ML18029A617
| ML18029A617 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1985 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18029A616 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507020505 | |
| Download: ML18029A617 (12) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (TVA BFNP TS 210) 8507020505 850626 PDR ADOCK 05000259 PDR
PROPOSED CHANGES UNIT 1
r
?.
Scconda Containment Incezritv 1.
Secondary containmenc integrity means chat the reactor
"-k~ building is inta'ct and the following conditions are met:
a)
At least one door in each access opening to the tu"bio b
'1'd control bay and out-of-doors is closed.
ur ine uil'ding, '
b)
The standbv.gas treatment svstem is operabl vacep negacive oressuie in venose area~eV e
and can maintain 0.2g inches oi is..s aceo.co exisc.
~
wnere seconaary conte>n>enc es.o.
'c Mcegricg c) All secondary containment penetratxons requir d t accident conditions are either:
uire to e closed durin usr t
uring Capable of being closed by an operable seco d
y automatic isolation system, or con ary containment 2.
Closed by at least one secondary containment valve deactivated in the isolated position.
nment automatic isolation 2.
Reactor zone secondary containment integrity means the unit reactor building is intact and the following conditions are mec:
. a)
Ac least one door between any open-'ng co cbe curbine bui1ding, contro1 bay and ouc-of-doors is closed.
b)
The standby gas teatment system is operable'and can maintain 0.25 inches water negative pressure on the unit zone, c)
All the unit reactor building ventilation system penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
I.
Capable of being closed by an operable reactor building ventilation system automatic isolation system, or 2.
Closed by at least one reactor building ventilation system automatic isolation valve deactivated in 'the isolated position.
Xf it is oesirable for operational considerations, a reactor zone mav be isolated from tne other reactor zones'and che refuel zone by maincai.ning at'east one closed door in eacn
- cor,
...on passageway between zones. ~ Reactor zone safety related features are not co;.,promisea by openings between adjacent units or re uel one,. unless it is des'rec co isolate a given zone.
~ To ef ectively control zone isolacio~, all access'wl 1 be 3.ocked or guarded to p-.event uncoacroll d
cesses co the affected zone zcneso ro e
passage to the unaffected
3.
Refuel zone secondary containment integrity neans the ref 1
ue zone xs intact
~
~
,<<and 'the following'zonditions are met:
a) At least one door in each access opening to the cut of-doors is c'osed b)
C
) one standby gas trearm nt, system is operable and dan'maintain
.2S inches
~ster negative pressure on the refuel zone.
c)
All the refuel zone ventilation system penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1.
Capable of being closed by an operable refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation system, or 2.
Closed by at least'ne refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.
If it is desirable for operatio~al considerations, the refuel zone m y be isolated from the reactor zones by maintaining all hatches in place between refuel floor and reactor zones and at least'ne closed door in each access between the refuel zone and the re ctor bu'ild'ng.-'
Refuel, zone the reactor o e ective'ly
~ill be locked zones
~
safety related features are not co;. ro...ised b-ope i ui ing unless it is des'red to isolate a given zone.
control zone isolatiog, all accesses to the affected zone or guarded to prevent uncontrolled passage to the unaffected 4B
PROPOSED CHANGES UNIT 2
7.
Seconda Containment Tntezritv 1.
Secondary containment integrity means that the reactor building is intact and the following conditions are met:
~
0 a)
At least one door in each access opening to the t -b:
control bay and out-of-doors is closed.
gi tur ine buildin b)
The standbv.gas treatment svstem is operable and can 5
h n
oary conraznment.~tegritj c) All secondary containment penetrations required to be close accident conditions are either:
require to be closed during Capable of being closed by an operable se'condar containm automatic isolation system, or 2.
Closed by at least one secondary contai valve deactivated in the isolated position.
n a nment automatic isolation
~
~
1 Reactor zone secondary containment integrity means the unit reactor building is intact and the following conditions re met.
. a)
At least one door between any. opening to the turbine building, control bay and out-of-doors is closed.
~~ ~
b)
The standb as t y g eatment system is operable'd can maintain 0.25 inches water negative pressure on the unit zone.
~ ~
c)
All the unit reactor building ventilation system pe et t' penetratxons required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
I Capable of being closed by an operable reactor b
ld'r uz.
zng vents.sation
~
~
~
system automatic isolation system, or 2.
Closed by at least one reactor building ventilation system automatic solation valve deactivated in 'the isolated position.
Xf it is desirable for operationa'onsideracions, z reactor zone mav be isolated from the other reactor zones hnd the refuel zone by maistaf. '
~ ann'no at 'east one closed door in each cor.
...on passage~ay between zones. ~ Reac"or zone eac.or
~one
~ safety related features are not co"...promised by openings between adjacent units or re uel one,. unless it is des'rec to isolate a given zone 1
g
~o e ectively control zone isol tio~, all acce ses to
'>>wll b lod d
d d guar e
to p-.event uncontrolled p ssage to the unaffected
3.
Refuel zone seconda"y containment integrity neans the refuel zzone is intact and the following condition are met:
Refuel zone the reactor
~ :o e.=ectively
<<"'ll be locked "c dies ~
safety related features are not co" "o...ised b
...'se y openings between building unless it is desired to isol-
'so ate a given zone.
or u
control zone isol tiog, all accesses to the ff d "
o e a ected zone guarded to p-.event. uncontrolled passage t
h o t e una fected a) At least one door in each access opening to the cut-of-doors is closed Z
~ \\
J b} ~ne standby gas treatm nt system is operable and (an"maintain
.25 inches
<<ster negative pressure on the refuel zone.
c} All the refuel zone ventilation system penetrations required,,to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1.
Capable of being closed by an. operable refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation system, or 2.
Closed by at least'ne refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.
lf it is desirable for operatio~al considerations, the refuel zone nay be isolated from the reactor zones by maintaining a11 hatches in place between refuel,floor and reactor zones and at least one closed door in each access between the refuel zone and the re cror bu'ilding.<<'
PROPOSED CHANGES UNIT 3
y7~
P.
Seconda Containment Intezritv l.
Secondary containment integrity means that. the reactor
- .~~.building is intac't and the following conditions are met
a)
At 3.east one door in each access opening to the tu-b-'ontrol bay and out-of-doors is closed e
ur -ne
- uilding,
~
~
b)
The standbv.gas treatment svstem is operable and can
<ate~ ne~qi e aressuie i L'those are-s unere secona h
noary contaxnmenc.ante>> t
')
All secondary'ontainment penetrations requi d t b
accident conditions are either'.
u re to e closed du u
t uring 1
Capable of being closed by an operable se d
y nment e secon ary containment automatic isolation system, or 2,
C3.osed by at least one secondary contain valve deactivated in the isolated position.
a nment automatic isolation 2 ~
Reactor zone secondary containment integrity means the unit reactor building is intact and the following conditions re met:
. a)
At least one door betveen any open-'ng co the turbine building, control bay and out-of-doors is closed.
~ W 0
b)
The standb as teat y g ment system is operable nd can maintain 0.25 inches eater negative pressure on the unit zone.
r c)
All the unit reactor building ventilation system penet t'm penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
-, 1.
Capable of being closed by an operable reactor building ventilation system automatic isolation system, ox 2.
Closed by at least one reactor building ventilation s t
is ion sys em automatic solation valve deactivated in 'the. isolated position.
Zf it is desirable for operationa'onsiderations, a reactor zone mav be isolated rom the other reactor zones,:and tne refuel zone by maiptaining at'3.east one closed door in eacn cor.=..on passages y bet~can "ones. ~ Reactor
'zone
. safety related features are not co-...promised by openings between adjacent units or refuel one,. unless it is desirec to isolate a driven zone
- To e 'ectively
>>ill be 3.ocked zcneso control zone isolation, all accesses to t". e uar e
to p.event uncontrolled passage to the unaff d
u Larzecte 4A
3.
Refuel zone secondary containment integrity neans the refuel e uc zone is intact and 'the following'conditions are met:
a) At least one door in each access opening to the cut-of-.doors is closed b) The stand&y gas treatment system is operable and Can"rr'ain '25 n maxntaxn a inches
~ater negative pressure on the refuel zone.
c)
All the refuel zone ventilation system penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1.
Capable'of being closed by an operable refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation system, or 2.
Closed by at least'ne refuel zone ventilation system automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.
If it is desirable for operatioaal considerations, the refuel zone nay be isolated fro h
s y maintaining all hatches in place between refuel floor and reactor zones and at le st one c1.osed door iz e h
C in eac access bemeen the re uel zone and the re cror bu'ilding."-
0 r e uel zone safety related features are not co-.. ro...ised b
o enin s bet~
he."eactor b 'ld' 1
't i d '" d is es're to isolate a given.zone.
'P pc
.o e
ectively control zone isolatio.
all a.
acce ses to the affected zone
'e oc e
or guarded to prevent.uncontrolled passage to the unaffected 4B
ENCLOSURE 2 DESCRIPTION, JUSTIFICATION, AND SAFETY ANALYSIS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS ls 2o AND 3 (TVA BFNP TS 210)
DESCRIPTION The amendment would expand-.the technical specification definitions to state that secondary containment integrity exists when a valve in a ventilation system penetration is deactivated in the isolated position.
JUSTIFICATION The present technical specification for secondary containment will not permit maintenance on an automatic isolation valve when secondary containment is to be maintained.
This presents a potential safety concern in that it could severely limit the plant's ability.to perform maintenance on secondary containment automatic isolation valves when it is necessary.
This provides the possibility of having the isolation system in a degraded condition for the;-;
period of time needed to achieve primary containment integrity as required by the present technical specifications.
During refueling operations the time to achieve primary containment integrity would be long and the risks involved in doing so would be much greater than performing the needed maintenance with the penetration already isolated by another valve in the line.
SAFETY ANALYSIS Secondary containment ventilation system isolation dampers are normally open isolation valves which close to prevent a radiological release from the secondary containment to the environs.
Each reactor building and refuel zone ventilation penetration has two such dampers in series.
If one damper must, be made inoperable (for example, to perform maintenance),
deactivating the other damper in the isolated position will ensur'e that the secondary containment function will be fulfilled'for that penetration.
Hence there is no reduction in the margin to safety as described in the FSAR.
The proposed definition of secondary containment integrity is consistent with BWR Standard Technical Specifications.
ENCLOSURE 3
DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TVA BFNP TS 210)
DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT RE VEST The amendment would expand the technical specification definitions to state that secondary containment integrity exists when a valve in a ventilation system penetration is deactivated in the isolated position.
BASIS FOR PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The Commission has provided guidance for the application of criteria for no significant hazards consideration determination by providing examples of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations (48 FR 14870).
These examples include: "(vi) A change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan (SRP):
For example, a change resulting from the application of a small refinement of a previously-used calculational model or design method."
The proposed amendment is encompassed by this example in that the revision reflects the requirements established in the Standard Technical Specifications under the definition 1.30 Secondary Containment Integrity (NUREG-0123, Revision 3).
Therefore, TVA proposes to determine that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.