ML18017A074

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Instrumentation & Control Sys for Review of Application for Ols.Util Should Correct & Clarify Discussion of ECCS & Associated Tables

ML18017A074
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	02/08/1980
From:	Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Curtis N PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 8002280279
Download: ML18017A074 (13)

Text

V II@QQj()~g f8LE ESPIt Distribution w gnclo's@e:

Doc et s ~

S.

arga NRC PDR

. '-F. Milliams Local PDR

. Parr LMR 83 File S. tJj~r D. Ross M.~shbrook D. Yassallo

~Mattson Docket Nos. 50-387/388 S. Hanauer J. Knight R. Tedesco R.

DeYoung Y. Moore ll. Kreger M. Ernst R. Denise ELD IE (3)

BCC:

NSIC TIC ACRS (16)

Mr. Norman M. Curtis Yice President - Engineering and Construction Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allento>in, Pennsylvania 18101 I'EB O8

>9SO

SUBJECT:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS NOS.

1 AND 2 <<

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORHATIOW As a result of our review of your application for, operating licenses for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Plant, we find that we need additional information in the area of Instrumentation and Control Systems.

The specific information required is listed in the Enclosure.

Some of this review has been performed by the Savannah River Plant (SRP).

The questions in the Enclosure were originated by SRP.

Please contact us if you desire any discussion or clar ification of the information requested.

Sincerely, Crt~in:3 81~nt:4 bg

o. b. parr Olan D. Parr, Chief Light Mater Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Prospect kfanagement

Enclosure:

As Stated 1~

cc w/enclosure:

See next page 8PP 2 <go 2'79 OFFICE P SURNAME OATE P Ul, lM3.:QC.

.....ODParrJ.LU<

2J

/80 NRC FORM 318 (9 761 NRCM 0240 AU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979.289 369

ii CI b

Mr'. Norman W; Curtis

~~~ o s )gag CC:

Hr. Earle H. Head Project Engineering Manager Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Al 1entown, Pennsyl vania 18101 Jay Silberg, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts Trowbridge 1800 H Street, N.

W.

Washington, D. C.

20036 Hr. William E. Barberich, Nuclear Licensing Group Supervisor Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentor, Pennsyl vania 18101 Edward M. Nagel, Esquire General Counsel and Secretary Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Al 1 entown, Pennsyl vani a 18101 Bryan Snapp, Fsq.

Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company 901 Hamilton Street Al 1 entown, Pennsyl vani a 18101 Robert M. Gallo Resident Inspector P. 0.

Box 52 Shickshinny, Pennsylvania 18655 Susquehanna Environmental Advocates c/o Gerald Schultz, Esq.

500 South River Street Wi lkes-Barre, PA 18702 John L. Anderson Oak Ridge National Laboratory Union Carbide Corporation Bldg. 3500, P. 0.

Box X Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Yir. Robert J. Shovlin Project Manager Pennsylvania Power and Light Cc.

2 Noi th Ninth Street, Al 1 entown, Pennsyl vani a 18101 Hatias F. Travieso-Diaz, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.

W.

Washington, D. C.

20036 Dr. Judi th H. Johnsrud Co-Director Env fronmental Coalition on Nuclear Power 433 Orlando Avenue State College, PA 16801 Hr. Thomas Yi. Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Department of Environmental Resources Commonwealth of Pennsylvania P. 0.

Box 2063 fiarrisburg, PA 17120 Hs. Colleen Harsh Box 538A, RDg4 Mountain Top, PA 18707 Hrs. Irene Lemanowicz, Chairperson The Citizens Against Nuclear Dangers P. 0.

Box 377 RD41

Berwick, PA 18503

0 ENCLOSURE 032.51 7.3.1.la.l Discussion of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the

~

associated tables a'e inccmplete and inconsistent.

Correct SUSQ and clarify the following:

1)

The same instruments are used for Reactor Vessel low water level and Primary Containment high pressure for many ESF systems.

The specification shown for these instruments in Tables 7.3-1 through 7.3-5 are not consistant.

Correct trip settings,

ranges, and accuracies shown 'for. these instruments.

2)

These tables have allotted colunns for instrument response times and margins (of trip setting) to meet requirements of IEEE 279-1971 Section 3, but most data has been emitted.

Response

times should indicate minimum and/or maximum where applicable.

3)

Table 7.3-1 has omitted all specifications for the Turbine overspeed instrument.

4)

Figure 7.3-5 has several errors:

o It does not show two ADS logics as indicated in 7.3.1.la.l.4.4.

o Referenced Figure 7.3-16 does not exist.

o It does not show low pressure interlocks to LPCI and CS required to initiate ADS as indicated in 731la144 l"

5)

Table 7.3-2 indicates only one reactor water level setpoint

(-149 inches) for the ADS.

Section 7.3.l.la.1.4.4 indicates two level setpoints, a low and a

lower water level.

6)

Use of level switches with a range of -150"/0/+60" to initiate ADS and CS action with trip settings at -149 does not seem like conservative design.

Justify the use of this range for this application.

Discuss accuracy of the trip setting and how it is affected by normal and accident environmental conditions and long term drift.

I 7)

Why are two ranges shown for LPCI pump discharge pressure (10-240 psig and 10-260 psig).

Range shown for this instrument in Table 7.3-4 is10-240 psig only.

.8)

Section 7.3.1.la.l.4.5 on ADS Bypasses and Interlocks indicates that it is possible for the operator to manually delay the depressurizing action and states "This would reset the timers to zero seconds and prevent depressurization for 105 seconds."

Table 7.3-2, Figure 7.3-8 Sht.

3 and Table 6.3-2 all indicate a time delay of 120 seconds.

How is a time delay of 105 seconds achieved?

9)

Explain why two ranges (50-1000 psig and 50-1200 psig) are listed for the Reactor Vessel Low Pressure instrument in Table 7.3-3.

10) Instrument ranges for pump discharge flow, Table 7.3-3, and pump minimum flow bypass, Table 7.3-4, are specified in inches of water but trip settings are in gpm.

Supply 4$

ranges for these flow instruments in gpm.

11) Table 7.3-8 HPCI System Minimum Numbers of Trip Channels Required for Functional Performance does not agree with Table 7.3-1 HPCI Instrument Specifications.

Table 7.3-8 does not list HPCI pump high suction pressure or Turbine

0

~\\,

Overspeed as shown in Table 7.3-1.

Table 7.3-8 lists two

items, HPCI pump flow and HPCI pump discharge flow, not shown in Table 7.3-1.

12) Table 7.3-4 Low Pressure Coolant Injection - Instrument Specifications does not agree with Table 7.3-10 Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Minimum Number of Trip Channels Required for Functional Performance.

Table 7.3-10 does not list Reactor low pressure or Pump discharge pressure as shown in Table 7.3-4.

Table 7.3-10 lists several trip channels which are not shown in Table H

lk 7.3-4.

These include Reactor vessel low water level inside shroud, Reactor vessel low flow, Primary containment high pressure, and Reactor vessel low water

. t level (Recirculation Pumps).

13) Table 7.3-11 Core Spray System Minimum Numbers of Trip Channels Required for Functional Performance is incomplete.

It does not list Pump Discharge Flow as shown in Table 7.3-1.

032.52

7. 3.1.la.2 Discussion of the'rimary Containment and Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System in Section 7.3.1.la.2 and associated SUSQ Tables 7.3-5, 7.3-7 and 7.3-12 are confused, incomplete and inconsistent.

Correct or clarify the following:

1)

Several instruments listed in 7.3.1.la.2.1 are not

, discussed in the text and/or do nat appear in the tables.

These include RWCS High Flow, RHRS High Flow, RICI High Flo w, HPCI High Flow.

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)

2)

Several items only appear in Table 7.3-5 with no discussion.

These include RCIC Turbine Steamline High Temperature and Low Pressure, HPCI Turbine Steamline High I

Temperature and Low Pressure, Reactor Building and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation.

3)

In Table 7.3-5, instrunent

ranges, setpoints, accuracies, and time responses have been omitted for many sensors.

Several sensors discussed in the text are not listed at all.

These include Condenser

Vacuum, RHR High Temperature and Differential Temperature, RNCS Differential Temperature, Main Steamline Differential Temperature.

It is understood that sane setpoints will be selected based on operating conditions, but these sensors must be identified.

4)

Table 7.3-12 is redundant.

It has only one entry, serves no purpose and could be eliminated.

5)

Section 7.3.l.la.4.12, Main Steamline-Leak Detection, appears to serve no purpose since all items are discussed in other parts of this section on the PCRVICS.

6)

Table 7.3-7, Trip Channel Required for PCRVICS, is i

0

'p incomplete.

Many functions discussed in the text and/or listed in Table 7.3-5 are missing.

7)

Section 7.3.1.la.2.4.2 references Table 7.3-7 for instrument characteristics.

These are actually shown in Tables 7.3-5.

O32. 53 It is the current staff position that Mark II suppression

7.3.1.la.4 SUSQ chamber sprays be actuated automatically instead of manually.

Similar plants such as Zimner and Shoreham are making this change.

Identify any significant differences between these plants and Susquehanna i'n this reguard and justify the proposed manual system.

032.54 Table 6.2-12 7.3.l.la.2.9 7.3.1.la.2.11 Describe test method to be used to verify closing times for main steamline isolation valves are within limits of technical 4

specifications.

Identify any special design features to facilitate this test.

Table 6.2-12 is referenced for closure SUSQ tim'es of main steamline isolation valves, but time has been omitted from that table.

Mhat is the range of acceptable closure times?

032.55

7. 3.1.la.3 SUSQ Review of the Hain Steamline Valve Isolation Control System logic at Hatch 2 and similar plants determined that failure of a single relay could cause two redundant isolation valves to open.

Has this problem been corrected in the Susquehanna designV 032.56 S USQ 10 General Electric and other NSSS suppliers have reported that post-accident temperature conditions can affect reactor vessel water level instrumentation.

1)

Describe the liquid level measuring systems within r

containment that are used to initiate safety actions or are used to provide post-accident monitoring information.

Provide a description of the type of reference leg used

~

~

i.e.,

open column or seal'ed reference leg.

2).

Provide an evaluation of the effect of post-accident ambient temperatures on the indicated water level to determine the change in indicated level relative to actual water level.

This evaluation must include other sources of error including the effects of varying fluid pressure and flashing of reference leg to steam on the water level measurements.

3)

Provide an analysis of the impact that the level measurement errors in control and protection systems (2

above) have on the assumptions used in the plant transient and accident analysis.

This should include a review of all safety and control setpoints derived from level signals to verify that the setpoints will initiate the action required by the plant safety analyses throughout the range of ambient temperatures encountered by the instrumentation, including accident 'temperatures.

If this analysis demonstrates that level measurement errors are greater than assumed in the safety analysis, address the corrective action to be taken.

The corrective actions considered should include design changes that could be made to ensure that containment temperature effects are atuomatically accounted for.

These measures may include setpoint changes as an acceptable corrective action for the short term.

However, some form of temperature compensation or modification to eliminate or reduce temperature errors should be investigated as a long term

solution.

4)

Review and indicate the required revisions, as necessary, of emergency procedures to include specific information obtained from the review and evaluation of Items 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that the operators are instructed on the potential for and magnitude of erroneous level signals.

Provide a copy of tables,

curves, or correction factors that would be applied to post-accident monitoring systems that will be used by plant operators.

032.5~

Pressure switches 1N022 A through S are used to actuate the 16 SUSQ safety relief valves in the dverpressure mode of operation as described in section 5.2.2.4.

1)

Describe the logic associ'ated with these instrunents including those associated with ADS relief valves (Figure 4

7.3-8 Sht.

3) and non-ADS relief valves.

2)

Identify design criteria and requirements met by this system.

I 3)

Justify the use of a single instrument to operate each 1

relief valve and analyze the effects of single failures.

032.58 7.6.la.8 SUSQ 12 The purpose of the Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) is to aid the Reactor Protection System (RPS) in protecting the integrity of the fuel barrier.

1)

Is the RPT designed in accordance with all requirements for the RPS? If not, identify and justify any exceptions.

2)

Plants such as Hatch 2 and Zimmer have provided

recii culation pump trips for reactor vessel low water level or high reactor pressure; Why have these not been provided for Susquehanna2