ML18029A236
| ML18029A236 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1984 |
| From: | Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18029A237 | List: |
| References | |
| DPR-33-A-114, DPR-52-A-108, DPR-68-A-082 NUDOCS 8411060304 | |
| Download: ML18029A236 (74) | |
Text
UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlSSION IlVASHINGTON,D. C. 20555 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-259 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.
114 License No.
DPR-33 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
{the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated April 30,
- 1982, as supplemented by letter dated June 10, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in~conformity with the appI ication, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, antt (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-33 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B,
as revised through Amendment No.
114, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
84ii060304 8410ih PDR ADOCK 05000259 P
- PDR,
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/'l~
Domenic B. Vassal lo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch P2 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
October 16,: 1984
, ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.
114 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-33 DOCKET NO. 50-259 Revise Appendix A as follows:
1.
Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages.
56 61 64 66 71 88 97 110 147 272 302 3/3 304 310 2.
Add new page 303A Revise Appendix B as follows:
1.
Remove the following page and replace with identical'ly numbered page.
42 The marginal lines on these pages denote the area being changed.
O CO CJl Minimum No.
Instrpment Channels Operable 1)(
TAMIL"= 3.2.A (Contin ed)
Tr n Le:ei Set" inp
~ Action (1)
Remarks 2 (12)
Instr~.en-Char.nel Main Stee" Line Tumbrel High.empe ature
<200 F l.
Above trip setting initiates Main Steam Line'Isolation 2 (14)
Instrument Channel-Reactor Mater Cleanup Sys-em Floor Dr in iiigh Te:nuerature, Instrument Channel-Rcactor Mater Clearup.
System-Space HiGh Temperature 160 180oF 160 - 180oF l.
Above trip setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Mater Cleanup Line f'rom Reactor and Reactor Mater Return Lire.
1.
Same as above Instrument Channel-Reac.or Building Venti-lation High Radiation Reactor Zone
< 100 mr/hoor downscale G
l.
1 upscale or 2 downscale vill a.
Initiate SGTS b.
Isolate reactor zone and refuleing floor.
c.
Close atr osphere control system.
Instrument Channel Reactor B'
- ding Ie."ltd lation HigR Radiat'on Refuleing Zone
< 109 mr/hr or dovnscale F
1.
1 upscale or 2 downscale vill a.
Initiate SGTS.
b.
Isolate refue'ing floor.
c.
Close atmosphere control system.
2 (7)(8)
Heaters Instrument Channel SGi'S Flov - Train B
Hea ers.
2 (7)(8) Instrument Channel SGTS Flow - Train C
Heaters 2 (7) (8) 'nstrument Channel SGTS Flow - Tra=n A
Charcoal Hea ers< 2000
. cfm R.
H. ife ters< 2000
'cfm H ar.d (A or F)
Charcoal Heaters<
2000 H and cfm R.H. Heat :s < 20CO (A or F) cW Charcoal Heaters<
2000 cf". H and R.H. Heaters<
2COO cfm (A or F) 1.
Below 2000 cfm, trip setting heaters vill turn on.
2.
Below 2000 cAn, trip setting heaters vill shut off.
1.
Belov 2000 cfm, trip scttirg heaters vill turn on.
2'.
Below 2000 cfm, trip -setting heaters vil'hut off.
l.
Below 2000 cfog, trip.setting heat'ers will turn on..
2.
Below 2000 cAn, trip setting heaters will shut off.
charcoal R., H.
charcoal R.H.
charcoal R.H.
6.
Channel shared by RPS and Primary Containment 6 Reactor Vessel Esolation Contro1 System.
A channel failure may be a
channel fa'lure in each system.
7.
A train is considered a trip system.
8.
Two out of three SCTS trains required.
A failure of more than one will require action A and F.
-9.
There is only one trip system with auro transfer to two power sources.
10.
Refer to Table 3.7.A and its notes for a listing of isol'ation Valve
-G"..oups and their initiating signals.
ll.
A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to Eour hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the t="pped condition provided at least one OP~HLE channel in the some trip system is monitoring that parameter.
12.
A channel contains four sensors, all of ~hich must be operable for the channel to be onerable.
2ower opera"'ons pe.Usted ior up re=perarure 'P tones operaole.
rt'o 30 days -ith 15 oi the '6 ln the event that normal ventilation is unavailable in the main steam line tunnel, the high temperature~hannels may be bypassed for a period of not to exceed four hours.
During periods when normal ventilation js not available, such as during the performance of secondary containment leak rate tests, the control room indicators of the affected space temperatures shall be monitored for indications of small steam leaks.
En the event of rapid increases in temperature (indicative of steam line break),
the operator shall promptly close the main steam line isolation valves.
13.
The nominal setpoints for alarm and reactor tr'p (1.5 and s.0 t mcs background, respectively) are established oased on the nor.al oock-round ar. full po~er.
The allowable setpoints for alarm and reactor trip are 1.2-3..8 'and 2.4-3.6 times background, resp'ectively.
14.
Requires two independent channels from each physical location, there are two locations.
61
I r
cs TAbLF. 3.2.0 (Cont InueC)
'lln ta n I4.
Operanle Per S~sl )
Funct lon instrument Chsooel Reactor I.nv Pressure (PS-68-9 3 t 9C, SM ll) 100 pelg
+
1S Real~ rks Below trip setting in con)unction Mith contsi>scient isolation signal and both suction valves open Mill. close 3)ik (LPCl) ad(>> is s ion va 1 ve a.
Core Sprz.r Auto Sequencing 6< t
< 8 seep.
Tine rs (5)
I.PCl Auto Sequencing T lairs (5) 0< t <1 eec.
IU+S>>1, 83, Cl, snd 03 13
< t <15 sec.
Tluers b
I.
filth diesel poucr 2 ~
(hse p>> r eotof Mith diesel paver 2.
(n~ ~ per eetor
]
I/1th diesel pover One per puap Core Spray and LPCl Auto SequencInz Tleeri (6) 0< t <1 sec.
6<t<8 aec.
12
< t < 16 sec.
18 t < er, *ec.
l.
I/lth nnraal poMer 2.
One per CSS motor 3.
TMo per R)IR >rotor RIIRSM Al, b3, C]
y and 0 3 Tl <Der s 21< t < 29 sec.
l.
41th no~1 pouer 2.
Cne pcr puap
.ABLE ).2.b (Continued)
.ifnlQUD ~o Operab1e Per Y~rl
~S
~
( I 3 Function Core Spray Trip System bus pover oonftor Trfo Level Sectfn H/A ACCI0A Recarks Konftora availability of pover co logic aystens.
ASS Trip System bus pover monitor H/A 1.
fonftora availability of pover to logic systens and valves.
ffPC1 Trf9 System bua pouer nonft-r H/A 1.
Honit'ors avaflabil ity of pover to logic systems.
RC1C Trip Sys t ea bus pove r nonftor H/A 1.
Monitors availability oi pover to logic systeas.
eTa Os l(2) iostruoent Channel Condensate lleader I.OW Level (LS-73-5SA A. B)
Elev.551'-
1.
BeloM trip sett'ag Wll open Es'uction vaLves to the suppression chamber.
l(2)
Instruaent Channel Suppression Chaaber High Leve)
< 7" above instrument zero A
1.
Above trip setting uill open HPCI auction valves to the suppression chaober.
2(2)
Instru"en:
Channel Reactor Hfgh Mater Level
< 583" above vessel zero.
l.
Above trio setting trips R:1C turb folic.
fnstrvaent Channel RCIC Turbine Stean Line High Flov c I50" H 0 (7) 1.
Above trfp setting isolates R
1C systet and trips RClC turbine.
NOTES FAR TAbLE 3. 2. 8 an CSCS System io required by section 3.5 to b>> op>>rable, Mh en >> v>>r any Ch>>ro shall be Cwa oporabla trip ayotcmo except ao o
re uiraa>>nc o
c o
rs co h fi t "oluan is reduced by onc, the indicated 1
b k
If tho soma function is inop>>rable in wro action shall bo Ca en.
chan one trip system or e
th first column reduced by ~re than one, action B shall be takaa.
Action:'.
Repair in 4
ours.
2 h
If th function ia not oporablc in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, e
take action B.
5.
beclare the system ot ccmponont inoperable.
C.
Israediately take action 8 until power ia verified on the trip syotear.
D.
Ho action required, indicators ara consider'd redundant.
2 ~
In only one trip aye tea.
3.
Hot considered in a trip system.
5.
6.
7 ~
Requires one channel free each physical location (there are 4 loca-tions) in the steam line space.
,P-Mi,th diesel power, each M)RS pump ia scheduled to start immediately and aach CSS pump ia sequenced to start about 7 sac later.
Mith normal power, one CSS and ono RHRS pump ia scheduled to start instantaneous y, one l
one CSS and one RHRS pump is ooquonccd to start after about 7 acc with similar pumps starting after about aec an 21 sec, ac which Citae tho full complement of CSS and RES pumps would be op>>racine.
The RCIC and HPCX steam line high flow trip Xevel settings're ivan in terms of difierential pressure.
The HCICS setting of 450" of water corresponds to at least 150% above maximum steady state steam flow to assure that spurious isolation does not occur while ensuring the initiation of isolation following a postulated steam line break.
Similarly, the HPCIS setting of 90 psi corresponds to at least l50% above maximum steady state flow while also ensuring the initiarion of isolation
.following a postulated break.
Note l does not apply to this item.
The head tank is designed to asau"e that the discharge piping from the CS and RHR pumps are ful.3..
The press e shall be maintained at or above the values l'sted in 3.$.H, vhich ensures vote." in the discharge piping end up to the head tank.
71 A)))5ndment Ho.
', '1'1'4
O TABLE I 2
A SURVEIILAHCE REQOIREKEHTS POR PRIHART COKFAIHNEHT AHO REACToR BUILOIHG ISOLATIOH IHSTROXEMTATIOH tunction Group 6 Logic croup B (Initzating) Logic Reactor Bui lding Isolar ion (re fue1 ing floor) Logic Reictor Building Isolation (reactor zone)
Logic SGTS Train A LOqiC SGTS Train B Logic SGTS Train C Logic static Pressure Control co (refuel ing floor) Logic Static Pressure Control (reactor xone)
Logic Functional Test once/o pe rat inq cycle (1B)
Checked during channel functional test.
Ho further test required.
once/6
>months (1B) once/6 nonths (18) once/6 sanths (19) once/6 months (19) once/6 aonths (19) once/oper itlng cycl e
( I6) once/operitinq cycle (1B)
Calibration fr uenc H/A (6)
(6)
H/A (6)
(6)
Inst'nt Check H/A H/A H/A H/A Instrument Channel Reactor Cleanup Systems t)oor Drain 1(igh Tenperature Ins't run ent Channel Reactor Cleanup Syetea Space Bigh Temperature (1):
once/qperating cycle once/operating cycle'/A
TAbLE 4.l.b
((.on< nued),
Fun=.t ion
'FnnctionaI Test Calibre t los Znctrmaent Duck Instant Channel wector La@ tressure (FS-48-93 L N) once/5 months Core Spr~y Auto Sequencing Tiaars (Keraaal tearer) once/ cpere ting cycle Cora Spray Auto Sequencing TLaars Qissal.
I'sorer) oaca jo~rating cycle nona QCI Auto Sequeocing (Lo~ 1'~~r)
M-"f Auto ~~quanckng Qhaaal Polar)
Tiaers Tkaars (4)
I (i) eeLce/cora tiring cycle ckLcajopcrn tLQ, 4/cia Al, gQ Cl, b3 Tierra (6~1 P~r) erne/~orating c'.yc'e Al, lf.$ Cl, D3 Thaara Ctfoosl V~r) ca-a/~orating cycle heal Thea<
HOTES POX TASLES 4.2.A THROUCn 4.2.H Continued 14, Uprcal ~ trip L>> tunct}onally tested during tuncclonal tert t!ss ss required by reccion 4.7.b.l.a and 4.7.C.l.c.
15.
The flou bias coopararor vill b ~ tented by putting one tlov uait
'Ln "Teat" (producing 1/
scram) and ad)use Log the tc ~ ( input to obtain cooperator rod block.
Thc tlov bi ~ ~ upscale vill be veriti.ed by observing a locaL upscale trip 1Lght during opcrccion and ver: tL ~ d thac it vill produce a rod bloc'k during thc operating cycle.
1&.
?sr{or>>scd during op<<racing cycle.
Portiono ot the logic Lr chad%ed
~ere frequencly during tun'ctional tcsca of the tunct'ons that produce a rod block.
17, Thia calibration tonal ~ ta ot recoving tho function trou
~ crvicc and pcrfor>>cing an electronic ealibracion ot chc channel.
18.
Functional te ~ c La linitcd to thc condition vhcre
~ scondary containmcnt Lntegr Lty Ls not requl red as ape<<it lcd in sections 3.7.C
~ 2 and 7.7.C.).
79.
yunctional teat is 1L>>sited to thc time uherc the SCTS Lr required to
.sect thc require~ence ot section 4.7.C. l. a.
1 20, Calibrat Lon ot the co>>epsrator require ~ thc inputs from both recLrculation loops to be interrupted, thereby removing thc tlou bLas
~ ignal to ths APRN and RLL'L aid scramming~he reactor.
This calibration can eely be r
pertor>>red duri
>g an outage..
21.
Logic telic ia limited to the time vhcre actual operation ot thc equitant pcrlc'Les Lb 1 ~ ~
4 22, One channel ot either the reactor zone ur retucl in'ona Reactor buL.idiot
, Ventilation Radiation Honi~ring System lcay be adninircratively bypas ~ sd tor a period not to exceed:'ours tor functional testing and calibrstiaa
~
23.
Deleted 24 ~
This instrumenc check consists of comparing rhe ther>>zocouple readings tor all valves for consisccnce.
and for nominal expected values (not required during refueling outages)
~
During each refueling outaR<<, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibrated.
This calibration includes verification of accelerometer response due to mechanical cxcitacLon in the vicinity of the sensor.
26.
This inscrunenc check consists ot comparing th<<backRround signal lave's tnr all valves for consiscency and for nominal expected values (not required dutinjt refueling outapes).
110 Amendment No.
1 2, 114 E
r
Il Z 1!Id ~
C!HHS tT 1 OH'c YSIH <n'YlthTlnH SURVV.lU.AACt.'k'l Ill(h!n:HTS
>. S.a nnn Id PI II~
c P.
- 's'
.c.
~AIIPS)
ILPCI nnd Conc ~ Innnnc Coo 1 in)t)
- 4. If'ny 0 RHR preps (LPCI mode) become inoperable, th reac t,or shall be placed in the cold
~
shutdovn condition Mithln 2fo il0LZ'S ~
4PSob Zte>>idudsl Hc>>t R movddl S>>tcdc
~clccs Ccpcc nnd concocn nnc Cooling) 4.
No additional surveillance required.
5.
1 f one RHR pusP>>
(con ta innn rcrnt COOl in'. c <de)
O" aa not lated hent exthanxez ia inc potable, the reactor ssay remain in operation for a period not ta exceed
)0 days prnv(dscd thc revainlng P)ib puops
{ennea inn nt cooling mode) and aaao-ciatcd heat exchangcra snd d'.eae l psnera:nrs
>>nd all acccas paths uf the RHRS (containment cooling ssode)*
are operable.
5.
bunsen it t>> dot roioed that one
".nhR puap (cuntainmenc coollnR csode) or asaoc(aced heat exchanger io inopszablc nt o
t lese uhen operability io re-
- quired, t)se remalnin!t RHR puxpa (containment coolinb node).
the aosoci ~ t"d heat cxchang-z s
ard dleael generators, and all active cossponenta
'n the accedes path ~ o,'he lVBS (contslnm nc coisling rode) shall bc o)e.nr; atra ted to be ope rabl s ir scd la tel y and sdaec.ly'here
~.'rcr a>>nil t'e inopersblc RHR puop (cont>>(nment coolint wdc) and aaaoc.'aced hest cxchan7,er ic returned to normal aer iicen 6.
tf tMo RHR rumps (Contatnaant cool inx mode) or assoc iatad hest cxchhnaezs arc inopats blc, the reoctc ~ r say remain In opcrst ton f ~ z
~
pp riod not to exceed 7 days pro-cdided thc ran~! n'na RHR punps (conts indsent cool inl csodc) s associated heat exchangers, diesel generators, and all access paths of the )!9>h (containment cooling mode) 6, tnhen it ia deterscsined thdst RH t puopa (Cont a Lncsent Cool!nS tode) or ad)ociat d heat etc..angd:r a
ar: inoperzblc st s
inc Adhcn operability is required, Lhc RHR pAespa (csntsindscnc cooling uodc),
the associsted heat exchanS rso di<<~el Ssneratorss and w'.I set(de cc"--
ponencs in the access'acha of tha RNRS (concalmenc coolin-147 Amendment No.,
114
opening.
If the check and green o! check light circuIt alone Ls inoperable, the valve shall be considered inopcroblc for full closure, If the red and check light circuits are inoperable thc valve shall be considered inopera-ble and open greater than 3
Por a light circuit to be considered operable the light must go on and off in proper sequence during the opening-c1osing cycle. Ifnone of thc lighcs change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unleso the check light stays on and the red light stays off Ln which case the valve shall be considered inopera-ble for openings The twelve dryvel.l vacuum breaker valves vhich connect the suppression chamber and dryvcll arc sized on the basis of the Bodcga pressure auppreo' sion system testo.
Ten operable to open vacuum breaker valves (18-inch) selected on this tcsc basis and confirmed by the green lights are adequate to limit cha preooure differential bctveen the suppression chamber and dry-vell during poet-accident drywall cooling operaciono to a value which is vithin ouppressLon system design values.
The containment design has been examined to determine that a leakage equi-valent to one dryvell vacuum breaker opened co no more'han a nominal 3's confirmed by the rcd light is acceptable.
On chio basLs light circuit c ircu It alone on one valve, on tvo valves an indefinite allovoble repair time for an inoperable red on any valve or on Lnopcrable check and green or check light or a malfunctLongf -thc operator or disc (Lf nearly closed) or on inoperable green and rcd or green light circuit-alone is )ustified, During each operating cycle, a leak rotc test shall be performed to verify that significanc leakage flow pacha do not exist between the dryveL and suppress'ion chamber.
The drywall pressure vill be increased by at laaot 1 psi vt,th respect to the'uppression chamber pressure and held constant.
Thc 2 poig oet point will not be exceeded.
The subsequent suppression chamber prcssure transient (if ony) vill be monitored vith a sensitive pres" sure gouge.
lf the dryvell prcsoure cannot be increased by 1 psi over the suppression chcmber prcssure Lt vould be because a significant leakage path existo; in this event the leakage source will be identified and eliminated before pover operation is resumed.
Mich a diffcrcntial prcssure
- o. greater chan 1 psig, the rate of change of che suppression chamber pressure must not execu.d 0.38 inches Of water per minute 'as measured over a
10 minute period, which corresponds co abovt 0.14 ib/oec of.containmcnt air.
In the event the rate, of change exceeds this value than the source of leakage will be identified and aliminaced before pover operation is resumed.
The voter Ln the suppression chamber is used for cooling in tha event of an accident L.e., it is noc used for normal operation; therefore, a daiLy check of the temperature and volume is adequate to assure that adequate heat removal capability io present.
272 Amendment No.
114
LIKlTINI.CONI)lTlONS FAR OPERATlON
- 3. 10 CORN Al.TERATlONS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4e 10 CORE ALTERATlONS Applies to the fuel handling and core reactivity limitations.
A 1 icab ilit Applies to the periodic testing of those interlocks and instru-mentation used during refueling and coze alterations.
O~beceive
~Ob ective To ensure that cora reactivity is uithin the capability of the control rods and to prevent criticality during refueling.
To verify the operability of instruraentation and interlocks used in refueling and core alter<<tions.
S acification A.
Rcfualin Interlocks 1.
The reactor mode ovitch shall be locked in the "Refuel" position during core <<iterations and the refuel inR interlocks shall be operable csee+
as specified in 3elO.A.Q and 3. 10.A. j bc loM.
h.
Ref ua 1 in inter locks Prior to any fuel hand-ling Mith the head off the reactor vessel, thc refueling interlocks shall be func tiona1ly tested.
They shall bc tas tcd at Meekly inter-vals thereafter until no longer required.
They shall <<lso be teated fol-lovinp any repair, vork associated Mith the inter-locks.
2.
Pucl shall not bc loaded into the ra<<ctor core unless all control rods are fully insez ted.
.2 No additional survei31nnce required.
302 Amendment Ho.
, 114
UNIT 1
I.!'El'I')NC CChl))T)ONS FOR OPFRAT)Ol)
SURvE)LLAwcE R UTRKHFNTS J. 10.h Refuel)n
)nter)ocks 4.10.A Refuc),in Interlocks 3.
4.
The fuel grapple hoist load snitch shell be set at
< 1,000 lbs.
)f the frame-mounted auxi-liary hoist, thc nmnorall-nounted auxiliary hoist, or thc service 'plstfo~ hoist l o bc used for handlino fuel vith thc head off the reactor vessel, the load lirait svitch on the hoist to be used shall be set at
< 400 lbs.
Haintenance may be performed on a single control rod or control rod drive without removing the fuel in the con-t".ol cell if'he following conditions are met:
3.
No additional surveillance required.
4.
No additional surveillance required.,
Prior to performing control rod or control rod drive maintenance on a control cell without=remov'ng fuel assemblies the surveillance
~ requirements of specification 4.10.A.1 shall be performed and all rods. face adjacent and diagonall.y adjacent to the maintenance rod shall be electrically disarmed per specification 3.10.A.5.b.'.
The requirements of specification 3.10.A.1 arei~et, and b,
All control rods diagonally and face adjacent to the maintenance rod are fully inserted and. have their directional control.valves electrically disarmed.
303 Amendment No.
5, 114
I G CONDITION F R P
- 3. 10.A. 6 4.10.A.6 A maximum of two non-ad)acent control rods may simultaneously be withdrawn from the core for the purpose of performing control rod and/or control rod drive maintenance without removing the fuel from the cells pro-vided the following conditions are satisfied:
Prior to performing control rod or control rod drive maintenance on two control cells simultaneously without removing the fuel from the
- cells, two SRO's shall verify that the requirements of specification 3.10.A.6 are satisfied.
a.
The reactor mode switch shall be locked in the "refuel" position.
The refueling interlock which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn may be bypassed for one of the control rods on which maintenance is being performed.
All other refueling inter-locks shall be operable.
303A Amendment No.
114
I.INIT IN<i Cot<I) I T ION!l YOI< OphlthT lOll
- 3. IO.A He(uelin~lnt erlncko 4.lO.A Re(uel in Interlocks 6.
(Continued) b.
All directional control valves for remaining control rods shall be disarmed electrically except as specified in 3.10.A.7 and sufficient margin to criticality shall be demonstrated.
c.
The two maintenance. cells must be separated by more than two control cells in any direction.
d.
An appropriate number of SRH's are available as defined in specification 3.10.B.
r hny nnmhrr n( con'ol roda mny he uitINIrnun or removed (rom the rcncrnr coro pro-v(dinIt the (ol lou(nil condi-tiono are aatio(icd:
a.
The reactor mode ouitch ia locked in the "ro-(ucl" polit(on.
The rcfualing interlock uhich prcvcnto morc tiuLn one control rod from 7,
lfith the riode ge)ection s.,it h
th<<0(ue>
oi shutdo<a pI0 t
0 more than one control rod may be withdrawn without first removing fuel from the cell except as specified in 4.10.A.6.
Any number of rods may be withdrawn once verified by two licensed operato..s that the fuel has been removed from each cell.
/
Amendment No.
53, 114
/
rnds and the rcf>>cling pint form provlh rei)>>nil tnt mrthoilw of prcvc>>t lng inadvertent criticality even after procedural violations.
Thc inter)ocks on hoists provide yet another ucchod of avoiding inadvertent criticality.
Fuel handling is normally conducted utch che fuel grapple boise.
Thc tocal load on this hoist uhcn the interlock ia required conoiots of the ucLL'.ht of chc fuel grapple and thc fuel assembly.
This total is approxi-mately 1,500
- 1ba, in comparison co thc load-trip occ ting of 1,000 lbs.
Provisions have also been made to nllou fuel handling uith either of thc three a>>xi)iary hoists and still mnlntnin che rcfurling interlocks.
The 400-ib load-trip sorting on these hnincs in adequate co trip the interlock uhcn nne of thc more thnn 600-lb fuel bundles is being handled.
During certain periodo, it io dcsirablo to perform maintenance on cuo control rods and/or control rod dc'ives at thc same cine without removing refuel from the cells.
The maintenance is performed with the mode switch. in the "refuel" position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations.-
In order to with-draw a second contxol rod after withdrawal of the first rod, it is
~ necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn at the same time.
The requirement that an adequate shutdown margin be demon-strated and that all remaining control rods have there directional control valves electrically disarmed ensures that inadvertent cri.ticality
~cannot occur during this maintenance.
The adequacy of the shutdown margin is verified 'by demonstrati+ that at least 0.38% dk shutdown margin is available.
Disarming the 4,xectional control valves.:ddes not inhibit control rod sciam capability.
C Spcclf ication 3.10.A.7 sllous unloading of n significant portion of the renctor core.
This operation is performed uich the cade siicch in the "rcfucl" position to provide chc refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations..~
order co uichdznu morc chan one control rod, it La nrccsnnry to bypass the refueling interlock on cnch uithdraun control rod uhlch prevcncs morc thon one control rod from being uithdraun at n t imc.
Thc requirement chat the fuel assembl Les ln che cell control) cd by chc concrol rod be removed from the reactor conc before chc inccrlock can be bypassed ensures chat. uithdraunl of another control rod does noc result in inadvertent criticality.
Each control rod provides primary reactivity control for the fuel aonemblica in thc cell associated uith chat control rod.
- Thus, rcmovn) of an entire cell (fuc) noscmblics p)us concrol rod) results in a louer reactivity potential of thc core.
The rcquircmcnta for SK.'I operability during these core altcrationa nosurc sufficient core monitoring ~
3IO Amendment No. 114
t t LOCAL MONITORliJG STATIONS BRQV/NS FERR Y NUCLEAR PLWiJT Pi
. 4.2-1 ATH"'AS U.S.
HWY 7'2 r5 8FHP ALA, HWY 20 Legend 0
Air Monitor 0
Air Monitor 5 TLD $ I a t ion TLD S to lion Automatic Nett Sumpter H
0oiry Farm DECATUR Scale 0
l 2
3 Miles
>l RFl,p~
~
0 UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IVASHINGTON,D. C. 20555 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-260 BROl<NS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment, No.
108 License No.
DPR-52 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated April 30,
- 1982, as supplemented by letter dated June 10,
- 1982, compl ies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facil-ity will operate in~conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and thee rules and regulations of the Commission; j
C.
There is reasonable assurance
{i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, arttf. (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulatjons; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
~
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-52 is hereby amended to read as fo'11ows:
{2)
Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B,
as revised through Amendment No.
108, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This 1icense amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
Domenic B. Vassa11o, Chief Operating Reactors Branch P2 Division of Licens ing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technica1 Specifications Date of Issuance:
October 16,'1984
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 108 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
OPR-52 DOCKET NO. 50-260 Revise Appendix A as follows:
1.
Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages.
56 61 64 66 71 88 97 110 147 153 164 R72')2 303 304 310 2.
Add new page 303A Revise Appendix B as follows:
1.
Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages.
The marginal lines on these pages.
denote the area being changed.
!linlmnm Ho.
Instrument Channels Op<
~lable TAMIL". 3.2.A (""'ntirued)
Tria Le:el Settinp Action (1)
Remarks 2 (12)
Ins'.""-e"- C"ar Vain Stee.".. Line ~Jewel High Temperature
< 200oF l.
Above trip setting initiates Mein Ste"~ Line Isolation 2(34)
Instrumer<t Channel Reactor Water. Cleanup Sys;em Floor Lr in leigh 160 1'80oF l.
Above trip setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Water Cleanup Line from Reactor and Reactor Water Return Lire.
Instrument Channel-Reactor Water Clearup Systc.-..
Sp. ce High T:.;ac ra tu re 160 - 180oF
'1.
Same as above
.Instrwncnt Charnel Reactor Bu'ldirg Venti-lat;on High Radia'o::-
Reactor Zone
< 100 mr/hr or.downscale G
l.
1 upscale or 2 dovnscale vill a.
Initiate SGTS b.
Isolate reactor zore and refuleing floor.
c.
Close a mosphere control system.
Instrument Channel -
< 100 ~/hr or dovnscale F
Reactor Bui'riing <lenti-lation High Radiation Refulcing Zone 1.
1 upscale or 2 dovnscale uill a.
Initiate SGTS.
b.
Isolate refue'ing floor.
c.
Close atmosphere control systen.
2 (7)(8) Instrument Channel SOTS Flow - T. a '
A He ters 2 (7)(8) Instrument Channel S<<!'S Flow - Train B
Hea'rs 2 (7)(B) Trstrumert Channel SGTS !'lou - Traii C
Heaters Charcoal Heaters<
2000 H ard cfm R.
H.
He ters< 2000 (A or F) cfm Charcoal Heaters
< 2000 H and cfr. R.H. Heaters<
2000 (A or F) cf Charcoal Heaters<
2000 cfm H end R.H. Heaters<
2CJO cfm (A or F) 1.
Belou 2000 cfm, trip setting heaters uill turn on.
2.
Belou 2000 cfm,.trip setting heaters uill shut off.
1.
Belou 2000 cfn, trip sett irg heaters uill'urn on.
2.
Belov 2000 cfm, trip setting heaters uil'hut off.
1.
below 2000 cA~, trip setting heaters will turn on.
2.
Below 2000 cfm, trip setting heaters< vill shut off.
charcoal R.
H.
charcoal R.
H.'harcoal R.H.
6.
Channel snared by PZS ard Pr~~ Containment
& Reactor Vessel isola ian Cort.ol System.
A channel failure may be a
cnannel failure in e'ach system.
7.
A t-ain is considered a trip system.
8.
Tvo out oi three SCTS rrains required.
A failure of more than one will require action A and P.
9.
There is only one trip system with auto transfer to two power sources'0.
Refer to Table 3.7.A and its notes for a listing of iso)ation Valve Groups and their irZ iating signals.
A cnannel may be placed in an nope-able status for up to four hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the t ipped condition proviaed at least one OPAL"- cnannel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
12.
A channel contains four sensors, all of which must oe operable far the channel to be operable.
over opera"'ans p~ "ted far up to 30 ciays --'
15 a= the 16 t~erature 's-
=ches operable.
Xn the event that normal ventilation is unavailable in the main steam line tunnel, the high temperature channels may be bypassed for a period of not to exceed four hours.
During periods when normal ventilation is not available, such as during the performance of secondary containment leak rate teWs, the control room indicators of
- he affected space temperatures shall be monitored for indications of
>mall steam leaks.
Xn the event of rapid increases in temperature (indicative of steam line break),
the operator shall, promptly close the main steam line isolation valves.
'T3 The nominal setpoints for alarm and reactor t-ip (1.5 and 3.0 times background, respectively) are estaolished based on the na
...al bac.".-
"rau"d a full power.
Tne Mo able setpaints for alam and reactor t='p are 1.2-1.3 and 2.4-3.6 ues background, respectively.
>4.
Requires two independent channels from each p y h sical location, there are two locations.
61 Nmondment Ho...,
1 3,
108
O TABLE 3.2.D (Cantlnu<C)
W'nt..n llr.
Op>> r ab1<
P
~al 1
S~al )
Funct ian instrument Channel Reacto'r Lov Prcssure (i'-66-93 6 9>>,
S'N I1) 100 pofg
+ l5 fte~arks l.
Belov trip setting in con]unction vith cuntsfisaent isolation sfgnsl snd both suction valves open vf1f close RfiR (LPCf) admission valv s.
Core Spray Auto ScquencfnB Tfaers (5).
LPC1 Auto Scquea<<fag Tiara (5) o< t <B secs
~
0< t <1 sec.
h I
l.
df th d 1 cse1 paver 2 e One p>> t'otor 1.
Mfth diesel paver 2.
Cine pcr abator Rfr~SM Al ~
83, Cl, and 53 13
< t <15 scc.
Tioccs tlfth dies<<1 paver 2 ~
Qoc per pvap Core Spray and LPCf Auto Sequencing Tiara (6) 0 < t < 1 sec.
6 < t
<< 8 sec.
12
< t < 16 scc.
16
< t < Q4 sec.
1, 1/1th nnmsl pover 2.
t)ne per CSS iaotor 3.
Tvo per RllR iaotor RDRS> A1, 83, Cl, and D 3 Timers 27 < t < 29 scc.
A 1.
4fth normal pover Cne pcr puzsp
N ~
ABLE ).2.b (Continued)
'Nlnfauo vo.
Operablc Pcr Trip
~S s (I)
Fun cion Trio Level Sect in Aecl n Rcaarks Core Spra) Trip System bus paver oonicor ADS Trip System.bus povcr monitor H/A H/A 1.
Honitora avaflabilfty of paver co logic aystens.
1.
'.lonf tora availability of pouer to logic systens aad valves.
IIPCI Trip Systea bu ~ paver noni t-r H/A C
1.
Ilonfcora availability of poucr co logic syscoaa.
RCIC Trip System bus paver aonlcor H/A C.'.
Monf tora availability oi ?over to logic aysccas.
1(2) last ruocnt Channel Oa Condcnsat>>
Lcvc l (LS-2)-55A L. B)
Kiev.55/'-
1.
Befou trip sectfag Wll open E?
suction valves co the suppress loa chamber.
l(2)
Instruoenc Channel Supprcssfoa Chaabcr llfgh Level
< 7" above instrument zero l.
Above trip setting vill open BPCI auction valves to th>> suppression chaaber.
2(2)
Instruoent Chaanci Reactor High 'Water Level
- I I n s c r un en c Ch zan e 1 RCIC Turbine Stean Line High Flov
< 5S3," above vessel zero.
'c 450" H 0 (7) l.
Above trio setting trips R:IC cur)inc.
l.
Above trfp aet ting Icol aces RCIC sysceL aad trips RCIC turbine.
NOTES FAR TASLE 3. 2. 8 1.
Mhancvar any CSCS S Item ia required by section 3.5 to be aporable, yl cm c
ran ha hall be cuba operable trip nyatema except ao note ed requiz'eaont a
t a rs f
h fi t -alum in reduced by one, cha indicat action shall ba taken.
If the oaaa function is inoperable in maze chan one trip ayscam oz the first column roducad by ~are tLsa ane, action 5 shall be cakaa.
Action:
A Repair in 24 haura.
If the function ia noc opcLrable in 24 haura, take action B.
b.
Declare the system oz component inoperable.
C.
I~diacely take actian B until power ia verified on the czip sya tern.
D.
Ha action zequired, indicstoza are consider d redundant.
3 ~
6.
7.
In only one trip systems.
Not conoidarod in a trip syotom.
Requires one channel from aach physical location {there aza 4 loca-ciana) in cha stean line apace.
Mith diesel paver, each MlRS pump ia scheduled to start immediately and each CSS pump ia sequenced to otarc abouc 7 aac lacer.
Mich normal povez, ona CSS and one RHRS pump ia nchodulcd to start c
canaaualy one CSS and anc RHRS pump in sequenced to ocart after about 7 nec with similar pumpo starting after abauc 1
a 11 sac, ac which tiraa cha Cull complement of CSS and RES pumpa would be aparacina.
The RCIC and HPCI steam line high flow trip level settings'are
'ivan in terms of diffezencial pressure.
The RCTCS setting of 450" of wacez corresponds to at least 150% above maxi~urn steady state steam flow to assure that spurious isolation does not occur awhile ensuring the initiation of isolation following a postulated steam line br<.ak.
Similarly, the ll)'CIS setting of 90 psi corz<<sponds to at least 1S0% above maximum steady state flow while also en<sui lng the initiation of isolation
.following a postulated brook.
Note 1 does not apply to this item.
9 The head tank is designed to asau"e that the di"charge piping f'rom the CS and RHR pumps are fu3.1.
The pressure ah~~
be maintained at or above the va1ues 1'sted in 3.5.H, vhich ensure vate." ln the discharge piping and up to the head tank.
~
~
TABLB a 2
SURVBILLAHCC REQQIRBNBHTS POR PRIHART COYPAIHHEHT ANO RBACTOR BUILOIHC ISDLATIO< IHSTROHBIG'ATIOH Punction Group 6 Logic Croup 8 (Init,sating)
Logic Reactor Bui )ding Isolation (refueling floor) Logic Reactor Bui lding Isolation (reactor zone)
Logic SOTS Train A Logic SCTS Train B Logic SCTS Train C Logic Static Pressure Control co (re fue I ing t 1 oor)
Log ic oo Static Pressure Concrol (reactor xone)
Logic Funct iona1 Test once/operating cycle (1 8)
Checked during channel Iunctional test.
Ho further test required.
once/6 saonths (18) once/6 s ont,hs (18)
't u<:
)PAL())
once/6 sanths (19) once/6 months (19) once/6 oontbs (19) once/oper a't I ng cycle (18) once/operac ing cycle (18) ca I lbra cion pr uenc H/A (6)
(6)
H/A (6)
Instrument Check H/A H/A H/A H/h lnocrunent Channel Reactor Cleanup System tloor Drain High Tenperature ln s trus en t Ch ann e I Reactoc Cleanup Syetaa Space Bigh TesPerature (a)'nce/qperating cycle; '/A once/operating cycle h/A
TABLE 4.2.B {(,ant~rued)
Function.
Instruaent Channel Reactor Lcw Pressure (PS&8-93 4 94)
Functional. Test Calibration once/3 aonths Instrument Check Core Spray Auto Sequencing Tiaers (Normal Power)
(4) once/operating cycle no'ne Core Spray Auto Sequencing Tiaers (Diesel Poorer)
(4) once/operating cycle h
LPCI Auto Sequencing Tiaers (Honaal Pcwer)
LPCI Auto Sequencing Tijaers (Diesel Poser)
(4)
(4) once/operating cycle A4
~
~V@Q once/operating cycle none RHRSM Al, 53, C1 ~ D3 Tiisers
(Ãoraal Pouer) once/operating cycle none RHRSM A1, B3, Cl~ D3 Tijaers (Diesel PoMer)
(4) once/operating cycle ADS Tiaer (4) once/operating cyc1e
I
~ ~
VvOTCS faa TASTES 4. 2. A TNROUCn 4. 7.H Conc Laved) 14, Upscale (rip Lv fun((fonally (es(cd durfng fun((Lanai (cs(
(Ltee as required by sec(fon 4
~ 7.5.l.a and 4.7.C.l.c.
1S, Ths tlov bias coeeparacor vill bs
( as(ed by pu((fng one flov ueft Ln
'sse" (producfng L/2 scrane) and ed)us(Log (he tcs(
Lnpv( (o sb(afn co~para(or rod block.. Tha !lov bL ~ s vpscsl ~ vLll bt vsrfffcd by observing a local upscale trip light dvrfnt opera(ion aad vsr: !Led thac Lt vill produca a rod block dvrfng ths spears(inc cycl ~.
16.
F ~ rforned during opera('ng cyclo.
For(iono of (hs logic fs checked mrs frequently during fun'ctional (esca of the.'unct'ons tha( produce a rod block.
17.
Thi~ cilfbra(fin consfs(s of receving (ho function froo service and parfortaing an clsctronfc calibration of cha channsl.
I I
Functional (ssc Ls lfnf(ad (o (hc conditfon vhcre secondary con(aidan(
integrity Ls no( rcq'uLred as specff Lcd Ln sections
].7.C.2 and ),7.C.].
l9.,yunctfonil (cs(
Ls lftmfcad to (ha (fend vhers the SCTS fs rsquf.ed (o
neet (ha rrqvfret sn(s of ssccfon 4,7.C.1.8.
10.
Cilibracion of (hs con para(or requfrcs the fnputa frovs both recirculicion loops (o be Ln(errup(sd, C+rsby rcravfng (hc flov b La ~ signal to the AFRO ind Rg.'L aid sczaenefnr, Rhc rsac(or.
This calfbra(fon can ooly bs performed during an outage,;
v 21e logic (e ~ c Ls 1'Laf ted to the Cftss vhere iccual opsratfon of Chs aqufm~sn(
fa perelfasfbl ~ ~
22.
One channel of eL(hsr (ha ~ac(cr zone or refueling zone gsac(or gufldLnz Yen(fla(fon Radii(fon Honi(orfng Sys(eo eeay bc adnfnfa(ra(fvely bypassed for a period no( to exceed hours for functional (sating and calfbra(icn.
23.
Deleted 24 ~
This fnstru4sent check consists of conparfng (he (hez-..ocouplc readings for all valves for consistence and for nominal expected values (no(
required during refueling oucages) 2g Uurfng each refueling outsRe, all acoustic monitoring channels shall be calibra(ed.
This cal'bra(ion inc'udes veri'cation of accclerozne(cr response duo to zsachanfcal cxcita('on in (hc vicinity of che sensoz'.
26.
This fnsc".unenc check consists of comparing the backRround signal lave's fnz'll valves for consfscency and for nominal expected values (noc required durfnR refuelfnR outafes).
27.
The funcc.anal test irequencv dec-.eased Co nnreiq months cn reciurc challczzizes (n
r< liti valves pv'r
!Il>III'.t-A7'17, 7trn 4I.K.Q. lb.
Amendment No.
, Q, lpga 108
n ~
h>>>> T }Ho C}l:S>>T>>>>}>>l'<<VSH>>>>}}'}:@AT>>n>>>> Su>>>>yt:tLt.a}>>C>>: }(>>.'( u}>>an}:H'}5 .<<na id ai ii~ h
- ~W'.h,
~ands<< (Lpcl and caniadanaap. Cool in}t) 4, It'ny '2 RHR preps fs~ ~cj become inopcrablc, ta} reactor shall be pieced tc} the cold shu'Jovn cc}ndtticsn a>>S.J6a 2 <<alo<<trS ~ 4~5a}} Rentdu<<<<t }}cat R mvht 5 htt<<d ~llKES (LPCI and Can<<adn ~ i CooLing) 4 Ma additional suxveillancc raquircd. 5. Iy onc RHR puts (contain nrnt cool tnt <dc) o" aa-noc lated heat txchanxer ta inoperablc, the reactor }say rhnatn ln ape!attan (or a period not ts exceed )0 days prnvid<<d} t}(c rec*inin}( R}iR puops (cnntatnctnt coattng.node) and aaao-ctatcd heat exchongtra and d!est l y,!ncrt.nrs and all access paths u( th. RHRS (cont~tnacnt cooling node) art aperablt. 5 ~ Vilen it th ds t Mtsed tha t one ".,HR punp (contain(<<Sent cool tnt node) or r.saoctat d heat exchanger io inapsrablc nt o tint Mhtn aperabtlity ta'e-
- quired, thc re(taintnR RHR pumps (con stnmcnt cooltne nod t),
the associated heat cxchant"rs erd dttael generators, and<<, nll active canpontnts 'n tht access path ~ oas the iUBS (concatnment co(}ling rode) shall ba <<lcnnp.- otrattd ta bt apcrablt tr=srdtatcly anil ute'd;ly therea'ter un.tl the inaptrsble RHR pump (contatnmtnt coaltnt <de) and ds ~ aoc.'at!d heat rxchhnptr ie returned to norr <<(1 arrvtcca 6. l l tvo RH}>> rut<<ps (Contatnmant Coo) tnt PP<<ode) or aaaoCtatad hcs. exchhn}>>t!s art tnopars-b lc, thc eeoc tiir ~ay rona in ln opcrst tun ("r a pi rtod not to exceed y I ays p 0 vlded thc rt<<Pa }nina RHR punps (contstn<<cent cooltnt cscsdt) s th associated heat exchangers, diesel generators, and all access paths of the )>>Fl}q (containment cooling mode) 6 ~ N:tn t's 2t t err<<tn d tbds t RHL puopa (contatncsent cool!ng esode) or associat=d beat etc'.-.angora ar: inoperable at a =tnt L hen opcrabtltty is rebutted, the renatn!nR RHR p(cspa (cont~.'nhsicnc cao! th) udsdc), the astoctstcd heat exchangtrs, dicot'snerators, and a'.I act'.vc cc=- pontnt > in the ac<<',cs t pa t}<<~ of tha ttHRS (cancaimant caolin- ~ h ,147 Amendment No. 4, 108
LIHITI!)C CO.')DITIONS IT)R OPERATIOX SURVEILLANCE REQUI~TS
- 3. 5.C (Con'tinued)
Three o! the Dl, D2, Bl. B2 RHRS)f pumps assigned to the RHR heat exchanger supplying, rhe standby Coolant supply connection may be inoperable for a period not to exceed 30 days provided the operable pump is aligned to supply the RHR heat exchanger header and the associated diesel generator and essential control valves are operable. ~ 4.5. C (Continued) 4. Mhen it is deters)ncd ah t three of the RHr~w pumps e<<p-plying standby coolan are inope table a t a t inc vh en operability is required, the opcrablc ERR'map end its asso-ciated diesel Ecnerator and the RHR heat exchanEez header and associated casen-ticl control valves shall bc deoonctrated to be. opetablc ~dlately end every 15 days thereafter. 5. The standby coolant supply capability may be inoperable for a period not to exceed ten days'. gf specifications
- 3. 5;C, 2 through 3.5.C.5 are not met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the unit placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
7. There shall be at 'least 2 RHRSW pumps, associated with the selected RHR pumps, aligned for RHR heat exchanger service for each reactor vessel containing irradiated fuel. 153 .Amendment No. , 108
~ ~ 4 ~
- 3. 5.
BASES Should the capability for prov44iag-flow through the cross-connect lines be lost, a tcn day repair time is allowed before shutdown is required. This repair time is Justified based on the very small probability for ever nrcding ]!HR pump" cnc! heat exchanger" to upply an ad)accnt un',t. REFEHEi!CFS - 1. Residual Heat,Rcaxxva3. System (BFilp FSAR subsection hv8) ?. C<>> e Standby Cnnlinp Systems {BFRP FSAR Section 6) 3. 't. C !I)IH Sc. v!c" !~Inter C "I,.ri ann !Cca]'rcncv t'in:ant C<<c! In ' atcr -.v::tnv (KI! !C:. ) Sho hea a There are two EECM headers (north and south) with four automatic starting RHRSW pumps on each header, A11 components requiring emergency cooling water are fed from both headers thus assuring continuity of operation if either header is operable. Each header alone can handle the flows to all components. Two RHRSW pumps can supply the full flow requirements of all essential EECW loads for any abnormal or postaccident situation. There are four RHR heat exchanger headers (A, B, C, 6 D) with one RHR heat exchanger from each unit on each header. There are two RHRSW pumps on each header; one normally assigned to each header (A2, B2, C2, or D2) and onc on alternate assignment (Al, Bl, Cl, or $1)vc One RHR heat exchanger header can adequately deliver the flow supplied by both RHRSW pumps to any two of the three RHRSW heat exchangers on the header, One RHRSV pump can supply the full flow requirement of one RHR heat exchanger. Two RHR heat exchangers can more than adequately handle the cooling requirements of one. unit in any abnormal or postaccident situation. The RHR Service Mater Systems was designed as a shared system for three units.. The specification, as written, is conservative when consideration is given to particular:pumps being out of service and to possible valving arrangements. If unusual operating conditions arise such that more pumps are out of service than allowed by this specification, a special case request may be made to the NRC to allow continued operation if the actual system cooling requirements can be assured. uld three of the four RHRSM pumps normally cr alternately assigned to the RRR t exchanger headers ..supplying the standby coolant supp'y ronncction become inoperable, capability'or long-term fluid mali:eup to thc unit reacto: and for rooling of tho unit containment remains operable. Because of the availabnlity of makeup and cooling capability which i" demonstrated to be operable,immediately and with spec(fied s>>bscqucnt s>>rveillancc, n 30-d,.y repair pcr ind 7s Justified. Unit 2 may bc supplied sta>>dby:onlant from eithrr of fn>>r pump.;M, K!, Dl, n> D2. Should the capability to provide standby coolant supply be lost, a 10<<day repair time is )ustified based on the low probability for ever needing the standby coolant supply. 164 Amendment No. , 108
i If the check.and green or check light circuf t alone is inopcrnblc, opening. t e c ec an the valve shall bc coneLdcred inopcrablc Eor full closure. check light circuits are inoperable the valve shall be considered inopera-ble and open greater than 3 Por a light circuit to be considered operable the light must go on and off in proper sequence during the opening-closing cycle. Ifnone of the lights change indication during the cycle, the valve shall be considered inoperable and open unless the check light stays on and tho red light stays off in which case the valve ohall bc considered inopera-ble for opening. The twelve drywell vacuum breaker valves which connect the suppression chamber and.drywcll arc aired on the basks of the Bodcga pressure suppres-sion system tests. Ten operable to open vacuum breaker valves (18-inch) selected on this test basis and confirmed by the green lights are adequate to limit thc pressure differential between the suppression chamber and dry-well during poet-accident drywall cooling operations to a value which is within suppression system design values. The containment design has: been examined to determine that a leakage equi-valent to one drywcll vacuum breaker opened to no more'han a nominal 3's conf irmcd by the rcd light is acceptable. On this basis light circuit circuit alone on one valve, on two valves an indefinite allowable repair time for an inoperable rcd o>> any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light or a malfunction of thc operator or disc (if nearly closed) or an inoperable green and rcd or green light circuit alone is )ustified. During each operating cycle, a ieak cata test'shs11 be performed to verify that significant leakage flow paths do not exist between the drywe t. and suppress'ion chamber. The dfywell pressure vill be increased by at least 1 pei with respect to the suppression chamber pressure and held constant. Thc 2 poig set point vill not be exceeded. The.subsequent suppression chamber prcssure transient (if any) will be monitored with a sensitive pres-sure gauge. If the drywell prcssure cannot be increased by 1 psi over the suppression chamber prcssure it would be because a significant leakage path exists; in this event the leakage source will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed. Mith a differential prcosurc
- o. greater than 1 psig, the rate of change of the suppression chamber pressure must not exceed 0.38 inches Of water per minute 'as measured over a
10 minute period, which corresponds to about 0.14 lb/sec of contninmcnt air. In the event the rate of change exceeds this 'alue chen the source of leakage ~ill be identified and oliminated before power operation is resumed. The water in the suppression chamber is used for cooling 'n the event of an accident," i.e., it is not used for normal operation; therefore, a daily check of the temperature and volume is adequate to assure that adequate heat removal capability is present. 272 amendment No. 108
t.'INITIHr. rnHI)ITIONS FOR OPI'.RATION
- 3. 10 CORI'. AI.TERATIONS W
4, 10 CORE ALTERATIONS Applies to the fuel handling and coro re-ctivity liaitationo. Ap licabilit Applies to the periodic testing oI'hose interlocks and instru-'x ntation used during refueling and cox'c altcrationa. Ob ective Ob ective To ensure that cox'c reactivity is Mithin the capability of the control rods and to prevent criticality during refueling. To verify the operability of instruraentat ion and interlocks used in refuel'ng and core alterations ~ S ccification A. Rc fuc 1 ing Inter locks Socc ifica t ion A, Refuel in Interlocks l. Thc reactor xnode switch ahall be locked in the "Refuel" position during core alterations and thc refueling interlocks shall bc operable except as specified in 3-10$. 6 and
- 3. 10.A. 7 bcloM.
1. Prior to any fuel hand-ling Mi.th the head off the reactox'essel, thc refueling interlocks shall be functionally teated. They shall be tested at Meekly inter-vals thcreaf ter until no longer required. They shall nlso be tested fol-loving any repair ~rk associated Mith the inter-locks. 2. Pucl shall not be loaded into the reactor core unlcsa all control rods are fully inserted. 2. No additional surveillance required.'02
I l;,<sZTINC CO.'n) lT10.'IS FOR OPERAT!Ot( SURVE1LLhtlCE REOUTREHF ITS J. lo.h Rcfuclin interlocks 3. The fuel "rapplc hoist load svitch shall be sec ac < 1,000 lbs. lf che frame-nounccd auxi-1iary hoist, chc monorail-nounced auxiliary hoist, or chc service 'piacfoaa hoist to be used for handlinc fuel Mith chc head off che reactor vessel, the load lithic switch on the hoist to bd used shall be set ac < 406 lbs. 5. Haintenance raay be performed on a single cont"ol rod or control rod drive without removing the fuel in the con-trol ce11 if the following conditions are met:
- 4. 10.A Refuel in Inter locks 3.
No additional surveillance required. t 4. No additional surveillance required; 5., Prior to performing control rod or control rod drive maintenance .on a control cell without"removing fuel assemblies the surveilgance ,requirements of specificatipn 4.10.A.1 shall be performed and all rods face adjacent and dna'qonally adjacent to the maintenance rod shall be electrically disarmed per specification 3.10.A.5.b. a. The 'requirements of-specification 3.10.A.1 are~met, and b. All control rods diagonally and face adjacent to the maintenance rod are fully inserted and. have their directional control.valves electrically disarmed. 303 Amendment No. , 108
i IN(: CONDIT ONS F OP 3.10.A.6 4.10.A.6' maximum of two non-adjacent control rods may simultaneously be withdrawn from the core for the purpose of performing control rod andjor control rod drive maintenance without removing the fuel from the cells pro-vided the following conditions are satisfied: Prior to performing control rod or control rod drive maintenance on two control cells simultaneously without removing the fuel from the
- cells, two SRO's shall verify that the requirements of specification 3.10.A.G are satisfied.
a. The reactor mode switch shall be locked in the "refuel" position. The refueling interlock which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn may be bypassed tor one of the control rods on which maintenance is being performed. All other refueling inter-locks shall be operable. 303A Amendment No. 108
~ '.IxITIx<: tnwl>ITInxs Ynn npbRATIon suRVKII.LANCE RY.( 0 IRONY.HTs 3.10.A ~I4:f Ll I < rl cl 4.10.A . Refuelin Interloc'ke 6. (Continued) b. All directional control valves for remaining control rods shall be disarmed electrically except as specified in 3.10.A.7 and sufficient margin to criticality-shall be demonstrated. c. The two maintenance cells must be separated by more than two control cells in any direction. d. An appropriate number of SRM's are available as defined in specifi~tion 3.10.3. Any n<<mbrr nf con'ol rode may bc uithdrnuu or removed from the reactor core pro-vid inR t he I o l lou in'ond i-tiono arc eatiaficd: a. The reactor ande aMitch ia loc'~cd in the "ro-fuel" poeition. The refueling interlock uhich prevcnte nore tiwn one control rod from 7. With the node selecticn s:;itch in the refuel or shutdo:In ri., r 0 more than one control rod may be withdrawn without first removing fuel from the cell except as specified in 4.IO.A.6. Any number of rods may be withdrawn once verified by two licensed operators that the fuel has been removed from cauli cell. Amendment No. , 108
) ~ 10 BhSES rnds and circ r<<fueling plat form provtd> redrrrrd >nr m<<rhodes of prcv<<nc lng fnadverccnc crtctcalfcy even nf cer procedural violet lone. The inter iocks on hofoto provide ycc another crcchod of avoiding inadvertent criticalicy. Fuel handl fng fs normally conducted utch che fuel grapple hoist. The cocal load on this hotsc vhcn che interlock is required consists of the vctghc ot'c fuel grapple anrl thc fuel assembly. Thts cotal ls approxi-mately 1, 500 lbo, in comparison co thc load-trip scc ting of 1,000 lbs. Frovle tons have also bccn>>rade co allou fuel handling uith cir:hcr of chc three auxi) fary hoists and still eratntatn thc refueling interlocks. Thc 400-lb load-trip setting on these hoiscs is adequate to crfp the fntcrlock vhcn nne of thc morc than 600-lb fuel bundles ts being handled. During, certafn periods, it is dcsirablo to perform maintenance on cvo contr'ol rods and/or control r'od drives at the sa>>re c tnc without removing fuel from the cells. The maintenance is performed with the mode switch in the "refuel" position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations. In order to with-draw a second control rod after withdrawal of the first rod, it is .necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn 'at the same time. The requirement that an adequate shutdown margin be demon-strated and that all remaining control rods have there directional control valves electrically disarmed ensures that inadvertent criticality ~cannot occur during this maintenance. The adequacy of the shutdown margin is verified 'by demonstrating that at least'.38% flak shutdown margin is available. Disarming the~girectional control valvessddes not inhibit control rodsciam capabilMy. Spccif ication 3.10.A.7 allovsiunloadtng of a significant por tion of the reactor core. This opc<<atfoa. ia performed uith the code si tech ln thc "refuel" position to provide thc rcfucling inter)ocks normally available durlnc refueling operations., In order co vichdrau nore chan one control rod. it ls n<<ccsAnry co bypass rh>> refueling interlock on each vltlrdraun control rod vlrlch prevents core thon one control rod iron being utthdravn ac rr c frrre. Th<<requl! r mene chac chc fuel asecmhl tev ln che cell controlled by tlr<<concrol rod be removed f rory chc reactor core before the inccrlock can be bypassed ensurerr thee vtchdraun 1 of another control rod does no( result in tnadvertcnt criticality. Each control rod pc'ovides p'rt~ary reactivity control for the fuel asse>>rblics in thc cell associated uith chat control rod.
- Tlrus, removal of an entire cell (fuel ssscmbltcs plus control rod) results ln a lover reactivity potential of thc core.
Th>> rcquircmcncs for SR!< operability during these core altcracions assure sufficienc core rrrontcortng. 3IO Amendment No. 108
LOCA'L MOiXITORINB ST TIONS BRQV'/PALS FE RR Y NUCLEAR PLANT Fi . 4.2-1 ATH"","JS U.S. HWY 72 8FiNP'LA. HV/Y 20 l..eg"..iid ('g A!" f'r'oriitor C. hir Monitor ! i..D Sloli>> l I,I) 1(sii ~~ ~ DECATUR Scale 4 Miles 08
UN)TED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlON WASHliXGTOiN,D. C. 20555 +<<*<<<< TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ~ DOCKET NO. 50-296 BROMNS FERRY. NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 82 License No. DPR-68 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission {the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated April 30,
- 1982, as supplemented by letter dated June 10, 1982, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and t4e rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance wit~he Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be.inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part Sl of the Coranission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-68 is hereby amended to read as follows: (2) Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 82 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3. This 'license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r r
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Domenic. B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch. 82 Division of Licensing Date of Issuance: October 16, 1984
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 82 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68 DOCKET NO. 50-296 Revise Appendix A as follows: 1. Remove the following pages and replace Qith identically numbered pages. 58 63 66 67 69 74 91 93 107 151 289 -%1 f32 333 394 335 341 2. Add new page 333A. Revise Appendix B as follows: 1. Remove the following pages and replace with identically numbered pages. 42 The marginal lines on these pages denote the area being changed. l
'Minimum No. .instrument Channels Operable per Trip Sys(1) (ll) TABLE 3 ~ 2.A PRIHARY CONTAIHHEHF AHD REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATIOH IHSTRUHEHTATIOH Level Setti Act'on 1 Remarks 2 (l4) Instrument Channel-Reactor Mater Cleanup System Ploor Drain High Temperature Instrument Channel-Reactor Mater Cleanup System Space High Temperature Instrument Channel-Reactor Building Venti-lation High Radiation-Reactor Zone Instrument Channel-Reactor Building Venti-lation High Radiation-Refueling Zone 2 (7) (8) Instrument Cnannel SGTS Flow - Train A Heaters 160 - 1804F 160 - 1804F S 100 mr/hr or downscale 100 mr/hr or downscale Charcoal Heaters S 2000 cfm R.H. Heaters S 2000 cfm G H and (A or F) l. Above trip setting initiates Isolation of Reactor Mater Cleanup Line from Reactor and Reactor Mater Return Line. 1. Same as above 1. 1 upscale or 2 downscale will a. Initiate SGTS b. Isolate reactor xone and refuelin'g.floor. c. Close atmosphere control system. 1. 1 upscale or 2 downscale ~ll a. Inptiate SGTS b. Isolate refueling floor. close atmosphere control system I 1'. Below 2000 cfm, trip setting char-coal heaters vill turn on. 2. Below 2000 cfm, trip setting R.H. heaters vill shut off. 2(7) (8) 'nstrument Channel SGTS Plow - Train B Heaters 2 (7) (8) ~ Instrument Charm=l SGTS Flow - Train C Heaters Charcoal Heaters S2000 cfm R.H. Heaters S 2000 cfm H and (A or F) Charcoal Heaters S,2000 cfm H and R.H. Heaters S 2000 cfm (A or F) 1..Below 2000 cfm, trip setting coal heaters vili turn on. 2. Below 2000 cfm, trap.setting heaters will shut off. 1. Below 2000 cfm, trip setting coal heaters will turn on. 2. Below 2000 cfm, trip setting heaters will shut off. char-R, H. char-R. H.
3. There are four channe'er steam line of wn'ch two must be operable. Only required in Run Mode (inte. Locked with Mode Switch). 5. Hot required "in Run Mode (bypassed by Mode Switch). 6. Channel shared by RPS and Primar y Containment 4 Reactor Ve sel Isolation Control System. A channel failure may be a channel failur in each system. 7. A train is considered a trip system. 8. Two out of three SGTS trains required. A failure of more than one will require actions A and F. 9. Ther e is only one trip system with auto transfer on two powe. source 10. ~ Refer to Table 3.7.A and its notes for a listing of isolation Valve Groups and the'r initiating signals. 11. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to four hour for required surveillance/maintenance without placing the trip syste in the tripped condition provided at least one. OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter. 12. A channel contains four senses, all of which must be operable ."or the channel to be operable. Pove oDe=z--'~a pe='=~M =c-o tc 30 days =-'h a> o = r".e 5 t pe a~ Jxe '>> ~es opera@le, ~ ln the event that normal ventilation is unavailable in the main steam line tunne', the high temperatur e channels may be bypassed for a period of not to exceed four hours. During periods when normal ventilation is not available, such as dur'ng the performance of secondar y containment leak rate test , the control room indicators cf the affected space temperatur es shall be monitored for indications of small steam leaks. En the event of rapid increases in temperature (indicative of steam line break), the oper ator shall promptly close the main steam line isolation valves. L3 4 The ncmirzL setpoi-..ts for alaa and reactor t='p (1.5 and back"round, respec-'vely) ar es tablmhed based on -he no.-.as. ~n @cued at fu'L pove The ~~lo~~bi se"points zor a~a.. ano reac=c. trip are 1.2-1.8 and 2.4-3.6 ~es background, respec".vely. L4 Requires two independent channels from each physical location, there are two locations. 63
Table 3.2.8 I:lSTRJ'i18:;TA IO:; TRAT I:4ITIAT.w:R CO:>PROLG '1 BE Ct RB A.';O CO.':.AI: HSRT CCOLI;iG STST ..S s ini~n 11o. Operatic Per Trio Svs~l) pur.ct ion Instru.icnt Cham. I Reactor 1~7~ Prcssilre (i G-3-74 A 6 8, SQ 4 2) (PS-68 95'>> 12) (PG-68-96'~ 12) Instru~cnt Channel Rcac or L~ Pressure (Ps-3-74A 6 B, GM 1 1) (PS-68-95, SM 11) (PS"68-96, SH 11) Ihstful4E nt Channel Reactor Lo~ Pre"sure (iiG-68-93 6 9C, SH > 1)- i'r~t.:1 e.r. i 4QQ pMlg '0 15 230 ps~9 ~ '108 psig t 15 Action A Remarks 1. BeloM triP setting (araissivr for opening CSS end LP I 8!r '.: SjOn valves. Beczrcu1at.con "iscl:Gree valve. ac t,ua tipn. 1. Bclc~ trip sett i n. in conjunction ~ith contninnent , isolation signal and b<ith suction valves opus'i) I close RHR (LPCI) a+a(salon valves. Core Spray Auto Sequencing Ti~ers (5) LPCI Auto Sequcrcing Tiri-.r" (5) RBR".4 A3, 8$. C 3 and Dj ~i ~.cr s 6<t<8 secs. 'Yt 1 sec 13<t 15 sea. 1. vith diesel (o-.c 2. One per motor 1. Pith diesel po<<er 2. one pcr motor l. 'Pith diesel paicr 2. One per pue~p
Table 3.2.B INSTRIM'ITATJGII TEAT INITIATES OR CORI'r OLS TL>S CORE !i'io ColiTAINHZNT COOI.IN." SYSI'Wr.S ~ ~ NinlN"n No Cpetab! e Per TL'ip~si ( I) Fsnct icn Core Spray and LPCI Auto Sequencing T)Per s (6) NSRSM AQ SQ C 3 and D QTi~ers Tri Level Se..t in OStS1 sec. 6<t<S sec. 12<t.<16 sec. 18<tS20 sec. 27StS29 sec. Action Remarks 1. IIith rormal I.oier <<e per CSS motor 3. Two per RHR motor l. IIith normal ~er 2. One per punp i'K, )I"Pit() I 1 (16) ADS Tiner 120 sec t 5 1. Abov trip settir>7 in conjunction with lo~'eactor sat er level, high dry~el l pri ssure and LPCI or CSS pu~lis running initiates hGS. In"trumert Channol-1CO 4 1C psig RH"iDischatige Pressure l. Selcr~ tr'p 'ettirg defers ADS actus ion.
IHSTABHCHTATIOH T11AT IHITIAT Tabl e 3, 2 S " T~~ O" ~'<ABLS TBS coRC AHD COHTAXHHcHT CoOLIHC STSTIHS Hintoun Ho. Operable Pcc XXie Sya~.lL 1 f21 2 fl) a( ~l -Klan coco Spray Tcfp Systea bus povcc uonftoc AOS Trip Syatca bua poudr conf'to'c BPCI Trip Syaten bus paver nonltoc ACIC Trtp Syat~ bue pouc conf,tor I Inotruaent Channel-Con4cnsate )lOB<IE:1 Level (LS-13-56A 4 Bl Inatruoent Channel-Suppccaaloa Chaebas Btgh Lcvel Inotruocnt Channol-Acactor Qfgh llatcc t,evol Inatruucnt Channel ACIC Turbine Stean Line Bigb tlov Instrument Channol-ACIO Stean Line Space Sigh Tcnpcraturo ~~&vol Sc~cBQ H/A H/A H/A t Blcv $ $ 1 ~ ~,4 )pa $)o above instrtment ZerO $ 41 ~ above vessel aeco S a$ Oo BO Df $ 204oyo ~ct oB Rcosar)a 1. Heat tora availability of pwcr to logic syotaaa. 1. Honttoca availabiltty of poucr to loqfc ayatcoa an4 valves. 1. Honitoso aval labillty of povcr to logic ayatcoo ~ 1. Honftoro availability of power to logic ayatcoa. 1. Setov trip setting will'open BPCI auction valves to thc auppccooion chaabcr ~ Above trip setting vill open Bpcl ouctfon valvoo to tha ouppccaalon chaober 1. Above trip setting tx'ipa ACIC turbine. 1. Above trip setting iaolateo AC"C ayatca an4 tripe ACIC tu 'bine. I Above trip setting foolatce ACIC oyatca an4 trips ACIC turbine A) Cl.8 CD
t)OTES FOR TABLE 3. 2. 0 Whenever any CSCS System is required by section 3.5 to be
- operable, there shall be two operable trip systems except as notei.
Kf a requirement of the first coZumn is reduced by
- one, the indicated action shall be taken.
If the same function is inoperable in more than one trip system or the ~ first column reduced by more than one, action B shall be taken. Action: A. Repair in 24 hours. If the function is not operable in 24 hours, take action B. B. Declare the system or component inoperable. C. Immediately take action B until power is verified on the trip system. D. Ho action required, indicators are considered redundant. 2. In only one trip system. 3. Hat considered in a trip system~+ 4. Requires one channel from each physical location (there are 4 locations) in the steam U.ne space. 5. With diesel
- power, each RHRS purim is schedul'ed to start immediately and each CSS pump is sequenced to start
- about, 7
sec later. 6. With normal power, one CSS and one RHRS jump is scheduled to start instantaneously, one CSS and one RHRS pump is sequenced to start after about, 7 sec with similar pumps starting after about 14 sec and 21 sec, at which time the full complement of CSS and RHRS pumos would be operating. I 7. The RCIC and HPCI steam linc high flow trip level 'ettings are given in terms of differential pressure. The RCICS se tting of 450" of water corresponds to at lease 150% above"maximum steady state steam flow to assure that spurious isolation does not occur while ensuring the initiation of isolation following a postulated steam line break.. Similarly, the HPCIS setting of 90 psi corresponds to at least 150% above maximum steady state flow while also ensuring the initiation of isolation following a postulated break. 8. Rota 1 does not apply to this i,tern. 9. The head tank is designed to assure that the d'scharge piping from the CS and RHR pumps are f'u13.. The p"essu"e shali. be main aired at cr above the values listed in 3.5. H, which ensures water 'n the d'schargc piping and up to the head tank. Amendment No. 82
TABLE a 2ah SURVEILLANCE REQUIREHENTS POR PRIHARY COÃ1'AINHEHP AND~R BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUHENTATIOH Punction Group 6 Logic Group 8 (Initiating) Logic Reactor Building Isolation (refueling floor) Logic Reactor Building Isolation (reactor xone) Logic SGTS Train A Logic sGTS Train B Logic SGTS Train C Logic Static Pressure Control (refueling floor) Logic Static Pressure Control (reactor xone) Logic 1 Instrument Channel-Reactor Cleanup System Floor Drain High Temperature Instrument Channel-Reactor Cleanup System Space High Temperature net iona 1 Test ce/operating cle {18) A.eked during inannel functional test. No further test required. once/6 months (18) once/6 months (18) once/6 months (19) once/6 months {19) once/6 months {19) cycle {18) once/operating cycle (18) Calibration Fr uenc N/A (6) (6) {6) 1 (6) once/operating cycle once/operating cycle Instrument Check N/h N/A )Vh N/h N/A N/A
TABLE 4.2.8 S"i? VEILL;SCE RE"0 HEHENTS FOR I?>STRtSE??TATIOh THAT Il?ITIATE OR COS ROL TH: CSC.. funct Qe ~ Instr>L>>enc Channel Reactor Lo>> Pr ssure (PS-3-74A 6 8 j (PS-68-95) (PS 96) Instrument Channel Reactor Lo~ Pr snure (PS-68-93 5 94) Functional Test Calibration once/3 >>>onths once/3 >>>onths tnstrus.e~ Che k none none Core Spray Auto Sequencing Ti>>:ers (??orbal Po>>er) Core Spray A~to Seice.. ing Ti;>ers {Diesel Po>>er) (4) (4) once/operating cycle '" 'cr!'c8Poperati ng cycle none none LPCI Auto Sequ ncing Tiers (boreal Po<e ) LFCI Auto S&g enci Lg Tiners {Diesel Pcve=) RHRSH A3. bg C 3 D]. Ti>ner-(Hormal Power) RIE?SM A3, Bl, C 3 DlTi?>>ers (Diesel Po>>er) (4) (4) (4) once/operating cycle once/operating cycle once/operat ing cycle once/opervtin) cycle non>> none none none
rOI T*bt ES 4.2.A TBROUCI 4.1.H <Cont jnucd) 14 ~ Vpacsls trip Ls functionally tsscsd during functionsL tssc tins ss required by section <.7.5 ~ 1 a snd 4.7 ~C.l.c. Lb Ths flov bias csnparscor vill be tesced bv putting sos flov uoit "Tssc" (produciag 1/2 scrsa) sad sdJusting tn test iopuc to obtain coassrstor rod block The flov bias upscale vilL be verified by sbservtng s local upscale t Lp LLghc during operation sad wri'Lsd thee it vill produce s rod block during the operscing cycle tsrforned during opsrscing <<ycls. Porcions of the logic is checked are frsqusncly during functional tests of the functions that produce ~ rod block. 17. This calibration consists of rswving the function froo service sod perforning sn electronic cslibrscion of the chsnesl. lb. yunctionsl case is Iinttcd to the condition vhsre secondary contaiossnt integrity is not required ss specified in sections 3.7.C. snd 2.AC 2 ~ 19. yunctionsL cost (s linitsd ta chs tine vhere the SCTb is required to neet the rrquirsnsncs of section 4.7.C.l.a 10. Calibration of the conpsistor requires ths inputs fron boch rsc'rtulation loops co be interrupted. thereby rasmving the flou bias signal to chs Apktt and QH s >d sera~inc the reactor. This calibration can only bs perfornsd during sn outage. 21 22 Logic test ia 1%aired to the tine vhere actual operation of ths squipssnt Ls permissible One chsnneL ot either the rescron tone or refueLLng tone 4actor 3uildiat Ventilation Radiation Honitoring:Syecsa sLsy be sdeinistrstively bypassed for a period sot to exceed 24 hours-for functional testing and caLLbrst1oo. 23. Deleted 24. This inst-ament chock consists oi comparing the thermocouple readings far all valves for consistence aad 'or nominal expected values (not required during raiuallnp outsgea). 25. Durban,", tach refuelina autsaa, all acoust'c none arinp. chonncLs shaLL be calibrated. This csLLbrstLon incLudes verific. "'on of accclcroaeter rosaonse due ta aociunicsL exa'tatian in tho vicinity of tho sensor. 26. This instrument check consists of coanaring the backp'round signal levels fnr sLL valves far canslsttncy and ot nominal txpcc td vaLues (not required during refueLLag oucanos).
- 27. Funct"onal tesr.
fzequenc7 dec-.eased to once/3 months to reduce the challenges to relict vaJves "="."GREG-0737, item II.K.3.L6. 107 / Amendment No. 4g, 69,79, 82 t
LI!IITINCCONDITIONS FOR OPE!ATION SURVEILI,ANCF RFQUIRF!IEN'3'5 3 ~ 5 COBE AND Ci i 1'AINAF"T COOLING S YS".'EiMS
- 4. 5 CORE AND Cv.:T.'iIN IENT CO HALI".(".
SYS-.EW.; If one RIIR pump (containr;, nt coo'inq I~cdi ) or Qssocxated heat exchanger is ir:operable, the reactor may reirain in operat.ion for a peri od riot to exceed 30 days prov ided the remiaining RIIR pu."ips (con=ainment coolinq mode) =nd >ssoci ted heat exchangers in'iesel generators and all access path of the RIIRS (containment, cool'ng mode) are operable. If two RilR pumps (containment coolirig mode) or associated heat exchangers are inoperable, the rea cto r ma y remain in operation for a l>eriod not to exceed 7 days provided the remaining RHR pumps (containment coolinq mod e) t'e asso cia ted heat exchanqers diesel generators, and all access paths of the MRS (con-tainment cooling mode) are operable. 151 4 ~ No Q(lilitiona1 "ui vu llJncc regu'Lzcil r When it is determined that one Rlln pump (containment coo' nq mode) or associated heat exchanger is inoperable at a tiuie wlien operability is
- required, the rernaininq RllR pumps (containmrrit cool in'ode),
tlie associated heat exchanqers diesel ge:ierators, arid all active compon nts in tlie acce-.'atlis of the RkiRS (con tair&ent coo }.ir.g mode) shall bn derrionstra ted to be oper,ihle im:n'diately and weekly thereafter until the inoperabl.e RIIR pump (containment cooling Node) and as:oc'ated heat Amendment No. , 82
The containment desian has been 'examined to determine that a leakage equivalent to one dxywell vacuum breaker opened to no more than a nominal 34 as confirmed by the xed light is acceptable. On this basis an indefinite allavable repair time for an inoperable xed light circuit on any valve or an inoperable check and green or check light circuit a3.ane or a malfunction of the operator or disc (if nearly closed) on one valve, or an inoperable green and red ax'x'een light circuit along on two valves is justified. I During each operating cycle, a leak rate test shall be performed to verify that significant 3.eakage flaw paths do not.exist between the dxywell and suppression chamber. 'Phe dwell pressure vill be inc-geased by at least 1 ps'. with xespec:t to the sappy'csion chloe paea~e and ~ constant. The 2 ps1g set pnme war.l not, be exceeded The subsequent suppressicn chamber pxessuxe transient (if any) will be monitored vith a sensitive pressure gauge. If the drywell pressure
- cannot, be increased by 1
psi aver, the suppression chamber pressure it would be because a . significant leakage path exists; in this event the leakage source will be identified and eliminated before power operation is resumed. With a differential pressure of greater than 1 psig, the rate of change of the suppression chamber pressure must not exceed 0.38 inches of water per minute as.measured over a 10-minute period, v!ich coxresponds to about 0 10 1h/sec of containment air. In the event the xate of change exceeds this value then the source of leakage vill be identifiec4and eliminated befoxe power operation is resumed. The water in the suppression chamber is used fox cooling in the event of an accident; i.e., it is nat used far normal operation; thex'efore, a daily check of the temperature and volume is adequate to assuxe that adequate heat removal capability is present. The interior surfaces of the dryw'ell and suppression chamber are coated as necessary to provide corrosion protection and to provide a more easily decontaminable surface. The surveillance.inspection of the internal surfaces each operating cycle assures ately detection of corrosion. Dropping the torus water level to one foot below the normal operating level enables an inspection of the suppression chamber where problems would first begin to show. 289 Amendment Ho. ", 82
LI!CITING.CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3 1 0 CORE ALTERATIONS 1 0 COR E ALTERATIONS A licabilitv A olicabilit Applies to the fuel handling and core reactivity limitations. Applies to the periodic testing of those interlocks and instrumentation used during refueling and core alterations. ~Ob 'ective To ensure that core reactivity is within the capability of the control rods and to prevent criticality during refueling. ~Ob 'ective To verify the operability of instrumentation and interlocks used in refueling and core al terations. S ecification S ecification A ~ Refuelin Interlocks The reactor mode switch shall be locked in the "Refuel>> position during core alterations and the refueling interlocks shall be operable except as specified in. 3. 10. A. 6 and 3.10.A. 7 below. A. Re fuelin Interlocks 1. Prior to any fuel handling with the head off the reactor
- vessel, the refuel'ng interlocks shall be functionally tested.
They shall be tested at weekly intervals thereafter unti no longer required. They shall also be tested following any repair work associated with the interlocks. 33l Amendment No. 82
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVFILIANCE REQUIREMENTS
- i. 10 CORL'I TERATIONS 0, 10 CORE ALTERATIONS 2.
E'uel shall not be .loaded into the reactor core unless', all control rods ade fully inserted. I 2. No additional surveillance required. 3. No additional surveillance required. 3. The fuel grapple hoist load switch shall be set at 1,000 lbs-332 Amendment No, 56, 82
UNIT 3 LIMITING CONDIT 0"S FOR OPEHA IOll SURVEILLANCE REQU RZIMNTS 10 CORE ~LTEKVZIGItS Q. 10 CORE AL'L23ATIONS If the frame-mounted auxilia y hoist, the monorail-mounted au::iliary hoist, or the service platform hoist is to be used for handlinq fuel wi"h the head off the reactor vessel, the load limit switch on the hoist to be used shall be set at < 400 lls ~ 5- ,Haintenance may be performed on a single. control rod or controls rod drive without re-moving the fuel in the control cell'if the following conditions are met: No-additional surveillance required. 5. Prior to performing control rod or control rod drive maintenance on a control cell without removing fuel assemblies the surveillance requirements of specification 4.10.A.1 shall be performed and all rods face adjacent and diagonally adjacent to the maintenance rod shall be electrically disarmed per specification 3.10.A.5.b. a. The requirements of specification 3.10.A.l are met, and b. All control rods diagonally and face adjacent to the maintenance rod are fully inserted and have had their directional control valves electrically disarmed. 333 Amendment No. 82
- 3. 10.A. 6 4.10.A
~ A maximum of two nonadjacent control rods may be simultaneously withdrawn from the core for the purpose of performing control rod and/or control rod drive maintenance without removing the fuel from the cells pro-vided the following conditions are satisfied: 6. Prior to performing control rod or control rod drive maintenance on two control cells simultaneously without removing the fuel from the
- cells, two SRO's shall verify that the requi.rements of specification 3.10.A.6 are satisfied.
a. The reactor mode switch shall be locked in the "refuel" position. The refueling interlock which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn may be bypassed for one of the control rods on which maintenance is being performed. All other refueling interlocks shall ~ be operable. 333A Amendment No. , 82
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l.10 CORE ALTERATIONS
- 4. 10 CORE ALTERATIONS be All directional control valves for remaining control rods shall. be disarmed electri-'ally except as specified in 3.10.A.7 and sufficient margin to criticality
'hall be demon-strated; c. The two mainte-nance cells must be separated by more than twoa control cells. in any direction. d. An appropriate number of SRM's are availabl~s defined in specification 3.10.B. 334 Imendment No. , 82
I J
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUXREHi:NTS 3 ~ 10 COR E ALTERATIONS 0 ~ 1 0 CORE ALTERATIONS a. The reactor mode switch is locked in the <<refuel<< position. The refueling 'nterlock which prevents more than one control rod fron being withdrawn may be bypassed on a withdrawn contxol rod after the fuel assemblies in the cell containing (controlled by) that control rod have been removed from the reactor core. All other refueling interlocks shall be operable. S Any number of con'trol rods may be withdrawn or removed from the reactor co.e providing the followinq conditions are satisfied:.. with the mode selector switch in the refuel or shutdown
- mode, no more than one control rod may be withdrawn without first removing fuel from the. cell except as specified in 4.10.A.6.
Any number of rods may be withdrawn once verified by two licensed operators that the fuel has been removed from each cell. 335 Amerldment Ifo. 7, 82
criticality. The nuclear characteristics of the core assure that the reactor is subcritical even when the highest worth control rod is fully withdrawn. The combination of refueling interlocks for control rods and the refueling platform provide redundant methods of preventing inadvertent criticality even after procedural violations. The interlocks on hoists provide yet another method of avoiding inadvertent criticality. Fuel handling is normally conducted with the fuel grapple hoist. The total load on this hoist when the interlock is required consists of the weight of the fuel grapple and the fuel assembly. This total is approximat,ely 1,500 lbs, in comparison to the load-trip setting of 1,000 lbs. Provisions have also been made to allow fuel handling with either of the three auxiliary hoists and still maintain the refueling interlocks. The 400-lb load-trip setting on these hoists is adequate to trip the interlock when one of the more than 600-lb fuel bundles is being'andled. During certain periods, it is desirable to perform maintenance on two control rods and/or control rod drives at the same time without removing fuel from the cells. The maintenance is performed with the mode switcP in the "refuel" position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations. In order to withdraw a second control rod after withdrawal of the first rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one control rod from'eing with-drawn at the same 'time. The reqbirement that an adequate shutdown margin be demonstrated and that all remaining control rods have their directional control valves elecMically disarmed ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this maintenance. The adequacy of the shutdown margin is verified by demonstrating that at least 0.38% hk shutdown margin is available. Disarming the directional control valves does not inhibit control rod scram capability. Specification
- 3. 10.A.7 allows unloading of a significant portion of the reactor core.
This operation is performed with the mode switch in the <<refuel<< position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling operations. In order to withdraw more than one control rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on each withdrawn control rod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn at a time-; The requirement that the fuel assemblies in the cell controlled by the control rod be removed from the reactor core before the inter'lock can be bypassed ensures that withdrawal of another control rod does not result in advertent criticality. Each control rod 34l Amendment No. 82
>>>>k I OCR-, ViONITORIIXIG STATIOI'3S BROV/NS FE RR Y NUCLEAR PLAINT Fi . 4. 2-1 A( H=xl U.S. HWY 72 P 8FNP t ALA. HV/Y 20 Legend G Air Monitor Q Air I"iohitor 6 TLD S 9 a lion Tl,f) S)alion A. ~ lc>ma tie VVell Sampler I.>> ni",y t.o:ni N DEC ATUR Scale 0 l 2 Miles
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