ML18026A319
| ML18026A319 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1980 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Curtis N PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101090902 | |
| Download: ML18026A319 (19) | |
Text
Docket Hos.:
50-387 and (50-388~
Mr. Norman M. Curtis Vfce Presf dent - Engineering and Constructfon Pennsylvania Power and Lfght Company Two North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsyl van fa 13IOI
Dear Mr. Curtis:
bcc:
TERA NRC/PDR L/PDR NS IC TIC ACRS (16)
DISTRIBUTION:
~Docket:Fi1es BC'layton LB01 Rdg JKnox NRR Rdg SRhow OEisenhut ORoss RPurple FSchroeder JYoungblood JKniaht RStark RTedesco MRushbrook YNoonan PCheck RHartfield, i<)PA LRubenstein OELO JMiller OIE (3)
ASchwencer FMirag1ia RVollmer TMur 1 ey
Subject:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units Hos.
1 and 2 - Request for Addftfonal Information As a result of our review of your application. for operating licenses for the Susquehanna Steam E1ectrfc Plant, we find that we need addftfonal fnformatfon fn.the area of. power. systems, and the prodqdures and test review branches;.
The- -.-.-
specfffc information required fs 1-fsted fn the Enclosure.
If you desfre any discussion or clarfffcatfon of the informatfon reouested, please contact R. H. Star k, Lfcensfng Pro5ect
- Manager, (301-492-7238),.
Sfncerely, Encloaqye:
As stated cc w/encl.:
See next page Robert L. Tedesco, Assfstant Director for Licensing Ofvfsfon of Licensing g/DloZoTo&
DL:LBPl D.
B OFFICE
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L RLTedesco I2gg'/80 NRC FORM 318 Ie."
~'U.S. GOVERNI IENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979 289.369
Mr. Norman W. Curtis Yice President
- Engineering and Construction Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 cc Mr. Earle M. Head Project Engineering Manager Pennsylvania Power
& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Jay Silberg, Esq.
- Shaw, Pittman, Potts Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.
W.
Washington, O.
C.
20036 Hr. William E. Barberich, Nuclear Licensing Group Supervisor Pennsylvania Power
& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsyl vani a 18101 Edward M. Nagel, Esquire General Counsel and Secretary Pennsylvania Power
& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Bryan Snapp, Esq.
Pennsylvania Power
& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsyl vani a 18101 Robert M. Gallo Resident Inspector P.
0.
Box 52 Shickshinny, Pennsylvania 18655 John L.: Anderson Oak Ridge National Laboratory Union Carbide Corporation Bldg. 3500, P; 0.
Box X
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Gerald R. Schultz, Esq.
Susquehanna Environmental Advocates P. 0.
Box 1560 Wikes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18703 Mr. E.B. Poser Project. Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation P.
0.
Box 3965 San Francisco, California 94119 Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Esq.
- Shaw, Pi ttman, Potts Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.
W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 Or. Judith H. Johnsrud Co-Oi rector Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pa 16801 Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Department of Environmental Resources Comnonwealth of Pennsylvania P. 0.
Box 2063 Harn sburg, Pa 17120 Ms. Colleen Marsh Box 538A, RDb4 Mountain Top, PA 18707 Mrs. Irene Lemanowicz, Chairperson The Citizens Against Nuclear Oanagers P. 0.
Box 377 RO/j1
- Berwick, PA 18503 Mr. J.W. Millard Project HAnager Hail Code 394 General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125
ENCLOS FIRE PROTECTION SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (SSES)
UNITS 1
5 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-387/388 POMER SYSTEMS BRANCH In accordance with section 9.5.1, Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, position C.4.a.(1) of NRC Standard Review Plan and section III.G of new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, it is the staff's position that cabling for redundant safe shutdown systems should be separated by walls having a three-hour fire rating or equivalent protection (see section III.G.2 of Appendix R).
That is, cabling required for or associated with the primary method of shutdown, should be physically separated by the equivalent of a three-hour rated fire barrier from cabling required for or associated with the redundant or alternate method of shutdown.
To assure that redundant shutdown cable systems and all other cable systems that are associated with the shutdown cable systems are separated from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard, we require the following information for each system needed to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.
40.95 1.
Provide a.able that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital support system equipment required to achieve and maintain hot and/or cold shutdown.
For each equipment listed:
a.
Differentiate between equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown, b.
Define each equipment's location by fire area, c.
Define each equipment's redundant counterpart,
d.
Identify each equipment's essential cabling (instrumentation,
- control, and power).
For each cable identified: (1) Oescribe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and (2) Identify each fire area location where the cables are separated
~ by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables for any redundant shutdown
- system, and e.
List any problem areas identified by item l.d.(2) above that will be corrected in accordance with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R
(i.e., alternate or dedi'cated shutdown capability).
40.96 2.
provide a table that lists Class 1E and Non-Class lE cables that are associated with the essential safe shutdown systems identified in item 1
above.
For each cable listed:
a.
Oefine the cables'ssociation to the safe shutdown system (common power
- source, common raceway, separation less than Regulatory Guide 1.75 guidelines, cables for equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect shutdown systems, etc.),
b.
Oescribe each associated cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination, and c.
Identify each location where the associated cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-hour fire rating from cables required for or associated with any redundant shutdown system.
40 ~ 97 3.
Provide one of the following for each of the circuits identified in item 2.c above:
(a)
The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure caused by open, ground, or hot short of cables will not affect it' associated shutdown
- system, (b)
Identify each circuit requiring a solution in accordance with section III.G.3 of Appendix R, or (c)
Identify each circuit meeting the requirements of section III.G..2 of Appendix R (i.e., three-hour wall, 20 feet of clear space with automatic fire suppression, or one-hour barrier with automatic fire suppression).
40.98 4.
To assure compliance with GDC 19, we require the following information be provided for the control room. If credit is to be taken for an alternate or dedicated shutdown method for other fire areas (as identified by item l.e or 3.b above) in accordance with section III.G.3 of new Appendix R
to 10 CFR Part 50, the following information will also be required'or each of these plant areas.
a.
A table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the primary method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
b.
A table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and vital support system equipment that are required by the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of achieving and maintaining hot and/or cold shutdown.
c.
Identify each alternate shutdown equipment listed in item 4.b above with essential cables (instrumentation,
- control, and power) that are located in the fire area containing the primary shutdown equipment.
For each equipment listed provide one of the.ollowing:
(1)
Oetailed electrical schematic arawings that show the essential cables that
=are -duplicated-elsewhere-and are electricall.y isolated from the subject fire areas, or (2)
The results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short) of each cable identified will not affect the capability to achieve and maintain hot or cold shutdown.
d.
Provide a table that lists Class lE and Non-Class 1E cables that are associated with the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of shutdown.
For each item listed, identify each associated cable located in the fire area containing the primary shutdown equipment.
For each cable so identified provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, ground, or hot short} of the associated cable will not adversely affect the alternate, dedicated, or remote method of shutdown.
5.
The residual heat removal system is generally a low pressure system that interfaces with the high pressure primary coolant system.
To preclude a
LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recommenda-tions of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.
Thus, this interface most likely consists of two redundant and indep.'ndent motor operated valves with diverse interlocks in accordance with Branch Technical Position ICSB 3.
These two motor operated valves and their associated cable may be subject to a
single fire hazard.
It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-low pressure system interface.
To assure that this interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we require the following information:
a.
Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
b.
Identify each device's essential cabling (power and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) from source to termination.
c.
Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by less than a wall having a three-'hour fire rating from cables for the redundant device.
d.
For the areas identified in item 5.c above (if any), provide the bases and justification as to the acceptability of the existing design or any proposed modifications.
SUS UEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT ROSA E 2 SECOND ROUND OUESTIONS 423.25 (14.2.3)
The response to item 423.8 stated that FSAR Subsection 14.2.7 would be revised to show a 60 day period f'r NRC review of test procedures.
The revision was made in 14.2.3, not 14.'2.7.
Correct the item 4Z3.8 response.
423. 26 (14. 2.12)
The response to item 423.10 is incomplete.
Provide abstracts for the following tests:
A84.1; A85.2; A87.1; A99.2; and A99.6.
423. 27 (14.2.7)
Your response to item 423.11 states that current readings of containment recirculation fans will be higher during ILRT than at accident conditions.
Provide technical justification for this statement..
Address such issues as air density,. temperature, humidity, fan speed and blade angle.
423.28 (14.2.7)
The response to item 423.14 indicates that testing described in Regulatory Guide 1.80 sections C.7 through C.10 will not be done since the testing will have already been done during "various system preoperational tests".
Either provide test descriptions that show testing equivalent to that specified in regulatory positions C.8, C.9, and C.10 will be performed, or modify your preoperational test program to include an integrated loss of air test and provide an abstract of that test.
423.29 (14.2.7)
The response to item 423.15 is not complete.
It is the staff's position that you (1) provide quantitative acceptance criteria for drywell floor bypass
'1eakage and (2) modify your Reactor Protection System test to account for the delay time of interfacing hardware (e.g.,
sensing lines) on channel response time.
423. 30 (14.2.7)
Modify P51.1 to make it consistent with the response to item 423.16.
I 423.31 (14.2.7)
The response to item 423.17 states that Unit 1 and Unit 2 preoperational testing on the 4. 16 KV system (P4. 1) will be accomplished jointly in one month commencing 14 months prior to fuel load on Un'it 1 (Figure 14.2 - 4a) and 11 months prior to fuel load on Unit 2 (Figure 14.2 - 4b).
Section 14.2.11 states that because "the initial fuel loading of Unit 2 is scheduled to occur 18 months after Unit 1, the test programs will not overlap."
Modify Chapter 14 and the response to item 423.17 as necessary to correct this discrepancy.
In addition it will be necessary for you to provide the information requested in item 423. 17 (i.e., electrical lineups) in enough detail for us to determine the following:
(1)
That during the Regulatory Guide 1.41 testing on each unit, there will be no crossties from the other unit's e'1ectrica1 system that could compromise the validity of the test results.
(2)
That if Unit 1 is licensed at the time the Unit 2 test is performed, there will be no crossties that could cause a loss of power to"a Unit 1 emergency bus.
423.32 The response to item 423. 19 states that:
"Testing to verify that ESF pumps operate within their design pump head curves and with adequate NPSH will be done.
This testing is committed to in the General Test Statement as part of the answer to guestion 423.12."
The general test statement says this will be done, but only "where possible".
Modify the response to indicate that all ESP pumps will be completely tested.
423.33 (14.2.7)
The response to item 423.20 indicates that certain changes will be made to the initial test program.
Some of these changes have not yet been reflected in Chapter 14.
l.
Modify Figure 14.2-5 as stated in sub-item 7.
2.
Revise the abstracts for HPCI and RCIC tests to include the demonstration of several successful cold starts as stated in sub-items 9 and 10.
3.
Modify the PT-26 abstract to state that a review of factory test results (flow and opening times) is conducted as part of the overall test review program as described in the response to sub-item 16.
423.34 Modify Figure 14.2-4b to make it consistent with the response to item 423.22.
(Add or correct Tests P70.1, P30.2, P88.1, and P28.1).
423. 35 (14.2.12)
Expand or explain the following terms:
"Interlocks the RFPT alternate.
"high-high temperature.
(P45. 1)
(A30.3) 423. 36 Include testing of the communications system in the preoperational tests or provide assurance that the test procedure and results will be reviewed in a manner similar to the preoperational tests.
423.37 (14.2.7)
The exception to Regulatory Guide 1.108, "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants" (Revision 1), concerning the number of necessary consecutive valid tests per diesel is not acceptable.
It is the staff's position that you perform the 69 starts in accordance with n
Regulatory Position 2.a(9).
Modify Subsection 14.2.7 to state that your test will be conducted in accordance with this position or provide a description of tests that you will perform to demonstrate the required reliability.
423.38 (14.2.7)
Include Regulatory Guide 1.140, "Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Normal Yentilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" (Revision 1),
in Subsection 14.2.7.
Provide justification for any exceptions to Regulatory Positions C. 5 and C. 6.
423. 39 Revise Table of Contents listing of Tables and Figures to reflect the current status of FSAR Section 14.
'23.
40 Our review of recent licensee event reports disclosed that a significant number of reported events concerned the operability of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers.
Provide a description of the inspections or tests that will be performed following system operation to assure that the snubbers are operable.
These inspections or tests should be performed preoperationally if system operation can be accomplished prior to generation of nuclear heat.
423. 41 Revise acceptance test A39.1 (Condensate Demineralizer Abstracts) to correct the fo'llowing inconsistencies:
1)
State whether the system will process water at 1205 above rated capacity (Test Method) or at 120K of rated flow (Acceptance Criteria).
2)
Ensure that monitored conditions are at least held at design specifications (Test Hethod).
423.42 (14.2.12)
Clarify the first acceptance criterion in P45.1 (Feedwater System Preoperational Test).
423. 43 (14.2.12)
Modify the test method of P99.1 (Reactor Building Crane Preoperational Test) so that operation is completely checked in both directions vice "either direction" as stated.
423.44 Modify the Figure 14:2-3 references to refer to the proper figures.
423.45 (1) The response to item 423. 12 is not completely acceptable.
Several acceptance test abstracts (A3.1, A13.1-A13.4, A15.1, A41.1, A45.1, A45.2, and A68. 1) are labeled as preoperational tests.
Correct these inconsistencies.
(2) The response to several sub-items (i.e., l.i.2, 5.t, 5.u) does not address valve closure times.
Modify the response to address them or provide technical justification for the deletions.
(3) If factory testing of a component substitutes for inplant testing, then:
- 1) the method of testing,
- 2) the results of that testing, and 3) how these results are extrapolated to actual plant conditions should be reviewed and retained.
Modify your response to orovide this commitment.
423.46 (14. 2.12)
Revise the test method of A93. 1 (Turbine Lube Oil System) so that it indicates the actual test method.
423.47 (14.2.12)
Explain the status of ST-84 (RPV Internals Vibration). It has been deleted as a startup test in section 14.2.12.2, is included as a
startup test in Figure 14.2-5 sheet 3, is also included in Section 14.2.12.1 with preoperational test abstracts, and yet is not included in Table 14.2-2 or Figure 14.2-4.
Revise the applicable sections to address the internals vibration tests.
O CP aP5