ML18029A617

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Proposed Tech Specs,Expanding Definitions to State That Secondary Containment Integrity Exists When Valve in Ventilation Sys Penetration Deactivated in Isolated Position
ML18029A617
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/26/1985
From:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18029A616 List:
References
NUDOCS 8507020505
Download: ML18029A617 (12)


Text

ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (TVA BFNP TS 210) 8507020505 850626 PDR ADOCK 05000259 PDR

PROPOSED CHANGES UNIT 1

r

?. Scconda Containment Incezritv

1. Secondary containmenc integrity means conditions chat the reactor

"-k~ building is inta'ct and the following are met:

a) At least one door in each access opening to the tu"bio '1'd ur ine b uil'ding, '

control bay and out-of-doors is closed.

b) The standbv.gas vacep treatment svstem is oressuie negaciveexisc.

is..s aceo.co operabl in' venose area~eV~ wnere seconaarymaintain e and can

'c 0.2g conte>n>enc inches oi es.o.

Mcegricg c) All secondary containment penetratxons requir uire d tto e closed durin usr uring accident conditions are either:

Capable of being closed by an operable seco con d aryy containment automatic isolation system, or

2. Closed by at least one secondary containment nment automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.
2. Reactor zone secondary containment integrity means the unit reactor building is intact and the following conditions are mec:

. a) Ac least one door between any open-'ng co cbe curbine bui1ding, contro1 bay and ouc-of-doors is closed.

b) The standby gas teatment system is operable'and can maintain 0.25 inches water negative pressure on the unit zone, c) All the unit reactor building ventilation system penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

I. Capable of being closed by an operable reactor building ventilation system automatic isolation system, or

2. Closed by at least one reactor building ventilation system automatic isolation valve deactivated in 'the isolated position.

Xf it is oesirable for operational considerations, a reactor zone mav be isolated from tne other reactor zones'and che refuel zone by maincai.ning at'east one closed door in eacn cor, ...on passageway between zones. ~ Reactor zone safety related features are not co;.,promisea by openings between adjacent units or re uel one,. unless it is des'rec co isolate a given zone.

~ To ef ectively control zone isolacio~, all cesses co the affected zone or guarded to p-.event uncoacroll access'wl 1 be 3.ocked ro e d passage to the unaffected zcneso

3. Refuel zone secondary containment integrity neans the ref ue 1 intact

~

zone xs ~

,<<and 'the following'zonditions are met:

a) At least one door in each access opening to the cut of-doors is c'osed nt, system is operable and dan'maintain .2S inches C

b)) one standby gas trearm

~ster negative pressure on the refuel zone.

c) All the refuel zone ventilation system penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an operable refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation system, or
2. Closed by at least'ne refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.

it If is desirable for operatio~al considerations, the refuel zone m y be isolated from the reactor zones by maintaining all hatches in place between refuel floor and reactor zones and at least'ne closed door in each access between the refuel zone and the re ctor bu'ild'ng.-'

Refuel, zone safety related features are not co;. ro...ised b- ope i the reactor ui ing unless it is des'red to isolate a given zone.

o e ective'ly control zone isolatiog, all accesses to the affected zone

~ill be locked or guarded to prevent uncontrolled passage to the unaffected zones ~

4B

PROPOSED CHANGES UNIT 2

7. Seconda Containment Tntezritv Secondary containment integrity means that the reactor
1. following conditions are met:

is intact and the

~

building 0

a) At least one door in each access opening to the ttur-b:ine buildingi '

control bay and out-of-doors is closed. .

b) The standbv .gas treatment svstem' n

is operable

" and can 5 h oary conraznment.~tegritj c) All secondary containment penetrations requirerequired to be closed close during accident conditions are either:

Capable of being closed by an operable se'condar containm automatic isolation system, or

2. Closed by at least one secondary contai n a nment automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.

1

~ ~ Reactor zone secondary containment integrity means the unit reactor building is intact and the following conditions re met.

. a) At least one door between any. opening to the turbine building, control bay and out-of-doors is closed. ~ ~ ~

b) The standb y g as t eatment system is operable'd can maintain 0.25 ~ ~

inches water negative pressure on the unit zone.

c) All the unit reactor building ventilation system penetratxons pe et t' required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

I Capable of being closed by an operable reactor b uz. zng vents.sation ld'r

~ ~ ~

system automatic isolation system, or

2. Closed by at least one reactor building ventilation system automatic solation valve deactivated in 'the isolated position.

Xf it is desirable for operationa'onsideracions, z reactor zone mav be isolated from the other reactor zones hnd the refuel zone by maistaf. ~ ann'no ' at 'east one closed door in each cor. ...on passage~ay between zones. ~ Reac"or eac.or ~one zone safety related features are not co"...promised by openings between adjacent it

~

units or re uel one,. unless is des'rec to isolate a given zone 1

~o e g ectively control zone isol tio~, all acce ses to

'>>wll b lod d guar d e d to p-.event uncontrolled p ssage to the unaffected

3. Refuel zone seconda"y containment integrity neans the refuel zone is intact and the following condition are met:

a) At least one door in each access opening to the cut-of-doors is closed Z

\ J b} ~ne standby gas treatm nt system is operable and (an"maintain .25 inches

~

<<ster negative pressure on the refuel zone.

c} All the refuel zone ventilation system penetrations required,,to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an. operable refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation system, or
2. Closed by at least'ne refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.

it lf is desirable for operatio~al considerations, the refuel zone nay be isolated from the reactor zones by maintaining a11 hatches in place between refuel, floor and reactor zones and at least one closed door in each access between the refuel zone and the re cror bu'ilding.<<'

Refuel zone safety related features are not co" "o...ised '

...'se b y openings between the reactor building unless it is desired to isol-ate a given zone.

'so

~ :o e.=ectively control zone isol tiog, all accesses too thee a ffectedd zone "

<<"'ll be locked or guarded u to p-.event. uncontrolled passage t o t h e una fected "c dies ~

PROPOSED CHANGES UNIT 3

y7~

P. Seconda Containment Intezritv Secondary containment integrity means that. the reactor

l. is intac't and the following conditions are met:
.~~.building a) At 3.east one door in each access opening to thee ur -ne uilding, bay and out-of-doors is closed tu-b-'ontrol

~ ~

b) The standbv .gas treatment svstem

<ate~ ne~qi e aressuie i L'those h

is "

operable

- unere are-s and can secona noary contaxnmenc.ante>> t

')

All secondary'ontainment penetrations requi u re d to t be closed duuring accident conditions are either'.

1 Capable of being closed by an operablee secon se d aryy containmentnment automatic isolation system, or 2, C3.osed by at least one secondary contain a nment automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.

2~ Reactor zone secondary containment integrity means the unit reactor building is intact and the following conditions re met:

. a) At least one door betveen any open-'ng co the turbine building, control bay and out-of-doors is closed. W ~ 0 b) The standb y g as teat ment system is operable nd can maintain 0.25 inches eater negative pressure on the unit zone. r c) All the unit reactor building ventilation system penet penetrations required t'm to be closed during accident conditions are either:

-, 1. Capable of being closed by an operable reactor building ventilation system automatic isolation system, ox

2. Closed by at least one reactor building ventilation ion ssys t em automatic issolation valve deactivated in 'the. isolated position.

Zf it is desirable for operationa'onsiderations, a reactor zone mav be isolated rom the other reactor zones,:and tne refuel zone by maiptaining at'3.east one closed door in eacn cor.=..on passages y bet~can "ones. ~ Reactor 'zone

. safety related features are not co-...promised by openings between adjacent units or refuel one,. unless it is desirec to isolate a driven zone

  • To e 'ectively control zone isolation, all accesses to t". e

>>ill be 3.ocked uar e to p.event uncontrolled passage to the unaff u Larzecte d zcneso 4A

3. Refuel zone secondary containment integrity neans the refuel e uc zone is intact and 'the following'conditions are met:

a) At least one door in each access opening to the cut-of-.doors is closed b) The stand&y gas treatment system

~ater negative pressure on the is refuel operable and Can"rr'ain n maxntaxn'25

. a inches zone.

c) All the refuel zone ventilation system penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable'of being closed by an operable refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation system, or
2. Closed by at least'ne refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.

it If is desirable for operatioaal considerations, the refuel zone nay be isolated fro h s y maintaining all hatches in place between refuel floor and reactor zones and at le st one c1.osed door in iz eac e h access bemeen the re C uel zone and the re cror bu'ilding."-

0 r e uel zone safety related features are not co-.. ro...ised b o enin s bet~

he ."eactor b 'ld' 1 't is d es're i '" d to isolate a given .zone.

.o

'P e pc ectively control zone isolatio. all a. acce ses to the affected zone

'e oc e or guarded to prevent .uncontrolled passage to the unaffected 4B

ENCLOSURE 2 DESCRIPTION, JUSTIFICATION, AND SAFETY ANALYSIS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS ls 2o AND 3 (TVA BFNP TS 210)

DESCRIPTION The amendment would expand-.the technical specification definitions to state that secondary containment integrity exists when a valve in a ventilation system penetration is deactivated in the isolated position.

JUSTIFICATION The present technical specification for secondary containment will not permit maintenance on an automatic isolation valve when secondary containment is to be maintained. This presents a potential safety concern in that it could severely limit the plant's ability .to perform maintenance on secondary containment automatic isolation valves when it is necessary. This provides the possibility of having the isolation system in a degraded condition for the;-;

period of time needed to achieve primary containment integrity as required by the present technical specifications. During refueling operations the time to achieve primary containment integrity would be long and the risks involved in doing so would be much greater than performing the needed maintenance with the penetration already isolated by another valve in the line.

SAFETY ANALYSIS Secondary containment ventilation system isolation dampers are normally open isolation valves which close to prevent a radiological release from the secondary containment to the environs. Each reactor building and refuel zone ventilation penetration has two such dampers in series. If one damper must, be made inoperable (for example, to perform maintenance), deactivating the other damper in the isolated position will ensur'e that the secondary containment function will be fulfilled'for that penetration. Hence there is no reduction in the margin to safety as described in the FSAR. The proposed definition of secondary containment integrity is consistent with BWR Standard Technical Specifications.

ENCLOSURE 3 DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TVA BFNP TS 210)

DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT RE VEST The amendment would expand the technical specification definitions to state that secondary containment integrity exists when a valve in a ventilation system penetration is deactivated in the isolated position.

BASIS FOR PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The Commission has provided guidance for the application of criteria for no significant hazards consideration determination by providing examples of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations (48 FR 14870). These examples include: "(vi) A change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan (SRP): For example, a change resulting from the application of a small refinement of a previously-used calculational model or design method."

The proposed amendment is encompassed by this example in that the revision reflects the requirements established in the Standard Technical Specifications under the definition 1.30 Secondary Containment Integrity (NUREG-0123, Revision 3). Therefore, TVA proposes to determine that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.