ML18018A572
| ML18018A572 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1983 |
| From: | Mcduffie M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM LAP-83-250, NUDOCS 8307060095 | |
| Download: ML18018A572 (8) | |
Text
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'EGULATORINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION LITEM (RIDE)
ACCESSION NBR;8307060095 DOC ~ DATE: 83/07/01 NOTARlZEO:
NO DOCKET FACIL:50 460 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plantr Unit ii Carolina 05000400 50-401 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plantr Unit 2i Carolina 05000401 AUTH,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HCDUFFIE/H ~ A ~
Carolina l ower 8 Light Co, BEC IP', NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONrH,R<
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director
SUBJECT:
Responds to Containment Sys Branch draft SER Open Item. 68
'ddi failure alarm located within control room unnecessary, Continuous indication will be functioning within 30, minutes.
of safety injection initiation per *THI-Item'IFF ~ 1, OISTRIBUTI N CODE:
8001S COPIES RECEIVED!LTR g 'NCL.J SIZE ~, ~
TITLE: Licensing Submittal:
PSAR/FSAR Amdts S Belated <<Correspondence NOTES:
RECIPIENT IO CODE/NAME NRA/DL/AOL BIRR L83 LA INTERNAL: ELD/HDS1 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 IE/DFQA/QAB 21 NRR/DE/CEB li NRA/OE/EQB 13 NRA/OE/MEB i8 NRA/OE/SAB 24 NRR/DHFS/HFE840 NRA/DHFS/PSRB NRA/OSI/AE&
26 BRA/OS I/CP 8 NRR/OSI/ICSB 16 NRA/DSI/PS 8 19 NRA/Ds I/RSB 23 RGN2'XTERNAL; ACRS 41 OH&/Oss (AHDTS)
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0 Carolina Power & Light Company JUL 011S83 SERIAL:
LAP 83-250 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS ~
1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-400 AND 50-401 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT RESPONSES CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH
Dear. Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power
& Light Company hereby transmits one original and forty copies of the response to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)
Open Item 68.
Carolina Power
& Light Company will be providing responses to other Open Items in the DSER shortly.
Yours very truly, PS/ccc (6729PSA)
Attachment M. A. McDuffie Senior Vice President Engineering
& Construction Cct Mr. Yun-Seng Huang (NRC-CSB)
Mr. N. Prasad Kadambi (NRC)
Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
Mr. J.
P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII)
Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)
Mr. Daniel F.
Read (CHANGE/ELP)
Chapel Hill Public Library Wake County Public Library Mr.. Wells Eddleman Dr.. Phyllis Lotchin Mr.. John D. Runkle Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)
Dr. J.
H. Carpenter (ASLB)
Mr.. J. L. Kelley (ASLB) 8307060095 830701 PDR ADOCV, 0S000eOO E
PDR ooi 411 Fayettevilte Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh, N. C. 27602
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Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)
Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)
Containment Systems Branch 0 en Item 68 (DSER Section 6.2.5 a es 6-27 and 6-30)
Two redundant, independent, full capacity electric (thermal) hydrogen recombiners are permanently located inside containment to control the containment hydrogen concentration.
The hydrogen recombiners are designed to seismic Category I and Safety Class 2 standards and are powered from separate safeguard buses.
No single active failure, coincident with the loss of offsite power, will prevent the hydrogen recombiners from performing their intended design function.
When required, the hydrogen recombiners are manually actuated from the hydrogen recombiner control panels, which are located in an area within the control room environmental envelope adjacent to the main control room.
Because the hydrogen recombiner control panels are not located in the main control room, it is the staff's position that a hydrogen recombiner failure alarm should be provided in the main control room.
~Res oese The Applicant does not believe that an additional failure alarm located within the control room is necessary.
The operation of each hydrogen recombiner is manually controlled from the panel located within the control room envelope and is therefore readily accessible following a postulated accident.
All hydrogen recombiner supervisory instrumentation including trouble alarms are located in the panels.
Operating procedures require that both of the redundant recombiners be started when hydrogen concentrations reaches 3 volume percent following a postulated accident.
Since only one of the two recombiners is required to perform the system's safety function the operators may then selectively remove one recombiner from operation.
If one recombiner is selected to be removed from operation, the operator will base the selection upon the concentration of hydrogen in various locations in the containment and upon the performance characteristics of the recombiner.
Per the requirements of NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1., continuous indication and recording of hydrogen concentration will be functioning within 30 minutes of safety injection initiation.
The continuous indication and recording of hydrogen concentration will be monitored on the hydrogen analyzer remote control panel located in the main control room envelope.
The hydrogen analyzer alarm, located on the main control board, annunciates and is set at a 3 percent by volume hydrogen level concentration.
Post loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) hydrogen accumulation at 3
percent occurs approximately 7 days after an accident as shown in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Figure 6.2.5-6.
FSAR Section 6.2.5 indicates that the recombiners will be manually started when the hydrogen concentration in the containment atmosphere, as monitored by the hydrogen concentration in the containment atmosphere, as monitored by the hydrogen analyzer system, reaches 3 volume percent.
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0 en Item 68 Res onse (Continued)
This very conservative assumption was made in order to demonstrate that once a 3 volume percent concentration is reached either one of the two 100 percent capacity recombiners is sufficient to maintain containment hydrogen concentration beneath the 4 volume percent flammability limit.
Following a LOCA the control room operators willmonitor the performance of the recombiners and other back panels at specific intervals (e.g., every hour).
Since the recombiners will be placed in operation before the containment hydrogen concentration ever approaches 4 volume percent and since the recombiner operation will be monitored periodically, the main control board high-hydrogen alarm, in addition to the back panel indication and recording described in FSAR Section 6.2.5.2.3 "Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System," will provide adequate control for the safe operation of the hydrogen recombiners.
Ample time is available for remedial operator action to compensate for degraded recombiner performance.
FSAR Sections 6.2.5.2.1, 6.2.5.2.3 and 7.3.1.4.1 will be revised to reflect this change.
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