ML18025B781

Amends 84,81 & 55 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68, Respectively,Changing Tech Specs to Add Addl Requirements for Insp of Snubbers & Seismic Restraints in Response to 811120 Generic Request

ML18025B781
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/24/1982
From:	Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
Shared Package
ML18025B782	List: ML18025B781 ML18025B783 ML18025B784
References
DPR-33-A-084, DPR-52-A-081, DPR-68-A-055 NUDOCS 8206040065
Download: ML18025B781 (76)

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~ ~i UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 TENNESSEE YALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-259 BROMNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO.

1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.

84

'icense No. DPR-33 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

The application for amendments by Tennessee Yalley Authority (the licensee(

dated April 28, 1981, as supplemented by letter dated March 9, 1982, complies witfi tlie standards and requirements of the. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended Cthe Act], and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in.10 CFR Chapter. I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and.(ii) that" such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and. security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.,

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission".s regulations and all applicable requirements have'een satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical. Spec-ifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendmenI.

and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility License No. DPR-33 is hereby amended to 'read as follows:

(2)

Technical S ecifications The TechnicalSpecifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 84, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Te'chnical Specifications.

820b040065 820524 PDR ADOCK 05000259 P

PDR 3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Techni'cal Specificattons Date of Issuance:

May 24, 1982 Domentc B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 82 Di'vi'sion of Licensing

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e ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0.84 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33 DOCKET NO. 50-259 Revise Appendix A as follows:

1.

Replace the following page'with the identically numbered page:

Vl 1 Vlli 185 186 187 188 189; 190 1 9.1

'192 193 194 195

. 196-208 224 225 226 2.

Marginal lines. on these pages: indtcate the area Being revised.

The'verleaf page ts. not b'elng revised and should Be retained.

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LIST OF TABLES Cont'd Table Title Parcae Ho 4.2.F Hinimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation.... '......

105 4.2.G Surveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation Instrumentation....'.....

106 4.2.H Hinimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation 107 4.2.J.

Seismic Honitorina Instrument Surveillance...'.. '08 3.5,1 MAPLHGR VERSUS AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURES

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171,172,172m 4.6.A

.Reactor Coolant System Inservice 'inspection S chedule 209 3.7.A Primary Containment Isolation Yalves 250 3.7.8 Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals...

256 3.7.C 3.7.D

.-3.7.E 3.7.F Primary Containment Testable Isolation Valves Suppression Chamber Influent Lines Stop-Check Globe Yalve Leakage Rates Check Valves on Suppression Chamber influent 258 263 Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows 257 Lines

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263 3.7.H 4.8.A 4.8.8 3.11.A Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis 287 Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis 288 Fire Protection System Hydraulic Requirements 324 Testable Electrical Penetrations 265 6.3.A 6.8.A Protection Factors for Respirators Hinimum Shift Crew Requirements 343 360 Amendment No. +>84 vii

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LIST OF I LUSTRATIONS Fi~ure 2.1.1 2.1-2 4.1-1 4.2-1 APfN Flow Reference Scram and APRM Rod Block Settings APRH.Flow Bias 'Scram Vs. Reactor Core-Flow

~pa e no.

13 26 Graphic Aid in the Selection of an Adequate

- Interval Between Tests 49 System Unavailability 119 3.4-1 3.4-2 Sodium Pentaborate Solution Volume Concentrat Requirements Sodium Pentaborate Solution.Temperature.

Requirements" ion 130 139 3.5.2 3.6-1 3.6-2

'6.1-1 Kf Factor

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Hinimum Temperature

'F Above Change in Transient

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Temperature Change in Charpy Y Transition Temperature Vs.

Neutron Exposure TVA Office of Power Organization for Operation of Nuclear Power Plants 173.

194 195 361 6.1-2

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6.2-1 Functional Organization, 362 Review and Audit Function 363 6.3-1 In-Plant Fire Program Organization 364 Y111 Amendment No. ~~84

(I LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY H.

Seismic Restraints, Sup orts, and Snubbers 1.

During. all modes of operation except Cold Shutdown and Re-fuel, and seismic restraints, supportse and snubbers shall be operable except as noted in 3.6.H,2 and 3.6.H.3 below.

All safety-related snubbers are listed in Surveillance Instruction BF SI 4.6.H.

2.

Mith one or more seismic restraint

, support, or,snubber inoperable; within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoper-able seismic restraint(s),

support(s).,

or snubber(s),'o OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation on the attached component or

, declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate LIMITING CONDITION statement for that system.

3.

If a seismic restraint,

support, or snubber (SRSS) is determined

'o be inoperable while the reactor is in the shutdown or refuel mode, that SRSS shall be made operable or replaced prior to reactor startup.

If the inoperable SRSS is attached to a system that is required OPERABLE during the shutdown or refuel mode, the appropriate LIMITING CONDITIONS statement for that system shall be followed.

H.

Seismic Restraints Supports and Snubbers The surveillance requirements of paragraph 4.6.G are the...

only requirements that apply to any seismic restraint or support other than snubbers.

Each safety-related snubber shal:

be demonstrated OPERABLE BY.

performance of the following au gumen t ed inser vice inspection program and the requirements of Specification

3. 6. H/4. 6.H.

These snubbers are listed in Surveillance Instruction BF SI 4.6.H.

1.

Ins ection Grou s

The snubbers may be cate-gorized into two major groups based on whether the snubbers are'ccessible or inaccessible during reactor operation.

These major groups may be further subdivided into groups based on design, envir-

onment, or other features which may be expected to affect the operability of the snubbers within the group.

Each group may be inspected independently in accordance with 4.6.H.2 through 4.6.H.9.

2.

Visual Ins ection Schedule.

and Lot Size V

The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers not previously included in these technical specifications and whose visual inspection has not been performed and documented previouslv, shall be performed within six months for accessible snub-bers and before resuming power after the first refueling outage Amendment Nn.~Be 185

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I LINITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued)

H SURVEILLANCE REJUIREHFNTS Seismic Restraints Sun orts and Snubbers (continued) 2.

Visual Insnection Schedule and Lot Size (continued) for inaccessible snubbers subsequent to being included in these specifications.

The results of these inspections shall be used in the schedule table below to determine the subsequent visual inspection period.

Snubbers previously included in these technical.

specifications shall continue on their previously earned inspection schedule without affect from adding snubbers not within their group.

No. inoperable

+Subsequent Snubbers per Visual Inspec-Inspection tion Period Period 0

1 2

3,4

'5,6,7 8 or more 18 months + 25/

12 months + 25/

6 months + 25/

124 days + 25%

62 days + 25/

31 days + 25/

• The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

Visual Inspection Performance and Evaluation Anendment Ho.

,8'4 186 Visual inspections shall verify (1) that there are no visible indications of damage or im-paired OPERABILITY, (2) bolts attaching the snubber to the foundation or supporting structure are secure, and (3) snubbers attached to sections of safety-related systems that have experienced unexpected potentially damaging transients since the last inspection period

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LIMITING CONDITIONS POR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDKNTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (Continued) and Snubbers continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts 3 ~

Visual Ins ection Perform-ance and Evaluation (cont'd) shall be evaluated for the possibility of concealed damage and functionally tested, if applicable, to confirm operability.

Snubbers which appear in-operable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that (1) the cause of the re)ec-tion is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested, if applicable, in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.6.H.5.

Also, snubbers which have been made inoperable as the result of unexpected transients, isolated

damage, or other such random events, when the provisions of 4.6.H.7 and 4.6.H.8 have been met and any other appropriate corrective action implemented, shall not be counted in determining the next visual inspection interval.

4.

Functional Test Schedule Lot Size and Co osition During each refueling outage, a representative sample

'f 10/ of the total of each 187 Amendment No. 84

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION I

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (Continued H.

Seismic Restraints Su oorts and Snubbers (continued) 4.

Fun'ctional Test Schedule.

Lot Size and Composition (continued) gzoug of safety-related, snubbezs in use in the plant shall,be function-ally tested either in place or in a bench test.

The representative sample selected for functional testing shall include the various configurations, operating environments, and the range of size and capacity of snubbers with-in the groups.

The repre-sentative sample should be weighed to include moze snubbers from severe service areas such as near heavy equipment.

Thc stroke setting and the security of fasteners for attachment of the snubbers to the component and to the snubber anchorage shall be verified on snubbers selected for functional tests.

5.

'Functional 'Test 'Accc tance Criteria The snubber functional test shall verify that:

a.

Activation (restrain-ing action) is achieved.

in both tension and compression within the specified range, except that inertia dependent, acceleration limiting mechanical snubbers may be tested to verify 188 Amendment No. 84

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FO OPERATION

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SlTRVEILLANCE REQlJIR+j<';TS H.

Seismic Restraints

Sunoorts, and Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints Sup orts, and Snubbers (continued)

Function Test Acceptance Criteria (continued) a.

(continued) only that activation takes place in boih directions of travel.

b.

Snubb'er bleed, or release

~here required, is present in both compression and tension within the specified range.

Co For mechanical

snubbers, the force required to initiate or maintain motion.of the snubber is not great enough to overstress the attached, piping or component during thermal movement, or to indicate impending failure of the snubber..

I d.

For snubbers specifically, required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without:

displacement shall be verified.

189 e.

Testing methods may be used to measure para-meters indirectly or parameters other. than

-those specified if those results can be correlated to the specified'arameters through established methods.

Amendment No. 84...

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION H.

Seismic Restraints

.Sup orts, and Snubbers (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su ports, and Snubbers (continued) 6.

Functional Test Failure Analysis and Additional

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Test Lots T

An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the func-tional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure.

The result of this analysis shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbex's to be tested in the subsequent lot in an effort, to determine the operability of other snubbers which may be subject to the same failure mode.

Selection of snubbers for future testing may also be based on the failure analysis.

For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance

criteria, an additional lot equal to l0% of the remainder of that group of snubbers shall be functionally tested.

Testing shall continue until no addition-al inoperable snubbers are found within subsequent lots or all snubbexs of the original inspection group

'ave been tested or all suspect snubbers identi-fied by the failure analysis have been tested, as applicable.

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If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move, i.e.,

frozen in place, the cause will be evaluated and if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same 190

'mendment No. 84

LIHITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREHENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued) and Snubbers (continued H.

Seismic Restraints Sun orts 6.

Functional Test Failure Analysis and Addit'ional Test Lots (continued) design sub)ect to the same defect shall be functionally tested.

This testing requiremen" shall be independent of the requirements stated above for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

The discovery of loose or missing attachment fasteners will be evaluated to determine whether the cause may be localized or generic.

The result of the evaluation will be used to select other suspect snubbers for verifying the attachment fasteners, as applicable.

7.

Functional Test Failure-Attached Component Analysis For the snubber(s) found inoperable, an engineering, evaluation shall be performed on the components which are restrained 'by the snubber(s).

The purpose of this engineer-ing evaluation shall be to determine if the compo-nents restrained by the snubber('s) were adversely affected by the inopera-bility of the snubber(s),

and in order to ensure that the restrained component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

8.

Functional Testin Of Re aired and S are Snubbers 191 Snubbers which fail the vis>>

ual'inspection oi the func-tional test acceptance Amendment No. 84

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. I LIMITING CONDITIONS POR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIR&fiNTS H,

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints, Suooorts and Snubbers (continued) 8.

Punctional Testin of Re aired and Spare Snubbers (continued) criteria shall be repaired or replaced.

Replacement snubbers and snubbers which-have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit.

These snubbers sha' have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the functional test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

9.

Exem tion from Visual Ins ection or Functional Tests'ermanent or other exemptions from visual-inspections and/or functional testing for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commis-sion if a )ustifiable basis for exemption is presented and if applicable snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for the applicable design con-ditions at either the completion of their fabri-cation or at a subsequent date.

Snubbers so exempted shall continue to,. be listecf in the plant instructions with footnotes indicating the extent of the exemptions.

10.

Snubber Service Life Program 192 The service life of snubbers may be extended based on an eva1uation of the records of Amendment No. 84

LIHITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REqUIREHENTS H ~. Seismic Restraints Su

orts, and Snubbers (continued)

H.

~ Seismic Restraints Sun orts and Snubbers (continued) 10.

Snubber Service Life Pro~ram (continued) functional tests, main-tenance history, and environmental conditions to which the snubbers have been exposed.

Il JV 193 Amendment,.No.,

84.

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Figure 3.6-1 C

l200 lOOO 800

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9-25-80 Curve 81 Miuimum temperature for pressure tests

'uch as required by Section XI.

Curve P2 Minimum temperature for mechanical heat up or cooldown following nuclear shutdown.

Curve 83 Minimum temperature for core operation (criticality)

Includes additional margin required by 10CFR50 Appendix Gp Par.

IV A.2.C.

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CC Oa CCO

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t'otes Tllcsc curves are s5ifted 30 F to the right of the originaL set of curves to

'include a ART D

of 30 F.

This sIiDt will.

allow these curves to be used thru 4.0 EFPY.

.200 l 0 au

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%0 MINIlAJH TBPERATURE

( F) 194 Amendment No.

84

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W W

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Al CI Ql ID 150 100 50 0

1016 10 NfUTRON FLUEtlCE t>1 McVl (pl), net 101S

.FtGURE 3.6-2 CHANGE IN CHARPY V TRANSITlON TEMPERATURE VERSUS NEVTRON EXPOSURE 195 Amendment.No. 84

PACES 196-208 DELETED Amenedment No. 84

3.6.H/4.6.H Seismic Restraints Su ports and Snubbers Seismic restraints,

supports, and snubbers (SRSS) are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe or component motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown.

The consequence of an inoperable SRSS is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping or components as a result of a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.

It is therefore required that all SRSS required to prote'ct the primary coolant system or any other safety system or component be operable during reactor operation.

Because the SRSS protection is required only during relatively low probability events, a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed to replace or restore the inoperable SRSS(s) to operable status.and perfor2n an engineering

'valuation on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate limiting condition for operation statement for that system.

The engineering evaluation is performed to determine whether the mode of failure of the SRSS has adversely affected any safety-related component or system.

3.6/4.6 BASES To verify snubber. operability functional tests shall be performed during the refueling outages, at approximately 18 months intervals.

These tests will include stroking of the snubbers to verify proper

-movement, activation, and bleed or release.

Ten percent represents an adequate sample for such tests.

Observed failures on these samples will require an engineering analysis and testing of additional units. If the engineering analysis results in the determination that the failure'of a snubber to activate or to stroke (i.e. seized components) is the result of manufacture or design deficiency, all snubbers subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested.

A thorough inspection of the snubber threaded attachments to the pipe or components and the anchorage will be made in con)unction with all required functional tests.

The stroke setting of the sgubbers'selected for functional testing also will be verified.

All safety-related snubbers are also visually inspected for overall integrity and operability.

The inspection will include verification of proper orientation, adequate fluid level if applicable, and proper attachment of the snubber to piping and structures.,

The removal of..

insulation pr the verification of torque values for threaded fasteners is not required for visual inspections.

- 224 Amendment No. 84

3,6/4.6 BASES (Centdnned)

The visual'nspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection.

Thus, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures.

The number of inoperable snubbers found during a required inspection determines the time interval for the next required inspection.

Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection.

However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25 percent) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval.

Any inpsection whose results require a

shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

When the cause of th'e re)ection of a snubber in a visual inspection is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible and operability verified by inservice functional testing, if applicable, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable.

Generically susceptible snubbers are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as tempera-ture, radiation, and vibration.

Inspection groups may be established based on design features, and installed conditions which may be expected to be generic.

Each of these inspection groups is inspected and tested separately unless an engineering analysis indicates the inspection group is improperly-constituted.

All suspect snubbers are sub)ect to inspection and testing regardless of inspection groupings.

225 Amendment No'. 84

Amendment.No. 84

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-260 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 81

'icense No. DPR-52 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendments by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated April 28, 1981, as supp1emented by letter dated March 9, 1982 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that. such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The'issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable.requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Spec-ifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility License No. DPR-52 is hereby amended to'ead as follows:

(2)

Technical S ecifications The Technical., Specificatians contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 81, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

The.,license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

PPQ THE NUCL R REGULATQRQ C0$ $ ISS:RN Doolenlz 8:, gas,sa,llo, Ch.ref Pperyttng Reactors.

Ega,ncli92 Devi's5in,o f Ltcenstng

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

May 24, 1982

0

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

81 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE'NO; DPR-52

'OCKET NO. 50-'260 Revise Appendix A as follows:

1.

Replace.the following page with the'identically numbered page:

Vi'1 V'i'll 185 186 187 188 189:

19Q 19.1 192 193 194 195 196-2Q8 224 225 226 2.

Marginal lines on these pages Indicate the area, 5etng revised The overleaf page is.. not Keing revised and should 5e retained,

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.0 LIST OF TABLES Cont'd Table 4.2.F Titie

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Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation 105 4.2.G

'urveillance Requirements for Control Room Isolation,instrumentation 106 4.2.H Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection instrumentation 107 4.2.J.

Seismic Monitorino Instrument Surveillance 3.5.1 MAPLHGR VERSUS AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE.

108 171,172e172a 4.6.A Reactor Coolant System Inservice inspection Schedule 209 3.7.A 3.7.8 Primary Containment Isolation Yal ves.......

250 Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring eal s

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S 256 3.7.C 3.7.D

.-3.7.E Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows 257 Primary Containment Testable Isolation Yalves 258 Suppression Chamber Influent Lines Stop-Check Globe Yalve Leakage Rates 263 3.7.F Check Yalves on Suppression Chamber influent L'nes

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263 3.7.H 4.8.A Testable Electrical Penetrations 265 Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis 287 4.8.8 Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis 288 3.11.A 6.3.A 6.8.A Fjre Protection System Hydraulic Requirements..

Pro tee tion Factors for Res pira tors 324 343 Minimum Shift Crew,Requirements..........

360 vii Amendment No. Q +4, 81

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 2.1,1 Title APRN Flow Reference Scram'and APRH Rod Block Settings

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13 2.1-2 4.1-1 4.?-1 3.4-1 3.4-2 APRH.Flow Bias Scram Vs. Reactor Core-Flow.....

26 Graphic Aid in the Selection of an Adequate Interval Between Tests.."............

49 Sys tem Unavailability...............

119 Sodium Pcntaborate Solution Volume Concentration Requirements 130 Sodium Pentaborate Solution.Temperature.

Requirements 139 3.5.2 3.6-1 3.6-2

'6.1-1 f Factor

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K Hinimum Temperature

'F Above Change in Transient Temperature Change in Charpy V Transition Temperature Vs.

t(eutron Exposure TYA Office of Power Organization for Operation of Nuclear Power Plants

173, 194 195 361 6.1-2 6.2-1 6.3-1 Functional Organization Review and Audit Function e

In-Plant Fire Program Organization 362 363 364 Amendment No. P5, 81 v111

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY H.

Seismic Restraints, Sup orts, and Snubbers H.

Seismic Restraints Supports and Snubbers 1.

During. all modes of operation except Cold Shutdown and Re-

fuel, and seismic restraints, support.,

and snubbers shall be operable except as noted in 3.6.H.2 and 3.6.H.3 below.

All safety-related snubbers are listed in Surveillance Instruction BF SI 4.6.H.

2.

With one or more seismic restraint

, support, or snubber inoperable; within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoper-

'ble seismic restraint(s),

support(s).,

or snubber(s);

to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate LIMITING CONDITION statement for that system.

3.

If a seismic restraint,

support, or snubber (SRSS) is determined to be inoperable while the reactor is in the shutdown or refuel mode, that SRSS shall be made operable or replaced prior to reactor startup.

If the inopprable SRSS is attached to a system that is required OPERABLE during the shutdown or refuel mode, the appropriate LIMITING CONDITIONS statement for that system shall be followed.

The surveillance requirements of paragraph 4.6.G are the..

only requirements that apply to any seismic restraint or support other than snubbers-Fach safety-related snubber shal:

be demonstrated OPERABLE BY.

performance of the following augumented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specif ication 3. 6. H/4. 6.H.

These snubbers are listed in Surveillance Instruction BF SI 4. 6.H.,

1.

Ins ection Grou s

The sn>>bb~rs may be cate-gorized into two ma)or groups based on whether the snubbers are accessible or inaccessible during reactor operation.

These major groups may be further subdivided into groups based on design, envir-

onment, or other features which may be expected to affect the operability of the snubbers within the group.

Each group may be inspected independe'ntly in accordance with 4.6.H.2 through 4.6.H.9.

2.

Visual Ins ection Schedule.

and.Lot Size 185 The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers not, previously included in these technical specifications and whose visual inspection has not been performed and documented previously, shall be performed within six months for accessible snub-bers and before resuming power after the first refueling outage

'Amendment No.

81

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued)

H.

t SURVEILLANCE RFQVIREMFNTS Seismic Restraints Sun orts and Snubbers (continued) 2.

Visual Insnection Schedule and Lot Size (continued) for inaccessible snubbers subsequent to being included in these.specifications.

The results of these inspections shall be used in the schedule table below to determine the subsequent vis'ual inspection, period.

Snubbers previously included in these technical.

specifications shall continue on their previously earned inspection schedule without affect from adding snubbers not within their group.

No. Inoperable

• Subsequent Snubbers per Visual Inspec-Inspection tion Period Period 0

1 2

3,4 5,6,7 8 or more 18 months + 25%

12 months + 25%

6 months + 25%

124 days + 25%

62 days + 25%

31 days + 25%

• The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

3 0 Visual Inspection Performance and Evaluation

~

'86 Visual inspections shall verify (1) that there are no visible indications. of damage or im-paired OPERABILITY, (2) bolts attaching the snubber to the foundation or supporting structure are secure',

and (3) snubbers attached to sections of safety-related systems that have experienced unexpected potentially damaging transients since the last inspection period Amendment No. 8l

g g I

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I LIHITING CONDITIONS POR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REJUIRBfiNTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (Continued) and Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints Su oorts 3.

Visual Ins ec tion Perform-ance and Evaluation cont'd) shall be evaluated for the..

possibility of concealed damage and functionally tested, if applicable, to confirm operability.

Snubbers which appear in-operable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that (1) the cause of the re)ec-tion is clearly established and remedied for'hat particular snubber and for other snubbers that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested, if applicable, in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.6.H.5.

Also, snubbers which have been made inoperable as the result of unexpected transients, isolated

damage, or other such random events, when the provisions of 4.6.H.7 and 4.6.H.8 have been met and any other appropriate corrective action implemented, shall not be counted in determining the next visual inspection interval.

4.

Punctional Test

Schedule, Lot Size and Co osition During each refueling outage, a representative sample-of 10% of the total of each 187 Amendment No.

81

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (Continued H.

Seismic Restraints Su oorts and Snubbers (continued) 4.

Functional Test Schedule, Lot Size and Composition (continued) group of safety-related snubbers in use in the plant shall be function-ally tested either in place or in a bench test.

The representative sample selected for functional testing shall include the various configurations, operating environments, and the range of size and capacity of snubbers with-in the gzoups.

The repre-sentative sample should be weighed to include more snubbers from seveze service areas such as near heavy equipment.

The stroke setting and the security of fasteners for attachment of the snubbers to the component and to the snubber anchorage shall be verified on snubbers selected foz functional tests.

5.

Functional 'Test 'Acce tance Criteria The snubber functional test shall verify that:

a.

Activation (restrain-ing action) is achieved in both tension and compression within the specified range, except that inertia dependent, acceleration limiting mechanical snubbers may be tested to verify 188 Amendment No.

81

0

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LD1ITING CONDITIONS FO OPERATION H.

Seismic Restraints

Sunnorts, and Snubbers (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRE,)E'.~S H.

Seismic Restraints Sup orts, and Snubbers (continued) 5.

Function Test Acceptance Criteria (continued) a.

(continued) only that activation takes place in both directions of travel.

b.

Snubber bleed, or release where required, is present in both compression and tension within the specified range.

C ~

For mechanical

snubbers, the force required to ini.tiate or maintain motion of the snubber is not great enough to overstress the attached piping or component during thermal movement, or to indicate impending failure of the snubber.

d.

For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without, displacement shall be verified.

189 e.

Testing methods may be used to measure para-meters indirectly or parameters other.than those specified if th'ose results can be correlated to the specified'arameters through established methods.

'I Amendment No. 81.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION H.

Seismic Restraints

. Su

orts, and Snubbers (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIR~zNTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su ports, and Snubbers (continued) 6.

Punctional Test Pailure Analysis and Additional Test Lots An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the func-tional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure.

The result of this analysis shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in the subsequent lot in an effort to determine the operability of other snubbers which may be subject to the same failure mode.

Selection of snubbers for future testing may also be based on the failure analysis.

Por each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance

criteria, an additional lot equal to 10X of the remainder of that group of snubbers shall be functionally tested.

Testing shall continue until no addition-al inoperable snubbers are found within subsequent lots or all snubbers of the original inspection group have been tested or all suspect snubbers identi-fied by the failure analysis have been tested, as applicable.

l I

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move, i.e.,

frozen in place, the cause will be evaluated and if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same 190

'mendment No.

81

LIHITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREHENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued) and Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts 6.

Functional Test Failure Analysis and Addit'ional Test Lots (continued) design subject to,the same defect shall be functionally tested.

This testing requiremen-shall be independent of the requirements stated above for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

The discovery of loose or missing attachment fasteners will be evaluated to determine 'whether the cause may be localized or generic.

The result of the evaluation will be used to select other suspect snubbers for verifying the attachment fasteners, as applicable.

7.

Functional Test Failure

'ttached Com onent Analysis For the snubber(s) found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components which are restrained by the snubber(s).

The purpose of this engineer-ing evaluation shall be to determine if the compo-nents restrained by the snubber(s) were adversely affected'y the inopera-

~ bility of the snubber(s),

and in order to ensure that the restrained component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

8.

Functional Testin Of Re aired and S are Snubbers 191 Snubbers which fail the vis-ual inspecdion oi the func-tional test acceptance Amendment Ho.

81

I

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE RE/UIR~rNTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints

Supports, and Snubbers (continued 8.

Functional Testin of

~ Re aired and Spare Sn'ubbers (continued) criteria shall be repaired or replaced.

Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit.

These snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the functional test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

9.

Exem tion from Visual Ins ection or 'Functional Tes ts'ermanent or other exemptions from visual. inspections and/or functional testing for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commis-sion if a )ustifiable basis for exemption is presented and if applicable snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify snubber operability for the applicable design con-ditions at either the compl~tion of their fabri-cation or at a subsequent date.

Snubbers so exempted

. shall continue to be listed in the plant instructions with footnotes indicating the extent of the exemptions.

10.

Snubber Service Life Program 192 The service life of snubbers may be extended based on an evaluatiwn'f the records of Amendment No.- 81---

LIHITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REgUIRBKNTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints Sun orts and Snubbers (continued) 10.

Snubber Service Life "-

'ro~ram (continued) functional tests, main-tenance history, and environmental conditions to which the snubbers have been exposed.

193 Amendment'o.

81

Figure 3.6-1 I200 I000 800 I

~

"2 8

9"25-80 Curve Nl

'inimumtemperature for pressure tests such as required by Section XI.

Curve P2

.Minimum temperature for mechanical heat up or cooldovn folloving nuclear ahutdovn.

Curve 83 Minimum temperature for core operation (criticality)

Includes additional margin required by 10CFR50 Appendix C, Par.

IV A.2.C.

~

~

hotes Hlcse curves are s5ifted 30oF to the right of the original set of curves to

'include a AT >

of 30 F.

This skix7t vill allov these curves to be,,

used thru 4.0 EFPY.

'200

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0 I 0 200 I

I

%0 MININMTBPERATURE

( F) 194 Amendment No.,

81

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PAGES 196-208 DELETED Amendment-Noi 81 -.

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3.6.H/4.6.H Seismic Restraints Su ports and Snubbers Seismic restraints,

supports, and snubbers (SRSS) are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe or component motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown.

The consequence of an inoperable SRSS is an increase in the-probability of structural damage to piping or components as a result of a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.

It is therefore required that all SRSS required to protect the primary coolant system or any other safety system or component be operable during reactor operation.

Because the SRSS protection is required only during relatively low probability events, a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed to replace or restore the inoperable SRSS(s) to operable status and perfor'm an engineering evaluation on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate limiting condition for operation statement for that system.

The engineering evaluation is performed to determine whether the mode of failure of the SRSS has adversely affected any safety-related component or system.

3.6/4.6 BASES To verify snubber. operability functional tests shall be performed during the refueling outages, at approximately 18 months intervals.

These tests will include stroking of the snubbers to verify proper movement, activation, and bleed or release.

Ten percent represents an

'dequate sample for such tests.

Observed failures on these samples will require an engineering analysis and testing of additional units. If the engineering analysis results in the determination that the failure of a snubber to activate or to stroke (i.e. seized components) is the result of manufacture or design deficiency, all snubbers'ubject to the same defect shall be functionally tested.

A thorough inspection of the snubber threaded attachments to the pipe or components and the anchorage will be made in con)unction with all required functional tests.

The stroke setting of the srubbers selected for functional testing also will be verified.

All safety-related snubbers are also visually inspected for overall integrity and operability.

The inspection will Include verification of proper orientation, adequate fluid level if applicable, and proper attachment of the snubber to piping and structures.,

The removal of insulation pr the verification of torque values for threaded fasteners is not required for visual inspections.

-224 Amendment No.

81

3.6/4.6 BASES (Cenndnned)

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber prot'ection.

Thus, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures.

The number of inoperable snubbers found during a required inspection determines the

~

time interval for the next required inspection.

Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection.

However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time, less 25 percent) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval.

Any inpsection whose results require a

shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

When the cause of the re)ection of a snubber in a visual inspection is clearly established and remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically susceptible and operability verified by inservice functional testings if applicable, that snubber may be exempted from being counted as inoperable.

Generically susceptible snubbers are those which 'are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the snubber, or are similarly located or exposed to the same environmental conditions such as tempera-ture, radiation,'and vibration.

Inspection groups may be established based on design features, and installed conditions which may be expected to'e generic.

Each of these inspection groups is inspected and tested separately unless an engineering analysis indicates the inspection group is improperly constituted.

All suspect snubbers are subject to inspection and testing regardless of inspection groupings.

-'~

225 Amendment No.

81

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'I Amendment No.

81

I gag REC0, Mp,

~4 0

+y*yW UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-296 BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO. 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.

55

. License No. DPR-68 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendments by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee} dated April 28, 1981, as supplemented by letter dated March 9., 1982 complies wi'th the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(.the Act)., and the Commission's rules and regu'lations set forth. in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission' regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common

.defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E;

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Spec-ifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility License No. DPR-68 is hereby amended'o read as follows:

(2)

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 55, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licehsee shall operate the facility. in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as'of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COh1HISSION Domenic B:. Vassallo, Ckief Operattng Reactors Branch ¹2 Dtvi'ston of Li'censing

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications

'ate of Issuance:

May 24, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0.55 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

DPR-68 DOCKET'O: 50-'296 Rev ise Appendix A as fo 1 1 ows:

1.

Remove t4e follovrtng pages and replace with the identically numbered pages:

V'L1 Vl11.'98

,19K 200.

201.

202 2Q3 204 205 2QG 2Q7 208 2Q9:

21Q 211 212 213 214 215-219'28 229',

23Q Marginal lines-on the aBove pages tndtcate the area being revised.

NOTE

~ 'he table on pages 2Q9;-214 ts the same tnformatton previously on pages 203-208, Tlie taBle was moved, verBatim, to provide pages for the requtrements on snuBBers being added by this amendment.

4

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4e2eK 4 ~ 2 ~ F

'Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection Instrumentation Minimum Test.and Calibration Frequency for Surveillance Instrumentation 101 102 4 ~ 2 ~ G Surveillance Require.ments.for Control Room Iso lation Zn 4trumenta tion 103 4 ~ 2eH Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Flood Protection Instrumentation 4 ~ 2 ~ J r.4 ~ 6 A

Seismic Monitorinq Instrument Surveillance Requirements

'eactor "Coolant Syst'm Zhservice Inspection Schedule MAPLHQR vs. Average Planar Exposure 105 209 1F>,f82 3 7.A 3m7 ~ B 3%7 C

3.7.D 3 ~ 7 ~ E 3.7'F Primary Containment Isolation Valves Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals Testable Penetrations with Testable Bellows Primary Containment Testable Isolation Valves Suppression Chamber Influent Lines Stop-Check Globe Valve Leakage Rates Check Valves on Suppression Chamber Influent Lines

.262 268 269 279 280 3' '

3.7m H 4 ~ 8 A 4 ~ 8mB 6 ~ 3 A

6 ~ Beh Check Valves -on Drywell Influent Lines Testable Electrical Penetrations Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis Radioactive Gaseous Waste Samplinq and Analysi,s I

Protection Factors for Respirators Minimum Shift Crew Requirements 281 283 310 311 373 390 vii Amendment Ne. P, 55

I e ~

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m LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 2.1-1

2. 1-2

4. 1

4. 2-1 3e4-1 3 4-2 T+tle APRM Flow Reference Scram and APRH Rod Block Settings APRH Flow Bias Scram Relationship to Normal Operating Conditions Graphic Aid in the Selection of an Adequate Interval Between Tests System Unavailability Sodium Pentaborate Solution Volune Concentration Requirements Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temperature

"'R equi r erne nt s

~ae 25 117 141 142

3. 5.2 3.6-1 3 t6-2 6.1-1 Xg Factor vs. Percent Core Flow Temperature-Pressure Limitations Change in Charpy V Temperature vs.

Neutron Exposure TVA Office of Power Organizaticn for Operation of Nuclear Power Plants.'83 207 208 391

6. 1-2 6.2-1 6 ~ 3-1 Functional Organization Revie~ and Audit Function In-Plant Fire Program Orqanization 392 393 394 viii Amendment Nn. Pl, 55 e

I

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY SURVEILLANCE REJUIREqEiTS 4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY H.

Seismic Restraints Su norts, and Snubbers H.

Seismic Restraints Suooorts and Snubbers 1.

During all modes of operation except Cold Shutdown and Re-

fuel, and seismic restraints,

supports, and snubbers shall'e operable except as noted in 3.6.H.2 and 3.6.H.3 below.

All safety-related snubbers are listed in Surveillance Instruction BF SI 4.6.H.

2.

With one or. more seismic restraint

, support',

or snubber

. inoperable; within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore

. the inoper-able seismic restraint(s),

support(s),

or snubber(s),

to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate LIMITING CONDITION statement for that system.

3.

If a seismic restraint,

support, or snubber (SRSS) is determined to be inoperable while the reactor is in the shutdown or refuel mode, that SRSS shall be made operable or replaced prior to reactor startup.

If the inoperable SRSS is attached to a system that is required OPERABLE during the shutdown or refuel mode, the appropriate LIMITING CONDITIONS statement for that system shall be followed.

The surveillance requirements of paragraph 4.6.G are the only requirements that apply to any seismic restraint or support other than snubbers.

Each safety-related snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE BY performance of the following augumented. inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 3.6.H/4.6.H.

These snubbers are listed in Surveillance Instruction BF SI 4. 6. H.

l.

Insnection Groups The snubbers may be cate-gorized into two major groups based on whether the snubbers are accessible or inaccessible during reactor operation.

These major groups may be further subdivided into groups based on design, envir-onment, or other features which may be expected to affect the operability of the snubbers within the group.

Each group may be inspected independentlv in accordance with 4.6.H.2 through 4.6.H.9.

2.

Visual, Ins ection

Schedule, and Lot Size 198 The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers not previously included in these technical specifications and whose visual inspection has not been performed and documented previously, shall be performed within six months for accessible snub-bers and before resuming power after the first refueling outage Amendmept No. g S5

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I LIMITING CONDITIONS 'FOR OPERATION

\\

H.

Seismic Restraints Suonorts and Snubbers (continued)

, H.

SURVEILLANCE RFJUIREMFNTS Seismic Restraints Su ports, and Snubbers (continued) 2.

Visual Insoection Schedule and Lot Size (continued) for inaccessible snubbers subsequent to being included in these specifications.

The results of these inspections shall be used in the schedule table below to determine the subsequent visual inspection period. 'nubbers previously included in these. technical.

specif ications 'shall continue on their pr'eviously earned inspection schedule without affect from adding snubbers n'ot within their group.

No. Inoperable

• Subsequent Snubbers per Visual Inspec-Inspection tion Period Period 0

1 2

3,4 5,6,7 8 or more 18 months + 25/

12 months + 25K 6 months + 25K 124 days +-25K 62 days + 25'.

31 days + 25%

• The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time.

3.

Visual Insnection Performance and Evaluation 199 Visual inspections shall verify (1) that there are no visible indications of damage or im-paired. OPERABILITY, (2) bolts attaching the snubber to the foundation or supporting structure are secure; and (3) snubbers attached to'ections of'afety-related systems that have experienced unexpected potentially damaging transients since the last inspection period Amendment No.g~

55

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LIHITING CONDITIONS POR OPERATION 4

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.

Si ismic Restraint.,~S>>ppnr~ts and Snubbers (Continued)

H and 2P S>>ubbers (continued)

Sr.i:;m$ c Restraints, Su

orts, 3.

Visual Inspection Perform-ance and Evaluation (cont'd) shall be evaluated for the" possibility of concealed damage and functionally tested, if applicable, to confirm operability.

Snubbers which appear in-.

operable

.as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, providing that (1) the cause of. the re)ec-tion is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers that may be generically susceptible; and (2} the affected snubber is functionally tested, if applicable, in the as-found condition and.

determined

.OPERABLE per Specification 4.6.H.5.

Also, snubbers which have been made inoperable as the result of unexpected transients, isolated

damage, or other such random events, when the provisions of 4.6.H.7 and 4.6.H.B have been.met and any other appropriate corrective action implemented, shall not be counted in determining the next visual inspection interval.

4.

Punctional Test Schedule, Lot Size and Com osition 200 During each refueling outage, a representative sample of lOX of the total of each Amendment No.

55

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1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREM NTS H.

Seismic Restraints Suo orts and Snubbers Continued H.

Seismic Restraints,

Supports, and Snubbers (continued) 4.

Functional Test Schedule.

Lot Size and Composition (continued) group of safety-related snubbers in use in the plant shall be function-ally tested either in place or in a bench test.

The representative sample

, selected for functional testing shall include the various con igurations operating environments,

'nd the range of size and capacity of snubbers with-in the groups.

The repre-sentative sample should be weighed to include more snubbers from severe service areas such as near heavy equipmen The stroke setting and the sccuri,ty of fasteners for attachment'of the snubbers to the component and to the snubber anchorage shall

~

be verified on snubbers selected for functional tests.

P Functional;Test'Acceptance x erma The snubber functional test shall verify that:

201 a.

Activation (restrain-ing action) is achieved in both tension and compression within the speci. fied rarige, except that inertia dependent, acceleration limiting mechanical snubbers may be tested to verify Amendment No. 55

~

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR ERATION H.

Seismic Restraints Su

orts, and Snubbers (continued)

H.

SUR ILLANCE REJUIR@jEq~S Sei.,mic Restraints Sup orts, 5.

Function Test Acceptance Criteria (cccticced) a ~

(continued)

.only that activation takes place in both directions of travel.

b.

Snubber bleed, or release where required,

's present in both compression and tension within the specified range.

C ~

For mechanical

snubbers, the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is not great enough to overstress the attached piping or component during thermal movement, or to indicate impending failure of the snubber.

d.

For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous

load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without.

displacement shall be verified.

202 Testing methods may be used to mea'sure para-meters indirectly or parameters other than those specified if tho'se results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

Amendment No.

55

~ ~,

~ ac'

~ I LIMITING.CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION H.

Seismic Restraints

Supports, and Snubbers (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Support's,

, and Snubbers (continued) 6.

Punctional Test Failure Analysis and Additional-Test Lots An engineering evaluation shall oe made of each failure to meet the func-tional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure.

The result of this analysis shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in the subsequent lot in an effort to determine the operability of other snubbers which may be subject to the same failure mode.

Selection of snubbers for future testing may also> be based on the failure analysis.

For each snubber that does not meet the functional test acceptance

criteria, an additional lot equal to 10% of the remainder of that group of snubbers shall be functionally tested.

Testing shall continue until no addition-al inoperable snubbers are found within subsequent lots or all snubbers of the original inspection group have been tested or all suspect snubbers identi-fied by the failure analysis have been tested, as applicable.

203 If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lockup or fails to move', i.e.,

frozen in place, the cause

'illbe evaluated and if caused by manufacturer oi design deficiency, all snubbers of the same

, Amendment No.

55

\\

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LIHXTING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints Sup orts, and Snubbers (continued) 6.

Functional Test Failure

- Analysis and Additional Test Lots (continued design subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested.

This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated above for snubbers not mee ting the func tiona 1 test acceptance criteria.

The discovery of loose or missing attachment fasteners will be evaluated to determine whether the cause may be localized or generic.

The result of the evaluation will be used to select other suspect snubbers for verifying the attachment fasteners, as applicable.

7.

Functional Test Failure-Attached Component Analysis For the snubber(s) found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components whi,ch are restrained by the snubber(s).

The purpose of this engineer-ing evaluation shall be to determine if the compo-nents xestrained by the snubber(s) were adversely affected by the inopera-

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bility of the snubber(s),

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and in order to ensure that the restrained component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

8.

Functional Testin Of Re aired and S are Snubbers 204 Snubbers-which fail the vis-ual inspection or the func-tional test acceptance Amendment No. 55

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Su orts and Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints Sllooorts, and Snubbers (continued) 8.

Functional Testin of Re aired and Spare Snubbers.

(continued) criteria shall be repaired or replaced.

Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit.

These snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the functional test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

9.

Exem tion from Visual Ins ection or Functional Tests Permanent, or other exemptions from visual inspections and/or functional testing for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commis-sion if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and if applicable snubber life destructive testing

'was performed to qualify snubb'er operabili.ty for the applicable design con-ditions. at either the completion of their fabri-cation or at a subsequent date.

Snubbers so exempte'd shall continue to be listed in the plant instructions with footnotes indicating the extent of the exemptions.

10.

Snubber Service 'Life Pro ram 205 The service li.fe of snubbers may be extended based on an evaluation of the records of Ayeqdment Ho.

55

LIHITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRE? ENTS H.

Seismic Restraints Supports,'nd Snubbers (continued)

H.

Seismic Restraints, Su orts and Snubbers (continued)

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10.

Snubber Service Life Pro ram (continued) funccional tests, main-tenance history, and environmental conditions to which the snubbers have been exposed.

206 Amendment No.

55

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Figure 3.6-1 CO I

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1200 i000 800

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9-25-80 Curve fll Minimum temperature for pressure tests such as required by Section Xl.

Curve /2 Hiuemum rempererure

. Eor mechanical heat up or cooldown following nuclear shutdown.

Curve'3 Minimum temperature for core operation (criticality)

Includes additional margin required by 10CFR50 Appendix G, Par.

IV A.2.C.

I-I Q le1 C/l Ce'em C/1 C/1 ce'e O

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e Notes Ttcese curves are s$ifted 30 F to the right of the original set of curves to include a hPT I of 30 F.

.This sNkt vill allow these curves to be used thru 4.0 EFPY.

200 e

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I 300 40 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE

( F) 207 Anendment No. P(,

55

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h 200 W

150 100 O

I 50 AS C7 0

16 1017 1018 1019 NEUTRON FLUENCE l)1 MeV) (Pt), ssy!

FlGURE 3.6-2 CHANGE lN CHARPY V TRANSlilONTEMPERATURE VERSUS NEUTRON EXPOSURE l 208 Amendment No. 55

Table S.6.A EACToR COOIAIrr S STEN INSERVIC I SP ION SCHEDULE S

INSPe IN INSP~

A Reactor Vessel l.

Longitudinal and circuaf erential velds outside core region and in ves-sel head Those velds above sacrificial shield and all in closure hoad are accessible from vessel o.d 10% of accessible longitudinal code (1) 5% of accessible circumferential Volumetric

2. 'essel-to-flange circum( erential veld Head-to-flange circumferential veld 3.

Primary norsle-to-veosel velds and noxrle-to-vessel in-side radi,i From flange surface From o.d. of head All nozrles I inches and greater vill be accessible from vessel o.d.

4 100%

100%

100$ velds Inside radii at the 6 and 12 oi clock positions Code (2) code (2)

Code (2)

Code (2)

Volumetric Volumetric Volumetric 3a.

CRD housing-to-stub tube and stub tube-to-vessel velds and incore penetration During refueling from CRD area for signs of leakage 100%

At time of

'isual syotem hydro-stat a ~

Primary noxrles to safe-end Dissimilar IIetal velds All nozxles

~% inches and larger vill be accessible 100%

Code (2)

Visual, surface, and volumetric 5

Closure studs and nuts Studs in place, nuts on removal 100%

Code (2)

Visual, surface~

and volumetric Amendment No. 55

Table 4

6 h CTOR COOIANT SYSTEN INSERVICE INSPECTION SCREOULE RRERS OP INTEREST 6.

Closure vashers, Bushings ilCCEBS On removal In place, vhen studs are removed IHSP~

H H

IHTERVAI 100%

Nhen made accessible

~f1' EIICY Code (2)

NETBOD Visual Visual 7.

Integrally velded vessel supports Tvo sections 2 feet long each, 184 apart, accessible Ln support

- skirt to vessel veld One foot minimum length 180O apart - tvo spots Code (2)

'olumetric 8.

Vessel cladding During refueling-vcssel i.d.

6 predetermined patches (36 Ln.a each)

Code (2)

Visual 9.

Vessel internals and integrally welded internal suppo'rts hccessible areas during normal-re-fueling Accessible areas First refuel-Visual ing and every third refueling thereafter 10' Vessel flange-ligaments betvcen threaded stud holes Ouring refuelLng 100$

Code (2)

Volumetric B.

Pi in Pressure Bounda l.

Vessel, pump, and valve safe ends-to-primary pipe dLssinilar metal velds and safe ends in branch pLping velds 4 inches and larger From pipe o.d.

1006 Code (2)

Visual and sur-face and volmetric Amendment No.. 55

OR COOEhBT SZ Table

~.6,A SERVIC INSPECT ON SCB UL lLREAS OF IHFEREST IHSP IH IHSP INTERVAL 2

Circumferential and

- longitudinal pipe

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velds 4 inches and over Removable insulation 25S of 'circumferential welds code (2) plus 1 foot of adjacent longitudinal weld s Visual and volumetric Clrcuafer ential-type velds

- pipe whip protection 3.

Pressure-retaining bolting 4.

Piping supports and hangers Removable Insulation 2 inches and larger Bolting under 2

inches on piping 4

inches and over All those listed in Section 4.6 C.e of Technical Specifications 100S 100S code (1)

Visual and volumetric Code.(1)

Visual and volumetric Signs of leakage.dur-Visual lng normal maintenance a.

Integrally welded b.

Honintegrally velded supports C

Pun P essure u da 1.

Pump 'ca el ng Scaffolding - as required Scaffolding - as required'00S

visual, 25S Vol. (if suitable geometry) 100S Code (2)

Code'2)

Visual and volumetric Visual Amendment No. 55

Table a.6.h REh R COOLAH SYSTEM IHSKRVICE IHSPECT OH SCHEDN.

hQEhS OF IHTEREST Pump pressure boun-dary interior hCCESS Pron pump i.d. only

+hen maintenance requires removal of internals 5

HSP IH lSPo IHTERVhl One pump vith or vt.thout zelda if disassembled fR!RIUUlcI IIETHoo Code (1)

Visual if disassembled 2.. Pressure-retaining 2 inches a

d 1 bolting e

n argcr 1005 Code (1)

Visual and volumetric Bolting under 2

inches 1005 Signs of leakage 5ur-ing normal maintenance outage Visual I

hJ 3 ~

Supports

a. Jntegrally veld ed

b. Honintegrally velded I."

Homal e-to-safe end diesis.lar netal velds Valve P essure Sou da 1 ~

Valve body sean velds

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Scaffolding as required scaffold(ng as required Removable insulation Won valve o.d 255 1005 1005 1005 Code (2)

Code (2)

Code (2) volumetric Code (I)

Visual and volumetric Visual Visual and Visual and volumetric Amendment No. 55

Table S

6 A EACIOR COOLAHT S S

HSERVZCE HSPECT OH SCHEDULE AREAS Ot IHTEREST ACCESS S IHSP IH IHSP.

XHTIXVAL

'EI~UICY HEI'HOD Valve pressure boun-dary, interior Froa valve i.d only vhen naiatenance requires raeoval of internals one valve with or vithout velds if dJ.saseenbled Code (1)

Visual if disassembled 2 ~

Valve-to-safe end diesinilar metal zelda Renoval insulation 100%

Code (2)

Visual and volumetric 3 ~

Pressure-retaining 2 inches and larger bolting 100S code (1)

Visual and volumetric Supports and hangers-Bolting under 2 inches 100S Signs of leakage during nor-eal naintenance outage Visual

a. Integrally veld ed

b. Honintegrally voided Scaffolding - as required Scaffolding - as required 25S Vol (if suitable geoeetry)

Code (2) 10 0 S visua 1 100S Code (2)

Visual and volu~tric Visual Amendment No. 55

Table a.6.A eros cooDo 8 sr Hspnvic Hsp foN HEoOLE 0

NS var Inspection trequency:

Code (1) - Progran such that all areas of interest vill be inspected during tbe inspection interval, I

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Code (2) - Prograa such that at least 25% of the required exaainations shall have been. conpleted after one-third of the inspection interval has expired (vith credit for no nore than 33-1/3% if additional exaninations are ccapleted) and at least 50% after tvo-thirds of the inspection interval has expired (uith credit for no nore than 66-2/3X) ~

The reaainder shall be coapleted by the end of the inspection interval.

Amendment No.

55

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'I Amendment -No.- 55.--

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'BASES

. 0 It is int<<ndcd that thc required examinations and inspection bc completed during each 10-year interval.

Thc pcrindic examinations arc to be done during refueling outages or other extended plant shutdown periods.

Only proven nondestructive testing techniques will be used.

Morc frequent inspections shall bc performed on certain circu f r ti 1 p pe we s as istcd in 'ection 4.6.C.4 to provide additional protection against pipe whip.

These wclds werc selected in respect tn their distance from hangers nr supports whcrcin a failure of the weld would permit the unsupported segments of pipe to strike the drywcll wall nr nearby auxiliary systems or control systems.

Selection was based on'udgment from actual plant observation of hanger and support locations and review of rawings.

Inspection of all tl>csr welds.during each 10-yc;>r inspection interval. will result iin'hrct:<d<lit innal'xamin;>t ions nhnvc the requirements of Sc<<t/<>n XI

<>f ASHI Co<I<<.

REFERENCES l.

Inservice Inspection and Testing (BFNP FSAR Subsection 4.12) 2.

Inscrvicc Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Conlant Systems,Section XI, ASME Boiler and Pr<:ssure

<II'cssel Code 3.

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III (1968 edition)

American Society for Nondestructive Testing No.

SNT-TC-1A (1968 edition)

Seismic restraints, supports and snubbers (SRSS) are designed to prevent du unrestrained pipe or component motion under dynamic loads as might occ r u

uring an earthquake or severe transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and Shutdown.

Thc consequence of an inoperable SRSS is an increase in thc probablllty of structural damag<

rn 1>ipinj or It components as a result of a s<<ismic or other event initiating dynamic load

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t is therefore required that

<<11 SRSS required to prntcct the primary coolant system or any other safety system or component bc operable durin reactor operation.

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'Because the SRSS protection is required only during rcl.ativc'Ly low probability events, a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed tn replace nr restore the inoperable SRSS(s) to oper;>blc status and perform an engineering evaluation on the supported component or declare the supported system inoperablc and follow the appropriate limiting condition for operation statement for that system.

Thc engineering evaluation is performed to determine whether the mode of failure of thc SRSS has adversely affected any safety-related component or system.

Amendment No. Pi 55 228

3.6/4.6 BASES (Contin<<ed)

To verify snubber operability func'tional tests shall hc performed during the'efueling

outages, at approximately l8 months intervals.

These tests will include stroking of thc snubber's to verify proper movement, activation, and bleed or rclcase.

Tcn percent represents an adequate sample for such tests.

Observed failures on these samples will require an.engineering analysis and testing of additional units.

If the engineering analysis results in the determination that the failure of snubber to activate or to stroke (i.c. seized components) is the result of manufacture or design deficiency, all snubbers subject to rhe same defect shall be functionally tested.

A thorough inspection of the snubber threaded attachments to the pipe or components and the anchorage will be made in conjunction with all required 'functional tests.

The stroke setting'f the snubbers selected for functional testing also will be verified.

All safety-related snubbers are also visually inspected for overall integrity and operability.

The inspection will incl'udc verification of proper orientation, adequate fluid level if applicable, and proper, attachment of the snubber to piping and structures.

Thc removal of insulation or the verification of torq<<c values For threaded Fasteners is not required for visual inspections.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection.

Thus, thc require<1 inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures.

The n<<mbcr of inoperable snubbers found during a req<<ired inspection determines the time interval for the next required inspection.

Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed mny be used as n ncw reFcrcncc point to determine the next inspection.

However, thc rcs<<its of such early inspections performed before the origin~1 req<<ircd time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25 percent) may <<<it bc used to lengthen the required inspection interval.

Any inpsection whose rcs<<lt., require a

shorter'nspection interval will override the previous schedule.

Vheh the cause of the rejection of a snubber in a visual inspection is clearly established and.remedied for that snubber and for any other snubbers that may be generically s<<sccptihle and operability verified by inservice functional testing, if applicable, that sn<<bbcr may.be exempted from being counted as inoperablc.

Generically susceptible snubbcrs are those which are of a specific make or model and have the same design features directly related to rejection of the sn<<bber, or are similarly locared or exposed to the same env'ironmental conditions such as tempera-ture, radiation, and vibration.

Inspection groups may be established based on design features, and installed conditions which may be expected to be generic.

Each of these inspection gro<<ps Xs i<<spccted and tested separately unless an engineering analysis indicates thc inspection group is improperly constituted.

All suspect sn<<bbcrs are sub.jcct to inspection and testing regardless of inspection groupings.

229 Amendment No.

55

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Amendment No./

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