ML18033B159
| ML18033B159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1990 |
| From: | Blake J, Robert Carrion, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B154 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-89-57, 50-260-89-57, 50-296-89-57, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 9002070432 | |
| Download: ML18033B159 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1989057
Text
ZAR REONS,
(4
'40@0
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/89-57,
50-260/89-57,
and 50-296/89-57
Licensee:.
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN 37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260,
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
3
Inspection
Co~ducted:
December 4-8,
1989
Inspectors:
WJ'
.
C.
~
OU
// )0
ate
igned
<4
L
~
t
4~iQcg
~0
R.
.
rrson
(, I'g't"
ate
~gne
0
Approved by:
8 a e, Chief
Ma ri ls and Processes
Section
En ineering
BraI>ch
Division of Reactcr Safety
I
/2
QADI
ate
gne
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced
inspection
was conducted in the areas of:
pipe support
base plate desigrI using concrete
expansion
anchor bolts (IE Bulletin 79-02)
and
'seismic analysis for as-built safety-related
piping systems
Results:
In
the
areas
inspected,
one violation
was
identified in pipe
support
discrepancies
between
the as-installed
conditions
and
the drawings.
Much
improvement
in workmanship
was
noted.
However,
the guality Control
(gC)
personnel
and craft foreman failed to follow procedures
when reviewing
and
inspecting the completed supports.
0
POO2O70432
PI.IO130
F'Dp,
ADOCK
C~
F'DC
0
REPORT DETAILS
i ~
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- P.
R. Baron, guality Control Manager
R. Bice, Mechanical Modifications Engineer
- P. Carier, Site Licensing Manager
M. Cook, Mechanical guality Control Inspector
- R.
W. Johnson,
Modifications Manager
- N. C.
Kazanas,
Vice President - Nuclear Assurance
and Services
- O. D. Kingsley, Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Power
- W. A. Massie, Site Licensing
- J. McCarthy, Regulatory Licensing
- J.
R. Rupert, Civil Engineering
- J. Serafin, Modifications Manager - Engineering
,~H.
H. Weber, Engineering/Modification Restart
Manager
- C.
W. Whitehead,
Program Director - Nuclear Engineering
- 0. J. Zeringue, Site Director
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
during this
inspection
included
craftsmen,
engineers,
mechanics,
technicians,
and
administrative
personnel.
2.
NRC Resident
Inspectors
- E. E. Christnot,
Resident
Inspector
- W. S. Little, Project Section Chief for Browns Ferry
- Attended exit interview
and Initialisms used
throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Licensee Action on Previously
Opened
Items
(Open)
"Pipe Support
Base Plate
Designs
Using
Concrete
Expansion
Anchor Bolts"
{Open)
"Seismic Analyses
For As-Built Safety-Related
Piping Systems"
Background
The Tennessee
Valley Authority's (TVA's) special
program for piping
and
supports
(large
bore)
was
developed
to
address
concerns
identified with TVA's past
implementation of IE Bulletins 79-02
and
79-14.
The TVA's special
programs for Seismic
Class
I small
piping and Sei'smic
Class
I tubing were developed
to address
concerns
identified with problems
of design criteria, details,
and
thermal
stresses.
Those
programs
involve the inspection
and evaluation of
all piping systems
covered
by the
scope of the bulletins
(except
torus-attached
piping)
and the identification and implementation of
required restart
modifications.
The revised
program (large
bore)
calls for the completion of all the analyses
and modifications to
design criteria prior to restart.
The Special
Projects Division for
TVA of Nuclear. Reactor
Regulation
(NRR) of the
NRC had held several
meetings
with TYA to
discuss
the
programs
and design
methodology
(design
basis)
and
performed
three
inspections
to review design
criteria,
walkdown
procedures,
engineering
evaluation
criteria,
modification requirements,
quality assurance
audit reports,
stress
and support calculations,
and generic attribute evaluation for small
bore.
The three inspection reports
are 50-260/89-15,
50-260/89-36,
and 50-260/89-51,
the last of which will be issued
soor
by NRR.
The
main
purpose
of this
inspection
was
to verify design
modifications in the field.
The inspectors'alkdown
re-inspection
included
a verification of installed
conditions
compared
to the
latest
drawings for a recent
IE Bulletin 79-14 walkdown performed
by
Stone
and
Webster
Engineering
Corporation
and field modifications
performed
by
TVA due to the stress
re-analyses.
The procedures,
support calculations,
and work plans
which related to this walkdown
re-inspection
were also reviewed.
f
Procedure
Review
The following procedures
were previously reviewed
by
NRR for their
adequacy.
The
inspectors
reviewed
them
for
the
walkdown
re-inspection
and to assure
that the support calculations
were
done
in compliance.
Procedure
Revision
Title
SWEC-005
BFN-50-C-7303
BFN-50-C-7107
Pipe Support
Walkdown Procedure
Operability Criteria for Pipe
and Pipe
Supports
on Class
I Seismic Piping
Design of Class
I Seismic
Pipe
and
Tubing Supports
c ~
Walkdown Re-Inspection
The
inspectors
randomly
selected
27
pipe
supports
which
had
previously been accepted
by the licensee
gC inspectors.
The licensee
maintained
support
drawings
in three
locations for each individual
support,
including the original walkdown sketches
done
by Stone
and
Webster,
the
Design
Change
Notices
(DCN's),
and the Field Design
Change
Notices
(FDCN's).
It was difficult, and took considerable
time, to assemble all relevant support
drawings for this inspection
walkdown.
The walkdown re-inspection
was completed with assistance
from licensee
engineers,
gC mechanical
inspectors,
and
gC welding
inspectors.
The supports
were partially re-inspected
against their
detail
drawings for configuration, identification, fastener/anchor
installation,
member
size,
weld sizes,
component
identification
numbers,
dimensions,
oxidation
accumulation,
maintenance,
and
damage/protection.
The inspection
included verification of installed
conditions
against all of the latest
drawings,
which included the
Stone
and Webster
79-02/79-14
program walkdown sketches,
DCN's,
and
FDCN's.
The list below contains
supports
re-inspected
during the
current inspection.
All pipe supports
are in Unit 2 or the
Common
Area,
which is required
to support
the Unit
2 operation
and/or
restart.
TABLE I
Walkdown Re-Inspection
Supports
~So
ort no.
Revisior.
Comments/Discre
ancies
1-47B450R0012
1-47B450R0015
1-47B450R0016
1-478450R0017
1-478450S0022
1-47B450S0032
1-478450S0033
0
Warpage of up to 1/4" between
the slide
plates
(Piece
Yiark 87) all the
way around
the
edges
was
noted.
The drawing required
that there
be no gap.
0
None.
0
The orientation of the installed struts
was
opposite to that
shown
on the drawing.
0
None.
0
None.
0
The drawing calls for the hanger to be moved
1" north of its original location.
It was
moved
1" south.
Also, the bolts of the pipe
clamp were not staked
as required to prevent
the nuts from backing off.
0
None.
e
2-478400S0128
2-478400S0129
2-478400S0130
2-478400S0154
2-478400S0156
2-478400S 0157
2-478400S0208
2-478452R0051
2-478452H0054
2-478452H0063
2-'478452H0195
2-478452H0225
2-478452H0226
2-478452H0234
2-478452S0256
2-478452H0319
2-478455H0072
0
The previously existing support
was not
removed,
as required
by the drawing.
The previously existing support
was not
removed,
as required
by the drawing.
None.
None.
None.
A measured
3/4" width of the flat bolt head
is, to
be verified for
a
1/2"
diameter
self-drilled anchor bolt.
A Bergan-.Patterson
(8-P) snubber part number
2540
was
found in the field whereas
the
drawing called for 8-P part number 2440.
None.
The spacer is loose
as
a result of the gap
between
the
two halves of the
clamp being
greater
than that shown
on the drawing.
None.
A measured
15/16" width of the flat bolt
head is to
be verified for 5/8" diameter
self-drilled anchor bolts.
None.
A 6"-long vertical 1/4" fillet weld was
found at the back of the angle connection
on
the
Elevation
looking south
and
was
not
shown
on the drawing.
A 2"-long 5/16" weld
was found at the connection
between
an angle
and
an existing
beam,
whereas
the drawing
required
a 1/2" fillet weld all around.
The required stakes of the bolt threads
as
a
locking device for single
nuts
were
not
found.
None.
None.
None.
2-478455H0073
0
The previously existing support
was not
removed, .as required
by the drawing.
2-47B455H0079
0
None.
2-478455H0081
0
None.
All of the discrepancies
found in Table I and Table II (Paragraph
2d)
for the walkdown re-inspection
and calculation review were discussed
with licensee
engineers
and
gC
inspectors.
The significant
discrepancies
include
an unspecified
weld found in the field, an
undersized
weld, three previously existing supports
which were not
removed
from the field as required
by the drawing,
no locking device
(no staking) for a single nut, warpage of up to 1/4" between slide
plates,
etc.
The significant discrepancies
found were at variance to
Procedure
No.
SWEC-
005,
Revision
4,
"Pipe
Support
Walkdown
Procedure",
General
Construction Specification
G-43, or the specified
design
drawings.
This is
a violation of
Appendix
B,
Criteria V,
and
.is identified
as Violation 50-260/89-57-01,
"Pipe
Support
Discrepancies."
The licensee
is requested
to address
the
other discrepancies
listed in Tables
I and II for a future inspection.
I
Support Calculation
Review
Six pipe support
design
calculations
were partially reviewed
and
evaluated for thoroughness,
clarity, consistency,
and accuracy.
The
-calculations
contained
the
purpose,
assumptions,
references,
data,
computations,
summaries
and
conclusions,
and
attachments.
The
attachments
included
existing
pipe
support
confiourations
from
walkdowns,
proposed
support modifications or DCN's,
Employee
Concerns
Checklist,
and
computer
input and outp'ut for frame
and
base
plate
analyses.
The review included:
that the applied
loads
used
were
taken
from the latest stress
calculation;
computer
model,
computer
input and output, check of displacements,
member size,
weld sizes
and
symbols, bolt sizes,
and standard
component capacities
and settings.
In general,
the design calculations
were of good quality, except
as
noted
in
Table II.
Support
Calculation
No.
CD-(2001-882382,
Revision
0 for Pipe Support
2-478400S0130
was found to use
a tensile
allowable of 3300
pounds
and
a shear
allowable
4970
pounds for 1/2"
diameter self-drilled anchor bolts
on Sheet
2 of 2 Attachment
F.
Per
TVA Civil Design
Standard
DS-C1.7.1,
Revision 4,
"General
Anchorage
to Concrete.,"
Page
16,
the tensile
and
shear
allowables for 1/2"
diameter self-drilled anchor bolts should
be
1550
pounds
and
1400
pounds,
respectively.
The licensee's
cognizant engineer stated that
the current calculation
was
based
on
a
Design
Change
Notice
(DCN)
which required the installation of 1/2" diameter undercut bolts which
have higher allowable stresses.
During the field installation, Field
Design
Change
Notice
(FDCN)
F8083A
was
issued
to replace
the 1/2"
diameter undercut bolts with 1/2" diameter self-drilled anchor bolts.
The
licensee
Architect/Engineer,
Bechtel
Power
Corporation,
has
placed
the calculation
on its backlog to
be updated,
including -the
outstanding
FDCN.
There
is
no safety
concern for this support
because
the
1/2" diameter self-drilled anchor bolt
has
a safety
factor of 3.23,
which satisfies
the
minimum safety factor of 1.0.
The resolution of the anchor bolt allowables
used will be reviewed in
combination
with items
shown
in Paragraph
2(c)
during
a future
inspection.
Table II lists the support calculations
reviewed
by the
inspectors.
Table II
Support Calculations
Reviewed
~So
ort
Revision
2-478400S0128
0.
2-47B400S0129
0
2-47B400S0130
0
Comments/Discre
ancies
None.
None.
The wrong tensile allowable of 3300
pounds
and
shear
allowable
of
4970
pounds
were
used
for
the
latest
installed
1/2"
diameter
self-drilled
anchor bolts.
2-478400S0157
2-478452H0195
2-,47B452H0225
None.
None.
None.
Work Plan
Review
Work Plan
Nos.
2425-89
and
2449-89
were reviewed
by the inspectors
for general
contents
and information.
These
two work plans
have not
been
completed
because
the modifications for some supports
are not
yet finished.
The work plan contains
descriptions,
approvals,
a
Plant
Operation
Impact
Evaluation
Sheet,
General
Sheet
300
Work
Instructions
for Modifications,
Piping
Hanger
Scope
Sheet
401,
Modification
Workplan
associated
with
the
drawing list,
Implementation
Drawing List (for
FDCN records),
Material List,
ANII/ANI Instruction
Review Sheet,
ASME Section
XI Summary Report,
Work Instruction for Piping
Hangers,
and
Hanger
and
Restraint
Inspection
Data
Sheet
(MAI-4.2).
The work plans related
to five
individual supports
have
been
reviewed in detail since those supports
had
been
modified
completely
and
were
signed
off
by
the
foremen/responsible
engineers
and
gC inspectors.
Item 13 in MAI-4.2
Hanger
and Restraint
Inspection
Data
Sheet states,
"Verify support
removal
is required."
Both foremen/responsible
engineers
and
gC
inspectors
signed off the
above
items for Support
Nos.
2-478400S0128
and
2-47B400S0129
to indicate
that they
had verified that
the
existing
supports
had
been
removed.
Actually, those
two existina.
0
supports
had not
been
removed
from the field.
Those discrepancies
are also stated
in Paragraph
2(c).
Table III lists the individual
supports
reviewed in the work plans.
Table III
Su
ort No.
2-47B400S0128
2-478400S0129
2-478452R0051
2-47B452H0063
2-47B452H0065
3.
Exit Interview
Work Plan
Review
Work Plan
No.
2449-89
2449-89
2425-89
2425-89
2425-89
.
Comments/Discre
ancies
The previously existing
support
was
not
removed
although
gC signed off that
it had
been
removed.,
The previously existing
. support
was
not
removed
although
gC signed off that
it had
been
removed.
None.
None.
None.
4 ~
The inspection
scope
and results
were summarized
on December 8,
1989
with
those
persons
indicated
in
paragraph
1.
The
inspectors
described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail the inspection
results listed below.
Proprietary
information is not contained
in
this report.
Dissenting
comments
were
not received
from the
licensee.
The
inspectors
stated 'that
the
inspection
involved
approximately
10 percent of the completed
supports.
The problems
that inspectors
found indicate that there is probably
a problem with
attention to detail at the craft and
(}C level.
(Open) Violation 50-260/89-57-01,
"Pipe Support Discrepancies"
Acronyms and Initialisms
ASME-
ANII-
CFR
DCN
FDCN-
IEB
No.
NRC
SWEC-
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
Authorized Nuclear Inspector
Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector
Code of Federal
Regulation
Design
Change
Notice
Field Design
Change Notice
Inspection
and Enforcement Bulletin
Number
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
guality Control
~
Stone
and Webster Engineering Corporation
Valley Authority
0