ML18029A851
| ML18029A851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1985 |
| From: | Brooks C, Cantrell F, Patterson C, Paulk G, Petterson C, Stadler S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18029A848 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.3.28, TASK-TM 50-259-85-39, 50-260-85-39, 50-296-85-39, NUDOCS 8509160153 | |
| Download: ML18029A851 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1985039
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/85-39,
50-260/85-39
and 50-296/85-39
Licensee:
Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Tower II
Chattanooga,
37401
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260
8 50-296
License Nos.:
8
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection
Conducted:
July 27 - August 19,
1985
Inspectors:
G.
L.
Pa
k, Senior
R
id
o
ate
Signed
C. A.
Pa
erson,
Resi
en
C.
R. Bro
s,
eside
3
S.
D. Sta ler,
Inspec
or
Approved by:
F.
. Cantrell,
Sec
ip'n
ef
Division of Reactor
Prospects
ate
igned
o
D te
igned
D te
igned
8" 9g
q
Date
igned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine
inspection
involved
150
resident
inspector-hours
in the
areas
of operational
safety,
maintenance
observation,
reportable
occurrences,
surveillance
observation,
TMI action
item,
licensee
action
on previous
enforce-
ment items,
and unresolved
items.
Results:
One Violation - Technical Specification 6.3.A. 1 for failure to have
an
adequate
procedure
to cover operation of the Standby
Gas Treatment
(SBGT) System
charcoal
bed
heaters
and failure to
use
an
updated
procedure
which covered
operation of the heaters.
One Deviation - Final
Safety Analysis Report,
section
5.3.3.7 for not having
a
low temperature
alarm on the
SBGT system charcoal
bed heaters.
0
8509160153
850904
ADOCK 05000259
8
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
J.
A. Coffey, Site Director
R.
L. Lewis, Plant Manager (Acting)
J.
E. Swindell, Superintendent
- Operations/Engineering
T.
0
~ Cosby,
Superintendent
- Maintenance
J.
H. Rinne, Modifications Manager
J.
D. Carlson, guality Engineering
Supervisor
D.
C. Nims, Engineering
Group Supervisor
R.
McKeon, Operations
Group Supervisor
C.
G. Wages,
Mechanical
Maintenance
Supervisor
J.
C. Crowell, Electrical Maintenance
Supervisor (Acting)
R.
E. Burns,
Instrument Maintenance
Supervisor
A.
W. Sorrell, Health Physics
Supervisor
R.
E. Jackson,
Chief Public Safety
T.
L. Chinn, Senior Shift Manager
T.
F. Ziegler, Site Services
Manager
J.
R. Clark, Chemical Unit Supervisor
B.
C. Morris, Plant Compliance Supervisor
A. L. Burnette, Assistant Operations 'Group Supervisor
R.
R. Smallwood, Assistant Operations
Group Supervisor
S.
R. Maehr,
Planning/Scheduling
Supervisor
G.
R. Hall, Design Services
Manager
W.
C. Thomison,
Engineering
Section Supervisor
A. L. Clement,
Radwaste
Group Controller
2.
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
licensed
reactor
operators,
auxiliary operators,
craftsmen,
technicians,
public safety officers, guality
Assurance,
Design
and engineering
personnel.
Exit Interview
(30703)
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on August
2 and
19,
1985,
with the Plant Manager and/or Assistant Plant Managers
and other members of
his staff.
3.
The licensee
acknowledged
the findings and took no exceptions.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters (92702)
0
(Closed)
Unresolved
(259/260/296/85-36-03)
The charcoal
bed heaters
are the
subject of the violation and deviation in this report.
This item is closed.
5.
Unresolved
Items" (92701)
There are
two unresolved
items covered
in paragraph
five and eleven.
Operational
Safety
(71707,
71710)
The
inspectors
were
kept
informed
on
a daily basis
of the overall plant
status
and
any significant
safety
matters
related
to plant
operations.
Oaily discussions
were held each
morning with plant
management
and various
members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors
made frequent visits to the control
rooms
such that each
was
visited at least daily when
an inspector
was
on site.
Observations
included
instrument
readings,
setpoints
and recordings;
status of operating
systems;
status
and
alignments
of emergency
standby
systems;
onsite
and offsite
emergency
power
sources
available
for automatic
operation;
purpose
of
temporary tags
on equipment controls
and switches;
alarm status;
adherence
to procedures;
adherence
to limiting conditions for operations;
nuclear
instruments
temporary
alterations
in effect;
.daily
journals
and logs;
stack monitor recorder traces;
and control
room manning.
This inspection activity also
included
numerous
informal discussions
with
operators
and their supervisors.
General
plant tours were conducted
on at least
a weekly basis.
Portions
of'he
turbipe building, each reactor building and outside
areas
were visited.
Observations
included
valve positions
and
system
alignment;
and
hanger
conditions;
containment
isolation
alignments;
instrument
readings;
housekeeping;
proper
power
supply
and
breaker
alignments;
radiation
area
controls;
tag controls
on equipment;
work activities in progress;
radiation
protection
controls
adequate;
vital
area
controls;
personnel
search
and
escort;
and vehicle search
and escort.
Informal discussions
were
held with
selected
plant
personnel
in their
functional
areas
during
these
tours.
Weekly verifications of system
status
which included major flow path
valve
alignment, instrument
alignment,
and
switch
position
alignments
were
performed
on the source
range monitors
and
SBGT systems.
A complete
walkdown of the
accessible
portions
of the
system
was
conducted to verify system operability.
Typical of the items checked during
the walkdown were:
lineup procedures
match plant drawings
and
the as-built
configuration,
hangars
and
supports
housekeeping
adequate,
electrical
panel interior conditions, calibration dates
appropriate,
system
instrumentation
on-line, valve position alignment correct,
valves
locked
as
appropriate
and
system indicators functioning properly.
"An Unresolved
Item is
a matter
about which more information is required to
determine
whether it is acceptable
or may involve a violation or deviation.
Cy
All three
units
remained
shutdown
during
this period.
Unit
One
fuel
off-load commenced
on August 16,
1985.
Reactor
Building Flooding
During
a routine tour of the unit
one reactor building torus area
on
July 31,
1985,
the inspector
observed
several
inches
of water
on the
floor of the northwest
corner
room.
Matet
was spraying
down from the
next higher elevation
from the control
rod drive
(CRD)
pumps.
Access
to the corner
room was not restricted
in any
manner.
One of the
pumps
was running and was observed
to have
a severe
The
pump
was being
used
to adjust water levels prior to removing the
refueling gate.
The unit operator
was contacted
who stated
personnel
were being dispatched
to the afea.
Later, it was
learned
that
the flood level
switch located
six inches
off the floor had alarmed in the control
room.
This is one of the
same
flood level
switches for,which
a deviation
was given for the switches
not being fully operable
nor seismically mounted.
(Report 85-36).
The
inspector
notified the
plant
manager
of his concerns
and corrective
action
was promptly taken.
b.
SBGT Charcoal
Bed Heater
Problems
The inspector
continues
to track concerns
over the
apparent
lack of
understanding
of
how the
Standby
Gas
Treatment
(SBGT) System charcoal
bed heaters
operate
and
general
preventive
maintenance
of
them.
As
discussed
in Licensee
Event
Report
( LER) 259/85-29, it was previously
not known that the
SBGT charcoal
bed heaters
needed
to
be reset after
the
system
was
secured.
However, this information was available
on Final
Safety Analysis Figure 5.3-9,
note
six which describes
the
manual
reset.
This is
a violation of Technical Specification 6.3.A. 1
in that plant procedures
did not address
the
manual
reset
to insure
heater operation.
This violation was discussed
in an exit meeting with
plant management
on August 19,
1985.
(259,
260, 296/85-39-01).
After plant procedures
were revised
as discussed
in
an
operator
was questioned if the heaters
had been reset or were operating
properly.
This could not
be determined
as
no log readings
are
taken
nor is the
SBGT room routinely checked
on the operator
rounds
sheet.
Each train of heaters
is thermostatically controlled at
125 degrees
F.
If the
temperature
reaches
150
degrees
F.,
a
temperature
switch
interrupts
power
to
the
heater
and
alarms
in control
room.
The
temperature
switch must
be locally reset
in the
room.
Train
C
only has
an additional
safety switch set at 450 degrees
F. which must
be locally reset.
No temperature
indication is provided directly for
the charcoal
beds.
Local
and
remote temperature
indication is provided
at the outlet of the bed eighteen
inches
away from the bed.
The inspector
reviewed Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR) page 5.3-21
and
found that it stated
the charcoal
bed temperature
is thermostati-
cally controlled with high
and
low temperature
alarms
in the
Main
Control
Room.
A review of the control circuit with plant personnel
found no low temperature
alarm.
A low alarm would have
indicated
the
system
was
not operating.
This is
a deviation
from
FSAR section
5.3.3.7,
Standby
Gas
Treatment
System
for
failure
to
have
a
low
temperature
alarm for the charcoal
bed temperature.
This deviation
was
discussed
in
an
exit
meeting
on
August
19,
1985.
(259,
260,
296/85-39-02).
In
an attempt
to determine
the status of the charcoal
bed heaters
the
following problems
were identified:
Train C-
( 1)
On August 2, 1985, four of six,
750 watt heater s were found burned
out.
Temperature
switch
TS-65-63B
(450
deg.)
had
one
set
of
contacts
which
are
in line with the
heater
power
were
welded
closed.
The annunciator
in the control
room was alarming but the
red
run light was still indicating the
heaters
were
energized.
This led to the heater
burnout.
(2)
Temperature
switch
TS-65-63B
had
previously
been
replaced
on "
July 6,
1985
as indicated
in
Closer evaluation
of
the
heaters
indicated
the
design
was
wrong.
The iheaters
are
located in a pipe at the bottom of, the filter bank. (Train A and
B
heaters
are distributed
throughout
the charcoal
bed.)
The sensor
for TC-65-63 (125 deg.)
and
TS-65=63A (150 deg.)
are
located
on
the opposite
side of the charcoal
beds
and
near
the
top of the
filter bank.
The
TS-65-63B
sensor
was
located directly
on
the
heater
pipe.
Apparently the heaters
would come
on and due to the
location,
the
450 deg.
switch would be tripped prior to the other
controller or switch sensing
heat
from the heaters.
Prior to the
contacts
being welded shut the only way to have the heaters
remain
was to locally reset
the heaters
after
the
temperature
reached
450 degrees
F.
This fact was not
common
knowledge at the
plant.
The local reset
is inside
a cabinet in the
SBGT room and
is not labeled
on the outside of the cabinet.
The heater controls
could not be
made to function correctly.
Train B-
The temperature
control bulb ( 125 deg.)
was found not securely
mounted
and dangling next to the charcoal
bed.
The response
of the controller
was believed to be erratic depending
on the position of the bulb.
Train A-
During performance
of surveillance
instruction
on August 4,
1985,
TS
65-14 (150 deg.)
was found inoperable.
The licensee
delayed fuel off-load of unit one until problems with the
heaters
were
resolved.
On
August
8,
1985,
a
licensee
evaluation
determined that operation of the
SBGT system with the relative humidity
heaters
on for ten
hours
a month
ensures
no moisture
buildup in the
charcoal
beds.
This operation
is discussed
in
NRC Regulatory
Guide
1.52
and plant surveillance instruction
SI 4.7.B-10 implements this.
The evaluation
stated that similar charcoal
bed heaters
at Sequoyah
and
Watts
Bar nuclear plants
had
been
deenergized
because
of a potential
for
a malfunction of the heaters
causing
a fire in the absorber
bed.
This information had not been
relayed
to Browns Ferry.
The inspector
requested
from plant
management
when the information was
known at the
other
TVA facilities.
This will remain
an unresolved
item for further
review and evalution.
(259,
260, 296/85-39-03).
6.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
Plant
maintenance activities of selected
safety-related
systems
and compon-
ents
were
observed/reviewed
to
ascertain
that
they
were
conducted
in
accordance
with requirements.
The following items
were considered
=during
this review:
the limiting conditions for operations
were
met; activities
were
accomplished
using
approved
procedures;
functional
testing
and/or
calibrations
were
performed prior to returning
components
or
system
to
service;
quality control
records
were maintained;
activities
were
accom'-
plished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and materials
used
were
properly
certified;
proper
tagout
clearance
procedures
were
adhered
to; Technical
Specification
adherence;
and
radiological
controls
were
implemented
as
required.
Maintenance
requests
were
reviewed to determine
status of outstanding
jobs
and
to
assure
that priority was
assigned
to
safety-related
equipment
maintenance
which might affect plant safety.
The inspectors
observed
the
below listed maintenance activities during this report period:
a.
SBGT Charcoal
bed heater repair.
b.
Rework
of various
hangers
and
supports
incorrectly
designed
under
bulletins 79-02
and 79-14.
c.
Refuel activities.
d.
Cable spreading
room support inspections.
There were
no violations or deviations
in this area.
7.
Survei1
1 ance Testing
Obser vation
(61726)
The
inspectors
observed
and/or
reviewed
the
below listed
surveillance
procedures.
The inspection
consisted
of
a
review of the
procedures
for
technical
adequacy,
conformance
to technical
specifications,
verification
of test
instrument calibration,
observation
on
the
conduct
of the test,
,6
removal
from service
and return to service of the system,
a review of test
data,
limiting condition
for
operation
met,
testing
accomplished
by
qualified. personnel,
and that the surveillance
was completed at the required
frequency.
a.
SI 4.7.B-10 -
SBGT System Train Operation With Heater
On
b.
SI 4.7.B-2 - SBGT Humidity Control Capacity Test
c.
SI 4.7.B-4 - SBGT High Efficiency Particulate Activity Test
d.
Halogenated
Hydrocarbon Testing
e.
Removal Efficiency
f.
SIL-40 - Operation
Section Instruction Letter, Surveillance Instruction
g.
SI 4.7.B-1
-
SBGT Operability Test (see
below)
Ouring
a routine tour of the control
room
on July 30,
1985,
the inspector
found
a surveillance
procedure
being
used
which did not contain
a recent
change
concerning
the charcoal
bed
heaters.
Surveillance
Instruction
4.7.B-l,
Standby
Gas
Treatment Operability
Test,
was being
used
which did
not contain
a
change
dated July 7, -1985,
which required
the
charcoal
bed--
heaters
to
be
reset
after
system
shutdown.
The controlled
copy of the
instruction
in the
control
room contained
the
change
but
copies
of the
- instruction in
a file drawer
did not.
Operations
personnel
are instructed
by operations
section Instruction Letter SIL-40 to compare
page
by page the
file drawer
copy to the controlled
copy
to. ensure
the latest revision is
being
used.
However,
no signature verification or otherwise is required
to
indicate this has
been
accomplished.
A review of completed
SI 4.7.B-l
procedures
since
the
change
of July 7,
1985,
revealed
three out of ten
times
no
change
had
been
entered
into the
procedure.
The dates
of performance
are listed below:
7-07-85;
7-07-85;
7-08-85;
7-09"85;
7-09-85
7-11-85;
7-12-85;
7-13-85;
7-25"85;
7-25-85;
Changed
Changed
Changed
Changed
Changed
No Change
Changed
Changed
No Change
No Change
This is the
second
example of the violation against Technical Specification 6.3.A.1
(259,
260, 296/85-39-01).
In
an exit meeting
on August
19,
1985,
plant management
was informed of the violation.
8.
Reportable
Occurrences
(90712,
92700)
The
below listed licensee
events
reports
( LERs) were reviewed to determine
if the
information
provided
met
NRC
requirements.
The
determination
included:
adequacy
of event description,
verification of compliance
with
technical
specifications
and
regulatory
requirements,
corrective
action
taken,
existence
of potential
generic
problems,
reporting
requirements
satisfied,
and
the relative safety
significance of each event.
Additional
in-plant reviews
and discussion
with plant personnel,
as appropriate,
were
conducted
for
those
reports
indicated
by
an
asterisk.
The
following
licensee
event reports
are closed:
LER NO.
Date
Event
"259/85-37
7-18-85
"259/85-35
7-10-85
Containment Isolation Because
of a Blown Fuse
Secondary
Containment Isolation from a High
Radiation Alarm.
"259/85-29
6-28-85
Procedural
Deficiency - Controls Necessary
to
Ensure
Operability
of the
Standby
Gas
Treatment
System
Charcoal
Heaters
"259/85-28
7-06"85
Loss of Standby
Gas Treatment
System
The inspectors
reviewed
and
noted
the
problem with the
'C'rain
charcoal
bed heater
high temperature
cutout switch (450 deg.
F.)
was
more
than
a
switch drift.
The
design
problem with the 'C'rain is
discussed
in paragraph five.
9.
TMI Action Items
The following action
item was
reviewed
by the inspector during this report
period:
II.K.3.28, gualification of Accumulators
on Automatic Depressurization
System
(ADS) Valves.
This item requires
the
licensee
to address
two
separate
concerns
on short-term
and long-term operability
requirements
for the
ADS valves
and accumulators.
In
a letter
from
NRR to
TVA on
July 24,
1985,
on this item,
NRC found that the modifications committed
to be comiPleted
on the
ADS system is satisfactory.
This item will be
inspected
for
long-term
operability
modifications
during
future
inspections'0.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
The inspector
reviewed
a
number of open
items from Inspection
Report 84-52
regarding failures of Limitorque valve operator failures.
The licensee's
corrective actions
were detailed
in commitments
at the exit interview,
a
Response
Letter to violation 50-259,
260, 296/84-52 dated
February
13,
1985
and
a
Supplemental
Response
Letter dated
June
20,
1985 'he
licensee
has
substantially
upgraded
the maintenance
and electrical
procedures
applicable
to Limitorque operators
to ensure
proper installation of the motor pinion
gears;
and require
inspection
of these
gears
during preventative
mainten-
ance.
In addition,
a
comprehensive
three-day
Limitorque Valve Actuator
Course
has
been established
at the site for maintenance
personnel.
As part
of this
course,
Limitorque operators
are
utilized to
provide
hands-on
training
in maintenance,
repair,
and
inspection.
At the
time of this
inspection,
approximately
80 percent
of the
maintenance
personnel
respon-
sible for Limitorques
had completed this training course.
The licensee
has
also
completed
a
100 percent
inspection
of Limitorque operators
on safety
related
valves
to ensure
proper pinion gear orientation
and pinon gear set
screw tightness.
(Closed)
Violation
259,
260,
296/84-52-01:
The
licensee
has
revised
procedures
and
increased
training fo help control
assembly
of Limitorque
operators
and
has
inspected all safety related
Limitorque valve operators.
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup
Item
259,
260,
296/84-52-02:
Independent
verification
and
sign off for correct installation of the Limitorque valve
operator
motor pinion gear
has
been
added to Maintenance
Procedure
M/I-87.
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup Item 259,
260, 296/84-52-03:
Inspection of the
Limitorque motor side gearbox
and pinion gear
has
been
added to the preven-
tive maintenance
section of Maintenance
Procedure
MMI-87.
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup Item 259,
260, 296/84-52-04:
The direct current
(D.C.) Limitorque operators
isolation valves
have
been
added to the Outage
Shunt Field Inspection
Program.
General Electric Reports
The inspector
reviewed
a
number
of reports written
on
Browns Ferry safety
related
systems.
These reports
were generated
as
a result of a TVA initia-
tive to have General
Electric (GE) perform detailed engineering
analysis of
these
systems
and the applicable
operating
and surveillance
procedures.
Included within the
scope of these
reviews were the following:
a.
Vendor manuals
b.
c.
GEK's
d.
Technical Specifications
e.
Design specifications
f.
System walkdowns
g.
System Information Letters (SILs) and Product Experience
Reports
(PERs)
h.
Operating
procedures
correct equipment operation
agreement
with design intent
agreement
with references
changes
that the Operations
Department
would like to make
- controlling parameters
i .
Surveillance
procedures
- review only procedures
performed
by operations
- review for operational
correctness
and conformance with
design
and technical
specifications
intent
j .
Reactor
Protection
System
(RPS) trip hi story review and analysis
Excluded
from the
scope
of these
GE systems
evaluations
were the following
areas:
a.
Abnormal operation
procedures
b.
Commitment compliance
c.
Procedure
setpoint verification--
d.
and
NRC Information Notices
and Bulletins
e.
Identification of changes
required to other procedures
or
a result of
GE recommendations
f.
Compliance of recommended
changes
to administrative
requirements
g.
Identification of training required or
a result of GE -recommendations
The inspector's
review of these
system
and
procedure
reports
indicated
that they were well done
and very comprehensive.
Each report is subdivided
into several
sections
including
recommended
procedure
revisions,
walkdown
results,
operator
comments,
SIL and
PER status,
FSAR change
recommendations,
and
an overall
summary
of major
recommendations.
The
procedure
change
recommendations
were
numerous
for most
systems,
including procedural
steps
that would noi. work as written,
and
the
addition
of entire
sections
to
surveillance
procedures.
Although
not specifically required within the
scope of the
TVA-GE contact,
several
of the
engineers
also
conducted
very
detailed
walkdown of their assigned
systems.
A number of deficiencies
were
noted
on these
walkdowns, particularly
on the offgas
system.
Examples
of
the
deficiencies
included
broken
instruments,
pegged
high differential
indicators,
missing valve handles,
improper equipment installation,
missing
or improper labeling,
personnel
safety
hazards,
and burned
out indicating
lamps.
The inspectors
expressed
a concern for the status of safety related
systems
which were not walked
down to the extent the offgas
system.
J
)
10
The
inspector
encountered
substantial
difficulty in determining
who
was
coordinating
the overall resolution
to
recommendations
and identified
deficiencies,
the status
of each
item,
how the
numerous
deficiencies
and
recommendations
were
being
tracked
and
how
these
results
were
being
integrated
into the
many
on-going
Browns
Ferry
programs
including
RPIP,
Operational
Readiness
Assessment,
Configuration
Management,
the
Backwork
Taskforce,
etc.
To
help
ensure
that
each
GE identified
concern
or
recommendation
receives
adequate
consideration,
whether
incorporated
or
rejected, it would
seem
beneficial
to
assign
a
unique
identifier,
a
responsible
individual,
and
a
due date for
each
item.
This
would allow
tracking and is of particular importance
where safety issues
are invalid, or
where the item is considered
necessary
for Unit 2 restart.
Another area
of
concern
was the massive
procedure
changes
recommended
by
GE including 63 on
the
HPCI operating
procedure.
With this
number of changes,
the procedures
may require testing
and additional
operator training prior to restart
of
Unit 2.
The inspector
was also concerned that since
a large
number of plant
groups
and individuals are apparently
responsible
for determining
whether
these
GE recommendations
are incorporated,
therefore,
the safety
considera-
tion for recommendations
not utilized should
be considered
and reviewed
by
plant management.
Because
these
systems
involved in the
GE study are safety related,
and there
are potential
procedural,
technical
specification,
and
equipment deficien-
cies noted,
the resolution of these
reports will be carried
as
an unresolved
item 259,
269, 296/85-39-04.
The licensee, stated
at the exit interview that
a coordinator for the
GE systems
and
procedure
reports
had
been
appointed.
The licensee
also
committed to conduct
a
PORC review of all
GE recommenda-
tions not adopted.