ML18033B509
| ML18033B509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1990 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B507 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-90-26, 50-260-90-26, 50-296-90-26, NUDOCS 9009170118 | |
| Download: ML18033B509 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1990026
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET,'.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/90-26,
50-260/90-26,
and 50-296/90-26
Licensee:
ValTey Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection
Cond ct
.
August 6-10,
1990
Inspecto
Inspe tor
ho
eactor
nspector
M.
.
lei
rge
P. E., Reactor Inspector
ate
1gne
8w
Date Signed
.
B a e,
h>e
aterials
and Processes
Section
Engineering
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
ate
>gne
Scope:
This routine announced
inspection
was conducted in the areas
of licensee
actions.
on
previous
inspection
findings,
reportable
occurrences,
pipe
support
modifications for the licensee's
IEBs 79-02/79-14
program,
and welding.
Results:
Only one out of 33 pipe supports
was found to have
a minor discrepancy.
This
indicates
a significant improvement in quality, especially welding workmanship,
when compared to previous inspections.
In the
areas
inspected,
one violation was identified relating to inadequate
controls for welding.
No deviations
were identified.
(Paragraph
5.e.)
9009i7Oi is 9OOE30
ADDCK O5000259
A
Phil I
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
R. Baird, Civil Engineer
- R. Baron, Quality Control
(QC) Manager/Quality Assurance
(QA)
- P. Carier, Site Licensing Manager
- R. Cutsinger,
Lead Civil Engineer
- J. Danier, Site Programs
- J. Davenport, Site Licensing
- D. Gruber, Maintenance
Programs
Manager
G. Guffey,
QC Mechanical
and Welding Inspector
G. Hunt,
QC Manager
- W. Massie, Site Licensing Engineer
- B. McKinney, Technical
Support Manager
- M. Norrison, Nuclear Engineer - Compliance
And Licensing
- P. Osborne,
Principal Civil Engineer
M. Reischman,
Field Engineer - Modifications
- E. Ridgell, Compliance
and Licensing
- P. Salas,
Compliance
and Licensing Supervisor
- D. Smith,
Chemical
and Environmental
Manager
- J. Smithson,
Engineers
Supervisor - Modifications
M. Strickland,
QC Inspector
D. Winchester,
Mechanical
Engineer - Modifications
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
during this
inspection
included
craftsmen,
engineers,
mechanics,
technicians,
and administrative
personnel.
NRC Resident
Inspectors
D. Carpenter,
Senior Resident
Inspector
C. Patterson,
Senior Resident
Inspector
W. Bearden,
Resident
Inspector
K. Ivey, Resident
Inspector
Licensee Actions on Previous
Inspection
Findings
a.
Violation
(Closed) Violation 50-260/89-57-01,
Pipe Support Discrepancies
This violation involved
discrepancies
found
during
two previous
inspections
of the support modification program. All items in the
violation and the
commitments
in the response
to the violation from
the licensee
had
been
reviewed
and closed
in Inspection
Report
Nos.
Cl,,
90-09
and 90-19 except
commitments
item 3.
This was
a commitment for
the
licensee's
Modification group
and
gC
department
to
perform
walkdowns of in-process
Engineering
Change
Notes
(ECNs)
and
Design
Change Notices
(DCNs) to ensure that there were
no further examples of
the conditions 'identified in the
NRC violation.
This effort was to be
performed
in parallel
with the
79-02/79-14
modification effort.
However,
the licensee's
internal
memorandum
R28
900306
901,
dated
March 7,
1990, deviated
from the above
commitment in that
gC would not
be required
to participate
in the effort. In response
to the
NRC
concerns
regarding
this
change,
the
licensee
issued
internal
memorandum
R80 900412
967,
dated
April 12,
1990,
to fulfill the
commitment.
The
memorandum
with the
attached
action
plan
and
checklist stated that:
1) Effective April 16,1990,
the Modification team composed
of a
responsible
engineer
and
a craft supervisor, will be assigned
to
perform the final walkdown for all completed
work plans;
2)
gC department will perform an independent
walkdown on
a randomly
selected
samples of completed final walkdowns performed
by the
Modification team;
and
3)
A 10 percent
sample of 79-02/79-14
work plans that were
completed
before April 16,
1990, will be jointly walked
down by
gC and Modifications.
The
inspectors
discussed
the violation
and
commitment
with the
licensee's
engineers
and
reviewed
the
information provided.
The
licensee's
gC
and
Modification
team
walked
down
10
percent
of
approximately
580 pipe supports
whose work plans
were completed before
April 16,
1990.
The Modification team
walked
down
100 percent of
about
1000 pipe supports
independently
or jointly with gC for the work
plans
completed after April 16,
1990.
gC performed
a walkdown of
about
200 supports
independently
or jointly with the Modification team
whose
work
plans
were
completed
after April
16,
1990.
The
Modification team
and
gC did not find
a major discrepancy,
but did
find 11 minor discrepancies
such
as dimension differences for support
locations, differences
between
the Bill of Materials
and
as installed,
component
configurations
and part
numbers
not matched,
old parts
not
removed,
settings
out of range,
loose
lock nuts,
rust in
components,
etc.
Based
on the licensee's
effort, progress,
and the
continuing commitment,
the violation is considered
closed.
Inspector
Followup Items
(Closed)
Item 50-259,260,296/87-33-04:
"Deficient Welds
In
Piping Discovered
During MIC Inspection"
This item was discovered
during
a review of activities related to the
Browns Ferry Microbiologically Induced
Corrosion
(MIC) Program.
As
the
result
of this
review
three
concerns
were identified
and
subsequently
documented
in NRC Report
No. 50-259,260,296/87-33-04,
one
of
which
was
discussed
and
closed
in
NRC
Report
No.
50-259,260,296/89-20.
Of the
two remaining
concerns,
the
one relating to weld defects,
is
addressed
in NRC Report
No. 50-259,260,296/88-35,
which indicated that
the resident
inspectors
had reviewed,
and
found acceptable
for fuel
load,
the licensee's
actions
relating to this concern.
It remained
open
pending
a
scheduled
review,
by
NRC staff
Nondestructive
Examination
(NDE) personnel,
of 95 Emergency
Essential
Cooling Water
(EECW)
piping
radiographs.
This
review
was
completed
on
Oecember
23,
1988,
and
documented
in
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulations
(NRR) Letter dated
March
1989 which closed this portion of
this followup item
.
The
remaining
concern
related
to the
adequacy
of the licensee's
proposed
program,
as discussed
in
NRC Report 50-259,260,296/89-20.
On
~October
24,
1989,
NRR issued
Supplement
1 to the Safety
Evaluation
Report
(SER)
on
The
Browns
Ferry Nuclear
Performance
Plan,
which
concludes,
in paragraph
3. 14,
that
the
licensee's
inspection
and
monitoring
program for MIC will provide
reasonable
assurance
that
those
systems will not lose their capability to perform their safety
functions
due
to
MIC damage.
A11
the
concerns
being
adequately
addressed
this matter is considered
closed.
(Open)
Item 50-260/89-16-09:
"System
Flow Loss
Oue to Corrosion of
Carbon Steel
Piping"
This item concerned
the licensee's
method for calculation of pressure
drop in carbon
steel
piping
and
the fact that the
method
did not
account
for
an
increase
in relative
roughness
of pipe internal
surfaces
as
the piping ages
(due to corrosion or other causes).
The
specific concern
was related to the Core Spray
(CS) system.
The licensee
indicated that the
CS system at
BFN contains
condensate
grade water
and is not susceptible
to internal corrosion other than
a
smooth
iron oxide film.
This film is not
a factor which would
adversely
affect
pressure
loss.
The licensee
concluded
that
the
methodology in the pressure
drop calculations
was appropriate.
Because
the
licensee
did
not
provide
any
basis
to support
the
statement
that
the
condensate
grade
water
would not affect
the
internal
roughness
of carbon steel
piping, This matter remains
open.
3.
Reportable
Occurrences
(92700)
The Licensee
Event Reports
(LERs) listed below were reviewed to determine
if the
information provided
met
NRC requirements.
The determinations
included
the verification of compliance with TS
and regulatory require-
ments,
and addressed
the adequacy
of the event description,
the corrective
actions taken,
the existence of potential
generic problems,
compliance with
reporting requirements,
and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional in-plant
reviews
and
discussions
with plant personnel,
as
appropriate,
were co'nducted.
(Closed)
LER 50-259/89-01:
"Oesign Oversight
on Seismic gualification of
4160 Volt and 480 Volt Breakers
Places
the Plant in Unanalyzed Condition"
On January
18,1989,
the licensee
determined
that seismic
documentation
could not be established
for various positions of 4160 and 480 volt safety
related circuit breakers.
This determination
resulted
in the plant being
in an unanalyzed
condition.
The licensee
put the affected
breakers
in an
analyzed
position or
removed
them
frorg the vicinity of safety
related
equipment.
In addition the licensee
committed to provide administrative
controls
by
March
8,
1989
to ensure
breaker
seismic qualification is
maintained.
(Closed)
LER 50-260/89-16:
"Technical
Specification Violation Due to
a
Seismic Unqualified 480 Volt Shutdown Board"
On May 30,
1989, the licensee
determined that the 480 volt Shutdown
Board
2A.
had not
been
maintained
in
a seismically qualified configuration in that
the normal feeder breaker for the board
was in the disconnect
position with
the breaker
compartment
door open.
This placed the Core Spray Loop
1 in an
inoperable condition.
The core spray loop was required to comply with the
technical
specifications.
This
event
resulted
from
an "unidentified
person" failing to comply with the administrative controls instituted
as
the result of LER 50-259/89-01
discussed
above.
The inspectors
performed
a walkdown inspection of 33 safety-related
panels
containing
approximately
1500
breakers
to evaluate
compliance
with the
administrative controls instituted
as the result of LER 50-259/89-01.
In
'ddition,
the inspectors
reviewed the package
submitted
by the licensee for
the closure of both
LERs discussed
above.
The results of these
inspections
are discussed
below.
The inspectors
noted three
panel
doors
open including one
on
a breaker, all
of which are violations of the above discussed
administrative controls.
It
should
be
noted that,
because
all three units
are defueled, all seismic
controls
have
been
suspended,
and the percentage
of noncompliance with the
administrative controls is very small, there is
no safety significance to
this matter.
The inspectors
noted that, in the LERs, there
was
no mention of training to
assure
understanding,
and
compliance
with the instituted administrative
controls.
Additional
investigation
indicated
that training
had
been
performed
though
not
discussed.
The
inspectors
determined
that
the
licensee's
corrective actions
have
been
adequate
to prevent recurrence
of
this event.
Both the above
items are considered
closed.
4.
Licensee Action on Pipe Support Modifications
Reference
1:
"Pipe Support
Base
Plate
Designs
Using Concrete
Expansion
Anchor Bolts"
Reference
2:
"Seismic
Analyses
For As-Built
Safety-Related
Piping System"
a
~
Status
The inspection
involved pipe support modifications required to
meet
and 79-14 before the restart of Unit 2.
The last
inspection in this area
was
documented
in Inspection
Report Nos.
50-259,
260, 296/90-19
The
licensee
has
completed
approximately
1700
pipe
support
modifications,
which represents
about
70 percent of the total to
be completed
before restart.
All pipe support modifications are
scheduled
to
be
completed
to support
a fuel load schedule
of
October
1990.
b.
Walkdown Re-Inspection
The
inspectors
randomly
selected
33
pipe
supports
which
had
previously
been
inspected
and
accepted
by
the
licensee
construction
foreman
and
gC inspectors.
The
33 pipe supports
were all in large bore piping for three different safety-related
systems
located
both inside
and
outside
of containment.
The
walkdown
re-inspection
was
completed
with assistance
from
licensee's
engineers
and
a
gC mechanical
inspector
who was also
qualified
as
a welding inspector.
The supports
were partially
re-inspected
against
detail
drawings,
including the original
walkdown sketches,
the
Design
Change
Notices
(DCNs),
and
the
Field
Design
Change
Notices
(FDCNs).
They were
checked for
configuration,
identification,
fastener/
anchor
installation,
anchor size,
anchor type,
anchor marking,
anchor
edge distance,
base
plate size
and thickness,
plate warpage,
member size,
sizes,
component
identification
numbers,
component
sizes
and
settings,
dimensions,
oxidation accumulation,
maintenance,
and
damage/protection.
The supports
re-inspected
during the current
inspection
are listed below.
Table I
Walkdown Re-Ins ection
Su
orts
Item No.
Su
ort No.
Comments/Discre
ancies
1.
2.
3.
4,
5.
6.
7.
8.
9
10.ll.
'2.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
2-478406S0018
2-47B408S0045
2-47B408S0046
2-478408S0047
2-478408S0048
,
2-47B408S0053
2-47B408S0061
2-47B408S0062
2-47B408S0071
2-47B408S0078
2-47B408S0081
2-47B415H0002
2-47B415H0004
2-478415H0006
2-47B415S0007
2-478415S0008
2-47B415S0009
2-47B553H0001
2-47B553H0002
2-478553H0003
2-47B553H0004
2-47B553H0005
2-478553H0007
2-47B553H0008
2-47B553H0009
2-478553H0010
2-478553H0011
2-47B553H0012
2-478553H0014
2-47B553H0015
2-47B553H0016
2-47B553H0017
2-47B553H0018
The snubber
end attach-
ment was binding with
the recirculation
pump
lug.
All The
support
modifications
reinspected
were
found to
be
acceptable
except
Support
No.
2-47B408S0047.
For this item the
plate at the
end attachment
of the
was
found to have
bound
with the recirculation
pump lug.
The licensee's
engineer
and
QC inspector reinspected
the situation
and established
a I/32
inch clearance
by manually rotating the snubber.
However, after
a further investigation, it was found that the recirculation
pump
movement
during the operation will cause
the hydraulic snubber
to bind.
The licensee
agreed
to perform further evaluation
to
determine
any possible
clearance
problems for this support
and
other supports
on the recirculation
pumps
and will have observa-
tions for clearances
on all supports
on the recirculation
pumps
during hot function test.
This item is identified as Inspector
Followup Item (IFI) 50-260/90;26-01,
Clearance
Problems for Pipe
Supports
around Recirculation
Pumps.
c.
Support Calculation
Review
The design calculations listed below on Table II were partially
reviewed
and
evaluated
for thoroughness,
clarity, consistency,
and
accuracy.
The
calculations
contained
the
purpose,
assumptions,
references,
design
loads,
support
evaluations,
summary of results,
conclusion,
and attachments.
The attachments
included
existing
pipe
support
configuration
from walkdowns,
proposed
support modifications or Design
Change
Notices
(DCNs),
Employee
Concerns
Checklist,
and
computer
input and output for
frame
and
base
plate
analyses.
The review included:
that the
applied
loads
used
were taken from the latest stress
calculation;
computer
model,
computer
input
and
output,
check
of
displacements,
member size,
weld sizes,
and symbols, bolt sizes,
and
standard
component
capacity
and settings.
In general,
the
design calculations
were of good quality.
TABLE II
Su
ort Calculations
Reviewed
Su
ort No.
Calculation
No.
Rev.
2-478406S0018
2-478408S0081
2-47B553H0001
2-47B553H0002
2-47B553H0011
CDQ-2069870457
CDQ-2068900016
CDQ-2002892663
CDQ-2002892664
CDQ-2002892672
Within the areas
examined,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
1
5.
Welding
(55050)
The inspectors
reviewed procedures,
observed
work activities in progress,
and
reviewed
records
of completed
work,
as
indicated
below, to determine
whether
the licensee's
welding procedures,
welding work activities,
and
welding records
are in conformance
with applicable
codes,
standards,
and
regulatory
commitments.
The applicable
codes for welding work activities
are specified
below.
Pipe Welding:
Pipe Support Welding:
AISC Specification,
8th Edition/AWS-Dl.1-1980
Other Applicable Codes:
ASME Section
IX latest at time of qualification
a ~
Base Material
and Filler Material Compatibility
The inspectors verified the following:
base material-welding material
combinations
are appropriate
and consistent
with code
and regulatory
requirements;
the licensee/contractor
has
established
procedures
for
purchasing,
receiving, storing, distributing,
and handling of welding
consumables;
welding materials
purchasing
and receiving are conducted
in
accordance
with approved
procedures;
welding material
storage
procedures
contain
appropriate
identification
and
environmental
controls; welding materials
are clearly identified and controlled; the
licensee/contractor
has
a single
system
for controlling welding
consumables;
distribution of welding filler materials
including issue
return
and
stubs/scraps
are
properly controlled
and
ASME required
tests
are
performed
on
each lot of welding filler materials.
The
above
was
accomplished
by review of procedures,
interviews with craft
personnel,
inspection
of welding
consumables
issue
stations,
observation of work activities,
and review of selected
records.
Welding Materials
Examined
Size
Heat Lot or Batch
No
E7018
E7018
E-70S3
b.
Welding Procedures
3/32"
I/8"
3/32"
2B726AFO
29827C
J6629
The
inspectors
reviewed
the
below listed
Welding
Procedure
Specifications
(WPSs)
and their
associated
Procedure
gualification
Record
(PgRs)
to determine
whether:
the licensee
has
established
adequate
procedures
to
control
the
preparation,
qualification,
approval, distribution
and revision of WPSs;
WPSs define essential,
supplementary
essential,
and nonessential
variables
in accordance
with
the applicable
code sections;
WPSs
were qualified in accordance
with
applicable
code sections;
P(Rs list essential
variables
as required
by
T
Cl
the
code;
appropriate
mechanical
tests
were
performed
in accordance
with code
requirements;
PgRs
were properly certified
and mechanical
test results
meet or exceed
code
minimum requirements;
changes
to
WPS
essential
variables
are
supported
by requalification;
changes
to
WPS
nonessential
variables
are
properly identifies
and
documented;
and
WPSs
comply with appropriate
Regulatory Guides.
WPSs
Examined
WPS Identification
Process*
PgR
c ~
GT-SM11-0-03B
GTAW/SMAW
Welder Performance gualification
GT-SM11-0-3
GT-SM11-0-3-C
- SMAW-Shielded Metal Arc Welding;
GTAW-Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
The
inspectors
reviewed
procedures
and
welder/welding
operator
Performance gualification Test Records
(PETR) to determine
whether. the
licensee:
has established
adequate
procedures
for the qualification of
welders/welding
operators
consistent
with the applicable
code;
has
a
workable system for maintaining
a continuous
record for qualification
status;
and
has
qualified
and
maintained
the qualification of
welders/welding
operators
who are currently
performing
production
welding.
Welder/Welding Operator
P(TRs
Examined
BF-932,
BF-898, BF-451, BF-904,
and BF-1027
d.
Production Welding
The
inspectors
observed
welding
on
the
below
indicated
components/structures
to determine
the following: work conducted
in
accordance
with a "traveler";
WPSs
and drawings
were available to the
welder/welding
operator;
WPS
assignment
in
accordance
with the
applicable
code;
welding technique
and
sequence
were specified;
base
materials
and welding materials
were
as
specified,
identified
and
traceable
to test
reports; joint geometry
and preparation
was
as
specified; fit up configuration
and
dimensions
were
as
specified;
temporary attachments
were attached
by qualified welders in accordance
with a qualified
WPS;
purging
gas
was
as specified;
preheat
was in
accordance
with the applicable
WPS; welder
technique
was in accordance
with the
applicable
WPS;
welding electrodes
were
used
only in
positions
and with the electrical
characteristics
specified
by the
WPS; shielding
gas flow and composition were as specified in the
WPS;
shielding
gas
flowmeters
are
appropriate
to the
gas
used;
welding
equipment
including
cables
were
in
good
condition;
interpass
temperature
was properly controlled; interpass
cleaning
was conducted
10
in accordance
with applicable
procedures;
backgouging
was performed
as
specified;
temporary
attachments,
arc strikes,
and weld spatter
were
removed
and
inspected
in
accordance
with applicable
procedures;
process
control
system
has
provisions
for repairs;
repairs
are
conducted
in
accordance
with specified
procedures;
repairs
were
properly
documented;
welders/welding
operators
were
properly
qualified;
no peening
was
done
on the root or surface
layer of the
or
the
base
metal
at
the
edge
of the
weld;
and
the
licensee/contractor
has
a maintenance
program for welding equipment.
Com onent/Structure
Identification
Unit
~T
e
3-47B-451-R0076
3-47B-451-S0025
EECW-3-002-001
e.
Observations
3
Pipe Support
3
Pipe support
3
Pipe Weld
Contrary to
ASME Code Section
IX Paragraph
IW-200.2 (c), which
states
in part
"The
PgR shall list actual
variables
used within
the limits of a narrow range rather
than the full range of the
variables
allowed. ...,"
PgR GT-SNll-0-3-C lists wide ranges for
shielding
gas flow, welding current
and arc voltage.
This is of
concern
because
the minimum value for the nonessential
variable
gW-408.3
"A decrease
of 10Ã or more in the flow rate of shielding
gas..."
and
the
maximum value for the nonessential
variable
gW-409. 1 "...an
increase
in heat input..." cannot
be properly
determined for specification in the
WPS.
Contrary to ASME Code Section
IX paragraph
gW-403.6, which states
"...For
thickness of 5/8 in.
and greater
the minimum thickness
qualified is 5/8 in.," PgR GT-SN11-0-3-C,
an impact tested
P(R,
stated
the test
plate
thickness
was
1-7/8"
and
the
minimum,
thickness
qualified
was
3/16".
In addition
there
is
no
referenced
PgR that would support welding with WPS GT-SNll-0-03B
on
base
material
thickness
less
than
0.432"
even
though
TYA
General
Construction Specification
G-29 permits welding with WPS
GT-SM11-0-03B on material
thickness
as thin as 0. 187".
The
above
are
examples
of lack of adequate
control of the welding
process
at
the
Browns
Ferry site,
in that it appears
that
PgR GT-SN11-0-3-C
does
not appropriately
support welding for impact
test required applications.
Failure to control welding is
a violation
of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, which requires
adequate
measures
be
established
to control
special
processes,
including
welding,
to
assure
accomplishment
of those
special
processes
in
accordance
with applicable
codes
and standards.
This violation will
be identified as 50-259,260,296/90-26-02:
"Failure to Control Welding
for Impact Test Required Applications."
0
ll
In addition to the violation noted
above,
the inspectors
identified the
following items of lesser safety significance.
The inspectors
noted
on the
Weld Data
Sheet for weld EECW-3-002-001
the following:
'he
welder
foreman
erroneously
documented
the
Weld Procedure
Number
as
GT-SMll-B3 vice GT-SMll-0-3B, in several
locations
.
The
gC inspector
who
made
the fitup inspection
made
the
same
error.
Although the welding
had
progressed
past
the fitup stage,
the
space for the Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector's
(ANII's)
hold point had not been
signed off.
The inspectors
were informed
that the ANII had
indeed
signed off for the fitup in a separate
location
in the
package.
The
reason
gi.ven for the
remote
sign-off was
due to a dispute over the number of places
the ANIIs
are required sign-off in each
package.
The licensee
has
no formal
documented
program for the maintenance
of
welding equipment with the exception of BF 14.28,
dated
10/17/83,
"
CONTROL
OF
PORTABLE ELECTRICAL CORDS
AND DEVICES" which should
cover
welding cables.
The licensee
had
a
program for welding equipment
maintenance
described
in procedure
MAI -12,
but that procedure
was
discontinued
in 1987.
This is of concern,
in view of the non-isolable
leak in control
rod drive tubing, which was
caused
by an arc from a
degraded
welding cable, that occurred
August 8,
1990.
No
violations
or
deviations
were
identified
except
as
noted
in
paragraph
5.e.
6.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and results
were summarized
on August 10,
1990, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1.
The inspectors
described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail the inspection results listed below.
The
item concerning
welding
was identified as
an unresolved
item at the exit
interview.
The licensee
was
informed by telephone
on August 15,
1990 that the welding
item would
be cited
as
a violation.
Proprietary
information is not
contained
in this report.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the
licensee.
(Open) IFI 50-260/90-26-01:
"Clearance
Problems for Pipe Supports
around
Recirculation
Pumps" - Paragraph
4.b.
(Open) Violation 50-259,260,296/90-26-02: 'Failure to Control
Welding" - Paragraph
5.e.
r
L
0