ML18016A908
| ML18016A908 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1999 |
| From: | Richard Laufer NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Scarola J CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| GL-95-07, GL-95-7, TAC-M93469, NUDOCS 9904190149 | |
| Download: ML18016A908 (8) | |
Text
Mr. James Scarola, Vice ident
'hearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Carolina Power 8 Light Company PostOffice Box165, Mail Code: Zone1 New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165 April 14, 3
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATIONON GENERIC LETTER 95-07, "PRESSURE-LOCKING AND THERMAL-BINDINGOF SAFETY-RELATED POWER-OPERATED GATE VALVES,"- SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (TAC NO. M93469)
Dear Mr. Scarola:
On August 17, 1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to request that licensees take actions to ensure those safety-related power-operated gate valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their safety functions.
By letter dated February 13, 1996, Carolina Power 8 Light Company (CP8 L) submitted its 180-day response to GL 95-07 for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant. The NRC staff reviewed this response and requested additional information in a letter dated July 2, 1996. CP8L provided the additional information by "HNP-96-140, Forwards Response to RAI Needed to Complete Review of GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & [[Topic" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. of Safety Related Power-Operated Gate Valves|letter dated August 19, 1996]].
Based on its review of these submittals, the NRC
'staff has determined that additional information is needed to complete its safety evaluation.
The enclosed request for additional information regarding GL 95-07 was discussed with your licensing staff on April 8, 1999. A mutually agreeable target date of July 30, 1999, for your response was established.
Ifcircumstances result in the need to revise the target date, please call me at the earliest opportunity.
Sincerely, Docket No. 50-400
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure:
See next page Origixml signed by:
Richard J. Laufer, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Distribution:
+Dockeff.i~e PUBLIC PDII Rdg JZwolinski/SBlack BBonser, Rll OGC RLaufer ACRS G:ttHARRISttRAI93469.WPD
- no major changes to RAI OFFICE NAME DATE COPY PM:PDII/S2 RLaufer P
t /I'/99
/No lA:PDII/S2 D
EDunningt
//figg' Yes No EMEB DTerao 04/12/99 Yes/No OFFICIAL RECORD 9eoeae0X49 e90i<4 PDR ADOCK 05000400 P
PDR Sc:PDII/S terso l
99 YeslNo
0
~ ~
I l'Ii n
~pe REGS
+
0 Cy A.0 C
O Ith0 Y/+
~O
++*++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 April 14, 1999 Mr. James Scarola, Vice President Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Ca'rolina Power & Light Company Post Office Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATIONON GENERIC LETTER 95-07, "PRESSURE-LOCKING AND THERMAL-BINDINGOF SAFETY-RELATED POWER-OPERATED GATE VALVES,"- SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (TAC NO. M93469)
Dear Mr. Scarola:
On August 17, 1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to request that licensees take actions to ensure those safety-related power-operated gate valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their safety functions.
By letter dated February 13, 1996, Carolina Power & Light Company (CP8 L) submitted its 180-day response to GL 95-07 for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant. The NRC staff reviewed this response and requested additional information in a letter dated July 2, 1996.
CP8 L provided the additional information by "HNP-96-140, Forwards Response to RAI Needed to Complete Review of GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & [[Topic" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. of Safety Related Power-Operated Gate Valves|letter dated August 19, 1996]].
Based on its review of these submittals, the NRC staff has determined that additional information is needed to complete its safety evaluation.
The enclosed request for additional information regarding GL 95-07 was discussed with your licensing staff on April 8, 1999. A mutually agreeable target date of July 30, 1999, for your response was established.
If circumstances result in the need to revise the target date, please call me at the earliest opportunity.
Sincerely, Docket No. 50-400
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure:
See next page Richard J. Laufer, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Mr. James Scarola Carolina Power 8 Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 CC:
Mr. William D. Johnson Vice President and Corporate Secretary Carolina Power 8 Light Company Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Resident Inspector/Harris NPS c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5421 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, North Carolina 27562-9998 Ms. Karen E. Long Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina Post Office Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina Post Office Drawer Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Mr. Mel Fry, Director Division ofRadiation Protection N.C.'epartment of Environment and Natural Resources 3825 Barrett Dr.
Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721 Mr. Terry C. Morton Manager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs CPB 9 Carolina Power 8 Light Company Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-1551 Mr. Bo Clark Plant General Manager - Harris Plant Carolina Power 8 Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 165 New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165 Mr. John H. O'eill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts 8 Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20037-1128 Director of Site Operations Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Post Office Box 165, MC: Zone 1
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff NCUC Post Office Box 29520 Raleigh, North Carolina 27626 Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commission Post Office Box 29510 Raleigh, North Carolina 27626-0510 Mr. Vernon Malone, Chairman Board of County Commissioners of Wake County P.
O. Box 550 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Mr. Richard H. Givens, Chairman Board of County Commissioners of Chatham County P. O. Box 87 Pittsboro, North Carolina 27312 Ms. Donna B. Alexander, Manager Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 165, Mail Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165 Mr. Johnny H. Eads, Supervisor Licensing/Regulatory Programs Carolina Power 8 Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165, Mail Zone 1
New Hill, NC 27562-0165
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATIONON GENERIC LETTER 95-07 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1...
Your August 19, 1996, submittal states that the following valves are susceptible to pressure locking and that a calculation was used to demonstrate that the valves would operate during pressure-locking conditions.
1SI-3 1SI-4 1SI-52 1RC-113 1RC-115 1RC-117 1SI-86 1SI-107 1SI-359
, Boron Injection Tank Outlet Boron Injection Tank Outlet High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) to Reactor Coolant System Cold Lep Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Block Valve Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Block Valve Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Block Valve Normal HHSI to Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg Alternate HHSI to Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg Low Head Safety Injection to Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg The calculation assumed that leakage over a 6.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> period would partially depressurize the bonnet of the valves susceptible to thermally induced pressure locking (1SI-86, 1SI-107, and 1SI-359). This leakage rate was based on testing performed by Commonwealth Edison (ComEd). You also stated that the calculation that is used to predict the thrust required to open the valves during a pressure-locking condition is a simplified version of the ComEd pressure-locking methodology that was developed by ComEd to demonstrate that these valves would operate during pressure-locking conditions.
During a telephone conversation conducted on April 8, 1999, you stated that you are no longer using the ComEd leak rate test results nor the ComEd pressure locking prediction methodology to demonstrate that valves willoperate during pressure-locking conditions.
Explain your current methodology that is being used to demonstrate that valves will operate during pressure-locking conditions.
Include in the discussion the margin between actuator capability and the calculated thrust value when using your new pressure-locking prediction methodology, any limitations associated with the use of your new methodology, and any diagnostic test equipment accuracy requirements.
Your August 19, 1996, submittal states that the boron injection tank inlet valves,1SI-1 and 1SI-2, are not susceptible to pressure locking because it is acceptable for the valves to operate up to approximately 3 seconds at locked rotor conditions. At approximately 3
- seconds, a charging pump develops full discharge pressure and the valves are no longer pressure locked and open against a differential pressure.
Explain how any reduction in actuator capability due to operation at locked rotor was accounted for, any testing that demonstrates that actuator capability willor willnot degrade after operating at locked rotor for up to 3 seconds, and any testing that verifies that the charging pumps can develop adequate discharge pressure in 3 seconds.
The NRC has accepted operation of actuators for 1 second or less at locked rotor conditions because testing performed by Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (NUREG/CR-6478) demonstrates that the capability of the actuator does not degrade during the 1-second period..
The February 13, 1996, submittal states that residual heat removal (RHR) to charging and safety injection pump suction valves, 1RH-25 and 1RH-63, are susceptible to pressure locking and, as corrective action, the valves are cycled during startup when the RHR system is aligned to the emergency core cooling mode of operation.
Explain ifthe bonnets of these valves could be pressurized during the RHR pump injection mode of operation and whether these valves would be required to open later during the recirculation phase of an accident when pressure in the bonnets of the valves is greater than upstream and downstream pressures.
Your technical specifications (TS) require an operable emergency core cooling system injection.flow path from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to the reactor coolant system (RCS) via the RHR pump when RCS temperature is less that 350'F.
During the shutdown cooling mode of operation, the RHR pump suction valve to the RWST, 1SI-322 or 1SI-323, is shut.
Is the valve required to be opened to realign the RHR pump to inject into the RCS'P Ifso, explain why the valve is not susceptible to hydraulic or thermally induced pressure locking.
5.
Do your TS credit the use of a gravity boration path to the charging pumps'P Ifso, are there any valves in the gravity boration path that may be susceptible to pressure locking due to evolutions involving operation of boric acid pumps?
J I
~I L
I