Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Implementing Recommendations in Generic Ltr 84-15, Proposed Staff Actions to Improve & Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability.
	ML18032A348
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/29/1987
From:	; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	;
Shared Package
ML18032A347	List: ML18032A346; ML18032A348;
References
	GL-84-15, NUDOCS 8706100403
	Download: ML18032A348 (137)
	v • d • e

ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TVA BFN TS 231) 8><>+100@03 ~pgpq PDR ADOCK 05000259 P

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II LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd) labia Title ~Pa e Me.

4.2.E Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-53 4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation 3.2/4.2-54 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-56 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-57 4.2eJ Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2-58 4.2eK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation .

S urvexllance .

~ '1 e 3.2/4.2-62 3.5-1 Minimum RHRSW and EECW Pump Assignment . 3.5/4.5-11 3.5.I MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure . 3.5/4.5-21 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves 3.7/4.7-25 3.7.B Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals 3.7/4.7-32 3.7.C Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows. 3.7/4.7-33 3.7.D Air Tested Isolation Valves. 3.7/4.7-34 3.7.E Primary Containment Isolation Valves which Terminate below the Suppression Pool Water Level. 3.7/4.7-37 3.7.F Primary Containment Isolation Vales Located in Water Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines 3.7/4.7-38 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations . 3.7/4.7-39 4.9.A Diesel Generator Reliability . 3.9/4.9-16 4.9.A.4.C Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start . 3.9/4.9-18 3.11.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements. 3.11/4.11-10 6.8.A Minimum Shift Crew Requirements. 6.0-19 BFN vii Unit 1

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3.5/4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core S ra S stem (CSS) 4.5.A Core S ra S stem CSS) 4.5.A.l.d (Cont'd) 105 psi differential pressure between the reactor vessel and the primary containment.

e. Check Valve Once/

Operating Cycle

2. If one CSS loop is INOPERABLE, 2. When it is determined that one the reactor may remain in core spray loop is INOPERABLE, operation for a period not to at a time when operability is exceed 7 days providing reguired, the other core spray all active components in loop and the RHRS (LPCI mode) the other CSS loop and the shall be demonstrated to be RHR system (LPCI mode) OPERABLE immediately. The and the diesel generators OPERABLE core spray loop shall are OPERABLE. be demonstrated to be OPERABLE daily thereafter.

3. If Specification 3.5.A.1 or Specification 3.5.A.2 cannot be met, the reactor shall be shutdown in the Cold Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

4. When the reactor vessel pressure is atmospheric and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel at least one core spray loop with one OPERABLE pump and associated diesel generator shall be OPERABLE, except with the reactor vessel head removed as specified in 3.5.A.5 or prior to reactor startup as specified in 3.5.A.1.

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3.5 4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.5.B Residual Heat Removal S stem 4.5.B. Residual Heat Removal S stem (RRRS) (LPCI and Containment (RHRS) (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Cooling)

3. If one RHR pump (LPCI mode) 3~ When it is determined that is INOPERABLE, the reactor one RHR pump (LPCI mode) is may remain in operation for INOPERABLE at a time when a period not to exceed 7 days operability is required, provided the remaining RHR the remaining RHR pumps pumps (LPCI mode) and both (LPCI mode) and active access paths of the RHRS components in both access (LPCI mode) and the CSS and paths of the RHRS (LPCI mode) the diesel generators remain and the CSS shall be OPERABLE. demonstrated to be OPERABLE immediately and daily thereafter,

4. If any 2 RHR pumps (LPCI No additional surveillance required.

mode) become INOPERABLE, the reactor shall be placed in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

5. If one RHR pump (containment 5. When it is determined that cooling mode) or associated one RHR pump (containment heat exchanger is INOPERABLE, cooling mode) or associated the reactor may remain in heat exchanger is INOPERABLE operation for a period not to at a time when operability exceed 30 days provided the is required, the remaining remaining RHR pumps RHR pumps (containment (containment cooling mode) cooling mode), the and associated heat associated heat exchangers exchangers and diesel and all active components generators and all access in the access paths of the paths of the RHRS RHRS (containment cooling (containment cooling mode) mode) shall be demonstrated are OPERABLE. to be OPERABLE immediately and weekly thereafter until the INOPERABLE RHR pump (containment cooling mode) and associated heat exchanger is returned to normal service.

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3.5 4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5 B. Residual Heat Removal S stem 4.5 B. Residual Heat Removal S stem (RHRS) (LPCI and Containment (RHRS) (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Cooling)

6. If two RHR pumps (containment 6. When it is determined that cooling mode) or associated two RHR pumps (containment heat exchangers are cooling mode) or associated INOPERABLE, the reactor may heat exchangers are remain in operation for a INOPERABLE at a time when period not to exceed 7 days operability is required, the provided the remaining RHR remaining RHR pumps pumps (containment cooling (containment cooling mode),

mode), the associated heat the associated heat exchangers, diesel exchangers, and all active generators, and all access components in the access paths of the RHRS paths of the RHRS (containment cooling mode) (containment cooling are OPERABLE. mode) shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE immediately and daily thereafter until at least three RHR pumps (containment cooling mode) and associated heat exchangers are returned to normal service.

7. If two access paths of the 7 ~ When it is determined that RHRS (containment cooling one or more access paths of mode) for each phase of the the RHRS (containment mode (drywell sprays, cooling mode) are INOPERABLE suppression chamber sprays, when access is required, and suppression pool cooling) all active components are not OPERABLE, the unit in the access paths of the may remain in operation for a RHRS (containment cooling period not to exceed 7 days mode) shall be demonstrated provided at least one path to be OPERABLE immediately for each phase of the mode and all active components in remains OPERABLE. the access paths which are not backed by a second OPERABLE access path for the same phase of the mode (drywell sprays, suppression chamber sprays and suppression pool cooling) shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE daily thereafter until the second path is returned to normal service.

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3.5/4 5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.B Residual Heat Removal S stem 4.5.B Residual Heat Removal S stem (RHRS) (LPCI and Containment (RHRS) (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Cooling,)

12. If one RHR pump or associated 12. When it is determined heat exchanger located that one RHR pump or on the unit cross-connection associated heat exchanger in the adjacent unit is located on the unit INOPERABLE for any reason cross-connection in the (including valve inoperability, adjacent unit is pipe break, etc.), the reactor INOPERABLE at a time when may remain in operation operability is required, for a period not to exceed the remaining RHR pump and 30 days provided the remaining associated heat exchanger RHR pump and associated diesel on the unit cross-connection generator are OPERABLE. shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE immediately and every 15 days thereafter until the INOPERABLE pump and associated heat exchanger are returned to normal service.

13. If RHR cross-connection flow or 13. No additional surveillance heat removal capability is lost, required.

the unit may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 10 days unless such capability is restored.

14. All recirculation pump 14. All recirculation pump discharge valves shall discharge valves shall be OPERABLE prior to be tested for operability reactor startup (or during any period of closed if permitted reactor Cold Shutdown elsewhere in these exceeding 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , if specifications). operability tests have not been performed during the preceding 31 days+

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3.5/4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.3.5.C RHR Service Water and Emer enc 4.5.C RHR Service Water and Emer enc E ui ment Coolin Water S stems E ui ment Coolin Water S stems (EECWs) (Continued) (EECWs) (Continued)

2. During reactor power 2 ~ a~ lf no more than two operation, RHRSW pumps RHRSW pumps are must be OPERABLE and INOPERABLE, increased assigned to service as surveillance is not indicated in Table 3.5-1 required.

for the specified time limits. b. When three RHRSW pumps are INOPERABLE, the remaining pumps and associated essential control valves shall be operated daily.

c. When four RHRSW pumps are INOPERABLE, the remaining pumps and associated essential control valves shall be operated daily.

3. During power operation, 3. Routine surveillance for both RHRSW pumps Dl and these pumps is specified D2 normally or alternately in 4.5.C.1.

assigned to the RHR heat exchanger header supplying the standby coolant supply connection must be OPERABLE except as specified in 3.5.C.4 and 3.5.C.5 below.

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3.5/4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SVRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.C RHR Service Water and Emer enc 4.5.C RHR Service Water and Emer enc E ui ment Coolin Water S stems E ui ment Coolin Water S stems EECWs) (Continued) (EECWs) Continued)

4. One of the Dl or D2 RHRSW 4. When it is determined that pumps assigned to the RHR one of the RHRSW pumps heat exchanger supplying supplying standby coolant the standby coolant supply is INOPERABLE at a time connection may be when operability is INOPERABLE for a period required, the OPERABLE not to exceed 30 days RHRSW pump on the same provided the OPERABLE pump header and the RHR heat is aligned to supply the exchanger header and RHR heat exchanger header associated essential control and the associated diesel valves shall be demonstrated generator and essential to be OPERABLE immediately control valves are OPERABLE. and every 15 days thereafter.

5. The standby coolant supply capability may be INOPERABLE for a period not to exceed 10 days.

6. If Specifications 3.5.C.2 through 3.5.C.S are not met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the unit placed in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours.

7. There shall be at least 2 RHRSW pumps, associated with the selected RHR pumps, aligned for RHR heat exchanger service for each reactor vessel containing irradiated fuel.

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3.9/4.9< AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9 Auxiliar Electrical S stem 4.9 Auxiliar Electrical S stem A licabilit A licabilit Applies to all the auxiliary Applies to the periodic electrical power system. testing requirements of the auxiliary electrical system.

O~b'ective O~t'ective To assure an adequate supply of Verify the operability of the electrical power for operation of auxiliary electrical system.

those systems required for safety.

S ecification S ecification A. Auxiliar Electrical E ui ment A. Auxiliar Electrical S stem

1. The reactor shall not be 1. Diesel Generators started up (made critical) from the cold condition unless the following are a. Each diesel generator satisfied: shall be manually started and loaded to demonstrate

a. Diesel generators A, operational readiness in B, C, and D OPERABLE. accordance with the frequency specified in

b. Requirements 3.9.A.3 Table 4.9.A on a staggered through 3.9.Ae6 are test basis. The test shall met. continue for at least a one hour period at 75% of rated

c. At least two of the load or greater and the following offsite power operation of the diesel sources are available: fuel oil transfer pumps shall be demonstrated.

Also, the diesel generator (1) The 500-kV system is starting air compressor available to the shall be checked for opera-units 1 and 2 shut- tion and its ability to down boards through recharge air receivers.

the unit 1 station-service transformer The diesel generator fast TUSS/1B with no starts (10 seconds) from credit taken for the standby conditions shall be two 500-kV Trinity performed once per 184 days lines. If the in these surveillance unit/2 station- tests. All other engine service transformer starts for the purpose of is the second choice, this test may be preceeded a minimum of two by an engine idle start.

500-kV lines must be available.

BFQ 3.9/4.9-1 Unxt 1

3. 9/4. 9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.A. Auxiliar Electrical E ui ment 4.9.A. Auxiliar Electrical S stem 3.9.A.l.c. (Cont'd) 4.9.A.1. (Cont'd)

Additional reporting requirements due to failures are noted in Table 4.9.A.

All diesel generator starts shall be logged.

(2) The 500-kV system is b. Once per operating available to the units 1 cycle, a test will and 2 shutdown boards be conducted simulating a through the unit 2 loss of offsite power and station-service similar conditions that transformer TUSS 2B with would exist with the no credit taken for the presence of an actual two 500-kV Trinity lines. safety-injection signal If the unit 1 station- to demonstrate the service transformer is the following:

second choice, a minimum of two 500-kV lines must (1) Deenergization of the be available. emergency buses and load shedding from (3) The Trinity 161-kV line is the emergency buses.

available to the units 1 and 2 shutdown boards (2) The diesel starts through both common from ambient station-service condition on the transformers. auto-start signal, energizes the NOTES FOR (3): emergency buses with permanently connected (a) If unit 3 is claiming loads, energizes the the Trinity line as an auto-connected offsite source, see emergency loads unit 3 technical through load specifications, section sequencing, and 3.9.A.l.c.2. operates for greater than or equal to five (b) If unit 1 is in cold minutes while its shutdown, only one generator is loaded common station-service with the emergency transformer is required. loads+

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3.9/4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.A. Auxiliar Electrical E ui ment 4.9.A. Auxiliar Electrical S stem 3.9.A.l.c. (Cont'd) 4.9.A.l.b (Cont'd)

(4) The Athens 161-kV line is (3) On diesel generator available to the units 1 breaker trip, the and 2 shutdown boards loads are shed from through a common the emergency buses station-service and the diesel transformer when unit 1 is restarts on the in Cold Shutdown and unit 3 autostart signal, is not claiming the Athens the emergency buses line as an offsite source. are energized with permanently NOTE FOR (3) AND connected loads, (4)'ith the autoconnected no cooling tower pumps emergency loads or fans running, a cooling are energized tower transformer may be through load substituted for a common sequencing, and station-service transformer. the diesel operates for greater than or equal to five minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads.

c~ Once a month the quantity of diesel fuel available shall be logged.

d. Each diesel generator shall be given an annual inspection in accordance with instructions based on the manufacturer's recommendations.

e. Once a month a sample of diesel fuel shall be checked for quality.

The quality shall be within acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of the latest revision to ASTM D975 and logged.

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3. 9/4. 9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.B. 0 eration with Ino erable 4.9.B. 0 eration with Ino erable

~Eui ment EcCEui ment Whenever the reactor is in Startup mode or Run mode and not in a cold condition, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in 3.9.A except as specified herein.

1. From and after the date 1. When only one that only one offsite offsite power source power source is available, is OPERABLE, all reactor operation is units 1 and 2 diesel permissible for 7 days. generators and associated boards must be demonstrated to be OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter.

2. From and after the date 2. When a reguired that the 4-kV bus tie offsite power source board becomes INOPERABLE, is unavailable to reactor operation is unit 1 because the permissible indefinitely 4-kV bus tie board provided one of the or a start bus is required offsite power INOPERABLE, all sources is not supplied unit 1 and 2 diesel from the 161-kV system generators and through the bus tie board. associated boards shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter. The remaining offsite source and associated buses shall be checked to be energized daily, BFN 3.9/4.9-8 Unit 1

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3.9/4.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.D. 0 eration With Ino erable 4.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable E~ui ment' EcCEui ment

3. When one of the units 1 3 ~ When one of the and 2 diesel generator is units 1 and 2 diesel INOPERABLE, continued generators is found reactor operation is to be INOPERABLE, permissible during the all of the CS, RHR succeeding 7 days, (LPCI and contain-provided that 2 offsite ment cooling) power sources are systems and the available as specified remaining diesel, in 3.9.A.l.c and all of generators and the CS, RHR (LPCI and associated boards containment cooling) shall be systems, and the remaining demonstrated to be three units 1 and 2 diesel OPERABLE within 24 generators are OPERABLE. hours and daily If this requirement cannot thereafter.

be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be shut down and in the cold condition within 24 hours.

When one units 1 and 2 4. When one 4-kV 4-kV shutdown boaxd is shutdown board is INOPERABLE, continued found to be reactor opexation is INOPERABLE, all permissible for a period remaining 4-kV of 5 days provided that shutdown boards and 2 offsite powex sources associated diesel are available as generators, CS, and specified in 3.9.A.l.c RHR (LPCI and and the xemaining 4-kV containment cooling) shutdown boards and systems supplied by associated diesel the remaining 4-kV generators, CS, RHR (LPCI shutdown boards and containment cooling) shall be systems, and all 480-V demonstrated to be emergency power boards operable within 24 are OPERABLE. If this hours and daily requirement cannot be thereafter.

met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be shut down and in the cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

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3.9/4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable 4.9.B, 0 eration With Ino erable

~Eui ment ~Eui ment S. When one of the shutdown S. When a shutdown bus buses is INOPERABLE, is found to be reactor operation is INOPERABLE, all permissible for a period 1 and 2 diesel of 7 days. generators shall be proven OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter.

6. When one of the 480-V 6. When one units 1 diesel auxiliary boards and 2 diesel becomes INOPERABLE, auxiliary board is reactor operation is found to be permissible for a period INOPERABLE, the of 5 days. remaining diesel auxiliary board and each unit 1 and 2 diesel generator shall be proven OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter.

7. From and after the date that one of the three 250-V unit batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be INOPERABLE for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding 7 days. Except for routine surveillance testing, NRC shall be notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period, and the plans to return the failed component to an OPERABLE state.

BFN 3.9/4.9-10 Unit 1

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AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTENS TABLE 4.9.A Diesel Generator Reliability No. of Failures in No. of Failures in last 20 valid tests+ last 100 valid tests+ Reliabilit Actions Test at least once per 31 days

>2 Test at least once per 7 days~

> 3 6 Within 30 days, prepare a report for NRC audit, in accordance with Section 6.7.3.E.

>5 Declare the diesel generator INOPERABLE and perform a requalification test For the affected diesel generator pursuant to the attachment to this table.

Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide l. 108, Revision 1, August 1977, except that the number of tests and failures are determined on a per diesel generator basis. For the purposes of this test schedule, only valid tests conducted after the Operating License issuance date shall be included in the computation of the "last 20 valid tests". Entry into this test schedule shall be made at the 31 day test frequency.

~his test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced on one or less.

BFN Unit 1

ATTACHMENT TO TABLE 4.9.A DIESEL GENERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM (1) Perform seven consecutive successful demands without a failure within 30 days of diesel generator being restored to operable status and fourteen consecutive successful demands without a failure within 75 days of diesel generator of being restored to OPERABLE status.

(2) If a failure occurs during the first seven tests in the requalification test program, perform seven successful demands without an additional failure within 30 days of diesel generator of being restored to OPERABLE status and fourteen consecutive successful demands without a failure within 75 days of being restored to OPERABLE status.

(3) If a failure occurs during the second seven tests (tests 8 through 14) of (1) above, perform fourteen consecutive successful demands without an additional failure within 75 days of the failure which occurred during the requalification testing.

(4) Following the second failure during the requalification test program, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following'30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

(5) During, requalification testing the diesel generator should not be tested more frequently than at 24-hour intervals.

After a diesel generator has been successfully requalified, subsequent repeated requalification tests will not be required for that diesel generator under the following conditions:

(a) The number of failures in the last 20 valid demands is less than 5.

(b) The number of failures in the last 100 valid demands is less than 11.

(c) In the event that, following successful requalification of a diesel generator, the number of failures is still in excess of the remedial action criteria (a and/or b above) the following exception will be allowed until the diesel generator is no longer in violation of the remedial action criteria (a and/or b above).

Requalification testing will not be required provided that after each valid demand the number of failures in the last 20 and/or 100 valid demands has not increased. Once the diesel generator is no longer in violation of the remedial action criteria above the provisions of those criteria alone will prevail.

BFN 3.9/4.9-17 Unit 1

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VOLTAGE RELAY SETPOINTS/OIESEL GENERATOR START

l. 4-kV Shutdown Boards Trip Setpoint: 0 volts with a 1.5-second time Start diesel generators on loss of delay oFfsite power.

Allowable Values: ~ .1 second Trip Range: 1.4 to.l.6 seconds Reset Setpoint: 2870-V Allowable Values: AX oF 2870-V Reset Range: 2813-V to 2927-V lhubu:m1in<1F.

2. 4-kV Shutdown Boards Trip Setpoint: 3920 Second level undervoltage sensing Allowable Values: 3900-3940 relays - start diesel generator Reset Setpoint: Reset at S 1.5X above trip value on degraded voltage.

Setpoint Critical Time lmuuuhl

3. 4-kV Shutdown Boards 2-211-1A 0.3 g lOX N/A Auxiliary timers for second level (Timers shown for 2-211-2A 4.0 ~ lOX N/A undervoltage sensing relays.

4-kV shutdown board 2-211-3A 6.9 g lOX 8.2 A: 4-kV shutdown 2-211-4A 1.3 g 10K 1.5 The setpoint ranges speciFied boards B, C, and O. assure that the operating times similar, except for will be below the critical times change oF sufFix.) specified. These ranges are based on timer repeatability of z 5X as speciFied by the manuFacturer.

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3.9 BASES The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the plant during shutdown and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident. There are three sources of alternating current electrical energy available, namely, the 161-kV transmission system, the 500-kV transmission system, and the diesel generators.

The unit station-service transformer B for unit 1 or the unit station-service transformer B for unit 2 provide noninterruptible sources of offsite power from the 500-kV transmission system to the units 1 and 2 shutdown boards. Auxiliary power can also be supplied from the 161-kV transmission system through the common station-service transformers or through the cooling tower transformers by way of the bus tie board. The 4-kV bus tie board may remain out of service indefinitely provided one of the required offsite power sources is not supplied from the 161-kV system through the bus tie board.

The minimum fuel oil requirement of 103,300 gallons is sufficient for seven days of full load operation of three diesels and is conservatively based on availability of a replenishment supply.

The degraded voltage sensing relays provide a start signal to the diesel generators in the event that a deteriorated voltage condition exists on a 4-kV shutdown board. This starting signal is independent of the starting signal generated by the complete loss of voltage relays and will continue to function and start the diesel generators on complete loss of voltage should the loss of voltage relays become inoperable.

The 15-day inoperable time limit specified when one of the three phase-to-phase degraded voltage relays is inoperable is justified based on the two-out-of-three permissive logic scheme provided with these relays.

A 4-kV shutdown board is allowed to be out of operation for a brief period to allow for maintenance and testing, provided all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS, RHR, (LPCI and containment cooling) systems supplied by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards, and all emergency 480-V power boards are operable.

There are eight 250-V dc battery systems, each of which consists of a battery, battery charger, and distribution equipment. Three of these systems provide power for unit control functions, operative power for unit motor loads, and alternative drive power for a 115-V ac unit-preferred mg set. One 250-V dc system provides power for common plant and transmission system control functions, drive power for a 115-V ac plant-preferred mg set, and emergency drive power for certain unit large motor loads. The four remaining systems deliver control power to the 4,160-V shutdown boards.

BFN 3.9/4.9-19 Unit 1

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3.9 BASES (Cont'd)

Each 250-V dc shutdown board control power supply can receive power from its own battery, battery charger, or from a spare charger. The chargers are powered from normal plant auxiliary power or from the standby diesel-driven generator system. Zero resistance short circuits between the control power supply and the shutdown board are cleared by fuses located in the respective control power supply. Each power supply is located in the reactor building near the shutdown board it supplies.

Each battery is located in its own independently ventilated battery room.

The 250-V dc system is so arranged, and the batteries sized so that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit. Loss of control power to any engineered safeguard control circuits is annunciated in the main control room of the unit affected. The loss of one 250-V shutdown board battery affects normal control power only for the 4,160-V shutdown board which it supplies. The station battery supplies loads that are not essential for safe shutdown and cooldown of the nuclear system. This battery was not considered in the accident load calculations.

There are two 480-Volt ac RMOV boards that contain mg sets in their feeder lines. These 480-Volt ac RMOV boards have an automatic transfer from their normal to alternate power source (480-Volt ac shutdown boards). The mg sets act as electrical isolators to prevent a fault from propagating between electrical divisions due to an automatic transfer. The 480-Volt ac RMOV boards involved provide motive power to valves associated with the LPCI mode of the RHR system. Having an mg set out of service reduces the assurance that full RHR (LPCI) capacity will be available when required. Since sufficient equipment is available to maintain the minimum complement required for RHR (LPCI) operation, a 7-day servicing period is justified. Having two mg sets out of service can considerably reduce equipment availability; therefore, the affected unit shall be placed in Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The offsite power source requirements are based on the capacity of the respective lines. The Trinity line is limited to supplying two operating units because of the load limitations of CSST's A and B. The Athens line is limited to supplying one operating unit because of the load limitations of the Athens line. The limiting conditions are intended to prevent the 161-kV system from supplying more than two units in the event of a single failure in the offsite power system.

BFN 3.9/4.9-20 Unit 1

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4.9 BASES The monthly test of the diesel generators is primarily to check for failures and deterioration in the system since last use. The diesels will be loaded to at least 75 percent of rated power while engine and generator temperatures are stabilized (about one hour). The minimum 75-percent load will prevent soot formation in the cylinders and injection nozzles. Operation up to an equilibrium temperature ensures that there is no overheating problem. The tests also provide an engine and generator operating history to be compared with subsequent engine-generator test data to identify and to correct any mechanical or electrical deficiency before it can result in a system failure.

The test during refueling outages is more comprehensive, including procedures that are most effectively conducted at that time. These include automatic actuation and functional capability tests to verify that the generators can start and be ready to assume load in 10 seconds. The annual inspection will detect any signs of wear long before failure.

Battery maintenance with regard to the floating charge, equalizing charge, and electrolyte level will be based on the manufacturer's instruction and sound maintenance'ractices. In addition, written records will be maintained of the battery performance. The plant batteries will deteriorate with time but precipitous failure is unlikely. The type of surveillance called for in this specification is that which has been demonstrated through experience to provide an indication of a cell becoming irregular or unserviceable long before it becomes a failure.

The equalizing charge, as recommended by the manufacturer, is vital to maintaining the ampere-hour capacity of the battery, and will be applied as recommended.

The testing of the logic systems will verify the ability of the logic systems to bring the auxiliary .electrical system to running standby readiness with the presence of an accident signal from any reactor or an undervoltage signal on the 4-kV shutdown boards.

The periodic simulation of accident signals in conjunction with diesel-generator voltage available signals will confirm the ability of the 480-V load shedding logic system to sequentially shed and restart 480-V loads if an accident signal were present and diesel-generator voltage was the only source of electrical power.

BFN 3.9/4.9-21 Unit 1

4.9 B'ASES (Cont'd)

REFERENCES

1. Normal Auxiliary Power System (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.4)

2. Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.5)

3. 250-Volt DC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.6)

4. Memorandum from Gene M. Wilhoite to H. J. Green dated December 4, 1981 (LOO 811208 664) and memorandum from C. E. Minn to H. J. Green dated January 10, 1983 (G02 830112 002)

BFN 3.9/4.9-22 Unit 1

E. Diesel Generator Reliability Improvement Program Report shall be submitted within 30 days of meeting failure criteria in Table 4.9.A. As a minimum, the Reliability Improvement Program report for NRC audit shall include:

a. A summary of all tests (valid and invalid) that occurred within the time period over which the last 20/100 valid tests were performed.

b. Analysis of failures and determination of root causes of failures.

ce Evaluation of each of the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660, "Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability in Operating Reactors," with respect to their application to the plant.

d. Identification of all actions taken or to be taken to (1) Correct the root causes of failures defined in b above and (2) Achieve a general improvement of diesel generator reliability.

e. A supplemental report shall be prepared for an NRC audit within 30 days after each subsequent failure during a valid demand, for so long as the affected diesel generator unit continues to violate the criteria (3/20 or 6/100) for the reliability improvement program remedial action. The supplemental report need only update the failure/demand history for the affected diesel generator unit since the last report for that diesel generator. The supplemental report shall also present an analysis of the failure(s) with a root cause determination, if possible, and shall delineate any further procedural, hardware or operational changes to be incorporated into the site diesel generator improvement program and the schedule for implementation of those changes.

BFN Unit 1 6.0-17a

l LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd) 1itble Title ~Pa e Mo.

4.2.E Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-53 4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-54 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-56 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-57 4.2.J Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2-58 4.2aK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation .

Surveillance . 3.2/4.2-62 3.5-1 Minimum RHRSW and EECW Pump Assignment . 3.5/4.5-11 3.5.I MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure . 3.5/4.5-21 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves 3.7/4.7-25 3.7.B Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals . 3.7/4.7-32 3.7.C Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows. 3.7/4.7-33 3.7.D Air Tested Isolation Valves. 3.7/4.7-34 3.7.E Primary Containment Isolation Valves which Terminate below the Suppression Pool Water Level. 3.7/4.7-37 3.7.F Primary Containment Isolation Vales Located in Water Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines 3.7/4.7-38 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations 3.7/4.7-39 4.9.A Diesel Generator Reliability . 3.9/4.9-16 4.9.A.4.C Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start . 3.9/4.9-18 3.11.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements. 3.11/4.11-10 6.8.A Minimum Shift Crew Requirements. 6.0-19 BFN vii Unit 2

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3.944.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable 4.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable

~Eui ment EcCEui ment

3. When one of the units 1 3 ~ When one of the and 2 diesel generator is units 1 and 2 diesel INOPERABLE, continued generators is found reactor operation is to be INOPERABLE, permissible during the all of the CS, RHR succeeding 7 days, (LPCI and contain-provided that 2 offsite ment cooling) power sources are systems and the available as specified remaining diesel in 3.9.A.l.c and all of generators and the CS, RHR (LPCI and associated boards containment cooling) shall be systems, and the remaining demonstrated to be three units 1 and 2 diesel OPERABLE within 24 generators are OPERABLE. hours and daily If this requirement cannot thereafter.
be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be shut down and in the cold condition within 24 hours.
4~ When one units 1 and 2 4, When one 4-kV 4-kV shutdown board is shutdown board is INOPERABLE, continued found to be reactor operation is INOPERABLE, all permissible for a period remaining 4-kV of 5 days provided that shutdown boards and 2 offsite power sources associated diesel are available as generators, CS, and specified in 3.9.A.l.c RHR (LPCI and and the remaining 4-kV containment cooling) shutdown boards and systems supplied by associated diesel the remaining 4-kV generators, CS, RHR (LPCI shutdown boards and containment cooling) shall be systems, and all 480-V demonstrated to be emergency power boards operable within 24 are OPERABLE. If this hours and daily requirement cannot be thereafter.
met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be shut down and in the cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
BFN 3.9/4.9-9 Unit 2
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3.9 4.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable 4.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable
~Eui ment ~Eui ment
5. When one of the shutdown 5. When a shutdown bus buses is INOPERABLE, is found to be reactor operation is INOPERABLE, all permissible for a period 1 and 2 diesel of 7 days. generators shall be proven OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter.
6. When one of the 480-V 6. When one units 1 diesel auxiliary boards and 2 diesel becomes INOPERABLE, auxiliary board is reactor operation is found to be permissible for a period INOPERABLE, the of 5 days. remaining diesel auxiliary board and each unit 1 and 2 diesel generator shall be proven OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter.
7. From and after the date that one of the three 250-V unit batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be INOPERABLE for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding 7 days. Except for routine surveillance testing, NRC shall be notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period, and the plans to return the failed component to an OPERABLE state.
BFN 3.9/4.9-10 Unit 2
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AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEMS TABLE 4.9.A Diesel Generator Reliability No. of Failures in No. of Failures in last 20 valid tests+ last 100 valid tests+ Reliabilit Actions Test at least once per 31 days Test at least once per 7 days~
>3 6 Within 30 days, prepare a report for NRC audit, in accordance with Sect>on 6.7.3.E.
>5 Declare the diesel generator INOPERABLE and perform a requalification test for the affected diesel generator pursuant to the attachment to this table.
+ Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide l. 108, Revision 1, August 1977, except that the number of tests and failures are determined on a per diesel generator bas>s. For the purposes of this test schedule, only valid tests conducted after the Operating License issuance date shall be included in the computation of the "last 20 valid tests". Entry into this test schedule shall be made at the 31 day test frequency.
~his test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced on one or less.
BFN Unit 2
'I ATTACHMENT TO TABLE 4.9.A DIESEL GENERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM (1) Perform seven consecutive successful demands without a failure within 30 days of diesel generator being restored to operable status and fourteen consecutive successful demands without a failure within 75 days of diesel generator of being restored to OPERABLE status.
(2) If a failure occurs during the first seven tests in the requalification test program, perform seven successful demands without an additional failure within 30 days of diesel generator of being restored to OPERABLE status and fourteen consecutive successful demands without a failure within 75 days of being restored to OPERABLE status.
(3) If a failure occurs during the second seven tests (tests 8 through 14) of (1) above, perform fourteen consecutive successful demands without an additional failure within 75 days of the failure which occurred during the requalification testing.
(4) Following the second failure during the requalification test program, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .
(5) During requalification testing the diesel generator should not be tested more frequently than at 24-hour intervals.
After a diesel generator has been successfully requalified, subsequent repeated requalification tests will not be required for that diesel generator under the following conditions:
(a) The number of failures in the last 20 valid demands is less than 5.
(b) The number of failures in the last 100 valid demands is less than 11.
(c) In the event that, following successful requalification of a diesel generator, the number of failures is still in excess of the remedial action criteria (a and/or b above) the following exception will be allowed until the diesel generator is no longer in violation of the remedial action criteria (a and/or b above).
Requalification testing will not be required provided that after each valid demand the number of failures in the last 20 and/or 100 valid demands has not increased. Once the diesel generator is no longer in violation of the remedial action criteria above the provisions of those criteria alone will prevail.
BFN 3.9/4.9-17 Unit 2
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TABLE 4.9.A.4.C Rela Location Tri Level Settin Remarks
l. 4-kV Shutdown Boards Trip Setpoint: 0 volts with a 1.5-second time Start diesel generators on loss of delay offsite power.
Allowable Values: + .1 second Trip Range: T.4 to 1.6 seconds Reset Setpoint: 2870-V Allowable Values: +K of 2870-V Reset Range: 2813-V to 2927-V dander vol Sn e
2. 4-kV Shutdown Boards Trip Setpoint: 3920 Second level undervoltage sensing Allowable Values: 3900-3940 relays start diesel generator Reset Setpoint: Reset at < 1.5'l above trip value on degraded voltage.
Setpoint Critical Time Timer ~seconds
3. 4-kV Shutdown Boards 2-211-1A 0.3 + l(C N/A Auxiliary timers for second level (Timers shown for 2-211-2A 4.0 + ltd N/A undervoltage sensing relays.
4-kV. shutdown board 2-211-3A 6.9 + llew 8.2 A. 4-kV shutdown 2-211-4A 1.3 + 10K 1.5 The setpoint ranges specified boards 8, C, and 0, assure that the operating times I
similar, except for will be below the critical times change of suffix.) specified. These ranges are based CO on timer repeatability of + 5% as specified by the manufacturer.
BFN-Unit 2
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0 3,9 BASES The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the plant during shutdown and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident. There are three sources of alternating current electrical energy available, namely, the 161-kV transmission system, the 500-kV transmission system, and the diesel generators.
The unit station-service transformer B for unit 1 or the unit station-service transformer B for unit 2 provide noninterruptible sources of offsite power from the 500-kV transmission system to the units 1 and 2 shutdown boards. Auxiliary power can also be supplied from the 161-kV transmission system through the common station-service transformers or through the cooling tower transformers by way of the bus tie board. The 4-kV bus tie board may remain out of service indefinitely provided one of the required offsite power sources is not supplied from the 161-kV system through the bus tie board.
The minimum fuel oil requirement of 103,300 gallons is sufficient for seven days of full load operation of three diesels and is conservatively based on availability of a replenishment supply.
The degraded voltage sensing relays provide a start signal to the diesel generators in the event that a deteriorated voltage condition exists on a 4-kV shutdown board. This starting signal is independent of the starting signal generated by the complete loss of voltage relays and will continue to function and start the diesel generators on complete loss of voltage should the loss of voltage relays become inoperable, The 15-day inoperable time limit specified when one of the three phase-to-phase degraded voltage relays is inoperable is justified based on the two-out-of-three permissive logic scheme provided with these relays.
A 4-kV shutdown board is allowed to be out of operation for a brief period to allow for maintenance and testing, provided all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS, RHR, (LPCI and containment cooling) systems supplied by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards, and all emergency 480-V power boards are operable.
There are eight 250-V dc battery systems, each of which consists of a battery, battery charger, and distribution equipment. Three of these systems provide power for unit control functions, operative power for unit motor loads, and alternative drive power for a 115-V ac unit-preferred mg set. One 250-V dc system provides power for common plant and transmission system control functions, drive power for a 115-V ac plant-preferred mg set, and emergency drive power for certain unit large motor loads. The four remaining systems deliver control power to the 4,160-V shutdown boards, BFN 3.9/4.9-19 Unit 2
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3.9 BASES (Cont'd) e Each 250-V dc shutdown board control power supply can receive power from its own battery, battery charger, or from a spare charger. The chargers are powered from normal plant auxiliary power or from the standby diesel-driven generator system. Zero resistance short circuits between the control power supply and the shutdown board are cleared by fuses located in the respective control power supply. Each power supply is located in the reactor building near the shutdown board it supplies.
Each battery is located in its own independently ventilated battery room.
The 250-V dc system is so arranged, and the batteries sized so, that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit. Loss of control power to any engineered safeguard control circuits is annunciated in the main control room of the unit affected. The loss of one 250-V shutdown board battery affects normal control power only for the 4,160-V shutdown board which it supplies. The station battery supplies loads that are not essential for safe shutdown and cooldown of the nuclear system. This battery was not considered in the accident load calculations.
There are two 480-V ac RMOV boards that contain mg sets in their feeder lines. These 480-V ac RMOV boards have an automatic transfer from their normal to alternate power source (480-V ac shutdown boards). The mg sets act as electrical isolators to prevent a fault from propagating between electrical divisions due to an automatic transfer. The 480-V ac RMOV boards involved provide motive power to valves associated with the LPCI mode of the RHR system. Having an mg set out of service reduces the assurance that full RHR (LPCI) capacity will be available when required. Since sufficient equipment is available to maintain the minimum complement required for RHR (LPCI) operation, a 7-day servicing period is justified. Having two mg sets out of service can considerably reduce equipment availability; therefore, the affected unit shall be placed in Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
The offsite power source requirements are based on the capacity of the respective lines. The Trinity line is limited to supplying two operating units because of the load limitations of CSST's A and B. The Athens line is limited to supplying one operating unit because of the load limitations of the Athens line. The limiting conditions are intended to prevent the 161-kV system from supplying more than two units in the event of a single failure in the offsite power system.
BFN 3.9/4.9-20 Unit 2
4.9 BASES The monthly tests of the diesel generators are primarily to check for failures and deterioration in the system since last use. The diesels will be loaded to at least 75 percent of rated power while engine and generator temperatures are stabilized (about one hour). The minimum 7S-percent load will prevent soot formation in the cylinders and injection nozzles. Operation up to an equilibrium temperature ensures that there is no overheating problem. The tests also provide an engine and generator operating history to be compared with subsequent engine-generator test data to identify and to correct any mechanical or electrical deficiency before it can result in a system failure.
The test during refueling outages is more comprehensive, including procedures that are most effectively conducted at that time. These include automatic actuation and functional capability tests to verify that the generators can start and be ready to assume load in 10 seconds. The annual inspection will detect any signs of wear long before failure. The diesel generators are shared by units 1 and 2, Therefore, the capability for the units 1 and 2 diesel generators to accept the emergency loads will be performed during the unit 1 operating cycle using the unit 1 loads.
Battery maintenance with regard to the floating charge, equalizing charge, and electrolyte level will be based on the manufacturer's instruction and sound maintenance practices. In addition, written records will be maintained of the battery performance. The plant batteries will deteriorate with time but precipitous failure is unlikely. The type of surveillance called for in this specification is that which has been demonstrated through experience to provide an indication of a cell becoming irregular or unserviceable long before it becomes a failure.
The equalizing charge, as recommended by the manufacturer, is vital to maintaining the ampere-hour capacity of the battery, and will be applied as recommended.
The testing of the logic systems will verify the ability of the logic systems to bring the auxiliary electrical system to running standby readiness with the presence of an accident signal from any reactor or an undervoltage signal on the 4-kV shutdown boards.
The periodic simulation of accident signals in conjunction with diesel-generator voltage available signals will confirm the ability of the 480-V load shedding logic system to sequentially shed and restart 480-V loads if an accident signal were present and diesel-generator voltage were the only source of electrical power.
BFN 3.9/4.9-21 Unit 2
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REFERENCES
1. Normal Auxiliary Power System (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.4)
2. Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.5)
3. 250-Volt DC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.6)
4. Memorandum from Gene M. Wilhoite to H. J. Green dated December 4, 1981 (LOO 811208 664) and memorandum from C. E. Winn to H. J. Green dated January 10, 1983 (G02 830112 002)
BFN 3.9/4.9-22 Unit 2
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E. Diesel Generator Reliability Improvement Program Report shall be submitted within 30 days of meeting failure criteria in Table 4.9.A. As a minimum, the Reliability Improvement Program report for NRC audit shall include:
a. A summary of all tests (valid and invalid) that occurred within the time period over which the last 20/100 valid tests were performed.
b. Analysis of failures and determination of root causes of failures.
c ~ Evaluation of each of the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660, "Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability in Operating Reactors," with respect to their application to the plant.
d. Identification of all actions taken or to be taken to (1) Correct the root causes of failures defined in b above and (2) Achieve a general improvement of diesel generator reliability.
e. A supplemental report shall be prepared for an NRC audit within 30 days after each subsequent failure during a valid demand, for so long as the affected diesel generator unit continues to violate the criteria (3/20 or 6/100) for the reliability improvement program remedial action. The supplemental report need only update the failure/demand history for the affected diesel generator unit since the last report for that diesel generator. The supplemental report shall also present an analysis of the failure(s) with a root cause determination, if possible, and shall delineate any further procedural, hardware or operational changes to be incorporated into the site diesel generator improvement program and the schedule for implementation of those changes.
BFN Unit, 2 6.0-17a
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LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)
Table Title ~Pa e Na.
4.2.E Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-52 4.2.F Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-53 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation. 3.2/4.2-55 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation . 3.2/4.2-56 4.2.J Seismic Monitoring Instrument Surveillance Requirements 3.2/4.2-57 4.2eK Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Instrumentation .
Surveillance . 3.2/4.2-61 3.5-1 Minimum RHRSW and EECW Pump Assignment . 3.5/4.5-11 3.5.I MAPLHGR Versus Average Planar Exposure . 3.5/4.5-21 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Valves 3.7/4.7-24 3.7.B Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals 3.7/4.7-31 3.7.C Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows. 3.7/4.7-32 3.7.D Air Tested Isolation Valves. 3.7/4.7-33 3.7.E Primary Containment Isolation Valves which Terminate below the Suppression Pool Water Levele ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.7/4.7-36 3.7.F Primary Containment Isolation Vales Located in Water Sealed Seismic Class 1 Lines 3.7/4.7-37 3.7.H Testable Electrical Penetrations 3.7/4.7-38 4.9.A Diesel Generator Reliability . 3.9/4.9-15 4.9.A.4.C Voltage Relay Setpoints/Diesel Generator Start . 3.9/4.9-17 3.11.A Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements. 3.11/4.11-10 6.8.A Minimum Shift Crew Requirements. 6.0-19 BFN vii Unit 3
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3.5/4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core S ra S stem CSS 4.5.A Core S ra S stem (CSS) 4.5.A.l.d (Cont'd) 105 psi differential pressure between the reactor vessel and the primary containment.
e. Testable Once/
Check Valve Operating Cycle
2. If one CSS loop is INOPERABLE, 2. When it is determined that one the reactor may remain in core spray loop is INOPERABLE, operation for a period not to at a time when operability is exceed 7 days providing required, the other core spray all active components in loop and the RHRS (LPCI mode) the other CSS loop and the shall be demonstrated to be RHR system (LPCI mode) OPERABLE immediately. The and the diesel generators OPERABLE core spray loop shall are OPERABLE. be demonstrated to be OPERABLE daily thereafter.
3. If Specification 3.5.A.l or Specification 3.5.A.2 cannot be met, the reactor shall be shutdown in the Cold Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
4. When the reactor vessel pressure is atmospheric and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel at least one core spray loop with one OPERABLE pump and associated diesel generator shall be OPERABLE, except with the reactor vessel head removed as specified in 3.5.A.S or prior to reactor startup as specified in 3.5.A.l, BFN 3.5/4.5-2 Unit 3
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3.5&4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.5.B Residual Heat Removal S stem 4.5.B. Residual Heat Removal S stem (RHRS) (LPCI and Containment ~(RHRS (LPCI and Containment Cooling) Cooling)
3. If one RHR pump (LPCI mode) 3. When it is determined that is INOPERABLE, the reactor one RHR pump (LPCI mode) is may remain in operation for INOPERABLE at a time when a period not to exceed 7 days operability is required, provided the remaining RHR the remaining RHR pumps pumps (LPCI mode) and both (LPCI mode) and active access paths of the RHRS components in both access (LPCI mode) and the CSS and paths of the RHRS (LPCI mode) the diesel generators remain and the CSS shall be OPERABLE. demonstrated to be OPERABLE immediately and daily thereafter.
4. If any 2 RHR pumps (LPCI No additional surveillance mode) become INOPERABLE, the required.
reactor shall be placed in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ,
5. If one RHR pump (containment When it is determined that cooling mode) or associated one RHR pump (containment heat exchanger is INOPERABLE, cooling mode) or associated the reactor may remain in heat exchanger is INOPERABLE operation for a period not to at a time when operability exceed 30 days provided the is required, the remaining remaining RHR pumps RHR pumps (containment (containment cooling mode) cooling mode), the and associated heat associated heat exchangers exchangers and diesel and all active components in generators and all access the access paths of the RHRS paths of the RHRS (containment cooling mode)
(containment cooling mode) shall be demonstrated to be are OPERABLE. OPERABLE immediately and weekly thereafter until the INOPERABLE RHR pump (containment cooling mode) and associated heat exchanger is returned to normal service.
BFN 3.5/4.5-5 Unit 3
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3.5)'4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATXON SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5 B. Residual Heat Removal S stem 4.5 B. Residual Heat Removal S stem (RRRR) <LPCI and Containment (RHRS) (LPCX and Containment Cooling) Cooling)
6. Xf two RHR pumps (containment 6. When it is determined that cooling mode) or associated two RHR pumps (containment heat exchangers are cooling mode) or associated XNOPERABLE, the reactor may heat exchangers are remain in operation for a INOPERABLE at a time when period not to exceed 7 days operability is reguired, the provided the remaining RHR remaining RHR pumps pumps (containment cooling (containment cooling mode),
mode), the associated heat - the associated heat exchangers, diesel exchangers, and all active generators, and all access components in the access paths of the RHRS paths of the RHRS (containment cooling mode) (containment cooling are OPERABLE. mode) shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE immediately and daily thereafter until at least three RHR pumps (containment cooling mode) and associated heat exchangers are returned to normal service.
7. If two access paths of the 7. When it is determined that RHRS (containment cooling one or more access paths of mode) for each phase of the the RHRS (containment mode (drywell sprays, cooling mode) are INOPERABLE suppression chamber sprays, when access is required, and suppression pool cooling) all active components are not OPERABLE, the unit in the access paths of the may remain in operation for a RHRS (containment cooling period not to exceed 7 days mode) shall be demonstrated provided at least one path to be OPERABLE immediately for each phase of the mode and all active components in remains OPERABLE. the access paths which are not backed by a second OPERABLE access path for the same phase of the mode (drywell sprays, suppression chamber sprays and suppression pool cooling) shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE daily thereafter until the second path is returned to normal service.
BFN 3.5/4.5-6 Unit 3
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3.5/%.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.B Residual Heat Removal S stem 4.5.B Residual Heat Removal S stem
{RHRS) {LPCI and Containment ~(RHRS (LPCZ and Containment Cooling)(dont'd) Cooling)(Cont'd)
12. If one RHR pump or associated 12. Mhen it is determined heat exchanger located that one RHR pump or on the unit cross-connection associated heat exchanger in unit 2 is INOPERABLE located on the unit for any reason (including cross-connection in the valve inoperability, adjacent unit is pipe break, etc.), the reactor INOPERABLE at a time when may remain in operation operability is required, for a period not to exceed the remaining RHR pump and 30 days provided the remaining associated heat exchanger RHR pump and associated diesel on the unit cross-connection generator are OPERABLE. shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE immediately and every 15 days thereafter until the INOPERABLE pump and associated heat exchanger are returned to normal service.
13. If RHR cross-connection flow or 13. No additional surveillance heat removal capability is lost, required.
the unit may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 10 days unless such capability is restored.
14. All recirculation pump 14. All recirculation pump discharge valves shall discharge valves shall be OPERABLE prior to be tested for operability reactor startup (or during any period of closed if permitted reactor Cold Shutdown elsewhere in these exceeding 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , if specifications). operability tests have not been performed during the preceding 31 days.
BFN 3.5/4.5-8 Unit 3
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0 3.5/4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.C RHR Service Water and Emer enc 4.5.C RHR Service Water and E ui ment Coolin Mater S stems Emer enc E ui ment Coolin (EECWs) (Cont'd) Mater S stems (EECWs) (Cont'd)
2. During reactor power a. If no more than two operation, RHRSM pumps RHRSM pumps are must be OPERABLE and INOPERABLE, increased assigned to service as surveillance is not indicated in Table 3.5-1 required.
for the specified time limits. b. Mhen three RHRSM pumps are INOPERABLE, the remaining pumps and associated essential control valves shall be operated weekly.
c. When four RHRSW pumps are INOPERABLE, the remaining pumps and associated essential control valves shall be operated daily.
3. During power operation, 3. Routine surveillance for both RHRSM pumps Bl and these pumps is specified B2 normally or alternately in 4.5.C.l.
assigned to the RHR heat exchanger header supplying the standby coolant supply connection must be OPERABLE; except as specified in 3.5.C.4 and 3. 5.C. 5 below.
BFN 3.5/4.5-10 Unit 3
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3.5/4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.C RHR Service Water and Emer enc 4.5.C RHR Service Water and E ui ment Coolin Water S stems Emer enc E ui ment Coolin (EECWs) (Cont'd) Water S stems (EECWs) (Cont'd
4. One of the Bl or B2 RHRSW When it is determined that pumps assigned to the RHR the Bl or B2 RHRSW pump heat exchanger supplying is INOPERABLE at a time the standby coolant supply when operability is connection may be required, the OPERABLE INOPERABLE for a period RHRSW pump on the same not to exceed 30 days header and the RHR heat provided the OPERABLE pump exchanger header and is aligned to supply the associated essential control RHR heat exchanger header valves shall be demonstrated and the associated diesel to be OPERABLE immediately generator and essential and every 15 days thereafter.
control valves are OPERABLE.
5. The standby coolant supply capability may be INOPERABLE for a period not to exceed 10 days.
6. If Specifications 3.5.C.2 through 3.5.C.5 are not met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the unit placed in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours.
7. There shall be at least 2 RHRSW pumps, associated with the selected RHR pumps, aligned for RHR heat exchanger service for each reactor vessel containing irradiated fuel.
BFN 3.5/4.5-12 Unit 3
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3.9/4.9e AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9 Auxiliar Electrical S stem 4.9 Auxiliar Electrical S stem A licabilit Applies to all the auxiliary Applies to the periodic electrical power system. testing requirements of the auxiliary electrical system.
~Ob 'ective O~b'ective To assure an adequate supply of Verify the operability of the electrical power for operation of auxiliary electrical system.
those systems required for safety.
S ecification S ecification A. Auxiliar Electrical E ui ment A. Auxiliar Electrical S stem
1. The reactor shall not be 1. Diesel Generators started up (made critical) from the Cold Condition unless the following are a. Each diesel generator shall satisfied: be manually started and loaded to demonstrate
a. Diesel generators 3A, operational readiness in 3B, 3C, and 3D OPERABLE. accordance with the frequency specified in
b. Requirements 3.9.A.3 Table 4.9.A on a staggered through 3.9.Ae6 are test basis. The test shall met. continue for at least a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period at 75%%u of
c. At. least two of the rated load or greater and following offsite power the operation of the diesel sources are available: fuel oil transfer pumps shall be demonstrated.
(1) The 500-kV system is Also, the diesel generator available to the starting air compressor unit 3 shutdown shall be checked for boards through the operation and its unit 3 station- ability to recharge service transformer air receivers.
TUSS 3B with no credit taken for the The diesel generator fast two 500-kV Trinity 'starts (10 seconds) from lines. standby conditions shall be performed once per 184 days in these surveillance tests. All other engine starts for the purpose of this test may be preceeded by an engine idle start.
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3.9/4.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.A. Auxiliar Electrical E ui ment 4.9.A. Auxiliar Electrical S stem 3.9.A.l.c. (Cont'd) 4.9.A.l. (Cont'd)
Additional reporting requirements due to failures are noted in Table 4.9.A.
All diesel generator starts shall be logged.
(2) The Trinity 161-kV b. Once per operating line is available to the cycle, a test will unit 3 shutdown boards be conducted simulating a through a common loss of offsite power and station-service or similar conditions that cooling tower transformer. would exist with the presence of an actual NOTE FOR (2): safety-injection signal
'to demonstrate the If units 1 and 2 are following:
both in operation and claiming the Trinity {1) Deenergization of the line as an offsite emergency buses and source, TUSS 3B must load shedding from be claimed as the other the emergency buses.
offsite source for unit 3. (2) The diesel starts from ambient
{3) The Athens 161-kV line condition on the is available to unit 3 auto-start signal, shutdown boards through energizes the a common station-service emergency buses with or cooling tower permanently connected transformer. loads, energizes the auto-connected NOTE FOR (3): emergency loads through load If either unit 1 or sequencing, and unit 2 is claiming operates for greater the Athens line as than or equal to five an offsite source, minutes while its it may not be claimed generator is loaded as an offsite source with the emergency for unit 3. loads.
BFN 3.9/4.9-2 Unit 3
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3.9/4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.A. Auxiliar Electrical 4.9.A. Auxiliar Electrical EcCEui meet ~Setem 3.9.A.l.c.(3) (Cont'd) 4.9.A.l.b. (Cont'd)
NOTES FOR (2) AND (3):
If both Athens and (3) On diesel generator breaker trip, the Trinity lines are claimed as the two loads are shed from offsite sources for the emergency buses unit 3, no credit may and the diesel be taken for the restarts on the auto-Athens-Trinity line start signal, the tie breaker. emergency buses are Specifically, the energized with Athens line supplies permanently connected unit 3 through common loads, the auto-station-service connected emergency transformer A or loads are energized cooling tower through load transformer 1, and sequencing, and the the Trinity line diesel operates for must supply unit 3 greater than or equal through common station- to five minutes while service transformer B or its generator is cooling tower loaded with the transformer. 2. with the emergency loads.
c~ Once a month the quantity of diesel fuel available shall be logged.
d. Each diesel generator shall be given an annual inspection in accordance with instructions based on the manufacturer's recommendations.
e. Once a month a sample of diesel fuel shall be checked for quality. The quality shall be within acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of the latest revision to ASTM D975 and logged.
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,r 3.9/4.9 AUXILIARY ELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.B. 0 eration with Ino erable 4.9.B. 0 eration with Ino erable EqEui ment EcCEui ment Whenever the reactor is in STARTUP mode or RUN mode and not in a Cold Condition, the availability of electric power shall be as specified in 3.9.A except as specified herein.
1. From and after the date 1. When only one that only one offsite offsite power source power source is available, is OPERABLE, all unit 3 reactor operation is diesel generators and permissible under this associated boards must condition for seven days. be demonstrated to be OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter.
2. When one unit 3 diesel 2. When one unit 3 generator (3A, 3B, 3C, diesel generator is or 3D) is INOPERABLE, found to be continued reactor operation INOPERABLE, all of is permissible during the the CS, RHR (LPCI succeeding 7 days, provided and containment that two offsite power cooling) systems and sources are available as the remaining unit 3 specified in 3.9.A.l.c. diesel generators and and all of the CS, RHR associated boards shall (LPCI and containment be demonstrated to be cooling) systems, and the OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months remaining three unit 3 and daily thereafter.
diesel generators are OPERABLE. If this reguire-ment cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be shut down and in the Cold Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
BFN 3.9/4.9-8 Unit 3
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3.9/4.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.B. 0 eration With Ino 'erable 4.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable E~ui ment EcCEui ment
3. From and after the date 3. When a required that the 4-kV bus tie offsite power source board becomes inoperable, is unavailable reactor operation is because the 4-kV permissible indefinitely bus tie board or a provided one of the start bus is required offsite power INOPERABLE, all sources is not unit 3 diesel supplied from the 161-kV generators and system through the bus associated boards tie board. shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter.
The remaining offsite source and associated buses shall be checked "
to be energized daily.
4. When one unit 3 When one unit 3 4-kV 4-kV shutdown board is shutdown board is INOPERABLE, continued found to be reactor operation is INOPERABLE, all permissible for a period remaining unit 3 4-kV of 5 days provided that shutdown boards and 2 offsite power sources associated diesel are available as generators, CS, and specified in 3.9.A.l.c RHR (LPCI and and the remaining unit 3 containment cooling) 4-kV shutdown boards and systems supplied by associated diesel the remaining 4-kV generators, CS, RHR (LPCI shutdown boards and containment cooling) shall be systems, and all unit 3 demonstrated to be 480-V emergency power OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months boards are OPERABLE. If and daily thereafter.
this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be shut down and in the Cold Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
BFN 3.9/4.9-9 Unit 3
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3.9/4.9 AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable 4.9.B. 0 eration With Ino erable
~Eui ment ~Eui ment
5. From and after the date 5. When one 480-V diesel that one of the 480-V, auxiliary board diesel auxiliary boards is found INOPERABLE, becomes INOPERABLE, the remaining reactor operation is diesel auxiliary permissible for a period board and each unit 3 of 5 days. diesel shall be verified OPERABLE within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and daily thereafter.
6. From and after the date that the 250-V shutdown board 3EB battery or one of the three 250-V unit batteries and/or its associated battery board is found to be INOPERABLE for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible during the succeeding seven days.
Except for routine surveillance testing, the NRC shall be notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period, and the plans to return the failed component to an OPERABLE state.
7. When one division of the logic system is INOPERABLE, continued reactor operation is permissible under this condition for seven days, provided the CSCS reguirements listed in Specification 3.9.B.2 are satisfied. The NRC shall be notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of the situation, the precautions to be taken during this period, and the plans to return the failed component to an OPERABLE state.
BFN 3.9/4.9-10 Unit 3
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AUXILIARYELECTRICAL SYSTBlS TABLE 4.9.A Diesel Generator Reliability No. of Failures in No. of Failures in last 20 valid tests+ last 100 valid tests+ Rel iabi 1 it Actions Test at least once per 31 days
>2 Test at least once per 7 days~
> 6 Within 30 days, prepare a report for NRC audit, in accordance with Sect>on 6.7.3.E.
>5 Declare the diesel generator INOPERABLE and perform a requalification test for the affected diesel generator pursuant to the attachment to this table.
Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide l. 108, Revision 1, August 1977, except that the number of tests and failures are determined on a per diesel generator basss. For the purposes of this test schedule, only valid tests conducted after the Operating License issuance date shall be included in the computation of the "last 20 valid tests". Entry into this test schedule shall be made at the 31 day test frequency.
~his test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced on one or less.
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ATTACHMENT TO TABLE 4.9.A DIESEL GENERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM (1) Perform seven consecutive successful demands without a failure within 30 days of diesel generator being restored to operable status and fourteen consecutive successful demands without a failure within 75 days of diesel generator of being restored to OPERABLE status.
(2) If a failure occurs during the first seven tests in the requalification test program, perform seven successful demands without an additional failure within 30 days of diesel generator of being restored to OPERABLE status and fourteen consecutive successful demands without a failure within 75 days of being restored to OPERABLE status.
(3) If a failure occurs during the second seven tests (tests 8 through 14) of (1) above, perform fourteen consecutive successful demands without an additional failure within 75 days of the failure which occurred during the requalification testing.
(4) Following the second failure during the requalification test program, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .
(5) During requalification testing the diesel generator should not be tested more frequently than at 24-hour intervals.
After a diesel generator has been successfully requalified, subsequent repeated requalification tests will not be required for that diesel generator under the following conditions:
(a) The number of failures in the last 20 valid demands is less than 5.
(b) The number of failures in the last 100 valid demands is less than 11.
(c) In the event that, following successful requalification of a diesel generator, the number of failures is still in excess of the remedial action criteria (a and/or b above) the following exception will be allowed until the diesel generator is no longer in violation of the remedial action criteria (a and/or b above).
Requalification testing will not be required provided that after each valid demand the number of failures in the last 20 and/or 100 valid demands has not increased. Once the diesel generator is no longer in violation of the remedial action criteria above the provisions of those criteria alone will prevail.
BFN 3.9/4.9-16 Unit 3
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TABLE 4.9.A.4.C VOLTAGE RElAY SETPOINTS/DIESEL GENERATOR START Rela Location Tri Level Settin Remarks
l. 4-kV Shutdown Boards Trip Setpoint: 0 volts with a 1.5-second time Start diesel generators on loss of delay offsite power.
Allowable Values: + . 1 second Trip Range: T.4 to 1.6 seconds Reset Setpoint: 2870-V Allowable Values: +2% of 2870-V Reset Range: 2813-V to 2927-V
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2. 4-kV Shutdown Boards Trip Setpoint: 3920 Second level undervoltage sensing Allowable Values: 3900-3940 relays start diesel generator Reset Setpoint: Reset at < 1.5% above trip value on degraded voltage.
Setpoint Critical Time Timer ~seconds
3. 4-kV Shutdown Boards 2-211-1A 0.3 + 1(5 N/A Auxiliary timers for second level (Timers shown for 2-211-2A 4.0 + 10% N/A undervoltage sensing relays.
4-kV shutdown board 2-211-3A 6.9 + l(C 8.2 3EA. 4-kV shutdown 2-211-4A 1.3 + i(5 1.5 The setpoint ranges specified boards 8, C, and D, assure that the operating times similar, except for will be below the critical times change of suffix.) specified. These ranges are based on timer repeatability of + 5% as specified by the manufacturer.
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3.9 BASES The objective of this specification is to assure an adequate source of electrical power to operate facilities to cool the unit during shutdown and to operate the engineered safeguards following an accident. There are three sources of alternating current electrical energy available,
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namely, the 161-kV transmission system, the 500-kV transmission system, and the diesel generators.
The unit station-service transformer B for unit 3 provides a noninterruptible source of offsite power from the 500-kV transmission system to the unit 3 shutdown boards. Auxiliary power can also be supplied from the 161-kV transmission system through the common station-service transformers or through the cooling tower transformers by way of the bus tie board. The 4-kV bus tie board may remain out of service indefinitely provided one of the required offsite power sources is not supplied from the 161-kV system through the bus tie board.
The minimum fuel oil requirement of 103,300 gallons is sufficient for seven days of full load operation of three diesels and is conservatively based on availability of a replenishment supply.
The degraded voltage sensing relays provide a start signal to the diesel generators in the event that a deteriorated voltage condition exists on a 4-kV shutdown board. This starting signal is independent of the starting signal generated by the complete loss of voltage relays and will continue to function and start the diesel generators on complete loss of voltage should the loss of voltage relays become inoperable.
The 15-day inoperable time limit specified when one of the three phase-to-phase degraded voltage relays is inoperable is justified based on the two-out-'of-three permissive logic scheme provided with these relays.
A 4-kV shutdown board is allowed to be out of operation for a brief period to allow for maintenance and testing, provided all remaining 4-kV shutdown boards and associated diesel generators, CS, RHR, (LPCI and containment cooling) systems supplied by the remaining 4-kV shutdown boards, and all emergency 480-V power boards are operable.
The 480-V diesel auxiliary board may be out of service for short periods for tests and maintenance. There are five 250-V dc battery systems associated with unit 3, each of which consists of a battery, battery charger, and distribution equipment. Three of these systems provide power for unit control functions, operative power for unit motor loads, and alternative drive power for a 115-V ac unit-preferred mg set. One 250-V dc system provides power for common plant and tr'ansmission system control functions, drive power for a 115-V ac plant-preferred mg set, and emergency drive power for certain unit large motor loads. The fifth battery system delivers control power to a 4-kV shutdown board.
BFN 3.9/4.9-18 Unit 3
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3.9 BASES (Cont'd)
The 250-V dc system is so arranged and the batteries sized so that the loss of any one unit battery will not prevent the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of the loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit. Loss of control power to any engineered safeguard control circuits is annunciated in the main control room of the unit affected.
The station battery supplies loads that are not essential for safe shutdown and cooldown of the nuclear system. This battery was not considered in the accident load calculations.
There are two 480-V ac RMOV boards that contain mg sets in their feeder lines. These 480-V ac RMOV boards have an automatic transfer from their normal to alternate power source (480-V ac shutdown boards). The mg sets act as electrical isolators to prevent a fault from propagating between electrical divisions due to an automatic transfer. The 480-V ac RMOV boards involved provide motive power to valves associated with the LPCI mode of the RHR system. Having an mg set out of service reduces the assurance that full RHR (LPCI) capacity will be available when required. Since sufficient equipment is available to maintain the minimum complement required for RHR (LPCI) operation, a 7-day servicing period is justified. Having two mg sets out of service can considerably reduce equipment availability; therefore, the affected unit shall be placed in Cold Shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
The offsite power source requirements are based on the capacity of the respective lines. The Trinity line is limited to supplying two operating units because of the load limitations of CSST's A and B. The Athens line is limited to supplying one operating unit because of the load limitations of the Athens line. The limiting conditions are intended to prevent the 161-kV system from supplying more than two units in the event of a single failure in the offsite power system.
BFN 3.9/4.9-19 Vnit 3
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4.9 BASES The monthly tests of the diesel generators are primarily to check for failures and deterioration in the system since last use. The diesels will be loaded to at least 75 percent of rated power while engine and generator temperatures are stabilized (about one hour). The minimum 75-percent load will prevent soot formation in the cylinders and injection nozzles. Operation up to an equilibrium temperature ensures that there is no overheating problem. The tests also provide an engine and generator operating history to be compared with subsequent engine-generator test data to identify and to correct any mechanical or electrical deficiency before it can result in a system failure.
The test during refueling outages is more comprehensive, including procedures that are most effectively conducted at that time. These include automatic actuation and functional capability tests to verify that the generators can start and be ready to assume load in 10 seconds. The annual inspection will detect any signs of wear long before failure.
Battery maintenance with regard to the floating charge, equalizing charge, and electrolyte level will be based on the manufacturer's instruction and sound maintenance practices. En addition, written records will be maintained of the battery performance. The plant batteries will deteriorate with time but precipitous failure is unlikely. The type of surveillance called for in this specification is that which has been demonstrated through experience to provide an indication of a cell becoming irregular or unserviceable long before it becomes a failure.
The equalizing charge, as recommended by the manufacturer, is vital to maintaining the ampere-hour capacity of the battery, and will be applied as recommended.
The testing of the logic system will verify the ability of the logic systems to bring the auxiliary electrical system to running standby readiness with the presence of an accident signal from any reactor or an undervoltage signal on the start buses or 4-kV shutdown boards.
The periodic simulation of accident signals in conjunction with diesel-generator voltage available signals will confirm the ability of the 480-V load shedding logic system to sequentially shed and restart 480-V loads if an accident signal were present and diesel-generator voltage were the only source of electrical power.
BFN 3.9/4.9-20 Unit 3
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References
1. Normal Auxiliary Power System (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.4)
2. Standby AC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.5)
3. 250-Volt DC Power Supply and Distribution (BFNP FSAR Subsection 8.6)
4. Memorandum from G. M. Wilhoite to H. J. Green dated December 4, 1981 (LOO 811208 664) and memorandum from C. E. Winn to H. J. Green dated January 10, 1983 (G02 830112 002)
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E. Diesel Generator Reliability Improvement Program Report shall be submitted within 30 days of meeting failure criteria in Table 4.9.A. As a minimum, the Reliability Improvement Program report for NRC audit shall include:
a. A summary of all tests (valid and invalid) that occurred within the time period over which the last 20/100 valid tests were performed.
b. Analysis of failures and determination of root causes of failures.
Ce Evaluation of each of the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660, "Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability in Operating Reactors," with respect to their application to the plant.
d. Identification of all actions taken or to be taken to (1) Correct the root causes of failures defined in b above and (2) Achieve a general improvement of diesel generator reliability.
e. A supplemental report shall be prepared for an NRC audit within 30 days after each subsequent.
failure during a valid demand, for so long as the affected diesel generator unit continues to violate the criteria (3/20 or 6/100) for the reliability improvement program remedial action. The supplemental report need only update the failure/demand history for the affected diesel generator unit since the last report for that diesel generator. The supplemental report shall also present an analysis of the failure(s) with a root cause determination, if possible, and shall delineate any further procedural, hardware or operational changes to be incorporated into the site diesel generator improvement program and the schedule for implementation of those changes.
BFN Unit 3 6.0-17a
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ENCLOSURE 2 DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT Descri tion of Chan e The proposed changes to the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Technical Specifications prevent excessive testing of the diesel generators. The changes include the following.
1. Delete the requirements for diesel generator testing whenever an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) train becomes inoperable. Technical Specifications 4.5.A.2, 4.5.B.3, 4.5.B.5, 4.5.B.6, 4.5.B.12, 4.5.C.2.b, 4.5.C.2.c, and 4.5.4.
2. Change the requirements for testing the diesel generators to allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for testing remaining diesels and other equipment in the event of inoperable electrical equipment. Technical Specifications 4.9.B.1 through 6.
3. Administrative changes to add Table 4.9.A which specifies diesel generator testing frequencies and reliability program. Technical Specification 4.9.A.l.a, Table 4.9.A, and 6.9.2.7.
4. Restrict the requirement for diesel generator fast starts to once per 184 days. Technical Specifications 4.9.A.l.a.
5. Require a log book to record diesel generator starts. Technical Specifications 4.9.A.l.a, The following pages are revised only to provide proper pagination. Units 1 and 2, pages 3.9/4.9-3, -18, -19, -20, and -21; Unit 3, pages 3.9/4.9-3, -17, -18, -19, and -20.
Reason for Chan e NRC's Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," advised that technical specifications be amended to reduce excessive diesel generator starts due to their adverse effect on reliability.
Justification for Chan e The safety objective of the Standby A-C Power System is to provide a self-contained, highly reliable source of power, as required for the Engineered Safeguards System, so that no single credible event can disable the core standby cooling functions or their supporting auxiliaries. Eight generators~ (four for units 1 and 2, and four for unit 3) are provided as a standby power supply to be used on loss of the normal auxiliary power system.
Each of the diesel generators is assigned primarily to one 4.16-kV shutdown board. It is possible, through breaker ties to the shutdown buses, to make connections between units 1, 2, and 3 diesel generators allowing for flexibility in load distribution. All ac equipment necessary to the safe shutdown of the plant under accident or nonaccident conditions is fed from this distribution system.
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Justification for Chan e (Cont'd)
The diesel generators are General Motors Model Number 999. Each diesel generator is rated at 2,850 kW, 0.8 power factor, 4.16 kV, three phase, 60 Hz for 2,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months per year. Each diesel generator also has additional ratings of 2,950 kW for seven days and 3,050 kW for 30 minutes. For the long term (greater than 10 minutes), the system is designed so that, three of the units 1 and 2 diesel generators, paralleled with the three respective unit 3 diesel generators, are adequate to supply all required loads for the safe shutdown and cooldown of all three units in the event of loss of offsite power and a design basis accident in any one unit.
The technical specifications currently contain requirements that have been determined by Generic Letter 84-15 to be detrimental to the performance of the onsite emergency electrical power system. Therefore, the proposed changes to the technical specifications are to provide the improvements which are recommended by Generic Letter 84-15 to enhance the reliability of the diesel generators.
The requirement to test the diesel generators whenever an ECCS train fails is not in recently approved Standard Technical Specifications such as NUREG 1202; and, as stated in Generic Letter 84-15, the excessive testing results in degradation of the diesel engines. It should also be noted that failures experienced in the ECCS and residual heat removal (RHR) service water systems have no mechanistic connection with the performance of operable diesel generators and therefore should not require additional testing.
Changing the surveillance testing frequency to be dependent upon test failure experience on a per diesel generator basis, as supported by NRC Generic Letter 84-15, does not relax the current regular testing frequency. The present surveillance interval is monthly and the longest interval allowed by the new requirement will be once per 31 days. Therefore, the proposed surveillance frequency will not adversely affect diesel generator performance.
The requirement for fast start testing has been limited to once per 184 days as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 84-15. Fast-start testing results in incremental degradation of the diesel engines and is therefore in opposition to diesel generator reliability and availability. However, it is believed that fast-start tests should not be totally eliminated because of the need for such a capability during a design basis accident.
The current technical specifications require that every diesel be tested immediately whenever other power sources are declared inoperable. To be consistent with the philosophy of reducing excessive testing and thereby enhancing the reliability of the diesel generator, TVA proposes that when other power sources as presently listed in the technical specifications are declared inoperable, the remaining diesels and other equipment be demonstrated operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Because no mechanistic relationship exists between the operability of an individual power supply and the"failure of the equipment affected by this change, immediate testing of equipment is not necessary to ensure that the equipment will perform its
H I' Justification for Chan e (Cont'd) safety function. A 24-hour interval will reduce unnecessary starting and stopping of equipment and will also eliminate abusive fast diesel startups and stops that are presently required to test the diesels immediately. This change is also consistent with the guidance given in Generic Letter 84-15.
The proposed changes to BFN units 1, 2, and 3 are consistent with Generic Letter 84-15. They also provide positive improvements to diesel generator reliability. For these reasons, TVA has concluded that the proposed changes to the technical specifications will not reduce the margin of plant safety.
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0 C$ ENCLOSURE 3 DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT Descri tion of No Si nificant Hazards Consideration The proposed amendment would change the Technical Specifications of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) units 1, 2, and 3 to reflect the recommendations contained in NRC Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984. Specifically the amendment would make the following changes.
1. The requirement to test the diesel generators whenever parts of other safety related systems are inoperable will be deleted.
2. The requirement to immediately test the diesel generators and other equipment when electrical equipment becomes inoperable is to be changed to allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to test the diesels.
3. The technical specifications are changed to specify that diesel generator fast starts will only be required once per 184 days.
4. A table will be added to the technical specifications that specifies a testing frequency that is dependent on the test failure experience on a particular diesel generator. The longest test interval in this table is once per 31 days, which compares to the current requirements to test once per month. This table also will require a special report to NRC if there are three or more failures in the last 20 valid tests or six or more failures in the last 100 valid tests. Similarly, the table will require the performance of a requalification test if there are five or more failures in the last 20 valid test or 11 or more failures in the last 100 valid tests.
Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has provided standards for determining, whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operating of the facility in accordance with a significant increase in the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. or (2) create the possibility of a new or different. kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
A discussion of these standards as they relate to this amendment follow.
1. The probability of the occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report has not been affected since the diesel generators are not considered in determining the probabilities of accidents. Reducing the test frequency and modifying the starting requirements to be consistent with the recommendations made by Generic
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Letter 84-15 are intended to enhance diesel generator reliability by minimizing severe test conditions that can lead to premature failures.
Therefore, the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report has been reduced since the detrimental test requirements have been reduced.
The consequences of a malfunction oE equipment important to safety has not changed since the new surveillance requirements will not afEect the operation or operability of the diesel generators or any other safety related equipment. Based on this, the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 (c)(l) are satisEied.
2. The possibility of a new accident or a different kind of accident than evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report has not been created since the change affects only the frequency of starting and the loading practices during testing of the diesel generators. Operation of the diesel generators cannot create a new type of accident. Based on this, the criteria set Eorth in 10 CFR 50.92(c)(2) are satisfied.
3. The margin oE safety is not reduced by the proposed changes because the changes in Ithe testing requirements do not afEect the ability of the diesel generators to perform their function and therefore have no impact on safety margins. Based on this, the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 (c)(3) are satisfied.
Since the application for amendment involves proposed changes that are encompassed by the criteria Eor which no significant hazards consideration exists, TVA proposes to determine that the proposed amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
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ML18032A348

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