation B.

Fire Pumps and Water Distribution Mains C.

Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems D.

C02 Systems.

E.

Fire Hose Stations 3.11/4.11-1 3.11/4.11-2 3.11/4.11-7 3.11/4.11-8 3.11/4.11-9 F.

Yard Fire Hydrants and Hose Houses 3.11/4.11-11 G.

Fire-Rated Assemblies 3.11/4.11-12 H.

Open Flames, Welding Spreading Room and Burning in the Cable

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

3.11/4.11-13 5.0 Major Design Features 5.0-1 5.1 Site Features.

5.0-1 5.2 Reactor.

5.0-1 5.3 Reactor Vessel 5.0-1 5.4 Containment.

5.0-1 5.5 Tuel Storage 5.0-1 5e6 Seismic Design 5.0-2 BFN Unit 1

4!.

AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.9.C.

0 eration in Cold Shutdown 4.9.C.

0 eration in Cold Shutdown Whenever the reactor is in COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION with irradiated fuel in the

reactor, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in Section 3.9.A except as specified herein.

1.

No additional surveillance is required.

1.

At least two units 1

and 2 diesel generators and their associated 4-kV shutdown boards shall be OPERABLE.

2.

An additional source of power energized and capable of supplying power to the units 1

and 2 shutdown boards consisting of at least one of the following:

a.

One of the offsite power sources specified in 3.9.A.l.c.

b.

A third OPERABLE diesel generator.

3.

At least one 480-V shutdown board for each unit must be OPERABLE.

4.

One 480-V RMOV board mg set is required for each RMOV board (1D or 1E) required to support operation of the RHR system in accordance with 3.5.B.9.

BFN Unit 1 3.9/4.9-15

,.3.9/4".9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.9.D. Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and Shared S stems 4.9.D. Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems 1.

Whenever standby gas treatment is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 3.7.B and/or control room emergency ventilation is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 3.7.E, the associated diesel generator aligned to supply emergency power to that equipment shall be OPERABLE.

a.

Standby gas treatment train A and/or control room emergency ventilation train A Diesel generator 1/2A or 1/2B.

b.

Standby gas treatment train B Diesel generator 1/2D or 1/2B.

c.

Standby gas treatment train C Diesel generator 3D.

Surveillance requirements are as specified in 4.9.A.1, 4.9.A.2, 4.9.A.3, and 4.9.A.4 with the following provisions:

1.

The testing provisions of 4.9.A.l.b do not apply for a defueled unit.

2.

The common accident signal testing required by 4.9.A.3 requires the signal to originate only from units that require OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

This test will verify the automatic start of the diesel generators aligned to the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

d.

Control room emergency ventilation train B-Diesel generator 3C or 3B.

2.

When the diesel generator aligned to supply emergency power to the equipment in 3.9.D.l is inoperable on a unit that is in cold shutdown, refueling or is defueled, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the corresponding technical specification during the succeeding 30 days, provided that the redundant train(s) of equipment and their normal and emergency power supplies are OPERABLE.

BFN Unit 1 3.9/4.9-15a

3.9/4.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.9.D.

Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems 4.9.D.

Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems

3. If Specification 3.9.D.2 cannot be met, the affected equipment shall be declared inoperable.

BFN Unit 1 3.9/4.9-15b

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLYLEFT BLANK BFN Unit 1 3.9/4.9-15c

I+

1 1 I, 4

3.9 BASES (Cont'd)

Each 250-V dc shutdown board control power supply can receive power from its own battery, battery charger, or from a spare charger.

The chargers are powered from normal plant auxiliary power or from the standby diesel-driven generator system.

Zero resistance short circuits between the control power supply and the shutdown board are cleared by fuses located in the respective control power supply.

Each power supply is located in the reactor building near the shutdown board it supplies.

Each battery is located in its own independently ventilated battery room.

The 250-V dc system is so arranged, and the batteries sized so that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit.

Loss of control power to any engineered safeguard control circuits is annunciated in the main control room of the unit affected.

The loss of one 250-V shutdown board battery affects normal control power only for the 4,160-V shutdown board which it supplies.

The station battery supplies loads that are not essential for safe shutdown and cooldown of the nuclear system.

This battery was not considered in the accident load calculations.

There are two 480-Volt ac RMOV boards that contain mg sets in their feeder lines.

These 480-Volt ac RMOV boards have an automatic transfer from their normal to alternate power source (480-Volt ac shutdown boards).

The mg sets act as electrical isolators to prevent a fault from propagating between electrical divisions due to an automatic transfer.

The 480-Volt ac RMOV boards involved provide motive power to valves associated with the LPCI mode of the RHR system.

Having an mg set out of service reduces the assurance that full RHR (LPCI) capacity will be available when required.

Since sufficient equipment is available to maintain the minimum complement required for RHR (LPCI) operation, a 7-day servicing period is justified.

Having two mg sets out of service can considerably reduce equipment availability; therefore, the affected unit shall be placed in Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The offsite power source requirements are based on the capacity of the respective lines.

The Trinity line is limited to supplying two operating units because of the load limitations of CSST's A and B.

The Athens line is limited to supplying one operating unit because of the load limitations of the Athens line.

The limiting conditions are intended to prevent the 161-kV system from supplying more than two units in the event of a single failure in the offsite power system.

Specification 3.9.D provides the OPERABILITY requirements for emergency dieseI generator power sources for the plant shared systems of standby gas treatment and the control room emergency ventilation.

This specification addresses the condition where one or more of the units is in cold shutdown, refueling or is defueled, by requiring the diesel generators aligned to the shared systems to be OPERABLE when any of the BFN Units BFN Unit 1 3.9/4.9-20

~ I 1

3.9

. BASES (Cont'd) require OPERABILITY of the shared systems.

The allowed out-of-service time of 30 days for the diesel generator aligned to the shared systems is commensurate with the importance of the affected systems when a unit is in cold shutdown, refueling, or is defueled; considers the low probability of a LOCA/Loss of offsite power in these conditions; and considers the availability of onsite power to redundant trains.

4.9 BASES The monthly test of the diesel generators is primarily to check for failures and deterioration in the system since last use.

The diesels will be loaded to at least 100 percent of its continuous rating (i.e., g 2600 KW) while engine and generator temperatures are stabilized (about one hour).

A minimum 75-percent load will prevent soot formation in the cylinders and injection nozzles.

Operation up to an equilibrium temperature ensures that there is no overheating problem.

The tests also provide an engine and generator operating history to be compared with subsequent engine-generator test data to identify and to correct any mechanical or electrical deficiency before it can result in a system failure.

Diesel testing once per 18 months (i.e., at least once per fuel cycle) at a minimum load of 2800 KW for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, assures that each diesel generator will be capable of supplying the maximum load during the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of a loss of offsite power/loss of coolant accident.

This test also demonstrates each diesel generator's long-term load carrying capability.

The test during refueling outages is more comprehensive, including procedures that are most effectively conducted at that time.

These include automatic actuation and functional capability tests to verify that the generators can start and be ready to assume load in 10 seconds.

The annual inspection will detect any signs of wear long before failure.

BFN tests the 7-day diesel generator fuel oil supplies in accordance with Table 1 of ASTM-D975-89.

Each fuel oil supply is tested quarterly.

Battery maintenance with regard to the floating charge, equalizing

charge, and electrolyte level will be based on the manufacturer's instruction and sound maintenance practices.

In addition, written records will be maintained of the battery performance.

The plant batteries will deteriorate with time but precipitous failure is unlikely.

The type of surveillance called for in this specification is that which has been demonstrated through experience to provide an indication of a cell becoming irregular or unserviceable long before it becomes a failure.

BFN Unit 1 3.9/4.9-21

gll

4.9, BASES (Cont 'd)

The equalizing charge, as recommended by the manufacturer, is vital to maintaining the ampere-hour capacity of the battery and will be applied as recommended.

The testing of the logic systems will verify the ability of the logic systems to bring the auxiliary electrical system to running standby readiness with the presence of an accident signal from any reactor or an undervoltage signal on the 4-kV shutdown boards.

The periodic simulation of accident signals in conjunction with diesel generator voltage available signals will confirm the ability of the 480-V load shedding logic system to sequentially shed and restart 480-V loads if an accident signal were present, and diesel generator voltage was the only source of electrical power.

Specification 4.9.D provides surveillance requirements for Units 1, 2, and 3 diesel generator emergency power sources for the purpose of satisfying Specification 3.9.D.

Testing of these power sources is intended to ensure their OPERABILITY when required to support OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

REFERENCES 1.

Normal Auxiliary Power System (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.4) 2.

Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.5) 3.

250-V DC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.6) 4.

Memorandum from Gene M. Wilhoite to H. J.

Green dated December 4, 1981 (LOO 811208 664) and memorandum from C. E. Winn to H. J.

Green dated January 10, 1983 (G02 830112 002)

BFN Unit 1 3.9/4.9-22

Section

~Pa e Ne.

3.7/4.7 E.

Jet Pumpse

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

F.

Recirculation Pump Operation G.

Structural Integrity H.

Snubbers Containment Systems A.

Primary Containment.

B.

Standby Gas Treatment System C.

Secondary Containment.

3.6/4.6-11 3.6/4.6-12 3.6/4.6-13 3.6/4.6-15 3.7/4.7-1 3.7/4.7-1 3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-16 D.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves 3.7/4.7-17 E.

Control Room Emergency Ventilation 3.7/4.7-19 F.

Primary Containment Purge System 3.7/4.7-21 G.

Containment Atmosphere Dilution System (CAD) 3.7/4.7-22 3.8/4.8 H.

Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM)

System H2 Analyzer Radioactive Materials A.

Liquid Effluents B.

Airborne Effluents C.

Radioactive Effluents Dose D.

Mechanical Vacuum Pump 3.7/4.7-24 3.8/4.8-1 3.8/4.8-1 3.8/4.8-3 3.8/4.8-6 3.8/4.8-6 E.

Miscellaneous Radioactive Materials Sources.

3.8/4.8-7 3.9/4.9 F.

Solid Radwaste Auxiliary Electrical System A.

Auxiliary Electrical Equipment 3.8/4.8-9 3.9/4.9-1 3.9/4.9-1 B.

Operation with Inoperable Equipment.

3.9/4.9-8 C.

Operation in Cold Shutdown 3.9/4.9-15 D.

Diesel Generators Required for Units 1, 2, and 3 Shared Systems 3.9/4.9-15a BFN Unit 2

~

~

3.9/4'.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.9.D Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems 4.9.D Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems 1.

Whenever standby gas treatment is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 3.7.B and/or control room emergency ventilation is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 3.7.E, the associated diesel generator aligned to supply emergency power to that equipment shall be OPERABLE.

a.

Standby gas treatment train A and/or control room emergency ventilation train A Diesel generator 1/2A or 1/2B.

b.

Standby gas treatment train B Diesel generator 1/2D or 1/2B.

c.

Standby gas treatment train C Diesel generator 3D.

Surveillance requirements are as specified in 4.9.A.1, 4.9.A.2, 4.9.A.3, and 4.9.A.4 with the following provisions:

1.

The testing provisions of 4.9.A.l.b do not apply for a defueled unit.

2.

The common accident signal testing required by 4.9.A.3 requires the signal to originate only from units that require OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

This test will verify the automatic start of the diesel generators aligned to the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

d.

Control room emergency ventilation train B-Diesel generator 3C or 3B.

2.

When the diesel generator aligned to supply emergency power to the equipment in 3.9.D.1 is inoperable on a unit that is in cold shutdown, refueling or is defueled, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the corresponding technical specification during the succeeding 30 days, provided that the redundant train(s) of equipment and their normal and emergency power supplies are OPERABLE.

BFN Unit 2 3.9/4.9-15a

A

~ ~

'4

3.9/4'.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.9.D.

Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems 4.9.D.

Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems

3. If Specification 3.9.D.2 cannot be met, the affected equipment shall be declared inoperable.

BFN Unit 2 3.9/4.9-15b

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLYLEFT BLANK BFN Unit 2 3.9/4.9-15c

I 1'n 4

4 I

3.9 BASES (Cont'd)

Each 250-V dc shutdown board control power supply can receive power from its own battery, battery charger, or from a spare charger.

The chargers are powered from normal plant auxiliary power or from the standby diesel-driven generator system.

Zero resistance short circuits between the control power supply and the shutdown board are cleared by fuses located in the respective control power supply.

Each power supply is located in the reactor building near the shutdown board it supplies.

Each battery is located in its own independently ventilated battery room.

The 250-V dc system is so arranged, and the batteries sized so that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit.

Loss of control power to any engineered safeguard control circuits is annunciated in the main control room of the unit affected.

The loss of one 250-V shutdown board battery affects normal control power for the 480-V and 4,160-V shutdown boards which it supplies.

The station battery supplies loads that are not essential for safe shutdown and cooldown of the nuclear system.

This battery was not considered in the accident'oad calculations.

There are two 480-V ac RMOV boards that contain mg sets in their feeder lines.

These 480-V ac RMOV boards have an automatic transfer from their normal to alternate power source (480-V ac shutdown boards).

The mg sets act as electrical isolators to prevent a fault from propagating between electrical divisions due to an automatic transfer.

The 480-V ac RMOV boards involved provide motive power to valves associated with the LPCI mode of the RHR system.

Having an mg set out of service reduces the assurance that full RHR (LPCI) capacity will be available when required.

Since sufficient equipment is available to maintain the minimum complement required for RHR (LPCI) operation, a 7-day servicing period is justified.

Having two mg sets out of service can considerably redu'ce equipment availability; therefore, the affected unit shall be placed in Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The offsite power source requirements are based on the capacity of the respective lines.

The Trinity line is limited to supplying two operating units because of the load limitations of CSST's A and B.

The Athens line is limited to supplying one operating unit because of the load limitations of the Athens line.

The limiting conditions are intended to prevent the 161-kV system from supplying more than two units in the event of a single failure in the offsite power system.

Specification 3.9.D provides the OPERABILITY requirements for emergency diesel generator power sources for the plant shared systems of standby gas treatment and the control room emergency ventilation.

This specification addresses the condition where one or more of the units is in cold shutdown, refueling or is defueled, by requiring the diesel generators aligned to the shared systems to be OPERABLE when any of the BFN Units BFN Unit 2 3.9/4.9-20

r4

3.9

. BASES (Cont'd) require OPERABILITY of the shared systems.

The allowed out-of-service time of 30 days for the diesel generator aligned to the shared systems is commensurate with the importance of the affected systems when a unit is in cold shutdown, refueling, or is defueled; considers the low probability of a LOCA/Loss of offsite power in these conditions; and considers the availability of onsite power to redundant trains.

4.9 The monthly tests of the diesel generators are primarily to check for failures and deterioration in the system since last use.

The diesels will be loaded to at least 100 percent of its continuous rating (i.e., g 2600 KW) while engine and generator temperatures are stabilized (about one hour).

A minimum 75-percent load will prevent soot formation in the cylinders and injection nozzles.

Operation up to an equilibrium temperature ensures that there is no overheating problem.

The tests also provide an engine and generator operating history to be compared with subsequent engine-generator test data to identify and to correct any mechanical or electrical deficiency before it can result in a system failure.

Diesel testing once per 18 months (i.e., at least, once per fuel cycle) at a minimum load of 2800 KW for an interval of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assures that each diesel generator will be capable of supplying the maximum load during the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of a loss of offsite power/loss of coolant accident.

This test also demonstrates each diesel generator's long-term load carrying capability.

The test during refueling outages is more comprehensive, including procedures that are most effectively conducted at that time.

These include automatic actuation and functional capability tests to verify that the generators can start and be ready to assume load in 10 seconds.

The annual inspection will detect any signs of wear long before failure.

BFN tests the 7-day diesel generator fuel oil supplies in accordance with Table 1 of ASTM-D975-89.

Each fuel oil supply is tested quarterly.

Battery maintenance with regard to the floating charge, equalizing

charge, and electrolyte level will be based on the manufacturer's instruction and sound maintenance practices.

In addition, written, records will be maintained of the battery performance.

The plant batteries will deteriorate with time but precipitous failure is unlikely.

The type of surveillance called for in this specification is that which has been demonstrated'hrough experience to provide an indication of a cell becoming irregular or unserviceable long before it becomes a failure.

BFN Unit 2 3.9/4.9-21

~

'l ~ +

4

~ A

~

4.9...BASES (Cont'd)

The equalizing charge, as recommended by the manufacturer, is vital to maintaining the ampere-hour capacity of the battery and will be applied as recommended.

The testing of the logic systems will verify the ability of the logic systems to bring the auxiliary electrical system to running standby readiness with the presence of an accident signal from any reactor or an undervoltage signal on the 4-kV shutdown boards.

The periodic simulation of accident signals in conjunction with diesel generator voltage available signals will confirm the ability of the 480-V load shedding logic system to sequentially shed and restart 480-V loads if an accident signal were present, and diesel generator voltage were the only source of electrical power.

Specification 4.9.D provides surveillance requirements for Units 1, 2, and 3 diesel generator emergency power sources for the purpose of satisfying Specification 3.9.D.

Testing of these power sources is intended to ensure their OPERABILITY when required to support OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

REFERENCES 1.

Normal Auxiliary Power System (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.4) 2.

Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.5) 3.

250-V DC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.6) 4.

Memorandum from Gene M. Wilhoite to H. J.

Green dated December 4,

1981 (LOO 811208 664) and memorandum from C. E. Winn to H. J.

Green dated January 10, 1983 (G02 830112 002)

BFN Unit 2 3.9/4.9-22

Section 3.7/4.7 F.

Recirculation Pump Operation G.

Structural Integrity H.

Snubbers Containment Systems 3.6/4.6-12 3.6/4.6-13 3.6/4.6-15 3.7/4.7-1 A.

Primary Containment.

3.7/4.7-1 B.

Standby Gas Treatment System C.

Secondary Containment.

3.7/4.7-13 3.7/4.7-16 D.

Primary Containment Isolation Valves 3.7/4.7-17 E.

Control Room Emergency Ventilation 3.7/4.7-19 F.

Primary Containment Purge System 3.7/4.7-21 G.

Containment Atmosphere Dilution System (CAD) 3.7/4.7-22 3.8/4.8 3.9/4.9 H.

Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM)

System H2 Analyzer Radioactive Materials A.

Liquid Effluents B.

Airborne Effluents C.

Radioactive Effluents Dose D.

Mechanical Vacuum Pump E.

Miscellaneous Radioactive Materials Sources F.

Solid Radwaste Auxiliary Electrical System A.

Auxiliary Electrical Equipment B.

Operation with Inoperable Equipment.

C.

Operation in Cold Shutdown 3.7/4.7-23a 3.8/4.8-1 3.8/4.8-1 3.8/4.8-2 3.8/4.8-6 3.8/4.8-6 3.8/4.8-7 3.8/4.8-9 3.9/4.9-1 3.9/4.9-1 3.9/4.9-8 3.9/4.9-14 D.

Diesel Generators Required for Units 1, 2, and 3 Shared Systems 3.9/4.9-14a BFN Unit 3

Sect on

~Pa e Ne.

3.10/4.10 Core Alterations A.

Refueling Interlocks B.

Core Monitoring C.

Spent Fuel Pool Water D.

Reactor Building Crane E.

Spent Fuel Cask F.

Spent Fuel Cask Handling-Refueling Floor.

3.11/4.11 Fire Protection Systems A.

Fire Detection Instrumentation B.

Fire Pumps and Water Distribution Mains C.

Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems D.

C02 System E.

Fire Hose Stations.

F.

Yard Fire Hydrants and Hose Houses G.

Fire-Rated Assemblies 3.10/4.10-1 3.10/4.10-1 3.10/4.10-4 3.10/4.10-7 3.10/4.10-8 3.10/4.10-9 3.10/4.10-9 3.11/4.11-1 3.11/4.11-1 3.11/4.11-2 3.11/4.11-7 3.11/4.11-8 3.11/4.11-9 3.11/4.11-11 3.11/4.11-12 H.

Open Flames, Welding and Spreading Room.

Burning in the Cable 3.11/4.11-13 5.0 Major Design Features 5.0-1 5.1 Site Features 5.0-1 5.2 Reactor 5.0-1 5.3 Reactor Vessel

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

5.0-1 5.4 Containment 5.0-1 5.5 Fuel Storage 5.0-1 5a6 Seismic Design 5.0-2 BFN Unit 3 xv

)

3.9/4;9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.9.D. Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems 4.9.D. Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems 1.

Whenever standby gas treatment is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 3.7.B and/or control room emergency ventilation is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 3.7.E, the associated diesel generator aligned to supply emergency power to that equipment shall be OPERABLE.

a.

Standby gas treatment train A and/or control room emergency ventilation train A Diesel generator 1/2A or 1/2B.

b.

Standby gas treatment train B Diesel generator 1/2D or 1/2B.

c.

Standby gas treatment train C Diesel generator 3D.

Surveillance requirements are as specified in 4.9.A.1, 4.9.A.2, 4.9.A.3, and 4.9.A.4 with the following provisions:

1.

The testing provisions of 4.9.A.l.b do not apply for a defueled unit.

2.

The common accident signal testing required by 4.9.A.3 requires the signal to originate only from units that require OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

This test will verify the automatic start of the diesel generators aligned to the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

d.

Control room emergency ventilation train B-Diesel generator 3C or 3B.

2.

When the diesel generator aligned to supply emergency power to the equipment in 3.9.D.1 is inoperable on a unit that is in cold shutdown, refueling or is defueled, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the corresponding technical specification during the succeeding 30 days, provided that the redundant train(s) of equipment and their normal and emergency power supplies are OPERABLE.

BFN Unit 3 3.9/4.9-14a

~,

3.9(4.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 3.9.D.

Diesel Generators Re uired for Units l 2

and 3 Shared S stems 4.9.D.

Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and Shared S stems

3. If Specification 3.9.D.2 cannot be met, the affected equipment shall be declared inoperable.

BFN Unit 3 3.9/4.9-14b

L I

ta, 4

3.9.

BASES (Cont'd)

The 250-V dc system is so arranged and the batteries sized so that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit.

Loss of control power to any engineered safeguard control circuits is annunciated in the main control room of the unit affected.

The station battery supplies loads that are not essential for safe shutdown and cooldown of the nuclear system.

This battery was not considered in the accident load calculations.

There are two 480-V ac RMOV boards that contain mg sets in their feeder lines.

These 480-V ac RMOV boards have an automatic transfer from their normal to alternate power source (480-V ac shutdown boards).

The mg sets act as electrical isolators to prevent a fault from propagating between electrical divisions due to an automatic transfer.

The 480-V ac RNOV boards involved provide motive power to valves associated with the LPCI mode of the RHR system.

Having an mg set out of service reduces the assurance that full RHR (LPCI) capacity will be available when required.

Since sufficient equipment is available to maintain the minimum complement required for RHR (LPCI) operation, a 7-day servicing period is )ustified.

Having two mg sets out of service can considerably reduce equipment availability; therefore, the affected unit shall be placed in Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The offsite power source requirements are based on the capacity of the respective lines.

The Trinity line is limited to supplying two operating units because of the load limitations of CSST's A and B.

The Athens line is limited to supplying one operating unit because of the load limitations of the Athens line.

The limiting conditions are intended to prevent the 161-kV system from supplying more than two units in the event of a single failure in the offsite power system.

Specification 3.9.D provides the OPERABILITY requirements for emergency diesel generator power sources for the plant shared systems of standby gas treatment and the control room emergency ventilation.

This specification addresses the condition where one or more of the units is in cold shutdown, refueling or is defueled, by requiring the diesel generators aligned to the shared systems to be OPERABLE when any of the BFN Units require OPERABILITY of the shared systems.

The allowed out-of-service time of 30 days for the diesel generator aligned to the shared systems is commensurate with the importance of the affected systems when a unit is in cold shutdown, refueling, or is defueled; considers the low probability of a LOCA/Loss of offsite power in these conditions; and considers the availability of onsite power to redundant trains.

BFN Unit 3 3.9/4.9-19

4.9..

~ BASES (Cont'd)

Specification 4.9.D provides surveillance requirements for Units 1, 2, and 3 diesel generator emergency power sources for the purpose of satisfying Specification 3.9.D.

Testing of these power sources is intended to ensure their OPERABILITY when required to support OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

References 1.

Normal Auxiliary Power System (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.4) 2.

Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.5) 3.

250-V DC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.6) 4.

'emorandum from G.

M. Wilhoite to H. J.

Green dated December 4, 1981 (LOO 811208 664) and memorandum from C. E. Winn to H. J.

Green dated January 10, 1983 (G02 830112 002)

BFN Unit 3 3.9/4.9-21

ENCLOSURE 2

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CHANGES Summar of Chan es:

1.

For Unit 1, add Surveillance Requirement 4.9.C as follows:

4.9.C.

0 eration in Cold Shutdown 1.

No additional surveillance is required.

2.

For Unit 1, add the following Specification and for Units 2 and 3 change present Specification 3.9.D to read as follows:

3.9.D Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems 1.

Whenever standby gas treatment is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 3.7.B and/or control room emergency ventilation is required to be OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 3.7.E, the associated diesel generator aligned to supply emergency power to that equipment shall be OPERABLE.

a.

Standby gas treatment train A and/or control room emergency ventilation train A Diesel generator 1/2A or 1/2B.

b.

Standby gas treatment train B Diesel Generator 1/2D or 1/2B.

c.

Standby gas treatment train C Diesel Generator 3D.

d.

Control room emergency ventilation train B Diesel Generator 3C or 3B.

2.

When the diesel generator.,aligned,to supply emergency power to the equipment in 3.9.D.1 is inoperable on a unit that is in cold shutdown, refueling, or is defueled, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the corresponding technical specification during the succeeding 30 days provided that the redundant train(s) of equipment and their normal and emergency power supplies are OPERABLE.

3. If Specification 3.9.D.2 cannot be met, the affected equipment shall be declared inoperable.

3.

For Unit 1, add the following specification and for Units 2 and 3, replace present Surveillance Requirement 4.9.D with the following:

4.9.D Diesel Generators Re uired for Units 1

2 and 3 Shared S stems Surveillance Requirements are as specified in 4.9.A.l, 4.9.A.2, 4.9.A.3, and 4.9.A.4 with the following provisions:

1.

The testing provisions of 4.9.A.l.b do not apply for a defueled unit.

I t

e=

,I

~l

,/

2.

The common accident signal testing required by 4.9.A.3 requires the signal to originate only from units that require OPERABILITY of SBGT and/or CREVS.

This test will verify the automatic start of the diesel generators aligned to the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency

'ventilation system.

4.

For Unit 1, add the following to Bases 3.9.D and for Units 2 and 3 revise Bases 3.9.D as follows:

Existing bases reads in part, on page 3.9/4.9-20 for Unit 2 and page 3.9/4.9-19 for Unit 3:

Specification 3.9.D provides the OPERABILITY requirements for the Unit 3 diesel generators when they serve as emergency power supplies to standby gas treatment train C and control room emergency ventilation train B when they are being considered operable for Unit 2 technical specifications.

The allowable out of service time of 30 days is commensurate with the importance of the affected systems when Unit 3 is in cold shutdown, the low probability of a LOCA/Loss of offsite power and availability of onsite power to redundant trains.

Revised bases for Units 1, 2, and 3 are as follows:

Specification 3.9.D provides the OPERABILITY requirements for emergency diesel generator power sources for the plant shared systems of standby gas treatment and control room emergency ventilation.

This specification addresses the condition where one or more of the units is in cold shutdown, refueling or is defueled, by requiring the diesel generators aligned to the shared systems to be OPERABLE when any of the BFN Units require OPERABILITY of the shared systems.

The allowed out-of-service time of 30 days for the diesel generator aligned to the shared system is commensurate with the importance of the affected systems when a unit is in cold shutdown, refueling or is defueled; considers the low probability of a LOCA/Loss of offsite power in these conditions; and considers the availability of onsite power to redundant trains.

5.

For Unit 1, add the following to,Bases, 4.9.D..and,for Units 2 and 3, revise Bases 4.9.D as follows:

Existing Bases reads in part on page 3.9/4.9-22 for Unit 2 and page 3.9/4.9-21 for Unit 3:

Specification 4.9.D provides surveillance requirements for Unit 3 diesel generators for the purpose of satisfying Specification 3.9.D. It contains less stringent testing requirements for the Unit 3 diesel generators when they are only being used to support Unit 2 equipment.

Revised Bases for Units 1, 2, and 3 read as follows:

Specification 4.9.D provides surveillance requirements for Units 1, 2, and 3 diesel generator emergency power sources for the purpose of satisfying Specification 3.9.D.

Testing of these power sources is intended to ensure their OPERABILITY when required to support OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment system and/or the control room emergency ventilation system.

Y

,jt

~

I

~

~ 4A~

e o

p hl 4

~l I

l 4

Reason for Chan es:

BFN submitted and was granted a technical specification change (TS-283) which addressed the availability of Unit 3 emergency power to support Unit 2 operation.

TS-283 was issued as Amendments 186 and 150 for BFN Units 2 and 3, respectively.

TS-283 was required prior to Unit 2 restart in order to ensure availability of Unit 3 emergency diesel generators (EDG) that supply power to subsystems or trains that are shared by all three. units.

The proposed change in this amendment request addresses not only the Unit 3 EDGs required for Unit 2 operation but also the Unit 1/2 EDGS required for Unit 3 operation and Unit 3 EDGs required for Unit 1 operation.

The present technical specifications for.Units.2 and 3 include provisions for availability of emergency power for the shared systems of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation.

Specifically, the present TSs require Unit 3 EDG 3D to be operable to support SBGT Train C and Unit 3 EDG 3B or 3C to be operable to support CREVS Train B when Unit 2 requires operability of the affected systems.

These present TSs do not address the condition where SBGT:-

and CREVS are not required to be operable for Units 1 and/or 2 and, one or both systems are required operable for Unit 3.

'The'proposed change'to Unit 1 Specification 4.9.C is administrative in nature and provides, consistency with similar provisions in the Unit 2 and 3 technical specifications.

Justification for the Chan es:

The proposed changes to the Units 1g 2I and 3 Technical Specifications address the concern of emergency diesel generator power supply operability for the shared plant systems of SBGT and CREVS.

The present TSs only address the condition where Unit 3 EDGs are required operable to support equipment required for Unit 2 operation and they were written to specifically address the present condition where Unit 3 is defueled and Unit 2 requires operability of SBGT and/or CREVS.

The proposed TS changes specify in each Unit's TSs, emergency power supply operability when SBGT and/or CREVS are required to be operable by one or more of the three BFN Units.

Unit 1/2 EDG A provides emergency power to the SBGT A train and the CREVS A train.. Unit..l/2..EDG D provides emergency power to the SBGT B train.

Electrical alignment can also be made to supply emergency power-from Unit 1/2 EDG B for SBGT trains A and B, and for CREVS train A.

Unit 3 EDG 3C provides emergency power to CREVS train B while Unit 3 EDG 3D supplies SBGT train C.

Electrical alignment can also be made to supply emergency power from Unit 3 EDG 3B for CREVS train B.

This change does not affect the EDG requirements for RHRSW pumps A3 and C3 because their function is only required as an alternative to the Unit 1/2 pumps for EECW service.

TS Definition E currently requires operability of the normal and emergency power supplies in order to consider a piece of equipment operable.

Definition 1.C.2 contains an exception to this requirement (does not apply when a unit is in cold shutdown or refuel) which allows the limiting condition for operation for normal or emergency power supplies to determine required actions and allowed out of service time periods.

These definitions do not explicitly address the situation where the unit(s) requiring operability of the SBGT and/or CREVS is not in cold shutdown or refuel but one or more units are in cold shutdown, refuel, or defueled.

Present Unit 2 and 3 TSs address this condition by imposing an explicit 30-day allowed out-of-service limit for EDGs on Unit 3 required for SBGT and CREVS operability for Unit 2.

The proposed TS change will address this condition for all three BFN Units and will adopt the

,~present Units 2 and 3,~30-day allowed out-of-service interval for an emergency

'" 'power source that is inoperable on a unit(s) that is in cold shutdown, refuel, or is defueled when one or more units require operability of SBGT and/or CREVS.

~ g a

pl

~ ~ "N.A

~gi~q 44 P4

~t s,

c

~

1

~

< I f

~4 t X fVf/

'I k

,I

The, proposed changes for Section 3.9.D/4.9.D will replace the present specifications in Units 2 and 3, for Unit 3 EDGs Required Operable for Unit 2 Operation, with specifications for Diesel Generators Required for Units 1, 2, and 3 Shared Systems.

Unit 1 TSs will also contain the proposed Section 3.9.D/4.9.D.

Proposed Section 3.9.D implements the intent of present provisions in the Units 2 and 3 TSs by requiring operability of the associated EDGs when SBGT and/or CREVS are required operable by any units TSs.

Proposed 3.9.D allows the EDG power source to be inoperable for 30 days provided the redundant train(s) of equipment and their normal and emergency power supplies are operable.

If the required operability of the EDGs and corresponding offsite power sources for SBGT and/or CREVS is not met, proposed specification 3.9.D requires the affected equipment to be declared inoperable.

Proposed Surveill'ance.Requirement 4.9.D implements testing provisions of present 4.9.D in Units 2 and 3 TSs with a clarification to the common accident signal testing requirement.

The clarification will require the common accident signal for the test to originate only from units that require operability of SBGT and/or CREVS.

This clarification meets the intent of present Surveillance Requirement 4.9.D.l.c which requires the test signal to originate from Unit 2 for testing of the automatic start feature of the Unit 3 EDGs while Unit 3 is defueled and does not require operability of SBGT or CREVS.

The present provision'in the"'Units '2 and 3 TSs, that does not require the loss of offsite power/loss of coolant accident loads test for defueled units, is retained in the proposed change.

The proposed changes to Bases 3.9 and 4.9 are made to describe the changes to the affected specifications as discussed above.

(

~ y vi Ip J

usa

~,

+1 ~a

< ly

.;el' I

4

ENCLOSURE 3

PROPOSED DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

Descri tion of Pro osed Technical S ecification Chan es The proposed TS change for Units 1, 2, and 3 will replace present Units 2 and 3

Specification 3.9.D/4.9.D with new provisions that address emergency diesel generator operability for plant shared systems.

Proposed Specification 3.9.D will require the emergency diesel power>> sources to be operable whenever the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System and/or the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) are required operable by any units TSs.

Proposed changes to 4.9.D retain present intent in the Unit 2 and 3 TS, and clarifies testing provisions to make them applicable to all three units.

The Bases for 3.9 and 4.9 are revised to describe the changes proposed to the corresponding technical specifications.

Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Consideration Determination The NRC has 'provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c).

A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

1.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an, accident previously evaluated.

The safety design basis of the offsite po~er supplies is to provide adequate power to start the BFN Units, carry common plant auxiliary loads

and, when necessary, to carry the emergency loads of equipment in engineered safeguards systems for a unit in.,a design basis accident while also supplying auxiliary power requirements.

The safety ob)ective of the

- onsite'-power supplies is to provide a self-contained and highly reliable source of power;to the required loads for the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units -in the event of a loss of offsite power and loss of coolant accident in any one unit.

The safety functions of the onsite and offsite power supplies are maintained by this change to the Technical Specifications.

There are no physical changes to the plant as a result of this amendment.

The present provisions that address Unit 3 EDGs required operable for Unit 2 operation are being revised to address Units 1, 2, and 3 diesel power supply requirements for the plant shared systems of SBGT and CREVS. This TS change recognizes the interdependency of power supplies, from a unit that is in Cold Shutdown, Refuel, or ~defueled to a unit that is operating, for shared plant systems.

The SBGT system provides a means for minimizing the release of radioactive

.material from the containment to the environs by filtering and exhausting the air from the three Reactor Building areas and the common refueling area and maintaining the areas at a negative pressure during containment isolation conditions.

The ability to fulfillthe safety functions of the SBGT system is not changed by this proposed TS amendment.

The proposed change will require that when one or more units require operability of the

4 I sr 0

'4 I

""id.

r gv)g~

C.k P ~ I 5 a

SBGT system, that corresponding diesel generator emergency power supplies for SBGT Trains Ag Bg and C be operable.

As in present Unit 2 and 3 TSs, the allowed out-of-service time of 30 days is retained for an inoperable power supply provided the redundant train(s) of equipment and their normal and emergency power supplies are operable.

Zf these conditions are not met, the affected equipment is declared inoperable.

Each of the three 50% capacity trains of the SBGT system is supplied with emergency power from separate emergency power supplies to ensure that two trains are always available in case of loss of offsite power and the loss of any one train or EDG.

Control logic for the SBGT automatically and concurrently starts all three trains upon receipt of an accident signal (low reactor water level, high drywell pressure or high activity in a ventilation exhaust duct).

Should one train fail, the two remaining trains will continue to provide the required flow.

CREVS consists of two 100% capacity trains with each being capable of pressurizing the control room under isolated conditions.

The ability to meet the safety functions of the CREVS is assured by this amendment to the TSs.

The intent of present Unit 2 and 3 TSs is retained such that

'when CREVS is required operable by one or more BFN Units'Ss, the associated diesel generator emergency power supplies are also required to be operable.

The proposed changes do not affect accident precursors

and, as such, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes follow the intent of present provisions in Units 2 and 3 TSs and apply the intent of these provisions for plant shared systems to Units 1, 2, and 3.

The proposed changes assure that at least the present level of operability for the SBGT system and CREVS is maintainedy therefore, the changes do not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

The proposed change to the technical specifications does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the TSs do not involve any physical changes to the

,'facility...The effect of the proposed changes is to require operability, of the diesel generator emergency power supplies for the plant shared systems of SBGT and/or CREVS when-these systems are required operable by any unit, regardless of whether another unit is operating, shutdown, in refuel or is defueled.

Since at least the present level of operability is maintained for these systems and no new modes of operation are introduced, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The present TSs for Units 2 and 3 address the operability of the Unit 3 emergency diesel generators required for Unit 2 operation.

The proposed changes use the intent of present requirements to place similar operability requirements on Unit 1/2 emergency diesel generators required for Unit 3 operation, and also on Unit 3 emergency diesel generators required for Unit 1 operation.

Since at least the present level of operability for these systems is being maintained, the proposed changes do not involve a

~ significant reduction in a margin of safety.

w

< ~