ML18018B646
| ML18018B646 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1984 |
| From: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8405140590 | |
| Download: ML18018B646 (11) | |
Text
Docket No.:
50-400 APR 18 t984 DISTRIBUTION Mr. E.
E. Utley Executive Vice President Power Supply 8 Engineering and Construction Carolina Power 8 Light Company
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Dear Mr. Utley:
~C 1-50-400-i NRC PDR Local PDR PRC System LBP3 Reading JLee BBuckley NGrace EJordan
- Attorney, OELD ACRS (16)
Subject:
Request for Additional Information - Shearon Harris, Unit 1 We have reviewed your submittals regarding safe shutdown after a fire for compliance with Standard Review Plan Section 9.5. 1 entitled, "Fire Protection Program".
As a result of our review we find that additional information in response to the attached questions is required in order to continue our review.
Sincerely, Origina/ signed gy:
Harry Hood
Attachment:
As stated cc:
See next page George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No.
3 Division of Licensing DL:
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Mr. E.
E. Utley Executive Vice President Power Supply and Fngineering and Construction Carolina Power
& Light Company Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts
& Trowbridge 1800 M Street, NW Washington, DC 20036 Richard E. Jones, Esn.
Associate General Counsel Carolina Power
& Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Mall Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 M. David Gordon, Esq.
Associate Attorney General State of North Carolina Post Office Box 629
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Thomas S. Erwin, Esq.
115 W. Morgan Street
- Paleigh, North Carolina 27602 Mr. George Maxwell Resident Inspector/Harris NPS c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 1, Box 315B flew Hill, f'forth Carolina 27562 Charles D. Barham, Jr.,
Esq.
Vice President
& Senior Counsel Carolina Power
& Light Company Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, florth Carol',na 27602 Mr. John Runkle, Executive Coordinator Conservation Council of North Carolina 307 Granville Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Mr. Ir!elis Eddleman 718-A Iredel1 Street Durham, fforth Carolina 27705 Shearon Harris Mr. George Jackson, Secretary Environmental Law Proiect School of Law, 064-A Univeristy nf North Carolina Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Dr. Phyllis Lotchin 108 Bridle Run Chapel H~ll, North Carolina 27514 Mr. Travis Payne, Esq.
723 W. Johnson Street Post Office Box 12643
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Mr. Daniel F.
- Read, President CHANGE/ELP 5707 Waycross Street
- Raleiah, North Carolina 27606 Bradley W. Jones, Esa.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Region II 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Richard D. llilson, M.
D.
725 Hunter Street Apex, North Caro1ina 27502.
Peoional Administrator - Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 f!r. Robert P. Gruher Executive Director Public Staff -
NCUC Post Office Pox 991
- Raleiah, North Carolina 27602
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Dr. Linda Little Governor's Haste management Board 513 Albemarle Building 325 North Salisbury Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27611
E."JCLOSUP,E 410.23 410. 24 In the narrative in Attachment 1 to the applicant's February 24, 1984 submittal, it is stated that the safe shutdown systems are capab>e of attainina cold shutdown witt'in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Briefly out-line how this goal (cold shutdown in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) could be attained in the event of a control room fire with estimates of the times required to reach hot standby, hot shutdown and cold shutdown, including the time required for each step involved.
lie consider the instrumentation needed for safe shutdown after a
fire to be as follows:
a) pressurizer pressure and level, b) reactor coolant hot leg temperature and either cold leg temperature or TAVG, c) steam generator pressure and level (wide range),
N d) source range flux monitor, e}
actual flow measurements for all pumps used f) level indication for all tanks used.
It appears that all the required instrumentation is available at the auxiliary control panel (ACP) or is available locally in the event of a fire requiring evacuation of the control room with the exception of the source range flux monitor.
Verify the availability of the, necessary instrumentation and provide a readout for the source range flux monitor which will be avail-able for use in the event of a fire requiring evacuation of the control room.
410.25 From a comparison of the list entitled "Systems Required for Plant Shutdown in Case of a Fire," in the applicant's submittal with the list contained in Table 7.4.1-2 of the FSAR, entitled, "Instrumentation and Control, Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP)"
it appears that some of the systems required for safe shutdown will not be controlled from the ACP in the event of a fire in the control room.
Therefore,,
show that s>>fficient personnel are available to safely shut the plant down in the event of all fires which require operation from the ACP.
Provide summaries
.of procedures to confirm the number of personnel required.
In
- addition, discuss by what measures the people at the ACP will communicate with those people perfoming necessary functions at ott er locations throughout the plant.
410.26 410.27 410. 28 410.29 410. 30 410. 31 From a-review o~ Table 9. 5.B-3 in the applicant's February 24, 1984 submittal, it appears that the auxiliary control panel definitely needs to be used in the event of f.:re" in areas 12-A-CRC (305 Control Room Complex) and 12-A-CR (Control Room).
Regarding fire area 12-A-HYMIR it is stated "-The Control Room may also have to be evacuated---."
This appears to be conditional although the backup systems cited do not appear to provide cooling for the control room in which case the control room would have to be evacuated, eventually.
Please clarify this and provide corrections if and where necessary.
In the narrative contained in Attachment 1 of the applicant's sub-mittal of February 24, 1984 the seed for one train in systems with redundant trains for safe shutdown after a fire is specif ied.
However, there appears to be no specif icity as to which train should be operable when operating from the auxiliary control panel (ACP) after a fire.
Therefore, we conclude that all systems containing two or more trains will need Technical Specifi-cations containing limiting conditions for operation and surveil-lance requirements for each train at the ACP.
Verify that Technical Specifications will be provided for all these trains or, alternatively, tAat the train or trains reauired to be operable at the ACP w'ill
~ he specifjed and that Technical Specifications will be provided only for those trains at the ACP.
Discuss how the cables imcluded in Table 1 (attached) are not adversely affected by fires in associated circuits.
Show that, where necessary, coordinated protection exists so that failure of part of a cable in a local fire will not adversely affect power to other safe shutdown equipment.
Details of cable runs, cable trays and associated circuits are necessary to allow us to make an independent finding.
Provide outlines of procedures (if available) or cormit to develop procedures and to provide outlines for safe shutdown in the event of a fire in any plant area in which a fire may be postulated to occur.
A comnitment should include a schedule with sufficient time for our review of the outlines prior to plant startup.
Discuss how access to the ACP is controlled in order to minimize inadvertent or deliberate action to damage the plant by misuse of the transfer panels and transfer switches during operations when use of the ACP is not required.
Provide a commitment to perform adequate acceptance tests of the alternative shutdown capability in accordance with the provisions of Section
- 3. 4, 1 of Branch Technical Position CNEB 9. 5-1.
These tests should verify that:
equipment operates from the local c ntrol station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the "local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated
410. 32 410.33 410. 34 410. 35 410,36 from the control room; and that equipment onerates from the control room but cannot be operated at the local control stati'on when the transfer isolation switch is,in the "remote" position.
- Further, these tests should verify that there is no intermediate transfer switch position where equipment may be operated simultaneously at both locations or at neither location.
Comnit to provide Technical Specifications for surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operation for that equipment required for safe shutdown after a fire.
Surveillance testing should include periodic initiation and operation of equipment from the auxiliary control panel (ACP), at least once every 18 months.
Show that timely boron injection and shutdown can be effected 1n the event a fire damages or destroys both boric acid transfer pumps.
In Table 9.58-3 (Revision 2) it is stated (Comment 5, fire area 1-A-BAL A, Reactor Auxiliary Building) that air handling units AH-ll (lB-SB) and AH-11 (lA-SA) only provide local cooling for the equipment in that area.
Does the area cooled by the two air handling units contain equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire. which could damage or destroy both air handling units7 If so, show that loss of both air handling units in a single fire will not affect safe shutdown of the plant.
In Table 9.58-3 (Revi'sion 2) it is noted that cables in fire area 12-A-BAL (Reactor Auxiliary Buildingj could be damaged in a tire so that air handling units AH-92 (lA-SA) and AH-92 (1B-SB) would not be available to cool motor control centers located on eleva-tion 61.
Further, it is noted that shutdown would not be adversely affected since cooling could be effected by HVAC units located
'n other fire areas.
Show that effective cooling of the affected motor control centers can be maintained in the event of a fire resulting in inoperability of air handling units AH-92 (lA-SA) and AH-92 (1B-SB).
In the submittal (Table
- 9. 5B-3, Revision
- 2) regarding fire area 1-c (Containment Building) it is stated that "the 'redundant cables equipment and associated nonsafety circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown meet Appendix P, to 10 CFR 50 Paragraph III.G.2.D separation criteria-"
Explain how such separation criteria is provided for the pressurizer heaters and cables throughout the containment building.
If the required separation
. is not provided either show how it will be provided or discuss hpw system pressure will be maintained without the pressurizer heaters.
410. 37 410..38 410:39
-4 In the section entitled "General Comnents" for fire are~
1-C in Table 9.5B-3 (Revision 2) it is stated that various SA and SB instru-ment racks are within 20 feet of one another out that loss of a set of local A and B instrument racks does not result in failure to shutdown because only one steam generator (SG) is needed.
- Then, when listing the racks (Cl-R2, -R3, -R4, -Rq, -R7, -Rq, -Rg, -R10,
-R13, -R14, and -R15) it is shown that racRs
-R13, -014-and
-R15 contain instruments for steam generator IC.
proviae 'further assurance that a fire in the area of these instrument racks will not prevent use of at least one SG for saf~ shutdown.
Discuss how the onsite fuel sunoly for the diesel generator (DRs) is 'sufficsent to operate the Db=- for enough time to permit addi-tional diesel fuel to be broughtmnsi& fn the event of a fire in the Shearon Harris plant.
In table 9.5B-3 (Revision 2) it is stated that only one steam generator is required for safe shutdown after a fire (see g 410.37.,
above).
However, in Section 10.4.9.1 of the Shearon Harris FSAR relating to the auxiliary feedwater system, it is'tated that "'---For a transient or accident condition, the minimum flow is delivered to at least two effective steam generators-- "
Explain these apparent discrepancies and make any necessary'orrections.
410.40, a.
Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses redundant electrically controlled devices (such as two series motor operated valves) to isolate or. preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.
b.
For each set of redundant valves identified in a., verify the redundant cabling (power and control) have adequate physical separation as required by.Secti.n III.G.2 of Appendix 'R.
c.
For each case where adequate separation is not provided, show that fire induced failures (hot short, open circuits or short to ground) of the cables will not cause maloperation and result in a LOCA.
'TABLE I Table 9.5B Cable Function Reports Page
- S09, Sheet 24 - Cable No.
- 10942A, Component Cooling Pump 1B-SB
,Power. Feeder 2.
Page
- S09, Sheet 24 - Cable No.
- 11975C, AFW Turbine lX-SAB Steam Isolation Valve 2MS-V9SA-1 Control 3.
Page
- S13, Sheet 1, Cable No.
- 10321A, Residual Heat Removal PlA-SA Motor Power Feeder 4.
Page
- S14, Sheet 1, Cable No.
- 10270C, Cable Between MTC-lA{SA) and 480V MCC-lA35-SA 5.
Page
- S13, Sheet 15, Cable No.
12604D, Chiller llC-2 (lA-SA), Chilled 1Jater Pump P-4, AEP-1 Control 6.
Page
- S15, Sheet 1, Cable No.
- 10299C, Control Cable to 480V MCC-lA35-SA from MTC 1A-SA for Charging/Safety Injection Valve 1-8133A 7.
Page Sll, Sheet 8, Cable No.
- 10268A, Power Cable to boric acid tank to charging pump valve 1-8104 8.
Page
- S07, Cable No.
Page
- S05, Cable No.
- 11779C, Feed to MCC lB-32SB 10.
Page
- S20, Cable No.
- 10988A, Steam Generators A, 8, C, Pressure Signal to PIC Cable Note:
S05 stands for CAR-SH-SK-668S05
e a