ML18018A989

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Westinghouse Electric Company - Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report No. 99900404/2017-201
ML18018A989
Person / Time
Site: 99900404
Issue date: 01/22/2018
From: Todd Jackson
NRC/NRO/DCIP/QVIB1
To: Corletti M
Westinghouse
Galletti G, NRO/DCIP
References
IR 2017201
Download: ML18018A989 (17)
v • d • e


Text

January 22, 2018 Michael Corletti, Director New Plant Technologies & Licensing 1000 Westinghouse Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066

SUBJECT:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INSPECTION OF WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY REPORT NO. 99900404/2017-201

Dear Mr. Corletti:

On December 11-15, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff conducted an inspection at the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) facility in Cranberry Township, PA.

The purpose of the limited-scope inspection was to assess WECs compliance with the provisions of selected portions of Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.

This inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) systems for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 currently under construction. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.

This NRC inspection report does not constitute NRC endorsement of your overall quality assurance (QA) or 10 CFR Part 21 programs.

During this inspection, the NRC staff evaluated aspects of WECs design and testing of the PMS, reviewed the vendors setpoint calculation notes methodology and implementation, and the results of the engineering effort associated with the maximum Central Processing Unit (CPU) analyses of the Advant Controller, Model 160 (AC160) microprocessor used in the PMS.

These activities were associated with inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) from Appendix C from the Combined License for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. Specifically, these activities were associated with ITAACs 2.5.02.10 and 2.5.02.11.

With respect to a previously identified unresolved issue regarding implementation of aspects of the cyber security program, the NRC inspectors documented the basis for closure of the issue.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if applicable) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System, which is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your

M. Corletti response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request that such material is withheld from public disclosure, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21, Protection of Safeguards Information: Performance Requirements.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Terry W. Jackson, Chief Quality Assurance Vendor Inspection Branch-1 Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs Office of New Reactors Docket No.: 99900404

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 99900404/2017-201 and Attachment

ML18018A989 *via email NRO-002 OFC NRO/DCIP NRO/DEI NRO/DEI NRO/DCIP NAME GGalletti* JAshcraft* WRoggenbrodt* TJackson DATE 01/22/2018 01/18/2018 01/19/2018 01/22/2018 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS DIVISION OF CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION AND OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS VENDOR INSPECTION REPORT Docket No.: 99900404 Report No.: 99900404/2017-201 Vendor: Westinghouse Electric Company 1000 Westinghouse Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 Vendor

Contact:

Michael Corletti, Director New Plant Technologies & Licensing 1000 Westinghouse Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 Email: corletmm@westinghouse.com Nuclear Industry Activity: Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, located at 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Cranberry Township, PA 16066, whose scope of supply includes but not limited to safety-related design, fabrication, testing, and delivery of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System and the non-safety Diverse Actuation System instruments and controls products to the current U.S. AP1000 plants under construction.

Inspection Dates: December 11-15, 2017 Inspection Team Leader: Greg Galletti NRO/DCIP/QVIB-1 Inspectors: Joseph Ashcraft NRO/DEI/ICE William Roggenbrodt NRO/DEI/ICE Approved by: Terry W. Jackson, Chief Quality Assurance Vendor Inspection Branch-1 Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs Office of New Reactors Enclosure

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Westinghouse Electric Company 99900404/2017-201 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff conducted this vendor inspection to verify that Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC (hereafter referred to as WEC), implemented an adequate quality assurance program that complies with the requirements of Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, and 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance. The inspectors conducted this inspection at the WEC facility in Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania, on December 11-15, 2017.

This inspection evaluated aspects of WECs programs for the design, implementation, and testing of the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) systems for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 currently under construction. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection.

This NRC inspection report does not constitute NRC endorsement of your overall quality assurance (QA) or 10 CFR Part 21 programs.

During this inspection, the NRC staff evaluated aspects of WECs design and testing of the PMS, reviewed the vendors setpoint calculation methodology and implementation, and engineering results associated with the maximum Central Processing Unit (CPU) analyses.

These activities were associated with inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) from Appendix C from the Combined License for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. Specifically, these activities were associated with ITAACs 2.5.02.10 and 2.5.02.11.

The following regulations served as the bases for this NRC inspection:

The information below summarizes the results of this inspection.

PMS Setpoint Methodology and Implementation (ITAAC 2.5.02.10)

The inspectors concluded that WECs implementation of the design calculation notes were developed in accordance with the approved setpoint methodology. Each of the calculations reviewed reflected a positive margin, thus signifying that the previously established setpoints are adequate to ensure that the protective functions would occur before the analytical limit established by the plant safety analysis is reached. No findings of significance were identified.

PMS Maximum CPU Engineering Evaluation (ITAAC 2.5.02.11c)

The inspectors concluded that WECs implementation of their policy and procedures for control of design and testing associated with the PMS maximum CPU engineering evaluation was consistent with the regulatory requirements set forth in Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XI, Test Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. No findings of significance were identified.

PMS Channel Integration Test (CIT) Results Report Review (ITAAC 2.5.02.11d)

The inspectors concluded that WECs implementation of their policy and procedures for control testing of associated with the PMS CIT satisfy the regulatory requirements set forth in Criterion XI, Test Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. No findings of significance were identified.

Inspection Report 99900404/2015209 Unresolved Issue (URI) Follow-up The NRC performed an evaluation to determine if the URI represented a non-conformance to contractual requirements. Based on this review, the NRC staff concluded that a NON may be used when a contractor fails to meet contract requirements related to 10 CFR § 73.54, but did not identify a specific requirement failure to include an individual with strong knowledge in emergency management systems on its Cyber Security Team. Therefore the staff determined that a non-conformance is not warranted. This issue is resolved.

REPORT DETAILS

1. PMS Setpoint Methodology and Implementation (ITAAC 2.5.02.10)
a. Inspection Scope The Inspectors reviewed the following design calculation notes: APP-PMS-M3C-100, Pressurizer Pressure RTS/ESAS Setpoints, and EOP Uncertainty calculations for AP1000 Plant, Revision 1; APP-PMS-M3C-101, Main Steam Line Pressure ESFAS Setpoint and EOP Uncertainty Calculations for the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2, APP-PMS-M3C-103, Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Reactor Trip Setpoint Calculations for the AP1000 Plant, Revision 1; and APP-PMS-M3C-104, Spent Fuel Pool Level PMS Uncertainty Calculations for the AP1000 Plants, Revision 2. The inspectors used APP-PMS-JEP-001, (WCAP-16361-P), Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems-AP1000, Revision 1, to determine if the design calculation notes were developed according to the NRC-approved setpoint methodology.

The inspectors confirmed that the uncertainties and assumptions used in calculation were taken from the referenced documentation provided in each calculation and properly implemented in the calculation notes and that a positive margin had been obtained. A positive margin assures that the established setpoint adequately protects the plant safety limits. Tap and transmitter elevations were not addressed in the calculation notes and there was no reference to scaling calculations used to account for any head correction due to tap and transmitter elevations. The calculations would be updated once the as-built plant configuration is completed and the tap and transmitter elevations are known. The inspectors interviewed WEC personnel on topics of precision of decimals used in calculations, rounding of numbers, tap and transmitter elevations used for head correction, scaling calculations, assumptions, and methods used by the calculation verifiers.

The inspectors confirmed that Section 4.3 of the setpoint methodology describes the process of how plant-specific information, such as process scaling calculations and other types of as-built information that support the calculation notes, will be confirmed, validated, and updated to calculation notes, as necessary, prior to fuel load.

b. Observations and Findings No findings of significance were identified.

c. Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that WECs implementation of the design calculation notes were developed in accordance with the approved setpoint methodology. Each of the calculations reviewed reflected a positive margin, thus signifying that the previously established setpoints are adequate to ensure that the protective functions would occur before the analytical limit established by the plant safety analysis is reached. The inspectors concluded that WECs implementation of their policy and procedures for control of the setpoint methodology and implementation satisfy the regulatory requirements set forth in Criterion III, Design Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

No findings of significance were identified.

2. PMS Maximum CPU Engineering Evaluation (ITAAC 2.5.02.11c)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed APP-PMS-GER-004, AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System AC160 Application CPU Load / Performance Analysis, Revision 3, dated November 2017, which documented the re-performed analysis for Software Baseline 8.4 (BL 8.4) US release, to confirm that the system utilized in production software will not exceed 70 percent maximum load for the Processor Module of the Advant Controller Model 160 (AC160).

The inspectors confirmed the methodology:

1. Adds additional tasks to the software routines, so that the software under test executes at a CPU utilization rate, or CPU load, slightly higher than the production software;
2. Adds a task related to performing a run-time analysis or counter task at the end of the executable software that captures and lists the maximum CPU utilization rate experienced by the microprocessor during its execution cycle;
3. Accounts for the backplane traffic potentially experienced by lower priority tasks by conducting a synchronization analysis in which the different software control modules (CONTRMs) with different priorities and execution times are driven to synchronization. This ensures that all CONTRMs are requesting use of the backplane input/output bus at the same moment, thus providing the longest system time required to execute all critical tasks within on execution cycle;
4. Includes a Delta Runtime Analysis to account for the changes made (additional load experienced by the microprocessor) to the BL 8.4 production level software.

The inspectors reviewed the change process applied to the AC160 Processors Modules for three engineering change packages that implemented a variety of PMS software and hardware design changes, including one that added new Class 1E level sensors and transmitters processed within the PMS. The inspectors confirmed the changes made to the system addressed and accounted for additional application tasks presented to the system micro-processors. The inspectors also reviewed various design and requirement specification documents, to confirm that those documents adequately reflected the design changes in BL 8.4.

b. Observations and Findings No findings of significance were identified.

c. Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that WECs implementation of their policy and procedures for control of design and testing associated with the PMS Maximum CPU Engineering Evaluation was consistent with the regulatory requirements set forth in Criterion III, Design Control, and Criterion XI, Test Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. No findings of significance were identified.

3. PMS Channel Integration Test (CIT) Results Report Review (ITAAC 2.5.02.11d)

CIT testing is used to isolate the PMS to a single division in order to facilitate performance of reactor trip and Emergency Safeguards Actuation System (ESFAS) features, integrated logic processor component logic, qualified data display and nuclear instrumentation operation, channel accuracy, cabinet indications and status, and plant control system hardware interface functionality testing. The functionality of all intra-cabinet and inter-divisional cabling and communications is also verified.

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed APP-PMS-T2R-050, AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Channel Integration Test Integrated System Validation Test Report, Revision 0, dated November 2017, and APP-PMS-T1P-050, AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Fuel Load Regression Test Procedure, Revision 2, to confirm the testing was performed in accordance with the applicable PMS testing procedures.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the test data sheets APP-PMS-T1D-018,AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring system I/O Channel Accuracy Channel Integration Test Data Sheets, Revision 6, to confirm that the recorded test data was within the expected response range, and where anomalies were documented, appropriate corrective actions were developed to identify and correct the causes, and appropriate evaluation, including retesting, if needed, was performed.

The inspectors reviewed Table A1-1, CIT Environmental Conditions Log, and confirmed environmental conditions were documented per the requirements of NABU-DS-00092-GEN, Safety Platform System Design Requirements, Revision 2, on environmental test log and those parameters of temperature and humidity were within the bounds specified for such tests in accordance with those requirements.

The inspectors reviewed the CIT Test Equipment Log Table D-1 and sampled the entries to confirm that the equipment used was adequately evaluated and within calibration prior to installation in the test configuration. The report also included a component log indicating where each test tool was located in the test configuration and duration of use of that item in that location.

b. Observations and Findings No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that WECs implementation of their policy and procedures for test control regarding the PMS CIT satisfy the regulatory requirements set forth in Criterion XI, Test Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. No findings of significance were identified.
4. Inspection Report 99900404/2015209 Unresolved Issue (URI) 99900404/2015-209-01 Follow-up During the February 6-9, 2017, NRC inspection of the PMS design and implementation, the inspectors reviewed activities related to on-going cybersecurity-related implementation. The results of that inspection were documented in NRC issued Inspection Report Number 99900404/2015-209, issued on May 12, 2017.

Based on that review, the inspectors identified a URI (99900404/2015-209-01) associated with aspects of WECs implementation of the cybersecurity-related activities concerning the need for inclusion of an individual with knowledge of emergency management on the Cyber Security Team. This issue was further evaluated by the NRC and included a review of contractual documentation.

The NRC evaluation included an analysis of whether a Notice of Nonconformance (NON) can be issued in the 10 CFR § 73.54 context and whether the issuance of a NON would be appropriate for the apparent deficiency observed during the inspection. Specifically, the staff looked for the existence of a contractual basis in the Vogtle purchase orders and subsequent change orders to identify failure to include an individual with strong knowledge in emergency management systems on its Cyber Security Team.

Based on this review, the NRC staff concluded that a NON may be used when a contractor fails to meet contract requirements related to 10 CFR § 73.54, but did not identify a specific requirement failure to include an individual with strong knowledge in emergency management systems on its Cyber Security Team. Therefore the staff determined that a non-conformance is not warranted. This issue is resolved.

5. Entrance and Exit Meetings On December 11, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection scope during an entrance meeting with Mr. Gary Brassart, Vice-President, Global Instrumentation and Controls, of WEC, and other WEC personnel. On December 15, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results during an exit meeting with Mr. Michael Corletti, Director, New Plant Licensing, of WEC and other WEC personnel.

ATTACHMENT

1. PERSONS CONTACTED AND NRC STAFF INVOLVED:

Name Affiliation Entrance Exit Interviewed Gary Brassart WEC X Stephen Packard WEC X X Dale Harmon WEC X Gregory Glenn WEC X X X Sarah DiTomasso WEC X X X Bob Hirmanpour SNC X X Michael Corletti WEC X Joseph Reagan WEC X X X Terry Williams WEC X X X Mike Drudy WEC X X X Quang Nguyen WEC X Mark Mamo SNC X Kasey Corbin WEC X X X Amanda Pugh SNC X Terry Tuite WEC X John Wiessmann WEC X X Pavel Tyrpak WEC X Dan Mikinac SNC X X Duong Nguyen SNC X X Dave Malarik WEC X X Brian Domitrovich WEC X X X Eric Pitschke WEC X X Steve Radomski WEC X Ron Wessel WEC X Martin Washington SNC X X Aleksey Popalehov WEC X X Mark Humphrey SNC X X Brad LeDonne WEC X X Cherie Paugh WEC X Jonathan Durfee WEC X Murat Uzman WEC X Vasilii Savtchouk WEC X Jason Zielinski WEC X Darin Orendi WEC X Cynthia Taylor NRC X X Carl Jones NRC X X Ken Mott NRC X Joseph Ashcraft NRC X X Greg Galletti NRC X X Lisa Castelli NRC X X William Roggenbrodt NRC X X

2. INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED:

IP 43002, Routine Inspections of Nuclear Vendors, dated July 15, 2013 IP 60001.22, Inspection of Digital Instrumentation and Control (DI&C) System/Software Design Acceptance Criteria (DAC)-Related ITAAC, dated December 19, 2011

3. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED:

Item Number Status Type Description Applicable ITAAC 99900404/2015-209-01 Closed URI Cyber NA

4. INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA:

The U.S. NRC inspectors identified the following ITAAC related to components being designed, manufactured, and tested at WEC. For the ITAAC listed below, the inspectors reviewed WECs QA controls in the areas of design control, test control, inspection, nonconforming materials parts and components, and corrective actions. The ITAAC design commitments referenced below are for future use by the NRC staff during the ITAAC closure process; the listing of these ITAAC design commitments does not constitute that they have been met and/or closed.

This section of the inspection report focuses on the vendors implementation of aspects of their QA program for the activities affecting quality associated with the design and testing of the aspects of the AP1000 PMS. This included a review of completed Generic AP1000 Baseline (BL) 8.4 PMS software and hardware design and testing documentation and review of setpoint calculation notes. These activities are associated with ITAAC 2.5.02.11 (Index No. 550) and 2.5.02.10 (Index No. 549), respectively. The goal of these inspection activities is to examine the governing documents and samples of engineering activities that demonstrate the implementation of the design commitments and design attributes as stated in the ITAAC design commitments.

ITAAC ITAAC Inspections, Index Section Design Commitment Acceptance Criteria Tests, Analyses No. No.

Inspection will be

10. Setpoints are A report exists and concludes performed for a determined using a that the PMS setpoints are document that methodology which determined using a describes the accounts for loop methodology which accounts 549 2.5.02.10 methodology and inaccuracies, response for loop inaccuracies, input parameters testing, and maintenance response testing, and used to determine or replacement of maintenance or replacement the PMS instrumentation. of instrumentation.

setpoints.

11. The PMS hardware A report exists and concludes and software is that the process defines the developed using a organizational responsibilities, planned design process activities, and configuration which provides for management controls for the specific design following:

documentation and a. Not used.

reviews during the b. Specification of functional following life cycle Inspection will be requirements.

stages: performed of c. Documentation and review a) Not used the process used of hardware and software.

550 2.5.02.11 b) System definition to design the d. Performance of system phase hardware and tests and the documentation c) Hardware and software. of system test results, software development including a response time phase, consisting of test performed under hardware and software maximum CPU loading to design and demonstrate that the PMS implementation can fulfill its response time d) System integration criteria.

and test phase e. Performance of installation e) Installation phase tests and inspections.

5. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED:

Setpoint Calculation Notebook Evaluation APP-PMS-JEP-001, (WCAP-16361-P), Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems-AP1000, Revision 1, dated February 2011 APP-PMS-M3C-100, Pressurizer Pressure RTS/ESAS Setpoints, and EOP Uncertainty calculations for AP1000 Plant, Revision 1, dated March 28, 2017 APP-RCS-M3C-101, RCS Instrumentation and Packaged Mechanical System Interface Requirements, Revision 11, dated September 2016 SV0-JE52-J0M-002, Vogtle AP1000 Class 1E Pressure and Differential Pressure Transmitters Suppliers B - Technical Manual, Revision 1, dated September 19, 2016 APP-JE52-Z0R-001, AP1000 Class 1E Pressure and Differential Pressure Transmitters Data Sheet Report, Revision 3, dated June 29, 2015 APP-PMS-J4-020, AP1000 System Design Specification for the Protection and Safety Monitoring System, Revision 13, dated August 2016 APP-PMS-VPR-001, Environmental Test Report for the AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System and Nuclear Instrumentation System Auxiliary Panels, Revision 0, dated November 2012 APP-GW-VP-030, AP1000 Environmental Conditions, Revision 6, dated October 2016 APP-GW-M3C-022, AP1000 Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation, Revision 1, dated October 2016 APP-PMS-M3C-135, Insulation Resistance Degradation Uncertainties for the Domestic AP1000 Plants, Revision 0, dated November 2016 APP-PMS-M3C-101, Main Steam Line Pressure ESFAS Setpoint and EOP Uncertainty Calculations for the AP1000 Plant, Revision 2, dated April 17, 2017 APP-SGS-M3C-101, SGS Instrumentation and Packaged Mechanical System Interface Requirements, Revision 9, dated March 2016 APP-PMS-M3C-103, Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Reactor Trip Setpoint Calculations for the AP1000 Plant, Revision 1, dated April 25, 2017 APP-JE62-Z0D-101, AP1000 Specification Data Sheet for Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Sensor, Revision 0, dated October 12, 2010 APP-SSAR-GSC-135, Advanced First Core LOFTRAN Base Deck, Revision 1, dated December 16, 2014 APP-JY62-VNM-101, Instruction Manual for the 46C1-01 and 46C1-02 AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Sensor Preamplifier Assemblies, Revision 0, dated June 27, 2014 APP-JE62-Z0-001, JE62/JE40 RCP Speed/ Phase Reference Sensor, Revision 4, dated September 8, 2016 APP-JY62-Z0-002, Class 1E RCP Speed Sensor Preamplifier Specification, Revision 4, dated January 14, 2014 APP-PMS-M3C-104, Spent Fuel Pool Level PMS Uncertainty Calculations for the AP1000 Plants, Revision 2, dated April 3, 2017 APP-SFS-M3C-101, SFS Instrumentation and Packaged Mechanical System Interface Requirements, Revision 13, dated August 4, 2016 APP-SFS-M3-001, AP1000 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System - System Specification Document, Revision 10, dated September 27, 2016 APP-SFS-M3-001, AP1000 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System - System, Revision 10 APP-SFS-M3C-012, AP1000 Spent Fuel Pool Heatup, Boiloff, and Emergency Makeup on, Revision 6 APP-RXS-M8-020, AP1000 NSSS / Core Design Interface Document, Revision 3 APP-JE04-ZOR-001, AP1000 Non-Class IE Orifice-Type and Venturi-Type Flow Elements Data Sheet Report, Revision 0, dated May 15, 2014 APP-ISIP-T1P-422, AP1000 CIM/AOI Function Integration Test Procedure, Revision 0, dated November 2015 APP-ISIP-T2R-422, AP1000 Function Integration Test Report, Revision 0, dated March 2016 Drawing APP-PMS-J0-002, AP1000 PMS Architecture Division A, Revision 7, dated October 21, 2015 RITS 49832, Discrepancy between Division B and D PMS Logic (valve SGS-V040A),

dated December 20, 2015 RITS 45447, HSL Data Stream Quality, dated May 21, 2015, closed CAPAL 100301483, Non-MOV-Configured CIM Response to Opening CIN3, CIN4 Inputs, dated May 19, 2015 CPU Maximum Load APP-PMS-GER-004, AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System AC160 Application CPU Load/Performance Analysis, Revision 1, dated January 8, 2016 APP-J1-001, AP1000 PMS Functional Requirements, Revision 09, dated September 2014 APP-PMS-J3-388, AP1000 Detailed Functional Diagram Auxiliary Building Flood-up Level, Revision 00, dated September 2014 APP-PMS-J4-020, AP1000 System Design Specification for the Protection and Safety Monitoring System, Revision 09, dated October 2014 APP-PMS-J4-102, AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Software Requirements Specification, Revision 13, dated January 2015 APP-PMS-GHY-001, AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Software Design Description, Revision 12 APP-PMS-J4V-001, Safety Display Functional Specification, Revision 08, dated September 2014 WNA-RL-05234-WAPP, AP1000 PMS Software Configuration Management Release Report (for Baseline 8.2), Revision 00, dated June 2015 WNA-AR-00438-GEN, AC160, Load and Performance Analysis, Revision 1, dated June 1, 2014 Engineering and Design Change Report, EDCR-162 Engineering and Design Change Report EDCR-181 RITS 62648 dated December 15, 2017 CIT Testing APP-PMS-T2R-050, AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Channel Integration Test Integrated System Validation Test Report, Revision 0, dated November 2017 APP-PMS-T1P-050, AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Fuel Load Regression Test Procedure, Revision 2 APP-PMS-T1D-018,AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring system I/O Channel Accuracy Channel Integration Test Data Sheets, Revision 6 NABU-DS-00092-GEN, Safety Platform System Design Requirements, Revision 2, dated September 2007.

RITS58466 dated June 19, 2017 RITS58378 dated June 12, 2017 RITS58377 dated June 13, 2017 URI 99900404/2015-209-01 APP-GW-Y0-004, AP1000 Cyber Security Team, Revision 1, dated June 2016 Vogtle AP1000 Nuclear Units 3&4 Change Order #1 Cyber Security, dated December 31, 2015 Virgil C. Summer AP1000 Nuclear Unit(s Change Order #14 Cyber Security Phase 1, dated February 28, 2012 Virgil C. Summer AP1000 Nuclear Units 2 & 3 Change Order #29 Cyber Security, dated August 24, 2016 Engineering, Procurement and Construction Agreement between South Carolina Electric &

Gas Company, For Itself and as Agent for The South Carolina Public Service Authority, as Owner and a Consortium Consisting of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC and Stone &

Webster, Inc., as Contractor for AP1000 Nuclear Power Plants, dated May 23, 2008

6. ACRONYMS:

AC160 Advant Controller Model 160 BL Baseline CAPAL Corrective Action Program and Learning System CFR Code of Federal Regulations CIM Component Interface Module CIT channel integration test CONTRM software control module CPU central processing unit DCD Design Control Document DCIP Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs DCIS Distributed Control and Information System DI&C digital instrumentation and control E&DCR Engineering & Design Change Report QVIB Quality Vendor Inspection Branch I&C instrumentation and control IP inspection procedure ITAAC Inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria CPU Central Processing Unit NON Notice of Nonconformance NRC (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRO Office of New Reactors PMS Protection and Safety Monitoring System QA quality assurance RITS Repair Replacement and Automation Services Issue Tracking System SNC Southern Nuclear Company U.S. United States (of America)

WEC Westinghouse Electric Company

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