ML18025B405
| ML18025B405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1981 |
| From: | Chase J, Dance H, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B403 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-80-47, 50-260-80-37, 50-296-80-41, NUDOCS 8103240681 | |
| Download: ML18025B405 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1980047
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
BEGjON II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SVITE 3100
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303
Report Nos.
50-259/80-47,
50-260/80-37
and 50-296/80-41
Licensee:
Va 1 1 ey Authority
'. 500A Chestnut Street Tower II
Chattanooga,
37401
Facility:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Docket Nos. '0-.'259, 50-260 and:50-296
License Nos.
OPR-33,
OPR-52 and OPR-68
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Athens,
Inspectors
CZ.
R. F. Sulliv
Date Signed
J.
W. Chase
~/-
Approved by
'(. '4 i'=
H. C. Dance,
Section Chief,
RONS Branch
~ %/
C
Date Signed
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Inspection
on.December'. 1.to Pecember. 31 1980.
Areas Inspected
This routine inspection
invol've'd '146'resident'nspector-hours
'in the
areas
of
0'perational
'safety,
repor'table
occurrences,
plant physical
protection,
design
changes,
radiographing,
reactor trips, refueling,
fuel
storage
racks
and
discharge
header radiation protection,
maintenance,
heavy loads
and fuel pool areas.
(
r
4 r
Results
L
Of. the 13 areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were found in
9 areas,
four
'iolations
were identified in 4 areas,
(Violation -'ai.lure to have torus access
shield plugs installed
as required
by a safety analysis while operating'at
power,
paragraph
6; Violation fail.ure to meet technical
specification
requirements
to
'preven't
unauthori'zed'"entry
- i'n'to'a"po'sted
high:"r adi'ation area;
- paragraph:16'",'"-.' '
" Viol'ation -failifre to'dhere
to"p'rocedure
requirementsduring
the'in'stalTationof
a main
steam
safety valve,
paragraph
17; Violation - failure to evaluate
and
r
t
f
r
verify test results
and
complete quality assurance
reviews for work plan
Nos.
6371
and
7703 issued to install high density spent fuel storage
racks
in to Unit
1 and 3 spent fuel pools, paragraph
12.)
r
( ~
0ETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
H. L. Abercrombie-, Plant Manager
J.
L. Harness, Assistant Plant Manager
J.
B. Studdard,
Operations Supervisor
R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations
Supervisor
J. A. Teague,
Maintenance,
Supervisor, Electrical
M
. A. Haney,"Maintenance
Supervi.sor,.Mechanical
J.
R. Pittman, Maintenance Supervisor,
Instruments
R. G. Metke, Results Section Supervisor
R. T. Smith,
QA Supervisor
J.
E. Swindell, Outage Director
B. Howard, Plant Health Physicist
R. E. Jackson,
Chief, Public Safety
R. Cole,
QA Site Representative
Office of Power
T. Chinn, Compliance Staff Supervisor
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
licensed
senior
reactor
operators
and
reactor
operators,
auxiliary operators,
craftsmen,
tech-
nicians, public safety officers,
QA personnel
and engineering
personnel.
Management Interviews
Management
interviews were conducted
on Oecember
5,
12 and
19,
1980, with
the plant manager
and selected
members
of his staff.
The inspectors
sum-
marized the sco'pe
and findiags
of, their inspection activities.
The licensee
'wa's -informedhe. five appar'en't.'violation's'Rat
'were "identif'ied'-duiing
this report period
3.." Licensee A'ction on Previous'Inspection
Findings"
(Closed)
Open Item (80-260/40-01)
Unreviewed Safety Questions
Oetermination
(USQD) is needed
to address
supplemental
cooling water to the
new Hydrogen-
Oxygen (H2-02) monitor.
A USQO has
been
issued
which addresses
the cooling
water supply to the H2-'02 monitors.
4.
Unresolved Items
r
There were no unresolved
items identified during this report period.
5:" .-Op'eratiorra'1".Safety~.,:
.:.".;-::.-...".-:..'.:::.'.:...:::," .'
a
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~
The inspectors
kept informed
on
a daily basis of the overall plant status
and
any
signi icant
safety
matters
related
to plant operations.
Oaily
discussions
were held each morning with plant managemen.
and various members
of the plant operating staff.
I'
The inspectors
made frequent visits to the control
room such that each
was
visited at least daily when
an inspector
was on site.
Observations
included
instrument readings,
setpoints
and recordings;
status of operating
systems;
status
and alignments
of emergency
standby
systems;
purpose
of temporary
tags
on equipment controls
and
switches;
alarms;
adherence
to
procedures;
adherence
to limiting conditions
for operations;
temporary
alterations
in effect; daily journals
and data
sheet entries;
and control
room
manning.
This
inspection
activity also
included
numerous
informal
discussions with operators
and their supervisors.
General
plant tours were conducted
on at least
a weekly basis.
Portions of
the turbine building,:eachreactor
building and outside
areas
were visited:
Observations
included valve positions
and
system
alignment;
and
hanger
conditions;
instrument
readings;
housekeeping;
radiation
areas
controls; tag con rois on equipment;
work activities in progress;
vital area
controls;
personnel
badging,
personnel
search
and escort;
and vehicle search
and escort.
Informal discussions
were held with selec
ed plant personnel
in
their functional areas during these tours.
During
a routine tour of Unit
1 reactor building, the inspectors
noted that
a lead blanket
was installed
on the east
side
scram discharge
with
the unit operating.
Further investigation
by the inspectors
determined that
an unreviewed safety question determination
(USED) had
been
processed
which
permitted
a
lead blanket to
be installed
as
long as
the
discharge
was not filled with water.
The plant manager
stated that it was not
the. policy of the plant to have
a lead blanket
on the scram discharge
.
while the plant 'was operating
but only when it was
shutdown
to
reduce
radiation
levels
during
maintenance.
The
blanket
was
immediately
removed from the scram discharge
The licensee will issue guidelines
on installation of lead blankets
on safety-related
piping.
During
a tour'of 'Unit 2 torus area,
the inspector
saw three
examples
where
were being
used to support scaffolding.
This
was brought to the
attenti'on of pl'ant-management
by the inspector
who expressed
a concern for
possible
damage
to the snubbers.
The licensee
removed all scaffolding from
the
and performed
an inspection
on all uni ts.
The results of the
licensee
inspection
indicated that
no damage
had occurred
to the
used to support scaffolding'he
licensee
is also revising
the
Standard
Practice for errection of scaffolding to endure that snubbers
are not used
as
supports.
The licensee
has committed to revising the Standard
Practice
by February. 15, 1981,
On November 29,
1980, after
a contin'uous withdrawal of control rod 14-11 to
notch
48 on Unit 1, the operator,
following normal operating instructions,
-. ."::;:attempted .ta.'withdraw':the: rod..to'determine
-if.:the."rod:.had..become'-uncoupled..-
'
Thi'sis "performedby -'attempting '-to withdraw'he
rod -another
notch
and'checking
to
see if over travel indication is received.
If a rod is coupled
the
over travel light will not indicate.
On this
occasion
indicated it was
uncoupled
by
the
over
travel
light.
Following
the
recoupling procedure the operator successfully
recoupled the rod.
0
3..
The inspector
questioned
what limitations should
be placed
on the rod and
what could cause
the
rod to
become
uncoupled?
The General
Electric
(GE)
site representatives
referenced
GE service information letter (SIL) No.
52
dated July 31,
1974,
which discusses
that
an
uncoupled
rod which is sub-
sequently
recoupled
should
be restricted
to the jog only mode of withdrawal
operation.
The control
rod inner filter should
be
inspected
at the next
scheduled
outage
as the inner filter could have
become
separated
from it'
connector causing uncoupling of the rod.
Browns Ferry has revised their emergency
procedure
to require recoupled
rods
to
be withdrawn in single
notch controls
An inspection
for this rod is
scheduled at the:next vefueling outage.
No violation or devations
were identified within the areas
inspected.
Design, Design Change
and Modifications
The inspector
noted that the torus access
hatches
shield plugs
on the east
and west side of Unit 2 reactor building were not installed
on December
2,
1980,
and the unit was operating at power.
Inspection report 50-260/80-40
discusses
the
new
hydrogen-oxygen
(H2-02)
monitoring
system
that
was
installed
in Unit 2.
The safety
analysis
required
that
concrete
torus
access
hatches
shield plugs remain installed during plant operation
unless
supplemental
cooling
was
provided
to the
H2-02 monitors.
Since
the
new
H2-02
monitoring
system
is
supplied
with
supplemental
cooling,
the
inspectors
requested that
a revised safety analysis
be provided to determine
'he
adequacy
of this cooling for post
Loss of Coolant Accident
(LOCA)
environment if the torus access
hatches
shield plugs were to remain
removed.
In the
meantime,
the licensee
was to keep the torus access
hatches
shield
plugs installed as: required by .the safety analysis.
As of December
2,
1980,
, n'o safety anhlysis.'ad
been" rece'ived 'on the suppI'cmental
cooling'and'he'orus
access
hatches
shield
plugs
have
remained off, while the plant
was
operating
at. power,
since
November 25,
1980.
When
the
inspector
on
December
2,
1980,-'i'nformed
the 'licensee
that the
access
hatches
were off
temporary metal'lates
were installed
over the openings:
The
permanent
concrete
shield plugs could not
be installed
because
rigging the shield
plugs into place could cause
possible
damage
to safety equipment in the area
whi'le the plant was operating at power.
The inspector again
requested
a safety analysis
on the operability of the
H2-02'onitor'ith .supplemental
cool'ing installed, 'uring'
post
enviro'nment with the torus
acces's
hatches 'shield
plugs
removed
and also
determine
the
adequacy
of the
temporary
metal
plates
as
compared
to the
concrete
shield plugs.
The safety
analysi,s. was received
on
December
22,
- .:*:'-":-.',":.'-1980.'"and it wa's: stated: that: with'-,the "to'rus'ccess. hatch'hield,
plugs
.
removed 'the tempera'tu'r'e. ar'ou'nd'he'H2-'02'onitor
'could reach'70
degree's
F'nder
a
post
LOCA environment
and
the
supplemental
cooling
could
only
t
adequately
cool
the monitors to
a temperature
of
150
F; therefore,
the
requirement for the tour access
plugs to be installed during plant operation
still applied.
The licensee-has
placed signs
on the plugs requiring them to
e
4
remain installed unless
the reactor is shutdown.
The analysis
also
stated
that the temporary metal plates are adequate.
7';
On
December
5,
1980,
the inspectors
identified to the plant
manager
that
operating
the plant with the torus access
hatches
shield plugs
removed with
no safety
analysis
on
the
adequacy
of the
supplemental
cooling
was
an
apparent violation.
The pl.ant manager
accepted
the findings .and stated- that
he had
an apparent
problem in that operating requirements
were inserted into
safety analysis
without the
knowledge ~of plant personnel
and that closer
attention to USED's would be given at the plant level.
(260/80-37-01).
Radiographing '
'
On November 21,
1980,
radiographers
from World Testing. were setting
up to
X-ray welds
on the
new condensate
storage
tanks being constructed
on site.
At 6:30 p.m.
and 7: 10 p.m., the east'gate
portal radiation monitor alarmed
which was later determined to be equipment malfunction.
.While investigating
the
causes
for the
alarms,
health
physics
personnel
discovered
that the
radiographers
had unshielded their source to establish
radiation boundaries.
The plant health physics
personnel
determined that at one rope barrier the
radiation
level
was
60
mrem/hr
and
at
another
120
mrem/hr.
They
also
determined that the areas
was not completely marked in that personnel
could
enter
the
area
without
knowledge
of radiographing
in progress.
Plant
personnel
escorted
the radiographers
offsite and did not let them back on
site until they demonstrated
that radiographing
could
be
done
in
a proper
and controlled manner.
This incident
was reported
to Region II health physics
personnel
who sub-
sequently
reported it to the State
of Tennessee
under
which the
radio-
graphers
hold their license.
a
8.
ReportabTe
Occurences
'he
bel'ow listed: l.i'censee; event reports
(L'ERs) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met
NRC reporting requirements.
The determination
included
adequacy
of event description
and corrective
action
taken
on
planned,
existence
of potential
generic
problems
and the relative safety
significance of each event:
Additional inplant reviews and discussions with
plant personnel
as appropriate were conducted for those reports
indicated
by
an asterisk.
"259/8065
259/8069
9-22"80
9"26-80
LER
NO
Date
"259/8039
Rev
1
10-27-. 80
P J
~
~
~,
~
":"259/8052 :': ':"7-25-80'
Event'ydrogen
sensor qualification not
- , '::;.:demo.ns.trated':""
- ..
'4KV- Shutdown board tripped. on degraded
voltage
Mind direction indicator out of
commission
Hydrogen sensors failed
~
5
259/8071
"259/8072
10"14-80
10-24-80
Refueling zone damper inoperable
Reactor building continuous air
monitor in'operable
<<259/8076
"259/8077
<<259/8086
259/8080
259/8082
259/8083
<<259/8084
"259/8085
260/8019
260/8023
"260/8024
"260/8025
260/8030
<<260/8032
260/8036
260/8045'260/8054
"296/8039
, 296/8053
"296/7920
<<296/8007
296/8025'96/8028
296/8035
296/8041
During review
dioxide
(C02)
..1 caking,. ya.l.ve
.',.'the'ir.e: watc
requirements.
11"5-80
Air temp delta
T recorder inoperative
10-23-80
Degraded
seismic supports
on
RHRSM
piping
12"24-80 Rod became
uncoupled
11"13-80
Leak in carbon dioxide fire protection
system
,Drywell pressure
transmitters
not
qualified
HPCI temperature
switch set high
Alternate feeder to 4KV bus tie failed
to dose
12-5-80
.
River delta. T exceeded
5 degrees
F
5-13-80
Higher than normal flow signal
7-7"80
2A Reactor
i4!G set tripped
7-14"80
'RD 38-27 fa i 1 ed to
1 a tch
6-31-80
Safety valves
have cracks in guide
9-4-80
Pressure
switch 3-204 A/B setpoints
higher than Tech Spec limit
9-5-80
HPCI turbine tripped due to high
rupture disc pressure
9-26-80
H2 monitor would not calibrate
11-18-80
Violation of secondary containment
12-22-80
'efuel interlock on platform failed to
operate
10-17-80
480V board feeder breaker failed
12-24-80
.
Refuel. interlock, on platform failed
'
'
"'
t'o'opei a'te.
',:
.
12-19-79
Violation of secondary containment
3-28-80
Loss of 161KV line
7-24-80"'
'onti'nuous strip heat detector
damaged
8-28-80
LIS-3-203C reactor water level
switch setpoint drifter
9-26"80
3A recirc pump tripped
11-5"80
Alternate feed breakers to unit
board 3A & 3C tripped
of. LER 259-80.-80,
which reported
the
removal of the carbon
fire protection
"system
from service
in order to repair
a
. the..i.nspectors
determined. that the,individiua.ls assigned
to
h 'detai'l'.'di,d',.'not:;ful,I'y, meet
'the
Technical
Sp'ecification
11"12-80
12-5-80
12-9-80
The
C02 system
was
aken out of service
on October
15,
1980 from 7:12 p.m.
un-il
9:00 p.m.
to repair
valve
39-11.
Technical
Spec.',ica
ion
3. 11.8
requires that.a
continuous. fire, watch
be establi,shed
in the cable
spreading
rooms when the C02 prot'ectioh is lost and other affected areas
are to be
checked
hourly.
Personnel
assigned
checked
the
cable
spreading
rooms
intermittently and
made
no entries
to any of the three auxiliary instrument
rooms during the period the
C02 system
was out of service.
These observa-
tions were discussed
with the plant manager
and presented
to the Region II
fire protection
engineer
for review
and
enforcement
action.
Inspection
Report
50-259/81-01,
50-260/81-01
and
50-296/81-01
deta i 1 s
enforcement
actions.
9.
The inspectors
reviewed activities associated
with the below listed reactor
'ri'ps during'hi's 'report
period.
The
review
included
determination
of
cause,
safety. significance,
performance
of personnel
and
systems,
and
corrective action.
The inspectors
examined
instrument recordings,
computer
printouts,
operations
journal entries,
reports
and
had discussions
with operations,
maintenance
and engineering
support
personnel
as
appro-
priate.
On November 28,
1980, Unit
1 scrammed
from approximately
40.o power which was
caused
by turbine
stop
valve closure.
The Unit was
undergoing
a load
reduction
in preparation
for manual
shutdown
for maintenance.
Mhen
the
electrical
load for the
shutdown
bus
1
was
transferred
from Unit
1 to
Unit 2, the unit preferred breaker tripped.
Mhen the unit preferred breaker
was reenergized,
the turbine tripped.
TVA is currently evaluating
how this
could cause the turbine to trip.
Systems
performed as designed.
On Oecember
27,
1980, Unit 2 scrammed
from 93.o power during performance of
Surveillance Instruction 4. 10.A-10.
After testing channel
A1 of main
steam
high radiation,
the operator
tripped channel
B before resetting
channel Al.
This caused
a Group
1 isolation
and subsequent
All.systems operated
nor mal ly',."" ."
On December
29,
1980, Unit
1 was manually tripped from 407. power to replace
the main generator station-cooling Alters.
Systems
performed as designed.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas
inspected.
10.
Plant Physical Protection
Ouring
the .course
of routine inspection activities,
the inspectors
made
observations
of certain
plant physical'rotection
activities.
These
'ncluded
personrrel
badging,
personnel
search
and escort,
vehicle
search
and
escort,
communica'tions'and vital area access control.
.....
No v4olations-or...'devi.actions..were:,tdentified'ithin;the,
areas,.inspected.;
11.
CELCON Contact Arm Retainer
On 12/2/80
a fire occurred
in the lA reactor protection
system
(RPS) motor
generator
set motor. controller.
The fire was caused
by the overheating of a
celcon contact. arm retainer
on a-GE CR120A. relay..
directed action
be taken to identify and replace fire prone celcon contact
arm
retainers
with the
more fire retardant
valox retainers.
Licensee
response
to. IE- Bulletin 78-01 indicated that
an indepth search
has
been
made
to locate and identify all relays that have celcon
arm retainers.
The
motor generator
set controllers for all
3 reactor units
had
been
overlooked in the initial search.
Plant management
has
agreed
to reverify
that all
celcon
contact
arm retainers
are identified
and replaced.
In
addition plant management
has
agreed
to'update
the response
and
revise
the electrical
maint'enance
instruction
(EMI53) which
directs
CR120A relay contact
arm retainer
changeout.
This item will rema'.'n
o'en
and examined during 'a subsequent
inspection.. (259/80-47-,.02)
No violations or deviations were idnetified within the area inspected.
0
12.
High Density Spent Fuel Storage
Racks
(HOSFSR)
The inspector
reviewed documentation,
work plans,
and boral inspection strip
charts
in the
areas
of
HDSFSR ins'tallation
and testing
requirements
con-
cerning Unit
1
and
3 spent
fuel pools.
The inspector verified that
the
expansion of the
spent
fuel
pool
storage
capacity
was
done
in accordance
with regulatory requirements
contained
in the facility Operational guality
.
Assurance
Manual,
Amendment
42 to Unit 1 license,
Amendment
16 to Unit 3
license,
and
Several
HOSFSR
" installation
work plans
were
reviewed for completion.
The
work on Unit
1
HDSFSR was completed
in August,
1979 and the work on Unit 3
HDSFSR was completed
in September
1978.
Work Plan
No.
7703 used to install
HDSFSR 3 and
6 into Unit, 3 spent fuel pool was reviewed for completion.
The
work plan
had. no .final quality assurance
review and
spent
fuel
has
been
" '
" '.:.; '- loaded'in'to
HOSFSR 6:.si'nce:august'1'979.
Work Plan
No.
6371 for Unit 1, issued to install
HDSFSR 2, 3, 5,
6
and
7,
was
reviewed 'for compl'etion.
The work'lan
was
incomplete
in. that the
verification that neutron
absorber material is instal'led in HOSFSR
had not
been
evaluated
by the
cognizant
engineer
and
by quality assurance.
In
addition, the work plan had no final quality assurance
review and spent
fuel
has-been
loaded into HOSFSR 2,
5 and
6 since January
1980.
The licensee
on
December
2,
1980,
conducted
a review and evaluation of the test results to
verify that neutron
absorbing
material
had
been installed in the
HOSFSR.
The
improper
documentation
and failure to evaluate
test
results
is
an
apparent violation (259/80-47-03
and 296/80-41-03).
13.
Airborne Activity on Refuel Floor
'
"- Qn'N'ovember""26
1980
whileemoving'he" reactor'essel-head-'n'repartaion
.
for refueling
on Unit 3,
a radioactive
cloud
was emitted
from the Unit 3
t
internal
upper
head
area into the refuel floor area.
The cloud escaped
from
the mating flange
area
between
the
vessel
head
and
core barrel
when
the
vessel
head
was pulled clear of the core barrel.
A vacuum exited within the
-reactor,vesse'1
'pri'or to:the.vessel'ead'pull
and a,greater, than n'ormal
8'ifferential
pressure
existed
between
the
internal
vacuum
area
and
the
refuel
floor.
The refuel
floor was
evacuated
and
unnecessary
personnel
remained clear for thirteen
hours while cleanup
and surveillance activities
were
conducted.
Eighteen
whole
body
counts
were
conducted
with normal
expected
results
and
no internal
contamination
was
found.
There
was
no
release of activity to the atmosphere.
A
~
r
~
~,
~
An inspector
reviewed
the
cause
of the
incident
and
found
Mechanical
Maintenance
Instruction
1 to
be unclear
and
imprecise
in the
procedural
steps
related to the vessel
head
removal
sequence.
Plant management
agreed
that the maintenance
instruction
needed clarification
so that
a similar
occurrence:in'the
future.woul'd'.be
prevented.
'lant"management
has committed
to changing Mechanical. Maintenance Instruction
1 to correct this deficiency.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas
inspected.
14.
Excessive Turbulence Water in Unit
1 Spent Fuel Pool
On November 29,
1980
an
unusual
turbulent flow was noticed
by the refuel
floor
supervisor
in the water of Unit
1 spent
fuel
pool
above
the high
density fuel modules
2 and 6.
46 fuel assemblies
had been
placed
in to fuel
module
6
twenty-four
hours
prior to
the
unusual
flow.
The
46
fuel
assemblies
were in addition to the
127 fuel
assemblies
already
stored
in
Module 6.
This left module
6 about three-fourths
solid.
Fuel
module
2 had
t
previously
been
loaded solid eleven
months
before this date.
After the
turbulence
was noticed, the recently
added.
46 assemblies
were changed
from a
solid pattern to
a checkboard
pattern.
Prior to the fuel assemblies
being
changed
from
a solid pattern
to
a checkerboard
pattern
the refuel floor
supervisor
'reported
the
unusual
flow had minimized.
Concurrently,
spent
fuel pool. cooling
was apparently
not operating
normally.
The licensee is
'-'ev'alirating-th).s'rea.'he
cause"and"ad8itfo'nal'@or'rectiye
action is bei'ng :" ':
evaluated
by the lic'en'see.'
This will remain an'op'en
item'.
(259/80-47-04).'
15;.
Unit 3 Refueling ".:
'I
Two inspectors
independently
reviewed
documentation
and
made direct
ob-
servations
during fuel handling operations
on Unit 3.
Handling operations
were noted to be in accordance
with the
TVA commitment (L. M. Mills letter
of November 6, 1980).for "an independent,
second party verification of fuel
assembly
location
and orientation",
On completion of fuel loading quality
assurance
verification of fuel
assembly
orientation
and location
was ac-
complishedd
'with satisfactory results.
In addition; the inspector verified
core
map
position
and orientation 'through
video
recordings
taken after
Unit 3 fuel shuffle was completed.
No discrepancies
were noted.
.:" '
16: H'igh:Radiat'ion Area':: ".""'...":"
The inspector
conducted
a plant tour on December
22,
1980,
and noticed the
I
access.
door to the reactor
cleanup
pump
room
3A was
open
and
unguarded.
Plant staff was notified and prompt corrective action taken.
The posting at
.. the access:door=.indj'cated"a:h'igh
radiati;on area and:a review:of'heal-th- ',
9
I
17.
physics
records
indicated
that
the
most
recent
survey
(on
December
16,
1980),
of the
3A reactor
cleanup
pump
room
had
a highest
general
area
reading of 2,000 mrem/hr.
A Special
Work Permit
had been written for work
in reactor
cleanup
pump
room
3A and
3B which encompasses
the December
22,
1980,
timeframe.
During the plant tour the inspector
noted people
working
in the
3B reactor cleanup
pump
room.
The two access
entrances
to
3A and
3B
pump
rooms
were physically separated
by
a temporary
wooden. structure
and
temporary
outage
equipment,
,Standing
at the
entrance
to reactor
cleanup
pump
room 3A, it is not possible to observe
access
to
pump
room
3B and vice
versa.
This
violates
technical specification 6.3.0.2
which
requires
unguarded
of greater
than
1000 mrem/hr to
be
locked.
(296/80" 41",01)'.
Main Steam Safety Valve Maintenance
On
December
30,
1980,
the
inspector
was
made
aware that there
was
high
radioactivity in the turbine building in the vicinty of unit 3 turbine area.
Some personnel
were contaminated
with short lived activity which. decayed
by
the time the personnel
were counted.
The activity was determined
to be from
reactor water drained to the condenser via the main steam line drain.
The 'nspector
reviewed
the
circumstances
of
the
event
to
determine
compliance with regulatory requirements.
This review included
examination
of written procedures,
interviews with plant staff and discussions
with
health physics personnel.
The inspector
determined
that the
reason
for draining
the water
to the
condenser
was to drain
the
steam line to remove
a main
steam safety valve
1-501.
The valve was removed to determine
why there
appeared
to be too much
material:.between
the valve and the mounting flange.
On disassembly
"it'as
fo'un'd; tha't the-old. gasket wasst'i:Tl in'lace 'and"th'e new.flexitalli'c.'
'asket'as
als'o in'pla'ce
making the gaskets
into a piggyback arrangement.
The old gasket
had been left. installed
when the main
steam safety valve was
reinstalled.
Step'.3 of Mechanical Maintenance Instruction
77 directs that
.
the old gasket
be
removed
and the seating
surface
to
be cleaned
with
a
stainless
steel wire brush.
This is
a violation of technical specification 6.3.A, failure to follow
written procedures,,
and applies to Unit 3. (296/80-41-02)
18.
Heavy Loads in the Vicinty of an Open Reactor Vessel
On November 28,
1980,
the resident insepctor
was notified by the
licensee
that the dryer-separator
pit shield blocks were installed in violation of
.'.'. :.':..:.. Mechanical'aintenance~Instruction-1:;-'-:The
.reactor
vessel."head.
was .aff with ',-" "..-'-
fu'el's'sembl'ies
'exposed':during- thi's 'move: 'The inspector 'reviewed circum-
stances
of
the
event.
The
review
included
examination
of written
procedures,
interviews with supervisors
involved and discussions
with craft
personnel.
The dryer"separator pit shield plugs were installed
o protect
personnel
working on main
s
earn line plug adap
ors from high radiation
'I
P
10
levels that were present
from the dryer and separator
units stored in the
dryer-separator pit as the water level is lowered in the reactor cavity.
The inspector's
concern for the movement of heavy loads in the vicinity of
the
open reactor vessel
was reviewed with the licensee.
After refueling of
Unit 3 was completed
the four shield plugs required
moving again
to place
~ the. dryer
and. separator
unit back into the reactor
vessel..
The licensee
decided to move the shield plugs with the reactor
vessel
open.
The'licensee
made
a
commitment
to
implement
the interim guidelines
of
on
December
22,
1980,
and moved the shield plugs with the reactor vessel
open
on December
30, 1980.~,
'
No Violations or. deviations were identified within the areas
inspected.
h
Scram Discharge Header Monitoring
The installation of the continuous
monitoring
sys
em
(CMS) for the
discharge
(SOH) in conformance with NRC requirements
was completed
on
Units
1
and
2
and
considered
operational
on
December
21,
1980.
The
inspectors
verified that the
equipment
had
been
installed,
functionally
tested
and calibrated
by use of a test mock up.
On December
24,
1980 testing
as required
by IEB 80-17 Supplement
4 was begun
on Unit 1.
With the reactor operating at power two control rods
on the
same
were
scrammed
with
a special
recording
-instrument monitoring the
response
from the
sensing
device on'he
SOH.
The
recording
showed
no
response
attributed
to water
in the
SOH nor as
expected
was there
any
indication received in the control
room.
the old
UT monitoring system
was
kept operational
and the
scope
on this device did show that approximately
one half inch of water.was
introduced into the
SOH.
A sensitivity problem
"with 'thehew. sy'tem
w'as .thou'ght': to. e'xi st. and, further: evaluation'rid: con-'.
sultation 'with the
v'endo'r
was initiated.
Thirty minute
checks
of the
recording on the old monitoring system were resumed.
J
On December
27,
1980 Unit 2 tripped during
a surveillance test
and the
failed to actuate
the control room alarms that greater
than
1~~
inch of water
was in the
SDHs.
Vendor personnel
were brought to the site
on December
30,
1980 to correct the problem and
make the
system operable.
Some
improvement
in signal
response
had been
made
by relocation of the sensing
device in the
SOH but the
system
was still considered
not operational
at month end.
The
inspectors
are continuing to follow the progress
in this area.'