ML18029A189

Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting Proposed Removal of Secondary Containment Static Pressure Limiting Sys

ML18029A189
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	10/19/1984
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18029A188	List: ML18029A186 ML18029A189
References
TVA-BFNP-TS-202, NUDOCS 8410260036
Download: ML18029A189 (50)

Text

ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISIONS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (TVA BFNP TS 202) 84i0260036 PDR ADOCK 8410i9 05000259'DR

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UNIT 1 PROPOSED SPECIFICATIONS

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TABLE 3 2 ~ A PRIMARY CO:1TAINM=b AND REA TOR BUILDING ISOZATION INSTRUNFN ATION fiAt ..u~ .'(p.

Enstrurenr.

Channels Operable

.~er Trio 5"s{1}!1; Level Setti Remarks Reactor Building Isolation 0 < t < 2 secs ~ HorF 1. Below tr' setting prevents Timer (refueling floor) spurious trips and system pertur-ba..ions from initiating isolation Reactor Building Isolation 0 < t S 2 secs. GorA 1. Below trip setting prevents Timer (reactor zone) or 8 spurious trips and system pertur-bations from initiating isolation (10) Group 1 (Initiating) Logic N/A 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

Group 1 (Actuation) Logic 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

TABLE 3 ~ 2 ~ A PRIMARY CONTAIllENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

'Minimum No.

Instrument Channels Operable Function Tri Level Settin Action 1 Remarks 2 Group 2 (Initiatin ) Logic A or 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of (B and E) valves.

Group 2 (RHR Isolation- N/A Actuation) Logic Group 8 (Tip-Actuation) N/A Logic Group 2 (Drywell Sump N/A Drains-Actuation) Logic Group 2 (Reactor Building FandG 1. Part of Group 6 Logic.

S Refueling Floor, and Dry-well Vent and Purge-Actuation) Logic Group 3 (Initiating) Logic: N/A 1. Refer to Table 3 7.A for list of valves.

Group 3 (Actuation) Logic N/A Group 6 Logic N/A F andG 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

Group 8 (Initiating) Logic N/A 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

2. Same as Group 2 initiating logic'.

Reactor Building Isolation N/A HorF (refueling floor) Logic Reactor Building Isolation N/A H or G (reactor zone) Logic or A

TABLE 3.2.A PRINARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUNENTATION

.-Inl;..un .'.o.

LnsCrul".ent Channels Operable Tri Level Settin c on 1 Rem rks

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1(7) (8) SGTS Train A Logic L or (A and F) 1(7) (8) SGTS Train B Logic N/A L or (A and F) 1(7) (8) SGTS Train C bagic N/A L or (A and F)

Refer to Table 3.2.B for RCIC and HPCI functions including Groups 0, 5, and 7 valves.

HOTKS FOR TAbLP. 3.2.A

l. Whenever che reopectfve funct iona sre required to be operable trip for functfon.

shelf be tvo operable or tripped systems sech che first colunm cannot bc mct for one of the trip systems, that trip eyocem or logic for that function shall be tripped (oc. the approprfate accfon lioted belov shall be taken). If the column cannot be mec for all trip systoas, the appropriate action listed belov alcall be taken.

A. Initiate en orderly ohucdovn end have the reactors in Cold Shutdoun Condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

S. Inft Lace zn orderly load reduction 'and have Main Steam Lines isolated vf chfn eight hnurs.

C. Isolate Rcuccor Mater Cleanup Systece.

0. Isolate Shucdovn Cooling V... Init face prfmsry cnncafcueenc isolation vf thin 24 hours.

F. The hendiing of spent fuel vill be prohibited and all operations over spent fuclo snd open reactor voile shall be prohibited.

CD IsoloCe the reactor buildings and start tha standby gas treatment systems H. Ieraedfacely perform a logic system functional test on the logic fn che other trip sjocemoand daily thereafter not to exceed 7 days.

I DELETE

.i. Ml chdrav TIP.

V.. Nanuelly foofncc the af (ected lines. Refer to section 4.2.K for chc equfrcmi neo of an inooerablc syoceeL.

L. l f one SC1'f> train fs fhopcrsblc cake actions H or action A and F. If cvo SOTS crafn;> are innpec able coke accfnns A bnd F

2. When fc L~ deccmfned that. a channel ps failed fn che unsafe condfcfnn, chc ocher channels that monitor tho same variable shall be functionally ceeccd fosaediacely before the .trip system or logic for chat function fo tripped. The trip system or tha logic for that function may remain uncrfppcd for short periods of t&e to allov functional testing of thc r cher crfp system nr logic for that function.

3. There ere fouc Nunc'or.". per otoam line of vhfch tvo must be operablc.

4. Only requtrcd fn Run Node (Lntcrlocked vfth Mode Svicch),

5. Hoc required in Run Node (bypassed by mode svicch).

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6. Channel shared by RpS and primary Containment g Reactor Vessel Isolation Control system. A channel ne failure ax ure mayma he a channel failure .in each system.

7. A train is considered a trip syst,em.

8; Two out. of three SGTS trains required. A failure of more than one will require action A and F.

9. (Deleted)

10. Refer to Table 3.7.A and its notes for a listing of Isolation Valve Groups.

and their initiating signals.

A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for u to four h required surveillance without i ou p lac ng the trip system in the r ppeed condition provided at least one OPEIQBLI'.. c h annel in the same trip system tri is monit or ing t h at parameter.

12. A channel contains four sensors, all of which must oe operable far the channel td be operable.

o~c operatians over oper p~~tted for to 30 days w'th 1"vo tne16

r. Derarur e 'r ="hes operable.

up In the event that normal ventilation is unavailable in the main steam line tunnel, the high temperature channels may be bypassed for a period of not to exceed four hours. During per iods when no'rmal ventilation is not available, such as duringcontrol. the per formance of room indicators of secondary containment leak rate tests, the

he affected space temperatures shall be monitored for indications of

>mall steam leaks. Xn the event of rapid increases in temperature (indicative of steam line break), the operator shall. promptly close'he main steam line isolation valves.

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13. The nominal setpoints for alarm and reactor trip (1.5 and 3.0 times background, respectively) are established b 'ase e b'ased on the no ...al back-at po~er. The allowable setpoinrs for alarm and reacror t"'p are 1.2-1.B and 2.4-3.6 times background, respectively.

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I TABLE a 2,A SURVEILLANCE RBQOIRENENTS POR PRINARY CONXAINNENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUNENTATIOl(

~net i or) un iona 1 est Calibration Pr uen Instrument Check Instrument Channel- ()) ()4) (22) once/3 aonths once/day (B)

Reactor Building Ventilatica High Radiation - Refueling Xone instrument Channel- N/h SGTS Train A Heaters Instriuxent Channel-scTS Train B Heaters Instruaent Channel-SGTS Train C Heaters Reactor Building Isolation once/operating cycle N/A Tiner (refuelinq floor)

Reactor Building Isolation once/operating cycle N/A Tiaer (reactor xone)

E TABLE 0 2 A SURVRILLAHCR R3QQIRZHEHTS POR PRIMARY COÃTAINl4EHT AHC ~~R WILDING ISOLATIOH IHSTRVNKHTATIOH punction unct iona) Test Calibration Fr ~uenc Instment Check Grcup 6 Logic once/operating K/A cycle (18)

Croup 8 (Initiating) Logic Checked durinq H/A channel I unctional test. Ho further test required.

Reactor Building Isolation once/6 n-nths ('18) (6)

(refueling floor) Logic Re ctor Building Isolation once/6 sonths (18) (6) H/A (reactor xone) Logic SOTS Train A Logic once/6 eonths (19) H/A 'H/A SGTS Train 8 Logic once/6 eonths (19) H/A SGTS Train C Logic once/6 eonths (19)

Instruaeot Channel-teactor Cleenup Syeevse tloor Drain High Tenperature once/operating cycle H/A instruaent Channel Reactor Cleanup Systems Space (Iigh Tenperature (23)

a. RTD onoe/o pe= sting cpcle ( )

(once/operating cycle)

h. Teaperature= Suitch ( )

i!"TFq FOR TABL'..:"'.2.h THROUGH 4.2.H Fu~rli'>>uiI tc"ts "hull be performed once pcr month.

2 Functions'ests shall be performed before each startup wftI> a required frequency not to exceed once per weel:.

".~<as inst. umenta.ion is excepted from the functional test definition.

fun tf onal test wi 1 1 consist of fnjecti ng a simulated elect. ical ign 1 into the measurement channel.

L. Tested during lo-"ic system functional tests.

5. Refer tc Tab'e 4.1.B.

he logic system .unctional tests shall include a 'celfbration once per op . sting cvcle of tine delay relays and timers necessary for proper functionirg of the trip systems, The functiona'es will consist of verifying continunity across the inhibit with e volt-ohmmeter.

Inst. ament checks shall be performed in accordance with the definition of Zns.rument Check (see Sectfon 1.0, Definitions). An instrument check fs not applicable to a particular setpoint, such as Upscale, but fs a qualitative check that the instrument is behaving and/or indfcating in an acceptable mmner for the particular plant condition. Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an Instrument Check will be performed on the instrument. Instrument checks art not required when these instruments are not required to bc operable or are tripped.

9. Calfb>ation frequency shall be once/year.

DELETE

11. portion of he logic is functionally tested during ou age only.

1 a

~ ~ TI e detector vill be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel into the core verified.

13. Functional test will consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3).

Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale trips will be verified, but no rod block will be produced at this time. 'he inopera-tive trip wi'1 be initiated to produce a rod block (SR!$ and IR>I inoperative a)s. bypassed with the mode switch in RUI/). The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly will be verf fied during the operating cycle.

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UNIT 2 PROPOSED SPECIFICATIONS

'I 8

TABLE 3 '+A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION Minimum ho

Enstrunent channels Operable Function Tri Level Setti Remarks Reactor Building Isolation 0 < t < 2 secs ~ HorF 1. Below trip setting prevents Timer (refueling floor) spurious trips and system pertur-bations from initiating isolation Reactor Building Isolation 0 < t5 2 secs. GorA or 8

1. Below trip setting prevents

'purious trips and system pertur-Timer (reactor xone) bations from initiating isolation 2 (lp) Group 1 (Init,iating) Logic N/A 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

Group 1'(Actuation) Logic N/A 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.'

TABLE 3 2.A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

'Hinimum ) o.

. Instrument Channels Operable Functio Tri 'Level Settin Action 1 Remarks 2 Group 2 (Initiatin.-) Logic N/A A or 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of (B and E) valves.

Group 2 (RHR Isolation- N/A Actuation) Logic Group 8 (Tip-Actuarion) N/A Logic Group 2 (Drywell Sump N/A K Drains-Actuation) ..oqic Group 2 (Reactor Building N/A FandG 1. Part of Group 6 Logic.

S Refueling Floor, and Dry-well Vent and Purge-Actuation) Logic Group 3 (Initiating) Logic N/A 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

Group 3 (Actuation) Logic N/A Group 6 Logic N/A F and G 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

Group 8 (Initiating) Logic N/A 1. Refer to Table 3 7.A for list of valves.

2. Same as Group 2 initiating logic'.

Reactor Building Isolation N/A HorF (refueling floor) Logic Reactor Building Isolation N/A HorG (reactor zone) Logic or A

TABLF. 3.2.A PRIMARY COSTAIAK~V." A;..l a=ACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION IHSTRUNEHTATIOH Nini-..uw '.(o.

Instrunent Channels Operable unct on Level Settin c on 1 Rp>ark i 1 (7) (B) SGTS Train A logic N/A L or (A and P) 1(7) (B) SGTS Train B Logic L or (A and F) 1(7) (8) SGTS Train C logic '.:/A L or (A and F)

Refe to Table 3.2.B for RCIC'and HPCI functions including Groups 0~ 5, and 7 valves.

8 HATES FOR TAbLE 3.2.A

1. Mhenever che respective functions are requited to be operable, there

~ hall be. tvo operable or tripped trip systems for each function.

If che ficst column cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that trip system or logic for that funccioa shall be tripped (or the appropriate action listed belov shall be taken). If the column cannot be met for all trip systems, the appropriate action listed belov shall be taken.

A. 'Initiate sn ordetly ~ hucdovn and have the reactors in Cold Shutdovn Cond1tion in 2'ours,

b. Initiate an orderly load reduction and have Main Steam Lines isolated vithi'n ~ ight hours.

C. Isolate Reactor Mater Cleanup System.

0. Isolate Shutdown Cooling Y.. Inici*ce prtmsry concsiruaeat isolation within 24 hours.

F. The handling of spent fuel vill be prohibited and all operations over spent fuels snd op>>a reactor veils shall be prohibited.

G. Isolate the reactor buildiag and start the standby gas treatment cyst>>ac H. Iwaediately perform a logic system functional test on the logic in che other trip Wstemsaad daily thereafter not to exceed 7 days.

DELETE

3. illthdrsv TIF.

R. Manually Isolate the affected lines. Refer to section 4.2.K for Lhe Icquiremcocs of sn inoperable system.

L. it one scis train is I~noperable take actions H or action A snd F. If cMo sGTs trains are Inoperable take actions A snd F

2. Ken Ic is determined that s channel is failed In the unsafe condition che other charm>>I ~ that monitor the same variable shall be. functionally

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rested Imsaediately before the trip system or logic for that function is tripped. The trip system or the logic for that function msy remain uncripped for short periods of time to allov functional testing of thc c cher trip system or logic fot that function.

3. There are four gcnnnr~" per steam line of vhich tvo must be operable.

4. Only required in Run Mode (interlocked vith Mode Svitch).

5. Not ~ required in Run Ko'de (bypass>>d by saode svicch).

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6. Channel shared by RPS and Primary Containment 6 Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System. A channel failure may be a channel failure in each system.

7, A train is considered a trip system.

8. Two out of three SGTS trains required. A failure of more than one will require action A and P.

(Deleted)

10. Refer co Table 3.7.A and its notes for a listing of'solation Valve Groups and. their initiating signals.

11. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to four hours for required surveillance without placing the trip svsccm in che crhpped condition pxovided at least one OPERABLE chaqnel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

12. A channel contains four sensors, all of which muse be operable for the channel to be operable.

Powez'perations permitted for up to 30 days with 15 of che 16 temperature'switcnes operable. m In the event that normal ventilation is unavailable in the main steam line tunnel, the high temperature channels may be bypassed for a period of not to exceed four hours. During periods when normal

.ventilation is not available, such as during the performance of secondary containment leak rate tests, the contxol room indicators of

he affected space temperatures shall be monitored for indications of

>mall steam leaks. In the event of rapid increases in empera t ure n temper

((1 n diccative of steam line break), the operator,,shall .promptly close the main steam line isolation valves.

13. .The nominal secpoincs fox'larm an d raactox'ri'p background, respectively) ((1..5 and 3.0 cimcs a y are established based ground at full power o n tne normal ooca-all ar. Th e allowable oi set points for alarm and reactor trip. are 1.2-1.8 an ~ -3.6 and 2.4-3.6 time background, times respectively.

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P F

TABLE 4 2.A SURVEILLANCE C R)X)OZREHENTS R OZREHEN POR PRIHARY COHTAIHHEÃF AHD REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATIOH ZHSTRQHEHTATIOH nctson un 'na est'>)

Calibration Fr uen nstrunent Check Znstruaent Channel (>4) (22) once/3 nonths once/day (8)

Reactor Building Ventilatica Bigh Radiation - Refueling tone Instruaent Channel- (4) H/h SOTS Train h Beaters Instrunent Channel-SCTS Train B Beaters Znstruaent Channel-SCtS Train C Beaters Reactor Building Isolation (4) once/operating cycle Tiaer (refueling floor)

Reactor Building Isolation (4) once/operating cycle H/A Tiner (reactor xone)

TABIK 4 ~ 2 A SUPVKILLAHCK RKQDIREHRITS FOR PRINARY COMTAIhHKÃI'ND RZACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRONKNTATIOH Functzon functaonal Test Calibration Fr uenc Instrument Check Group 6 Logic once/operating H/h N/h cycle (18)

Croup 8 (Inztlatlng) Logic Checked during channel functiona 1 test. Ho further test required.

Reactor Building Isolation once/6 months (18) (6)

(refueling floor) Logic Reactor Building Isolation once/6 nonths (18) (6) N/h (reactor zone) Logic SCTS Train A Logic once/6 months (19) H/A N/A SGTS Train B Logic once/6 months (19) N/A SGTS Train C Logic once/6 months (19)

Instrument Channel-Reactor Cleanup System tloor Drain High Temperature once/operating cycle Instruaent Channel-Reactor Cleanup System Space Bigh Teaperature (23)

a. RTO oooe/operating cycle ( )

(once/operating cycle)

b. Temperature Svitcb )

lJO cS vOo TAB .S 4 2 A THROUGH 4 2 H

1. Functiona'ests shall be performed once per month.

Functional tes s shall be performed before each startup vith a required frequency not to exceed once per veek.

This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition.

The functional test vi3.1 consist of in)ecting a simulated electrical signal" nto the measurement channel.

4. Tested during logic system functional tests.'.

Refer to Table 4.1.B.

6. The logic system functional tests shall 'nclude a calibration once per operating cycle of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper

.unc ioning of the trip systems.

7. The functional test vill consist of verifying continunity across the inhibit vith a volt-ohmmeter.

8. Ins.rument checks shall be performed in accordance vith the definition of Instrument Check (see Section 1.0, Definitions). An instrument check is not applicable to a particular setpoint, such as Upscale, but is a qualitative check that the instrument is behaving and/or indicating in an acceptable manner for the particular plant condition. Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an Instrument Check vill be performed on the instrument. Instrument checks are not required vhen these instruments are not required to be operable or are tripped.

9. Calibration frequency shell be ence/year.

DELETE ll. Portion of .he logic is func ion- ly tested during outage only.

12. The detector will be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of trave'nto he core verified.

13. Functional test vill consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3).

Local alam lights representing upscale and dovnscale trips vi11 be verified, but no rod block vill be produced a. this time. The inopera-tive t.ip vill be initiated to produce a rod block (SRM and IRM inoperative also bvpassed vith the mode switch in RUH). The functions that cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly i<11 be verified during the operating cycle.

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UNIT 3 PROPOSED SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3 2 A PRINARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUNENTATION

-Hinimum No.

Instrument

'hannels Operable Tri Level setti Remarks Reactor Building Isolation 0 S tS 2 secs. HorF 1 Below trip setting prevents Timer (refueling floor) spurious trips and system from initiating isolation pertur-'ations Reactor Building Isolation Timer (reactor xone) 0 S t S 2 secs. GorA or H

1. Below trip setting prevents spurious trips and system pertur-bations from initiating isolation 2 (10) Group 1 (Initlatin@) Logic N/A 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

Group 1 (Actuation) Logic N/A B 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

TABLE 3 '+A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION

~

Minimum )(o.

Instrument Channels Operable Functio Tri 'Level Settin Action 1 Remarks 2 Group 2 (Initiating) Logic N/A A or 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of-(B and E] valves.

Group 2 (RHR Isolation- N/A Actuation) Logic Group8 (Tip-Actuation) N/A logic Group 2 (Dzywell Sump N/A K Drains-Actuation) Logic Group 2 (Reactor Building N/A F and G 1. Part, of Group 6 Logic.

6 Refueling Floor, and Dry-well Vent and Purge-Actuation) Logic 2 Group 3 (Initiating) Logic ~ N/A 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

1 Group 3 (Actuation) Logic N/A C 1 Group 6 Logic N/A F andG 1- Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

Group 8 (Initiating) Logic N/A 1. Refer to Table 3.7.A for list of valves.

2. Same as Group 2 initiating logic.

Reactor Building Isolation N/A HorF (refueling floor) Logic

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Reactor Building Isolation N/A H or G (reactor zone) Logic or A

TABLE 3 2 A PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION INSTRUHENTATION Minimum No.

Instrument Channels Operable J Tri Level Setti Action 1 Remarks 1(7) (8) SGTS Train A Logic L or (A and P) 1{7) (8) SGTS Train B Logic L or (A and P) 1(7) (8) SGTS Train C logic L or (A and F)

Refer to Table 3.2.8 for RCIC and HPCI functions including Groups 4, 5, and 7 valves.

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2 A

1. Whenever the respective functions are required to be operable, there shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for each function. I If the first column cannot be met 'cr one of the trip systems, that trip system or loqic for that function shall be tripped (or the appropriate action listed below shall be taken) . If the column cannot be met for all trip systems, the appropriate action listed below shall be taken.

A~ Initiate an orderly shutdown and have the reactor in Cold Shutdown Condition in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Initiate 1

Be an orderly load reduction and have Main Steam Lines isolated within eight hours.

C. Isolate Reactor Water Cleanup System.

.D. Isolate Shutdown Cooling.

E. Initiate primary conta'inment isolation within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

F~ The handling of spent fuel will be prohibited and all operations over spent fuels and open reactor wells shall be prohibited.

G. Isolate the reactor building and start the standby gas treatment system.

H. Immediately perform a logic system functional test on the logic in the other trip systems and daily thereafter not to exceed 7 days.

DELETE J. Withdraw TIP.

K. Manually isolate the affected lines. Refer to section

4. 2. E for the requirements of an inoperable system.

L. If one SGTS train is inoperable take actions H or action A and F.

and F.

If two SGTS trains are inoperable take actions A

2. When it is determined that a channel is failed in the unsafe condition, the other channels that, monitor the same variable shall be functionally tested immediately before the trip system or loqic for that function is tripped. The trip system or the logic for that function may remain untripped for short periods of time to allow functional testing of the other trip system or l'ogic for that function.

3. There are four channels,per steam line of which,.two must be operable.

Only required in Run Mode (interlocked with Mode Switch). 'I

5. Not required in Run Mode (bypassed by Mode Switch).

6. Channel shared by RPS and Primary Containment 4 Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System. A channel failure may be a. channel failure in each system.

7. A train is considered a trip system.

8. Two out of three SGTS trains required. A failure of more than one will require actions A and F.

(Deleted).

10. Refer to Table 3.7.A and its notes for a listing of Isolation Valve Groups and their initiating signals.

11. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for, up to four hours for required surveillance/maintenance without placing the tt ip system in the tripped condition provided at least one. OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that par ameter.

12. A channel contains four sensors, all of which must be operable for the channel to be operable.

2over operawoos pe='tted for up to 30 days w.'th w~ "o= the l5 r~e=aasre 's<tches operable.

In the event that normal ventilation is unavailable in the main steam line tunnel, the high temperature channels may be bypassed for a period of not to exceed four hours. During periods when normal ventilation is not available, such as during the performance of secondary containment leak rate tests, the control room indicators of the affected space temperatures shall be monitored for indications of

~

small steam leaks. In the event of rapid. increases in temper ature (indicative of steam line break), the oper ator shall promptly close the main steam line isolation valves.

13. The nominal setpoints for alarm and rcacror trip (1.5 and 3.0 times background, respectively) are established based on the no ..al bac'r.-

E>>uad at full paver. The allowable serpoints for alarm and reactor trip* are 1.2-1.8 and 2.4-3.6 times background, respectively.

TABLE ao2oA SORVEILLAHCE RSQQIREKENTS FOR PRIMARY COSZAIHKEST ASD RSACTOR SOILOIHO ISOLATIOS INSTRUHEHTAT14%

Ca b ation r uen Instrument Check Instruaent Channel- (4) (4s) l>>) once/3 eonths once/day (0)

Reactor Building Ventilation Bigb Radiation - Refueling Xone Instr~t SGTS Channel-Train A Beaters Instruaent Channel-SGTS Train B Rosters Instrueent Channel-SOTS Traia C Beaters Reactor Building Isolation once/operating cycle Tlaer (refueling floor)

Reactor Buildiag Isolatioa once/operating cycle Thser (reactor soae)

TABLE a 2~h SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS POR PRINARY CONTAIN(ENT AHD REACTOR BUILDING IR)LATIOH IHSTRUNENTATION pune&an Functional Test Calibration Fr Instrunent Check Group 6 Logic once/operating H/h N/A cycle (1 8)

Group 8 (Initiating) turkic Checked during channel functional test. Ho further test required.

Reactor Building Isolation once/6 aonths (18) (6)

(refueling floor) lugic Reactor Building Isolation once/6 nonths (18) (6) H/h (reactor zone) Logic SGTS Train A Logic once/6 nontbs (19) N/A SGTS Train B Logic once/6 nonths (19)

SQTS Train C Logic once/6 nonths (19)

=j Instrunent Channel-Raactor Cleanup Systea tloor Drain Nigh Teaperature once/operating cycle Instruaent Channel-Reactor Cleanup System Space Sigh Tesperature (23) ao RTD caaoe/k~ating cycle )

(once/operating cycle)

h. Teaperature Switch (1) ( )

A 8 FOR BLES 4.2.A THROU 8 4 2 H tunctional tests shall be performed once per month.

2~ Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to" exceed once per week 30 This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definition. The functional test vill consist of infecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel.

Tested during logic system functional tests.

5o Refer to Table 4.1.B.

6 The logic system functional tests shall include a calibration once per operating cycle of time delay relays and "timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip systems 70 The functional test will consist of v'erifying continuity across the inhibit vith a volt;ohmmeter.

8~ checks shall be performed in accordance vith the definition of Instrument Check (see section 1.0 ~

Definitions). An instrument check is not applicable to a

'nstrument particular setpoint, such as Upscale, but is a qualitative check that the instrument is behaving and/or indicating in an acceptable manner for the particular plant condition.

Instrument check is included in this table for convenience and to indicate that an Instrument Check vill be performed on the instrument. Instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not required to be operable or are.

tripped 9~ Calibratim frequency shall be once/year.

10. DELETE 11 ~ Portion of the logic is functionally tested during outage only.

12 ~ The detector vill be inserted during each operating cycle and the proper amount of travel into the core verified.

13 Punctional test will consist of applying simulated inputs (see note 3). Local alarm lights representing upscale and downscale tripe will be verified, but no rod block vill at this time. The inoperative trip vill be be'roduced initiated to produce a rod block (8RN and IRM inoperative also bypassed with the mode switch in RUN) ~ The functions that, cannot be verified to produce a rod block directly vill be verified during the operating cycle.

106

ENCLOSURE 2 DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION (TVA BFNP TS 202)

Pages 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 86, 88; and 109 for units 1 and 2.

Pages f 59, 60, 61 62 ~ 63 s 89 s 9 1 and 106 or

~ unit 3.

These changes are being made to delete the requirements for and all references to the static pressure limiting system for the secondary conta1nment. The 'system for the refueling floor is a shared system which affects the technical specifications of all units.

The system was originally installed to prevent the standby gas treatment blowers, which have an excess capacity, from creating a large negative pressure in the building and causing difficulty in the opening of doors as stated in the FSAR section 5.3.3.7.'he system was in the technical specifications because misoperation could result in loss of secondary containment because the regulators failed in the open direction.; No other safety basis for this system has been found.

Safet Anal sis Operating exper ience. has indicated 'that this system is not needed to limit building negative pressure as was originally anticipated. The original had no safety basis and was for operational practicality only. 'unction The existence of this system increases the probability of loss in secondary containment because of failur e to the system in the open direction. When this request for change is approved, the system will be disabled with the dampers in the closed position or it will be blanked off. =This will result in an increase in safety.

ENCLOSURE 3 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TVA BFNP TS 202)

Descri tion of Chan e The proposed amendment deletes the requirement for and all references to the static pressure limiting system for'he secondary conta1nment.

Basis for Pro osed No Si ificant Hazards Consideration Determination The original purpose of the static pressure limiting system was to prevent the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system blowers, which have an excess capacity> from creating a large negative pressure in the build1ng and causing difficulty in the opening of doors as stated in the FSAR section 5.3.3.7. The system was in the technical specifications because~

the regulators failed in the open position, it would result in the loss of if secondary conta1nment. If the regulators failed in the closed posit1on, no corrective action was required since the reactor zone walls and ceiling are designed above the suction pressure of the SBGT.

The amendment will allow the removal of the system which will result in disabling the damper s in the closed position. Thus, the removal of the system will result in decreasing the probability of losing secondary containment. Removal of the system is not connected with any foreseeable accident and will result in an overall increase in the safety margin.

Based on this analysis, TVA proposes to determine that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.