ML18019A296
| ML18019A296 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1985 |
| From: | Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18019A294 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-85-24, NUDOCS 8508080086 | |
| Download: ML18019A296 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1985024
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/85-24
Licensee:
Ca'rolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris Unit
1
Inspection
Conducted:
May 20
June
20,
1985
License No.:
CPPR-158
Inspectors:
G.
. Maxwell
Date Signed
R.
. Prevatte
Date Signed
S.
P. Burris
Approved by:
P. Fredrickson,
Sectio
ief
Division of Reactor Projects
Date Signed
Date Signed
SUMMARY
lr
Scope:
This routine,
announced
inspection
involved 344 (resident)
inspector-
hours
on site
in the
areas
of licensee
action
on previous
enforcement
items;
inspector
followup items;
licensee
identified
items;
pipe
hangers;
heating,
ventilation
and
air conditioning;
electrical;
nonconformance
control; fire
prevention/protection;
storage;
instrumentation
and control; preoperational
test
program implementation verification and independent
inspection.
Results:
Of the
12 areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified
in 11 areas;
one violation was found in one area (violation "Failure to conduct
preoperational
tests
in accordance
with procedural
requirements",
identified in
the details Section
13.2 of the report).
No apparent
deviations
were found.
8808080086
850628
- ADOCN, 05000400
8
II
1
I
I
I
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
"R. A. Watson,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
G. A. Myer, General
Manager,
Milestone Completion
C.
C. Wagoner,
Project General
Manager,
Construction
"J.
L. Willis, Plant General
Manager,
Operations
"E. J.
Wagner,
Manager,
Engineering
J.
L. Harness,
Assistant Plant General
Manager,
Op'erations
"L. I. Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering
Support
M. Thompson, Jr.,
Manager,
Engineering
Management
B.
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Maintenance
- N. J. Chiangi,
Manager,
QA/QC Harris Plant
"C.
S. Hinnant,
Manager, Start-up
J.
M. Collins, Manager,
Operations
"A. H. Rager,
Manager,
Construction
Inspection
G.
L. Forehand,
Director,
QA/QC
C.
S.
Bohanan,
Director, Regulatory
Compliance
- M. D. Vernon, Superintendent,
- D. A. McGaw, Superintendent,
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
22 construction
craftsmen,
11 technicians,
28 operators,
eight mechanics,
11 security
force
members,
and ten engineering
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on June
21,
1985, with
those
persons
indicated
in paragraph
1
above.
No written material
was
provided to the
licensee
by the resident .inspectors
during this reporting
period.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the resident
inspectors
during this inspection.
The violation identified in this report
has
been
discussed
in detail with
the licensee.
The licensee
provided
no dissenting
information at the exit
meeting.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement
Items
(92702)
(Closed)
Violation 400/83-37-01
"Failure to Control Electrical
Cable
Installation".
The inspector
evaluated
CP&L's responses
to Region II
dated
March 16,
1984, August 24,
1984,
and April 12,
1985.
CP&L issued
design criteria to remove previously installed adhesive
backed
supports
t
I
I
l
and
prevent their
use
in future installations.
Additional training
was held for craft
and inspection
personnel
to, prevent
use
on other
equipment
in
further
applications.
Follow-up
inspections
by
the
resident
inspector indicate that this problem
has
been corrected.
This
item will be routinely evaluated
as
a part of the
ongoing inspection
program.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
Violation 400/83-22-01
"Failure to
Comply with Procurement
Requirements".
The inspector
evaluated
the
program outlined in
CPRL
letter to
Region II dated
September
2,
1983
and
CP&L information
letters
providing directions
to
those
required
to
take
corrective
steps.
During the weeks of May 13 and
May 20,
1985,
CPhL
QA conducted
an
in-depth
evaluation
of the
special
Inservice
Inspection
Program
(ISI) which has
been
established
to
assure
that
the
inspection
and
rework,
as
applicable,
of the
estimated
3000
weld joints
has
been
completed.
QA personnel
documented
the results of their evaluation
in
Surveillance
Report
numbered
QASC 85-907.
The inspector
observed
the
in-process
activities
of the
QA in-depth
evaluation
and
reviewed
Surveillance
Report
QASC
85-907 .
The inspector
determined
that the
special
ISI program
has
been
implemented
and
has identified those weld
joints which require special
inspections
and repairs.
The program
has
been
completed
on approximately
90 percent of the estimated
3000 joints
which require inspection,
with reasonable
assurance
that the remaining
welds will be
inspected
and
repaired
satisfactorily.
This
item is
closed.
4
Inspector
Followup Item (92701)
(Closed)
Inspector
Follow-up
Item 400/84-49-04
"ITE Gould
Motor Control
Center
Mechanical
Interlock Deficiencies".
This item was also reported
by
CPRL
as
a
item
400/CDR85-204
"Motor Starter-Mechanical
Vertical Interlock Binding".
The
closure
of this
item is discussed
in
paragraph
S.e.
This item is closed.
5.
Licensee Identified Items
(92700)
Prior to this inspection
period,
the licensee
had identified the following
items under
a.
(Closed)
400/CDR82-106
"480V Switchgear
Design
Deficiency of the
Secondary
Di sconnects".
On
November
12,
1982,
the
licensee
notified
Region II of
a
item concerning
possible
binding which
could result in breakage
of finger contacts
on the
secondary
discon-
nects for Brown-Bouveri class
1E 480V switchgear.
This defect
had been
identified in older designs
that were manufactured
with rectangular
tabs that hold the contact strips in place
and contain
a
small cutout
in the
contact strip.
When
the
breaker
is
racked
out the finger
contacts
could get caught
behind
the rectangular
tabs
and result in
breaking off of the contacts.
This would result in loss of control
circuitry.
The final report to Region II was
submitted
on April 29,
1983.
3
b.
c
~
The reports
have
been
reviewed
and
determined
to
be
acceptable
by
Region II.
The resident
inspector
has
reviewed all reports
and
the
"closed"
Deficiency
and
Disposition
Report
(DDR)
on this
item.
A
Brown-Bouveri
representative
changed
all
these
components
onsite
on
April
21
and
22,
1983.
CPS L provided
engineering
assistance
and
quality control coverage of these activities.
The inspector
completed
a
sample
audit
on six of the
51 components
replaced.
No deficiencies
were identified during thi s audit.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
400/CDR84-168
"6.9KV
Switchgear
Circuit
Breakers".
On
March 26,
1984,
the licensee
notified Region II of
a
item
concerning
incorrect
functioning
of the trip circuitry for
Siemans-Allis
switchgear circuit breakers.
This deficiency resulted
from the
interface
of
EBASCO wiring
standards
with Siemans-Allis
wiring.
The
EBASCO standard
practice is to monitor the trip coil with
the circuit breaker
in both the
open
and closed position.
Monitoring
the trip coil with the breaker in the open position allowed sufficient
current flow through the indicator lights to keep the trip coil in
an
energized
state.
This .current flow would prevent
breaker
operation.
Corrective action required
the rewiring of the control circuitry to
eliminate
the current
path
through
the trip coil
when the breaker is
open.
The final report
on this item was
submitted to Region II on
November
8,
1984.
The reports
have
been
reviewed
and determined to be
acceptable
by Region II.
The inspector
reviewed applicable
supporting
documentation
and
observed
a representative
sample
of the
work to
verify that corrective
actions
identified in the
report
have
been
completed.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
400/CDR84-176 "Electric Cables-Hi-Pot Test Failure".
On March
25,
1984 the
licensee
notified Region II of
a
item
concerning Hi-Pot test failure of two cables that
had previously passed
the site required
megger test.
This Hi-Pot test
was
not required
by
site
procedures.
Corrective
action
required
replacement
of both
cables.
The licensee additionally performed
a Hi-Pot test
on all
500
MCM power
cables
previously installed
and other selected
safety
and
nonsafety
600V power cables.
Applicable procedural
changes
have
been
implemented
to prevent
total
reliance
on
readings
for cable
acceptability.
The final report
on this item was
submitted
to Region
II on
December
12,
1984.
The report
has
been
reviewed
and determined
to
be acceptable
by Region II.
The
inspector
held discussions
with
responsible
licensee
representatives,
reviewed supporting documentation
and
observed
representative
samples
of work to verify that
the
corrective actions identified in the report
had
been
completed.
This
item is closed.
d.
(Closed)
400/CDR84-186
"Siemans-Allis 6.9KV Cubicle with Bent Terminal
Lugs
and Chaffed Wire".
On September
7,
1984,
the licensee
notified
Region II of a
item concerning chaffed wiring and bent
terminal
lugs in the Siemans-Allis
6.9KV switchgear.
This problem was
a result of inadequate
clearances
between
the
sides
of the circuit
breakers
and the
switchgear
cubicles.
Corrective action resulted
in
reworking of the internal wiring and
replacement
of the affected
lugs
by
a
vendor
representative.
This work was monitored
by
CPKL QA/QC
personnel.
The final report
on this item was
submitted
to Region II
on
February
14,
1985.
The report
has
been
reviewed
and
determined
acceptable
by
Region II.
The resident
inspector
has
reviewed
all
supporting
documentation,
held discussions
with responsible
licensee
personnel,
and observed
representative
samples
of work to verify that
the corrective
actions identified in the report
have
been
completed.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
400/CDR85-204
"Motor Starter-Mechanical
Vertical Interlock
Binding".
On January
22,
1985,
the licensee
notified Region II of
a
item
concerning
motor starter
mechanical
vertical
interlock binding for
two special
starters
supplied
by Gould,
Inc.
This defect
was
found in eight containment
fan cooler starters
which
could
have
prevented
the required transfer
between
high and low speed
operation.
Corrective
action
resulted
in rework of these
starters
to
an
improved design
developed
by Gould,
Inc.
The rework
has
been
performed
by
a vendor representative
in accordance
with Field
Change
Request
(FCR)
E-3883.
This
work was monitored
by
CP&L Construction
Inspection (CI) personnel.
The final report
on this item was submitted
to
Region II on April 12,
1985.
The report
has
been
reviewed
and
determined
acceptable
by
Region II.
The
resident
inspector
has
reviewed all
supporting
documentation,
held discussions
with respon-
sible licensee
personnel
and
observed
a representative
sample
of the
work to verify that the corrective action identified in the report
has
been
completed.
This item is closed.
Pipe Hangers
(50090C
and 92706B)
The
inspector,
assisted
by
CI
and
QC welding
inspection
personnel,
conducted
an inspection
on eight pipe hangers,
identified as:
329,
and
The
wor k, inspection
and documentation
review
had
been
completed
on these
hangers
and the packages
had
been
placed
in the
vault.
The inspection
included the following:
(1)
Location and elevation;
(2)
Material identification;
(3)
Catalog parts;
(4)
Strut/snubber
assembly installation;
(5)
Orientation,
geometry
and clearance
requirements;
(6)
Installation
and torquing of fasteners;
(7)
Attachments;
(8)
Physical integrity of hanger;
(9)
Welding identification and location were
as specified;
(10)
Welding
procedure
specifications
adhered
to the requirements
of
ASME Section
IX and
AWS D. 1. 1 for hangers;
'
(11)
Adherence to drawings
and inspection
procedures;
(12)
gualification of inspection
personnel;
and
(13)
Documentation of nonconforming. conditions.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
7.
Heating, Ventilation
and Air Conditioning Systems
(HVAC)
(50100)
The
inspector,
as
a part of the
inspection
of ongoing
work activities
associated
with the installation of HVAC systems,
observed
the leak testing
being
performed
on
package
HVAC-T-15C-1 for
RFT
8210-004.
The
inspector
observed
that
leaks
were
being repaired
at duct flanges
using
TREMCO
440
tape
to
seal
between
the
Discussions
with
the
applicable Harris Plant Engineering Staff (HPES) indicate that this material
is
specified
in
EBASCO specification
B-E04A.
The
resident
inspector
requested
that the
environmental
qualification report for this material
be
provided for review.
HPES provided preliminary data
and
stated
that
the
final qualification for this material
had not been
received
by
EBASCO or
HPES.
Pending
review of the final qualification of this material for its
suitability for
use
under
elevated
temperature,
moisture
and
radiation
environmental
conditions, this item will be identified as
an Unresolved
Item
"Environmental gualification of
TREMCO 440
Tape"
400/85-24-02.
No viola-
tions or deviations
were identified.
8.
Electrical
(51053C,
51063C,
927068)
a.
The
inspector
accompanied
construction
inspection
personnel
on
an
inspection
of completed
electrical
conduit
15436G-SB
in the reactor
containment building.
The inspection
covered
the following:
(1)
Conduit location, routing, size
and identification;
(2)
Torquing of fasteners;
(3)
Bending radius;
(4)
Couplings, fittings and grounding;
(5)
Interferences;
(6)
Supports;
(7)
Separation
requirements;
I
(8)
Adherence
to drawings,
specifications
and procedures;
(9)
gualification of inspection
personnel;
(10) Documentation of inspection results
and nonconforming
conditions.
b.
The
inspectors
observed
the installation activities
associated
with
Class
1E cables
with the following numbers:
12964G-SA
and
12967G-SA.
These observations
related to cable pulling and termination
and various
switchgear
and
cabinets.
The following were evaluated
during these
observations:
(1)
The latest termination cards
were in use;
(2)
The size
and type cable
was correct;
(3)
The
cable
identification
(cable
number
and
color
code)
was
correct;
(4)
The correct bending radius
was applied;
(5)
The cable routing was correct;
(6)
The cables
were protected
from damage;
(7)
gualified electrical
inspection
personnel
were monitoring the
installation activities;
(8)
Approved drawings
and specifications
were being used;
(9)
Approved materials
were being used;
(10) Cleanl iness;
(11) Calibration of tools and instruments;
(12) Approved work and inspection
procedures
were being used;
(13) Documentation of inspections
and nonconformances.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
9.
Nonconformance
Control
(92706B)
The inspector
reviewed
the
nonconformance
control
log and
reviewed
closed
nonconformances:
85-1320,
85-0851,
85-1085,
85-0852,
85-1249
and 85-0516.
This
sample
of six closed
nonconformances
was
reviewed to determine
the
following:
a.
Adequacy of identification of nonconformances;
b.
Proper review and evaluations;
c.
Correct disposition
and details;
d.
Verification, acceptance
and review of disposition;
e.
Performance
of reinspections;
f.
Adequacy of corrective action
and prevention
measures, if required;
g.
Proper final review and closeout.
No violations or deviations
were noted in the areas
inspected.
10.
Fire Prevention/Protection
(42051C,
92706B)
a.
The inspectors
observed
the fire prevention
and protection activities
related to containing combustible materials
where the ignition of these
materials
could damage
safety-related
structures.
The inspectors
also
observed
the ongoing site training activities for the construction fire
brigade.
b.
Some
of the specific
areas
observed
by the
inspectors
during this
period were:
(1)
Nonflammable protective
coverings
were
observed
over
such equip-
ment as the electrical control cabinets
at elevation 286'f the
reactor
auxiliary building and over various safety-related
pumps
and components
located throughout the plant.
(2)
The inspectors
observed
during the various tour s of the reactor
auxiliary building and the containment building that the accumula-
tion of combustible materials
in these
areas
was being minimized.
(3)
Flammable
materials
were
stored to prevent
or reduce
the likeli-
hood of combustion.
(4)
Melding activities were observed
in at least
15 separate
locations
throughout
the site
and
in each
instance it was
observed
that
appropriate
fire extinguishing
equipment
was
available
within
close
proximity of the
welding activities.
It was
also
noted
that
the
portable fire extingui shers
contained
sufficient fire
extinguishing
medium,
as
evidenced
by displaying current
inspec-
tion stickers and'aving
unbroken
seals.
(5)
The inspectors
observed that at the various elevations
throughout
the reactor auxiliary building and the containment building, fire
suppression
devices
are strategically
located
and readily avai 1-
able for use.
c.
A review of the fire brigade drill and training records
showed that
drills
and training
are
conducted
on
a regular
basis
for the fire
brigade
members.
During the
above
observations,
the following were referenced
for requi re-
ments:
FSAR Section
1.8
and 9.5;
Regulatory
Guide 1.39,
NFPA Standard
241
and AP-VII-03 (Exhibits 2,
3 and 4).
No violations or deviations
were noted in the areas
inspected.
ll.
Storage
(50073C,
92706B)
The inspector
toured
warehouses
1,
2
and
3,
the operations
warehouse,
and
various
plant
equipment
storage
areas.
During
the tours,
the
storage
conditions of the equipment
were evaluated
to determine
whether requirements
are being met as follows:
a.
Piping and equipment,
in general,
were stored off the ground or floors
to prevent entry of dirt into them, or contamination
from environmental
conditions.
b.
The storage
areas
were identified sufficiently to provide identity and
locations
as
required
by those
who
may
be
seeking
the
locations
of
parts
or equipment.
c.
Access
was adequate
for placement
or removal of parts
and equipment.
d.
Warehouse
equipment
was stored in the correct position.
e.
The
temperature
and
humidity
controls
were
being
maintained
as
required.
f.
Access to plant storage
areas
was being maintained.
g.
Equipment installed heaters
were energized
as required.
h.
Protective
covers
were in place.
During the
observations,
the
following were referenced
for requirements:
PSAR Section 1.8,
and construction
procedures
AP-XIII-07 and
PGD-002.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
12.
Instrumentation
and Control
(52053C)
The
inspector
accompanied
Construction
Inspection
(CI) personnel
on
an
inspection
of the installation
of flow transmitter
FT-01RC-0425IIW;
the
associated
instrument
impulse lines;
tube track
and supports
W-S-l, W-S-2,
W-S-3,
F-5-4,
F-5-5,
W-S-6,
W-S-7,
and
W-S-8 in the
reactor
containment
building.
The inspection
included the following:
a.
Instrument location, identification and mounting;
b.
Use of correct materials;
c.
Torquing of fasteners;
d.
Tubing installation;
e.
Physical integrity;
f.
Adherence
to drawings, specifications
and procedures;
g.
gualification of inspection
personnel;
h.
Documentation of inspection results
and nonconforming conditions;
i.
Clearances,
as specified;
j.
Apparent
damage.
During the
above
observations,
the following were referenced
for require-
ments:
FSAR Section
1.8;
construction
work procedures
WP-300,
WP-302,
WP-304,
WP-305;
construction
inspection
procedures
and
construction
drawings
and specifications
CAR-2166-8-431
and CAR-SH-IN.
No violations or deviations
were noted in the areas
inspected.
13.
Preoperational
Test Program Implementation Verification (71302)
a.
During
the
week
of
May 20,
1985,
CP&L conducted
portions
of the
preoperational
performance
and flow balance
testing for the high-head
safety injection
pumps.
The test
procedure
is
numbered
1-2080-P01.
10
The high-head
safety injection
system utilizes the charging
pumps
as
the driving force during an anticipated
accident condition.
Steps
6.4,
6.6,
6.7, 6.8,
6.9,
6.10
and
6.11 of procedure
1-2080-P01
require
repositioning
the
manual
suction
and discharge
valves to each
of the charging
pumps
~
On
May 25,
1985, after completion of tests
on charging
pump
1A (step
6. 12
in
the
procedure),
the
start-up
test
engineer
directed
the
auxiliary operator to 'close the manually-operated
suction
and discharge
valves for pump
1A.
Closing
these
valves
was
not in accordance
with
the requirements
of the procedure.
To deviate
from the preoperational
test procedure,
the start-up engineer is required to obtain
an approved
temporary
change
notice in accordance
with the Start-up Manual, section
7.6.2.
The start-up
engineer
had not obtained prior approval to close
the charging
pump
manual
isolation
valves.
Subsequent
operation
of
charging
pump
1A, with the
manually-operated
suction
and
discharge
valves
closed,
resulted
in
pump failure.
CP&L start-up
personnel
documented
the failure of the charging
pump
on
a Nonconformance
Report
numbered
NCR-85-1471.
The inspectors
were informed by responsible
management
personnel
that
other conditions
contributed
to
the
pump
failure:
(1)
The
start-up
engineer
should
have
obtained
proper authorization
prior to implementing test changes.
(2)
The closing of the manually-operated
valves
was not communicated
to the control
room.
(3)
Test
personnel
failed
to follow the
general
requirements
of
procedure
which requires verification of
pump flow path
prior to starting
a
charging
pump.
Also,
involved
personnel
failed to follow the
requirements
of
a
caution
tag
which
was
attached
to the
pump's control
switch.
The caution
tag
reempha-
sized
the
need
to verify pump flow path prior to starting
the
pump.
The
inspectors
informed
CP&L management
that failure to follow the
requirements
of test procedure
1-2080-P01
and the
CP&L Start-up Manual,
section
7.6.2,
is contrary to
Appendix
B, Criterion
V;
Section
1.8.5.5;
and
CP&L Corporate
QA Program,
section
6.
This is
a
violation "Failure to Conduct Preoperational
Tests
in Accordance
with
Procedural
Requirements"
400/85-24-01.
During the weeks of May 27 and June
3,
1985,
the inspectors
evaluated
the
in-process
preoperational
test
for the
residual
heat
removal
(RHR) system.
This test is identified as 1-2085-P-03,
Low Head
Safety
Injection.
The
inspectors
reviewed this controlled
start-up
11
test procedure
to verify:
that
an approved
procedure
was available
and
in use; test
equipment
being
used
was properly calibrated;
changes
to
the procedure
were
documented
in accordance
with the administrative
procedures,
and personnel
were stationed
and in direct communication
as
required
by the procedure.
The inspectors
witnessed
section
6.5 "Interlock and Operating Differen-
tial Pressure
Check of Containment
Sump to
RHR and
RMST to
RHR Valves",
steps
6.5.9
through
6.5.27,
which verified
motor-operated
valve
operations,
computer
address
points,
pressure
regulated
valve adjust-
ments
and visual verification of these
evolutions.
The
inspectors
verified that test data
were recorded
on the appropriate
data
sheets.
During this inspection,
the inspectors
noted that the test
personnel~
involved with this test
conducted
themselves
in
a professional
manner
and took immediate corrective actions for any identified problems.
The fill and venting of the reactor
coolant
system
(RCS) started
on
June
16,
1985
and concluded
June
20,
1985, in accordance
with procedure
1-2005-0-01.
The
inspectors
reviewed
portions
of thi s procedure
to
ensure that the procedure
had been
approved
and selected
valve lineups
had been verified as to proper valve position requirements.
During the initial fill and venting
sequence,
the licensee identified
that
the
reactor
coolant
pump
seal
areas
for
loops
A and
B were
leaking.
After an inspection
by the licensee,
the
leaks
were
found
to
be located
at the flange
between
the motor
assembly
and
the
pump
casing;
this area
ia sealed
by use of
an installed 0-ring
and
then
torqued to approximately
1000 foot pounds.
The licensee
stopped
the fill and venting of the
RCS,
and depressurized
and drained
the
system
to inspect
these
mating surfaces.
Disassembly
inspection
of the
three
pumps
revealed
that
the 0-rings
were
not
installed.
Therefore,
the only boundary
was from the torque applied by
the flange bolts.
The inspectors will follow-up on this item during
future
inspections
to
determine
the
root
cause
and
review
CP&L's
corrective actions.
This item is identified as
an Inspector
Follow-up
Item 400/85-24-04
"Missing 0-Ring for Reactor
Coolant Pumps".
The
inspectors
conducted
tours
of
the
various
plant
areas.
The
following items were observed
and assessed
during the tours to assure
compliance with requirements:
(1)
The general
condition of the plant's
housekeeping
and the overall
condition of equipment
were observed.
(2)
The plant
was
found to
be free of any major fire hazards.
Fire
extinguishing
equipment
was
readily
available,
and
flammable
materials
were
being
protected
from ignition sources
and
were
being
controlled
in
accordance
with
site
administrative
procedures.
c
12
(3)
The
inspectors
observed
electrical
personnel
placing
cables
in
their respective
cable trays
and conduits.
Sufficient care
was
being taken to prevent
damage
to the cables
being
placed
and to
cables
which had already
been installed.
(4)
The
inspectors
looked for uncontrolled
openings
in previously
cleaned
or flushed
systems
or components.
Where
system
openings
were
identified,
cleanliness
controls
were
established
duri ng
flushing.
I
(5)
The inspectors
observed
one instance
in which electrical
personnel
were working on electrical
equipment which had already
been turned
over to the start-up
group.
The work was being accomplished
under
the
proper
admi ni strati ve
contr ol s
pr ovided
i n
the
Start-up
Manual .
~ e.
The
inspectors
observed
operations
personnel
deenergizing
electrical
components
as required
by the clearance
program
when equipment is being
placed out of commission for repairs,
tests
or rework.
f.
The
inspectors
observed
the
status
of the
plant
being
correctly
identified in the control
room
by operations
personnel.
The roving
operators
were making frequent tours of the various buildings and were
maintaining adequate
control of plant systems
and equipment.
g.
The
inspectors
reviewed
log
books
maintained
by the test
group
to
identify problems
or plant activities that
may
be
appropriate
for
additional follow-up.
Except
as
noted,
no violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
14.
.Independent
Inspection - Operations
(92706
and 42400B)
e
During the
weeks of June
3 and June
10,
1985,
the inspectors
reviewed
the licensee's
action with respect
to IE Information Notice No. 85-16,
"Time/Current Trip Curve
Discrepancy
of ITE/Siemens-Allis
Molded
Case
Circuit
Breaker".
This
IEN
described
a
potentially
significant
discrepancy
pertaining to HE-3-M040 breakers.
The inspectors
reviewed
documents
which indicated
that
a
CP5L on-site
nuclear
safety
review
group
study
had
indicated
that
ITE/Siemens-Allis
type
HE3 circuit
breakers
were not used at the Harris Plant.
The inspectors
toured the
diesel
generator building and observed that the class
1E motor control
centers
(MCCs) for the
emergency
diesel
generators
contain
the
ITE
type
HE3 circuit breakers.
The inspectors
evaluated
the
procurement
documents
and
the
documentation
provided
by
the
supplier
of the
emergency
diesel
generator
MCCs.
The
responsible
maintenance
and
start-up
personnel
were
interviewed
and
asked if CP&L planned
to
conduct
any tests
to determine if the type
HE3 circuit breakers
have
been adjusted
to trip at the prescribed
setpoints
~
l
13
The inspectors
were
informed by
CP&L procurement
personnel
that there
were
no test results
supplied
by the
MCC manufacturer
to verify proper
overload trip tests
for these
type
HE3 circuit breakers.
Interviews
with start-up
and maintenance
personnel
revealed
that there
have
been
no provisions
made to require testing the overload settings
on the site
electrical
systems
which contain
the
HE3 circuit breakers,
other
than
those required
by the proposed site technical
specifications.
CP&L is
currently
reviewing
the
extent
of
use
and
the
need
for
additional
testing of 'HE3 circuit breakers
at Harris.
The inspector
informed
CP&L management
that this
apparent
failure to identify
a
condition
adverse
to quality is
an
unresolved
item
pending
NRC
evaluation of the licensee's
review and is identified as "Overload Trip
Setpoints for ITE Type
HE3-M040 Molded
Case Circuit Breakers"
400/85-
24-03.
b.
During this
inspection
period,
the
inspectors
toured
the
emergency
diesel
generator
buildings
to
observe
ongoing activities to
ensure
compliance
with
NRC requirements
and
FSAR commitments.
Housekeeping
activities
were
adequate
for all
areas
inspected
and
sensitive
components
were
covered
as
necessary
to
prevent
contamination
by
airborne dust.
The inspectors
obtained
selected
diesel
generator
test
procedures
for review prior to the
licensee's
conducting
of these
specific tests,
which were scheduled
to commence during this inspection
period.
c.
During the
week of June
10,
1985, the inspectors
observed
the lifting
and installation of the reactor vessel
head.
The following attributes
were evaluated
while observing work activities:
(1)
The vessel
head "0" ring grooves
were verified for cleanness;
(2)
The overhead lifting hook was cleaned,
tested
and inspected;
(3)
The responsible
craft
and inspection
personnel
were cognizant of
the applicable
procedural
requirements.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.