ML18031B113
| ML18031B113 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1986 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18031B112 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-64314, TAC-64315, TAC-64316, NUDOCS 8701050180 | |
| Download: ML18031B113 (5) | |
Text
3.4/4.4 STANDBY LI UID CONTROL SYSTEM L'IMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.4 STANDBY LI UID CONTROL SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4 STANDBY LI UID CONTROL SYSTEM A licabilit Applies to the operating status of the Standby Liguid Control System.
~0b'ective To assure the availability of a system with the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain the shutdown condition without the use of control rods.
S ecification Applies to the surveillance reguirements of the Standby Liguid Control System.
~ob'ective To verify the operability of the Standby Liquid Control System.
S ecification A.
Normal S stem Availabilit A.
Normal S stem Availabilit 1.
The Standby Liquid Control System shall be operable at all times when there is fuel in the reactor vessel and the reactor is not in a shutdown condition with all operable control rods fully inserted except as specified in 3.4.B.l.
The operability of the Standby Liquid Control System shall be verified by the performance of the following tests:
1.
At least once per month each pump loop shall be functionally tested.
2.
At least once during each operating cycle:
a.
Check that the setting of the system relief valves is 1,425
+ 75 psig.
BFN Unit 1, 2, 3
3.4/4.4-1 b..
Manually initiate the
- system, except explo-sive valves.
Visually verify flow by pumping boron solution through the recirculation path and back to the Standby Liguid Control Solution Tank.
Verify minimum pump flow rate of 39 gpm against a system head of 1275 psig by pumping demineralized water through the 8701050180 861223 R
ADOCK 05000259 e
U
3.4/4.4 STANDBY LI UID CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.A Normal S stem A licabilit 4.4.A.2.b.
(Cont'd)
Standby Liguid Control Test Tank.
After pumping boron
- solution, the system shall be flushed with demineralized water.
c.
Manually initiate one of the Standby Liguid Control System loops and pump demineralized water into the reactor vessel.
This test check explosion of the charge associated with the tested loop, proper operation of the valves, and pump operability.
Replacement charges shall be selected such that the age of charge in service shall not exceed five years from the manufacturer's assembly date.
d.
Both systems, including both explosive valves, shall be tested in the course of two operating cycles.
B.
0 eration with Ino erable
, ~Com onents B.
Surveillance with Ino erable Com onents BFN Unit 1,2,3 1.
From and after the date that a redundant component is made or found to be inoperable, Specification 3.4.A.l shall be considered fulfilled and 'continued operation permitted provided that the component is returned to an operable condition within seven days.
3.4/4.4-2 1.
When a component is found to be inoperable, its redundant component shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter until the inoperable component is repaired.
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ENCLOSURE 2
DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION BROMNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Section 4.4.A.2.b of units 1, 2, and 3, technical specifications is changed to clarify surveillance requirements for the Standby Liquid Contxol System (SLC).
The change will add two phrases to the current requirement.
The first phrase being added would require the licensee to visually verify flow when pumping boron solution through the recirculation path.
The second phrase is added to specify pumping demineralized watex through the SLC test tank instead of borated water through the storage tank to verify flow rate.
The requirement to visually verify flow can be accomplished by observing turbulence through a sample opening in the top of the SLC solution tank.
The change to allow pumping demineralized water from the SLC test tank to verify flow rate will be satisfied by observing the rate of level change in the test tank to calculate the minimum pump flow rate.
REASON FOR CHANGE The current test method pumps demineralized water from the SLC test tank to calculate the flow rate.
However, the technical specifications surveillance requirement should be clarified since it presently implies that flow rate is measured during boron solution recirculation back to the SLC solution tank.
JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGE The purpose of the SLC system is to provide the capability of bringing the reactox from full power to a cold, xenon-free shutdown condition,
- assuming, that none of the withdrawn contxol rods can be inserted.
To meet this objective, the SLC system is designed to inject a quantity of boron that produces a concentration greater than 600 ppm of boron in the reactor core in less than 125 minutes.
The purpose of the SLC pump flow rate test is to monitor pump performance.
This objective can be met by pumping either borated water or demineralized water and by using either the SLC storage tank or the SLC test tank as the source of water.
The SLC system at BFN is designed so that this test, is conducted using the test tank and demineralized water.
Such testing is consistent with the requirements of Standard Technical Specifications and American Society of Mechanical EngineersSection XI.
Finally, neither the frequency of the test nor the required flow rate of 39 gpm against a system head of 1,275 psig is changed.
For these
- reasons, TyA has concluded that the proposed changes to the technical specifications will not reduce the margin of plant safety.
ENCLOSURE 3
DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION BROMNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT RE VEST The proposed amendment would revise the BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3 technical specifications to clarify the surveillance requirements for the Standby Liquid Control System (SLC).
The proposed amendment would specify the use of demineral'ized water for testing the minimum pump flow rate and require visual verification of flow when pumping boron solution through the recirculation path.
BASIS FOR PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c).
A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
A discussion of these standards as they relate to this amendment follows.
1.
The probability or consequences of an accident that has been previously evaluated will not be significantly increased since the proposed amendment will not result in the alteration of any plant equipment, change the surveillance frequency, or significantly reduce the effectiveness of the surveillance test.
Furthermore, the use of demineralized water is allowed by the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for this type of surveillance test.
2.
The possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not created since this change will not eliminate or modify any protective functions or permit any new operational conditions.
3.
The proposed change will not involve a significant reduction in margin of safety since it is a clarification of the current surveillance requirement.
and is consistent with what is allowed by STS.
Furthermore, it will not result in any physical modifications or any significant changes to existing procedures.
Since the application for amendment involves a proposed change that is encompassed by the criteria for which no significant hazards consideration
- exists, TVA proposes to determine that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.