ML18017B253
| ML18017B253 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1980 |
| From: | Economos N, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18017B248 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-80-18, 50-401-80-16, 50-402-80-16, 50-403-80-16, NUDOCS 8010140156 | |
| Download: ML18017B253 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1980018
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303
AUG 2 6580
Report Nos. 50-400/79-18,
50-401/79-16,
50-402/79-17
and 50-403/79-16
Licensee:
Carolina Power and I,ight Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant
Docket Nos. 50-400,
50-401,
50-402
and 50-403
License Nos.
CPPR-158,
CPPR-159,
CPPR-160
and
CPPR-161
Inspection at Shearon
arri
near Raleigh, North Carolina
Inspected
by:
N. Eco
Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief,
RC&ES Branch
SUNHARY
Inspection
on July 7-11,
1980
Areas Inspected
Da
Si ned
. 8'la g
Date
igned
This routine
unannounced
inspection
involved
41 inspector-hours
on site in the
areas of steel structures
and supports,
observation of welding activities inside,
and outside containment;
weld material control; pressurizer lift; storage;
main
dam construction activity; other safety-related
piping visual examination of
welds; housekeeping.
Results
Of the eight areas
inspected,
no items of noncompliance
were identified in five
areas;
three items of noncompliance
were identified in three areas (Infraction-
Failure to follow procedures
- housekeeping
storage
and document control, Para-
graph 5.a.; Infraction - weld material control, Paragraph
7; Deficiency - welder
qualification test records,
Paragraph
8.)
8 0 10140/5&'
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
I,icensee
Employees
-N.
%R
d E
'G
-"V.
D.
>R.
D.
G.
W.
J. Chiangi,
Manager Engineering
6 Construction,
M. Parsons,
Site Manager
E. Willett, Principal Engineer',
Mechanical
L. Forehand,
Principal
QA Specialist
M. Safarian,
QA Welding Specialist
C. Whitehead, Sr.,
QA Specialist Material Control
Hanford, Principal Engineer,
Met./Welding
Sugg, Civil QA
Milner, Civil QA
Mercer, Welding QA
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included construction craftsmen,
and
office personnel.
Other Organizations
Chicago Bridge 8 Iron Company
(CBI)
R. Lerch, Project Superintendent
F.
P. Hazelip, Welding and
QA Superintendent
2.
Daniel Construction
Company (Daniel)
="W. D. Goodman,
Project Manager
+Attended exit interview.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on July ll, 1980, with
those persons
indicated in Paragraph
1 above.
The inspector identified the
areas
inspected
which included steel structures
and supports - observation
of welding activities, welding material control, record review; pressurizer
lift. Three items of noncompliance
were discussed
in detail.
The licensee
concurred with the inspection findings.
'icensee
Action on Previous Inspection Findings
Not inspected.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
,
Independent Inspection Effort
"2"
a
~
Plant Tour
The inspector performed
a general inspection of various work areas
to
observe pipe handling, storage, installation and welding activities in
progress
and to inspect the general state of housekeeping,
cleanliness,
including control of unused
weld electrodes
and
equipment
near
the
working areas.
Within these areas,
the inspector
made the following observations:
(1)
Housekeeping
- On July
7 and 8, 1980, construction debris,
accumu-
lation of water, dirt and trash including soft drink cans,
rags,
empty cups, etc., in excess
amounts
were noted inside
the fuel
handling building, various other areas
of the auxiliary building
and reactor
containment building.
This observation
was discussed
with the licensee
representative
and
immediate action was taken
to correct the situation.
The condition described
above
was contrary to requirements
of
Procedure
AP-VII-06,
Rev.
2,
Appendix A which
requires
that
garbage
trash,
scrap
and other
excess
material ... shall not be
allowed to accumulate
and create
conditions
which may adversely
affect quality.
(2)
Pipe Protection
and Storage - On July 8 and 9, 1980, the inspector
noted
several
instances
where stainless
steel pipe spools
were
improperly stored,
e.g.,
behind
the
fab
shop
and
inside
the
reactor auxiliary building, fabricated
spools
were either resting
in water,
on the
ground
and in one instance,
several fabricated
short spools were covered with a thin coat of grout material.
Also, in these
same
areas
a number of fabricated stainless
steel
spools were left with openings, e.g., nipples, pipe ends unprotected
(uncapped).
In all instances
there
was
no evidence
of welding
activity in the area.
This observation
was discussed
with the
licensee
representative
who
agreed
that corrective
action
was
required.
The condition described
above
was contrary to requirements
of
Procedure
WP-113, Paragraph
3.7 which requires
component
ends to
be
plugged
or sealed
against
entry of contaminants
during the
times when the ends are not being worked on.
(3)
Document
Control -
On July 9,
1980, while observing fuel pools
liner welding activities discussed
in Paragraph
7 of this report,
the inspector noted that the weld procedure specification for the
automatic
gas tungsten arc process
(GTAW) WPS-.8BU7 used
on hori-
zontal
and vertical liner welds
was
an out-dated
Revision 2,
issue.
This had been
superseded
by Revision 3, issued
on June
18,
1980.
In discussing
this matter
the
licensee
representative
stated that failure to issue the new revision in a timely manner
was an isolated
case related to a personnel
problem which now has
been alleviated.
However,
the inspector
stated
that failure to
place the new revision into the field three
weeks after issuance
could not
be justified
on that basis.
Failure to issue
the
revised
WPS
and to recall
the
one
superseded
was contrary to
requirements of Procedure
CQA-2, Rev. 2, Paragraph 9.1, "... Proce-
dures
or portions
thereof that have
been
superseded
or voided
will be recalled or destroyed."
These
findings represent
three
(3) examples of failure to follow
procedural requirements.
Failure to accomplish activities affecting
quality in accordance with approved procedures is in noncompliance
with Criterion V of Appendix
B,
as
implemented
by
Carolina Power and Light PSAR, Section 1.8.5.5.
This noncompliance
was categorized
as
an infraction and
was identified as item 400/
80-18-01
"Failure to follow procedures
- housekeeping,
storage
and document control.
b.
Main Dam Construction Activity
The inspector
reviewed
Procedures
CQC-13,
Rev. 4,
Concrete
Control,
QCI-13.3,
Rev.
1, Concrete Field Tests
and observed
concrete
placement
on the wall lining of the spillway.
The inspector
witnessed
slump,
weight, air and temperature
checks
made by QA/QC personnel
and reviewed
related
QC/QA at the work station.
Within these
areas
the inspector
noted that the counter of truck No.
95 was inoperative.
At the time
of this discovery the first bucket of concrete
had been
drawn and was
being hoisted
to the point of placement
while the
second
bucket
was
made
ready to be filled.
Upon being notified that the counter
was
inoperative,
personnel
scrapped
the entire
load.
Discussions
with
licensee
QA representatives
disclosed
the counter
was repaired but
could not provide objective evidence for verification.
Within the
areas
inspected,
no items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
c ~
NSSS Material Storage Yard (Units 1-4)
Material and components
stored in this area
were inspected in order to
ascertain
whether
storage
conditions
were consistent
with applicable
specifications
and
standards.
Components
observed
included reactor
vessels,
pressurizer
steam
generator,
coolant
pumps
and
main loop
piping.
Within the areas inspected
no items of noncompliance
were identified.
d.
Pressurizer
- Iiftand Placement (Unit 1)
On July 9,
1980, pressurizer
S/N
1641
was transported
from the
storage
12, to the designated
area at the power block in preparation
for subsequent
placement into the pressurizer
cavity.
The transport
and lifting operation
was performed by Rigging International
(RI) with
procedures
reviewed
and
approved
by the licensee.
The licensee's
QA/QC organizations
handled all activities within the areas of their
responsibility,
e.g.,
surveillance,
inspections,
documentation
and
approval,
etc.
The inspector
observed
the transportation
and lift/
placement of the pressurizer - the latter
was performed
on July 10,
1980.
Related
records
reviewed included
QA records/reports
R-661-3,
checklists, lift, rigging, hoisting,
NDE (MT) and transporting reports
and,
NSSS checklist records.
The transfer
from storage
to the point
of liftwas performed with RI's Crawler Transporter while the lift was
performed with the Carolina Giant Crane.
Within the
areas
inspected
no items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
6.
Steel Structures
and Supports Visual Examination of Welds
The containment liner is being fabricated by CBI under
CPM, contract
number
84031 in accordance
with provisions of the
ASME Code Section III, Div. 2,
Subsection
CC (74W75).
At the time of this inspection,
work had progressed
to the 15th ring.
Field welds are being fabricated thru the use of manual
shielded
metal arc
(SMAW) and semiautomatic
subarc
(SA) processes.
CBI's
Nuclear
QA Manual for ASME Section III products is the controlling document
for all site activity including weld material control,
process
control
welding and NDE.
Completed welds between ring B17 and course
Cl of the roof and those polar
crane
girder vertical support
bracket
gusset
plates
Nos.
178-128
RSL,
-113L, -112RM, -97R and -64RSL were inspected/observed
for weld finish and
appearance,
transition between plates
of differing wall thickness,
height
of reinforcement,
presence/absence
of arc strikes
and weld spatter,
exces-
sive grinding and surface defects
as applicable.
For these welds the inspector also reviewed welder performance qualification
records,
radiographs
and
MT reports
as applicable,
shop release for shipment
checklists
for the 'gusset
plates
and job site receiving inspection
and
refurbishing checklists for plates
13-C1, 14-Cl and 15-C1.
Within these
areas
the inspector noted that the toe of the transition weld
between
ring B17 and
course
Cl of the roof was rather
abrupt,.
In many
locations this condition resulted in a rather sharp notch between the toe
of the weld metal
and the chamfered plate material of the Cl course.
The
roof plate
was chamfered to accommodate
the change in plate thickness,
3/8
ring B17 and 1/2" course Cl.
The inspector discussed this matter with CBI
and CPS'epresentatives
and
expressed
concerns
over the possible
adverse
conditions that can result from notch related stresses.
The CBI representa-
tive stated that his instructions
were that the weld was acceptable
provided
the included angle between the weld metal and the base material
was greater
than
90
.
The inspector
requested
that
CBI provide the basis for this
acceptance
criterion, that additional inspections
be performed to verify
asbuilt
conditions
meet
code
requirements
and
where
warranted,
to take
appropriate
steps
to provide for a more gradual transition at this point.
The licensee
agreed
to look further into this matter and to take whatever
action
was appropriate.
This matter
was identified as inspector followup
item 400/80-18-04,
"Containment liner weld geometry".
7.
Steel Structure
and Supports - Observation of Welding Activities Outside
Containment
Welding on the liner of the south fuel pool is controlled by Ebasco Specifi-
cation
CAR-SH-AS-17, Revision 4, "Pool Liners Seismic Class I Structures".
Site procedures
used to control welding related activities include MP-07,
Rev. 6,
"General
Welding Procedure
for Stainless
Steel
Welding", MP-05,
Rev. 9, "Stamping of Weldments'
MP Oly "Qualification of Weld Procedures",
Rev.
8,
"Welding Material".
Welding is being performed with weld
procedure
specifications
(WPS) qualified to the latest
addenda
of ASME
Section IX in force at the
time of the qualification.
Horizontal
and
vertical welds
except for the corners
and top seams
are fabricated by the
automatic
TIG process
using the Dimetrics equipment.
Corner and top seams
are fabricated with manual
SMAW and
GTAW processes.
In process,
horizontal
vertical, corner and top seams
between elevations
261 and 286 were observed
for compliance with code
and procedural
requirements.
Welders were inter-
viewed,
equipment
were inspected
and calibration stickers
checked
as applic-
able, field QA/QC records
were checked for accuracy,
weld material quality
records
and welder performance qualification test records
were reviewed for
compliance with applicable
codes
and standards.
Within these areas the inspector noted the following:
On July 9,
1980,
the welding material
used
on the fuel pool liner
welds as documented
on weld material issue slips were as follows:
SIZE
HTj//LOTj/
308
308
308
308
3/32 II
1/8"
3/32II
045
-602571
>65325H4BD
C3017
464176
A subsequent
review of quality records disclosed
that. the material issued
to the field as
308 stainless
steel material produced
from the heats
marked
with (-") was actually 308-L (low carbon) material.
An inspection of the
rod issue station
(No. 2) that issued
the material
showed that both heats
had been marked
on the log as
308 stainless
steel material even though the
manufacturer's
containers
correctly identified the material
as extra
low
(ELC).
This finding was
discussed
with CPRL site
management
who
took immediate corrective action on the matter.
The inspector stated that
failure to maintain control of materials
was contrary to Criterion VIII of
Appendix to
implemented
by CP&L's
PSAR Section 1.8.5.8
which
requires that ... measures
shall be designed
to prevent the use of incorrect
material ....
This finding was categorized
as
an infraction and
was
identified as item 400/80-18-02 "Weld Material Control".
8.
Other Safety-Related Piping, Visual Examination of Welds (Unit 1)
The
main
steam
safety
release
valve header
to the main steam isolation
valve welds were fabricated in the fab shop
and were completed at the time
of this inspection.
The
were fabricated in accordance
with ANSI
B31.1-73Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI</br></br>B31.1-73" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process. with weld procedures
and welders qualified in accordance
with ASME
Section IX.
The completed welds observed/inspected
were as follows:
DESCRIPTION
SIZE
FW"282
FW-287
FW-303
Pipe to Valve j/2MS-Vl-SAB-1
Pipe to Valve f/2MS-V2-SAB-1
Pipe to Valve
$j2MS-V3-SAB-1
1.052 x 32" f
1.052 x 32" f
1.052 x 32" g
For these welds,
the inspector observed/inspected
welder and joint identifi"
cation weld finish and workmanship, transition,
weld reinforcement,
spatter
and/or arc-strikes,
condition of base metal in the heat affected
zone area
for surface
imperfections.
Performance
qualification records
of welders
with these
welds were reviewed for compliance with applicable
code require-
ments.
Within these
areas
on July 10,
1980,
the inspector
noted that in certain
cases
where welders with stencils,
e.g.,
A51 and
B87 had qualified to
a
combination procedure involving two processes,
e.g.,
GTAW/SMAW, the record
did not
show the
amount of metal deposited
by each process
as required by
QW-351 of ASME Section IX.
The inspector discussed
this matter with cogni-
zant
CPRL personnel
who agreed
to review the records of welders qualified
in this manner and revise them to show this information as required.
The inspector stated that failure to maintain sufficient records to provide
objective evidence of activities affecting their quality was in noncompliance
w'ith Criterion XVII of Appendix B to
as
implemented
by CPM.'s
PSAR Section 1.8.5.17.
This noncompliance
was categorized
as
a deficiency
and
was identified as
item 400/80-18-03
"Welder performance qualification
records".
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