ML18012A881

Rev 0 to 14980-98207, Fire Endurance Test of Wall Assembly Clad w/Thermo-Lag 330-1

ML18012A881
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/01/1995
From:	Humphrey C, Stansberry H OMEGA POINT LABORATORIES
To:
Shared Package
ML18012A878	List: HNP-97-170, Provides Closeout Documentation Harris Nuclear Plant Re GL 92-08, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers. Plant Will Restore Thermo-Lag Barrier Configurations to Svc & Discontinue Compensatory Actions Accordingly ML18012A879 ML18012A880 ML18012A881
References
14980-98207, 14980-98207-R, 14980-98207-R00, NUDOCS 9709090341
Download: ML18012A881 (162)

Text

FIRE ENDURANCE TEST OF A WALLASSEMBLY CLAD WITH THERMO-LAG 330-1 Project No. 14980-98207 FIRE ENDURANCE TEST TO QUALIFYA WALLDESIGN AS A 180 MINUTEFIRE RESISTANT ASSEMBLY May 23, 1995 Prepared For:

VECTRA Technologies 6500 West Freeway, Suite 400 Fort Worth, TX76116

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page ii ABSTRACT A wall assembly consisting of a 3 in. x 3 in. x 3/8 in. steel angle structural perimeter frame and 3 in. x 3 in. x 1/4 in. steel angle cross framing supporting two layers of (5/8 in. nominal thickness)

Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire protective material (with Thermo-Lag 330-1 Trowel Grade over the steel elements) was tested (with the steel framework towards the fire) in accordance with ASTM E119-88 Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials for a period of 180 minutes (3h).

The details, procedures and observations reported herein are correct and true within the limits of sound engineering practice.

All specimens and test sample assemblies were produced, installed and tested under the surveillance of the

- testing laboratory's in-house Quality Assurance Program.

This report describes the analysis of a distinct assembly and includes descriptions of the test procedure followed, the assembly tested, and all results obtained.

Alltest data are on file and remain available for review by authorized persons.

Constance A. Humphrey Manager, QA Dept, Date rbert W. Stansberry Fire Test Technologist Date

Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page iii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION OBJECTIVE TEST PROCEDURE Fire Test Furnace Thermocouples Data Acquisition system Hose Stream Test Barrier Inspection TEST ASSEMBLY Test Wall Thermocouple Placement Thermo-Lag Installation Highlights TEST RESULTS CONCLUSIONS APPENDICES Appendix A: CONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS Appendix B: TEST PLAN Appendix C: THERMOCOUPLE LOCATIONS Appendix D: TEST DATA Appendix E: QUALITYASSURANCE Appendix F:

PHOTOGRAPHS Last Page of Document 1

3 3

3 5

6 6

7 7

7 8

10 11 14 16 22 34 38 88 228 268

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 1 "The performance of walls, columns, floors, and other building members under fire exposure conditions is an item of major importance in securing constructions that are safe, and that are not a menace to neighboring structures nor to the public.

Recognition of this is registered in the codes of many authorities, municipal and other. It is important to secure balance of the many units in a single building, and of buildings of like character and use in a community; and also to promote uniformity in requirements of various authorities throughout the country.

To do this it is necessary that the fire-resistive properties of materials and assemblies be measured and specified according to a common standard expressed in terms that are applicable alike to a wide variety of materials, situations, and conditions of exposure.

Such a standard is found in the methods that follow. They prescribe a standard exposing fire of controlled extent and severity.

Performance is defined as the period of resistance to standard exposure elapsing before the first critical point in behavior is observed.

Results are reported in units in which field exposures can be judged and expressed.

The methods may be cited as the "Standard Fire Tests," and the performance or exposure shall be expressed as "2-h," "6-h," "1/2-h," etc.

When a factor of safety exceeding that inherent in the test conditions is desired, a proportional increase should be made in the specified time-classification period.

The ASTM E119 test procedure is identical or very similar to the following standard test methods:

UL263 UBC 43-1 NFPA 251 ANSI A2.1

1. Scope 1.1 These methods are applicable to assemblies of masonry units and to composite assemblies of structural materials for buildings, including bearing and other walls and partitions, columns, girders, beams, slabs, and composite slab and beam assemblies for floors and roofs. They are also applicable to other American Society for Testing and Materials, 1986 Annual Book of Standards, ASTM E119-88 Standard Methods ofFIRE TESTS OF BUILDINGCONSTRUCTION ANDMATXZUALS.

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 2 assemblies and structural units that constitute permanent integral parts of a finished building.

1.2 It is the intent that classifications shall register performance during the period of exposure and shall not be construed as having determined suitability for use after fire exposure.

1.3 This standard should be used to measure and describe the properties of materials,

products, or assemblies in response to heat and flame under controlled laboratory conditions and should not be used to describe or appraise the fire hazard or fire risk of materials, products, or assemblies under actual fire conditions.

However, results of this test may be used as elements of a fire risk assessment which takes into account all of the factors which are pertinent to an assessment of the fire hazard ofa particular end use.

Note 1 - A method of Qre hazard classification based on rate of flame spread is covered in ASTM Method E84, Test for Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials.

1.4 The results of these tests are one factor in assessing fire performance of building construction and assemblies.

These methods prescribe a standard fire exposure for comparing the performance of building construction assemblies.

Application of these test results to predict the performance of actual building construction requires careful evaluation of test conditions.

2. Signi6cance 2.1 This standard is intended to evaluate the duration for which the types of assemblies noted in 1.1 willcontain a fire, or retain their structural integrity or exhibit both properties dependent upon the type of assembly involved during a predetermined test exposure.

2.2 The test exposes a specimen to a standard fire exposure controlled to achieve specified temperatures throughout a specified time period. In some instance, the fire exposure may be followed by the application of a speci fied standard fire hose stream.

The exposure, however, may not be representative of all fire conditions which may vary with changes in the amount, nature and distribution of fire loading, ventilation, compartment size and configuration, and heat sink characteristics of the compartment. It does, however, provide a relative measure of fire performance of comparable assemblies under these specified fire exposure conditions.

Any variation from the construction or conditions (that is, size, method of assembly, and materials) that are tested may substantially change the performance characteristics of the assembly.

2.3 The test standard provides for the following:

2.3.1 In walls, partitions and floor or roof assemblies:

2.3.1.1 Measurement of the transmission of heat.

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 3 2.3.1.2 Measurement of the transmission of hot gases through the assembly, sufficient to ignite cotton waste.

2.3.1.3 For load'earing elements, measurement of the load carrying ability of the test specimen during the test exposure.

2.3.2 For individual load bearing assemblies such as beams and columns:

Measurement of the load carrying ability under the test exposure with some consideration for the end support conditions (that is, restrained or not restrained).

2.4 The test standard does not provide the following:

2.4.1 Full information as to performance of assemblies constructed with components or lengths other than those tested.

2.4.2 Evaluation of the degree by which the assembly contributes to the fire hazard by generation of smoke, toxic gases, or other products of combustion.

2.4.3 Measurement ofthe degree of control or limitation of the passage ofsmoke or products of combustion through the assembly.

2.4.4 Simulation ofthe fire behavior ofjoints between building elements such as floor-wall or wall-wall, etc., connections.

2.4.5 Measurement of flame spread over surface of tested element.

2.4.6 The effect of fire endurance of conventional openings in the assembly, that is electrical receptacle outlets, plumbing pipe, etc., unless specifically provided for in the construction tested."

The objective of this project was to evaluate a specific Thermo-Lag wall construction for use as a 3-hour fire resistive barrier.

The entire program was carried out in accordance with the TEST PLAN; Fire Endurance Tests of a Wall Assembly Protected With The Thermo-lag 330-1 Fire Barrier System, Rev. 2 which may be found in Appendix B of this document.

For reasons of clarity and to reduce redundancy, many items discussed in the Test Plan have not been duplicated elsewhere in this document.

The test furnace is designed to allow the specimen to be uniformly exposed to the specified time-temperature conditions. It is fitted with 39 symmetrically-located natural gas burners designed to allow an even heat flux distribution across the

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 4 face of a test specimen.

Furnace pressures may be maintained at any value from

+0.04" W.C. to -0.20" W.C. It must be realized that any full-size vertical fire test furnace will have a pressure difference between the bottom and top of approximately O.l in. W.C. after operating temperatures are reached.

For this reason, the furnace is operated by controlling the pressure within the furnace (with respect to the laboratory ambient pressure) by regulating the pressure at a specific horizontal plane in the furnace.

Many times the furnace pressure willbe adjusted so that the "neutral pressure plane" (that where the pressure difference between the furnace interior and the laboratory is zero) is at a desired location: for instance; at the top, at a point V3 of the way down from the top, op at the bottom of the specimen.

The neutral pressure plane was positioned at the top of the wall assembly in this test.

The temperature within the furnace is determined to be the mathematical average of thermocouples located symmetrically within the furnace and positioned six inches away from the vertical face of the test specimen.

The materials used in the construction of these thermocouples are those suggested in the test standard.

During the performance of a fire exposure test, the furnace temperatures are recorded at least every 30 seconds and displayed for the furnace operator to allow control along the specified temperature curve.

The fire exposure is controlled to conform with the standard time-temperature curve shown in Figure 1, as determined by the table below:

1800 ASTME119 Time-Temperature Curve Time Temperature (min)

('F) 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 8

600 400 200 0

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 Time (min) 0 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 68 1000 1300 1399 1462 1510 1550 1584 1613 1638 1661 1681 1700 Rimmed

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 5 The fire test is controlled according to the standard time/temperature curve, as indicated by the average temperature obtained from the readings of the furnace interior thermocouples symmetrically located across the specimen, 6 in. away.

The thermocouples are enclosed in protection tubes of such material and dimensions that the time constant of the thermocouple assembly lies between 5.0 and 7.2 minutes, as required by the E 119 standard.

The furnace temperature during a test is controlled such that the area under the time/temperature curve is within 5% of the corresponding area under the standard time/temperature curve for the three hour test period.

The furnace pressure was controlled to be as nearly neutral with respect to the surrounding laboratory atmosphere as possible, measured at the top of the test specimen.

Temperatures on the unexposed surface of the wall were measured with Type K, 24 GA, Chromel-Alumel electrically welded thermocouples formed from Chromel and Alumel wires of "special limits of error (+1.1'C)," and covered with Teflon insulation.

These thermocouples have a continuous operating capability of around 600'F.

Temperatures of unexposed surfaces are monitored using thermocouples placed under 6 in. x 6 in. x 0.4 in. thick dry, felted pads as described in the standard.

Temperature readings are taken at not less than nine points on the surface, at intervals not exceeding 1.0 minute.

The temperature on

- the unexposed surface of a test specimen during the test is taken to be the average value of the qualification thermocouples.

Temperatures on the structural steel members were measured with Type K, Chromel-Alumel, electrically welded thermocouples contained within a 1/16 in.

diameter Inconel sheath with sealed, ungrounded tips.

These thermocouples were constructed of "special limits of error (+1.1'C)" wire and were purchased as assembled probes and were connected to the data acquisition system with the provided male plugs.

All connections within the probes were performed by the thermocouple vender.

Thermocouples of this construction, with a diameter of V4 in., have a continuous operating capability ofaround 2100'F.

A drawing showing the exact placement of all thermocouples may be found in Appendix C.

Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 6 DATAACQUISITIONSYSTEM The outputs of the test article thermocouples and the furnace probes were monitored by a data acquisition system consisting of a John Fluke Mfg. Co,, Model HELIOS 2289A Computer Front End and an Apple Computer Co., Macintosh Classic microcomputer and a 100 input thermocouple jack panel.

The Computer Front End is connected to the RS422 Serial Interface Port of the Macintosh.

The computer is programmed in Microsoft QuickBASIC to command the HELIOS units to sample the data input lines (from the thermocouple jack panel), receive and convert the data into a digital format, and to manipulate the raw data into usable units for display on screen and paper and for saving to magnetic hard disk.

HOSE STRKLMTEST>

"10.1 Where required by the conditions of acceptance, subject a duplicate specimen to a fire exposure test for a period equal to one half of that indicated as the resistance period in the fire endurance test, but not for more than 1 h, immediately after which subject the specimen to the impact, erosion, and cooling effects of a hose stream directed first at the middle and then at all parts of the exposed face, changes in direction being made slowly.

10.2 Exemption

- The hose stream test shall not be required in the case of constructions having a resistance period, indicated in the fire endurance test, of

- less than 1 h.

10.3 Optional Program - The submitter may elect, with the advice and consent of the testing body, to have the hose stream test made on the specimen subjected to the fire endurance test and immediately following the expiration of the fire endurance test.

10.4 Stream Equipment and Details - The stream shall be delivered through a 2>/2-in. (64-mm) hose discharging through a National Standard Play pipe of corresponding size equipped with a 11/8-in. (28.5-mm) discharge tip of the standard-taper smooth-bore pattern without shoulder at the orifice.

The water pressure and duration of the application shall be as prescribed [in the table below]:

American Society for Testing and Materials, 1986 Annual Book ofStandards, ASTM E119-88 Standard Methods ofFIRE TESTS OF BUILDINGCONSTRUCTION ANDMATERIALS.

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 7 Resistance Period Conditions For Hose Stream Test Water Pres-Duration of Application, sure at Base of min/100 ft2 (9 m2)

Nozzle,psi (kPa exposed area 8 h and over 4 h and over ifless than 8 h 2 hand over ifless than 4h 1-V2 h and over ifless than 2 h 1 h and over ifless than 1-1/2 h Less than 1 h, ifdesired 45 (310) 45 (310) 30 (207) 30 (207) 30 (207) 30 (207) 6 5

2-1/2 1-1/2 1

1 10.5 Nozzle Distance - The nozzle orifice shall be 20 ft (6-m) from the center ofthe exposed surface of the test specimen ifthe nozzle is so located that when directed at the center its axis is normal to the surface of the test specimen. Ifotherwise located, its distance from the center shall be less than 20 ftby an amount equal to 1 ft (305-mm) for each 10 deg of deviation f".om the normal."

The hose stream test was applied to a previous wall test (OPL Report No. 14980-97261) and therefore was not applied to this test sample.

The prior test assembly was considered the "Hose Stream Retest Sample" for this evaluation.

BARRIERINSPECTION

- Following the fire exposure, all barrier materials, joints and seams were visually inspected for burnthrough or openings in the barrier in accordance with the acceptance criteria outlined in the Test Plan.

Structural Steel Elements The perimeter framework for the test wall assembly consisted of a matrix of 3 in.

x 3 in. x 3/8 in. steel angle.

The cross braces and seismic bracing angles within this perimeter were fabricated from 3 in. x 3 in. x 1/4 in. steel angle.

Where two angle flanges met back to back, they were welded continuously along their flat sides (the unexposed face of the wall) with nominal 3/16 in. fillet welds.

Two sections of the test wall contained 24 in x 24 in. framed openings through which passed 24 in. x 24 in. steel duct sections (formed of 1/4 in. thick steel sections, continuously welded along the edges) perpendicular to the plane of the wall.

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 8 To allow for attachment of the Thermo-Lag Board materials to the wall framework, 5/16 in. diameter holes were drilled through the flanges of the steel angle 12 in. o.c. along each run of angle (3 in. from the beginning of each length of angle, except as noted in the drawings in Appendix A). Bolts (V4 in. diameter x 2-V2 in. long) were placed through each hole with the threaded ends protruding on the unexposed face of the wall and the hex heads were tack-welded to the flange of the steel angle.

Installed as such, the bolts provided a perimeter fastening means for each Thermo-Lag panel.

Exact locations of the fasteners and steel angle sections are contained in drawing in Appendix A. After assembly and welding, the steel was primed with Thermo-Lag 351 Primer.

Thermo-Lag 330-1 Materials Thermo-Lag materials were manufactured by Thermal Science, Inc., St. Louis, MO and were supplied by Florida Power 8r, Light and were representative of materials installed in the field.

Each one-hour rated Thermo-Lag 330-1 flat panel is 5/8 in. thick nominal x 48 in. wide x 78 in. long, with stress skin monolithically adhered to the panel on one face.

Thermo-Lag 330-1 trowel grade subliming compound was also supplied to be used with 330-1 panels and for protection of the framework steel.

AllThermo-Lag panels were measured, saw cut and installed onto the respective test assembly by Peak Seals craft personnel.

Installations were inspected by Peak Seals quality control inspectors.

Details of the Thermo-Lag installation are illustrated in Appendix A.

Other Materials Materials used in conjunction with Thermo-Lag components, or for penetration seals included:

Dow Corning Low Density Silicone Elastomer (LDSE) seal material, M-Board (ceramic fiber damming board), wire cloth (ASTM E437, Type 304, stainless steel plain weave, 8x8 square mesh, 0.028 in. diameter wire), 16 GA stainless steel tie wires and staples.

'LHERMOCOUPLE PLACEMENT For assessment of the performance of the wall system, only the following thermocouples (¹1-14) willbe considered:

24 gauge, Type K, Chromel-Alumel electrically welded thermocouples (Special Limits of Error: + 1.1'C, purchased with lot traceability and calibration certifications) with Teflon insulation were attached at not less than nine points on the unexposed surface of the test wall.

Five of these were symmetrically disposed, with one at the approximate center of the specimen (TC ¹1), and four at the approximate centers of its quarter sections (TC ¹2-5).

None of the thermocouples were located within 12 in. of the edges of the test specimen or over fasteners.

AlpAReyn thermocouples were placed under flexible pads (Ceraform 126, mjfnufactu4d by Manville Specialty Products, Cy AATO

Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 9 6+VS in. x 6+1/8 in. x 0.375+0.05 in. thick, held firmlyagainst the surface and fit closely about the thermocouple.

The remaining thermocouples were located near the geometric center of each panel of Thermo-Lag 330-1 and were covered with similar pads (TC ¹6-14).

Additional thermocouples (TC ¹15-16) were installed. for information only and designated as engineering thermocouples.

The description of placement of these additional engineering thermocouples follows:

Two thermocouples were attached to the unexposed face of the steel angle iron structure and were covered with Thermo-Lag materials (TC ¹19-22). Allof these thermocouples were installed into appropriately sized holes drilled to the center of each steel section.

The thermocouple leads were routed along the angles and secured by welded yokes formed from V4 in. x -3/4 in. x 4 mil thick stainless steel shim stock, placed as necessary.

The thermocouples then passed through the fire barrier material, to the unexposed side of the wall assembly.

Additional thermocouples were installed for the assessment of the duct penetration seals.

The description of placement of these additional engineering thermocouples follows:

Lower penetration Two thermocouples were placed on the unexposed face of the Thermo-Lag material covering the interior of the duct steel, 1" from the penetration seal (TC ¹17 on left side and TC ¹18 on top). Two thermocouples were placed on the unexposed face of the duct penetration

seal, 1" from the duct walls (TC ¹19 on right side and TC ¹18 on bottom). Three thermocouples were placed on the unexposed face of the duct penetration seal, in the field of the seal (TC ¹21-23). Allof these thermocouples were covered with 2 in. x 2 in.

pads of the construction noted previously.

Upper penetration

- Two thermocouples were placed on the unexposed face of the Thermo-Lag material covering the interior of the duct steel, 1" from the penetration seal (TC ¹24 on left side and TC ¹25 on top). Two thermocouples were placed on the unexposed face of the duct penetration seal, 1" from the duct walls (TC ¹26 on right side and TC ¹27 on bottom). Three thermocouples were placed on the unexposed face of the duct penetration seal, in the field of the seal (TC ¹28-30). Allof these thermocouples were covered with 2 in. x 2 in.

pads of the construction noted previously.

A drawing showing the exact placement of all thermocouples may be found in Appendix C.

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 10 THERMO-LAG INSTALLATIONHIGHLIGHTS Application Methods Thermo-Lag 330-1, 5/8 in. nominal thickness panels were pre-cut to fit steel framing for the wall. Pieces were installed on the framing with two panels back to back, with stress skin facing out on both sides.

Panels were fit over 1/4 in.

diameter bolts which were welded to the 3 in. x 3 in. x 1/4 in. steel angles.

Panels were attached with 1-1/2 in. o.d. and 1/4 in. i.d. washers and 1/4 in. nuts, tightened prior to post-buttering ofjoints. Following panel installation, Thermo-Lag 330-1 trowel grade material was installed over bolts and washers and on structural steel on the exposed side of the fire wall.

Several layers of Thermo-Lag 330-1 trowel grade material installation were required to develop the 0.75 in.

dry film thickness.

For protection of the penetration duct sleeves, a 0.75 in. dry film thickness of Thermo-Lag 330-1 trowel grade material was applied to the exposed steel on the inside and outside of the duct after the duct penetration seals were installed. An upgrade was applied to the outside ofthe ducts on the exposed face by adding a V8 in. thick layer of Thermo-Lag 330-1 trowel grade material skim coat over the baseline.

A layer of stainless steel wire cloth was applied over this layer and stapled and tie-wired into place.

A skim coat (1/16 in. thick) of Thermo-Lag 330-1 trowel grade material was applied over the stainless steel wire cloth.

Duct Fimseal Installation

- As part of the wall test, penetration seals were installed internally in the two duct penetrations.

During the installation of the duct penetration seals, the wall assembly test frame was turned. with one face parallel with the ground (so that the ducts extended perpendicular to the ground).

M-board material was installed into the bottom (exposed side) of each duct (secured by a friction fitwith the duct interior by trimming to close tolerances) to serve as damming material for the installation of the pour-in seals.

The lower penetration seal installation consisted of a 9 in. thick Low Density Silicone Elastomer seal centered in the duct at the wall location.

The upper penetration seal installation consisted of a 4 in. thick Low Density Silicone Elastomer seal centered in the duct at the wall location.

For additional details, see VECTRA Technologies'rawing 0132-00168-D-501, Page 4 of 4 in Appendix A: Construction Drawings.

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Repoxt No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page ll The completed test specimen was installed against the Laboratory's vertical fire test furnace located on the Laboratory's grounds at 16015 Shady Falls Road, Elmendorf, Texas

78112, on April 11, 1995.

The thermocouples were then connected to the data acquisition system and their outputs verified. The test was conducted by Herbert W. Stansberry II, with the following persons present:

Chuck Fisher Cal Banning Roger Sims Steve Hardy Randy Brown Deggary N. Priest Kerry Hitchcock Connie Humphry Cleda Patton Richard Beasley FP&L VECTRA CP&L CPkL Peak Seals Omega Point Laboratories, Inc.

Omega Point Laboratories, Inc.

Omega Point Laboratories, Inc.

Omega Point Laboratories, Inc.

Omega Point Laboratories, Inc.

The furnace was fired and the ASTM E119 standard time-temperature curve followed for a period of 180 minutes.

The pressure difference between the inside of the furnace (measured by a pressure tap located approximately 1/3 of the way down from the top of the specimen, on the horizontal centerline of the furnace) and the laboratory ambient air, was maintained at -0.03 in. of water column throughout the entire test (placing the neutral pressure plane at the top of the

- furnace).

TIME

~min:sc BE VA N

0:00 0:54 1:59 30:00 60:00 90:15 96:38 101:00 Furnace was fired at 9:10 a.m.

Discoloration of material along edges of penetrating duct and along edges of the steel angle Ganges.

Ignition ofthe exposed face ofthe test wall.

Cracks forming on exposed face of wall at interfaces between angle flanges and wall panels.

Material fallen away from edges of penetrating ducts, exposing stress skin.

Large section of material fallen from steel angle; surface of exposed face is "glass-like."

Steel angle exposed along diagonal seismic bracing.

Seam below right of TC N2 opening and allowing a steam leak on the unexposed sample face.

Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 12 TIME

~min: ec 8 ER AYI N c nt.

106:12 119:00 131:20 136:10 138:45 150:16 160:00 176:32 180:00 Steam/smoke leakage across top of unexposed face of wall assembly; smoke leakage from seam to right of TC ¹7.

TC ¹32 moved to 12 in. above TC ¹2 - no pad was installed over TC ¹32 and the thermojunction was positioned 1 in. away from the wall surface (as was the junction of TC ¹31).

Slight smoke/steam leakage and material separation along perimeter of penetration seals; discoloration of top, right corner of the panel containing TC ¹7.

Smoke leakage from lower right corner of the panel containing TC

¹10.

Cotton waste applied at the locations of the previously mentioned smoke leaks with no affect.

Smoke leakage along perimeter of penetration seals in the penetrating ducts.

Smoke leakage from around bolt directly below TC ¹6.

Mounds of material covering bolts near TC ¹2 falling from unexposed sample surface; surface of upper penetration seal discolored from smoke leakage - cotton waste applied with no affect.

Furnace extinguished; sample removed from furnace.

After removal from the test furnace, the wall surfaces were cooled with a water fog. No hose stream test was performed on this test sample.

The condition of the

- test wall was noted as follows: most of the steel angle on the exposed face was bare, the bottoms of the exposed side of the penetrating ducts were sagging, the stress skin on the exposed face of the sample was mostly consumed on each panel (panel closest to fire was completely consumed), under the remaining stress skin an approximate depth of 1-1/2 in. to 2 in. of char remained.

During the post-test disassembly of the test wall, several cross sectional dissections were made into the panels and seals and the following observations were noted concerning the sample condition:

Approximately V2 in. of uncharred material remained in the unexposed layer of Thermo-Lag panel directly under TC ¹5.

The surface of this material was discolored.

No uncharred material remained in the unexposed layer of Thermo-Lag panel directly under TC ¹7.

The surface of this material was blackened.

Approximately 3/8 in. of uncharred material remained 12 in.

away from the TC and approximately 1/8 in. of material remained in the vicinityofthe edge ofthe pad.

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 13 Approximately V8 in. of uncharred material remained in the unexposed layer of Thermo-Lag panel directly under TC ¹2 and ¹6. The surface of this material was darkened.

Approximately 3/8 in. of uncharred material remained 8 in. away from the TC and approximately V4 in. of material remained in the vicinityofthe edge ofthe pad Upper Duct Penetration Seal (4 in. depth) - the top right corner of the exposed face was consumed and delaminated with 1 in. of solid material remaining.

Up to 2 in. of solid material remained in the top left corner.

The bottom edge of the seal was "rounded" and charred through to the unexposed face (an approximate height of V2 in.).

Up to V4 in. of powdery char was beneath the ceramic fiber board with 3/8 in. to V2 in. of damaged material was found beneath this.

Unexposed side of penetrating duct (Thermo-Lag applied inside duct lining) - approximately 3/8 in, of uncharred material remaining with several blisters with up to 3/4 in. char between material and steel duct.

Lower Duct Penetration Seal (9 in. depth) - the top right corner of the exposed face was consumed and delaminated with 1 in. of solid material remaining.

Up to 2 in. of solid material remained in the top left corner.

The bottom edge of the seal was "rounded" and charred (an approximate height of V2 in.). Up to V4 in. of powdery char was beneath the ceramic fiber board with 3/8 in. to V2 in. of damaged material was found beneath this.

Unexposed side of penetrating duct (Thermo-Lag applied inside duct lining) - approximately 3/8 in. of uncharred material remaining with several blisters with up to 3/4 in. char between material and steel duct.

Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 14 The significant temperatures for the test wall after 108 minutes of fire exposure are presented in the table below (temperatures on the duct penetration seals are for the end of the 180 minutes fire exposure).

Distinctions between sets of similar thermocouples (e.i. wall surface, lower pen. seal, upper pen. seal, structural steel) are made with cell shading.

TC NO.

TEMPAT108 MIN('F)

TC NO.

TEINPAT108 MIN(oF) 3 316 311 17 81 10 318 y 261 ~

315 Y oj"";.".,:.','29"">i*;,'.";. "',; ."";,';",172"" -'"'

Wall Avg NOTE: Numbers with asterisks (*) indicate engineering-use-only thermocouples and are not considered in the average or in the performance evaluation of the test wall.

Alldata may be found in the Appendices attached to this document.

CONCLUSIONS The test wall successfully withstood the fire endurance test without passage of Game or excessive heat for a three hour period.

The barrier system was suf6cient to prevent temperature rises on the unexposed face of the wall from exceeding 325'F on individual point for 123 minutes and 250'F on average for 108 minutes.

The Upper duct penetration seal (4 in. depth) was sufficient to prevent temperature rises on the unexposed face from exceeding 325'F on individual point

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Report No. 14980-98207 VECTRA Technologies May 23, 1995 Page 15 for 171 minutes and the lower duct penetration seal (9 in. depth) was sufficient to prevent temperature rises on the unexposed face from exceeding 325'F on individual point for 180 minutes.

~o,A Qo OgAyo

ATTACHMENT2 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONON THERMO-LAG ENCLOSURES INSTALLEDINTHE CABLESPREADING ROOMS ANDAUXILIARYCONTROL PANELROOM 1)

ESR No. 95-00620, Attachment D, 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation (54 pages)

CP&L 10 CFR 50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 Page 1 of 5 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluatfon Screen ACTIVITYNO. ESR 9 5" OOb2O ESR A-95-oo('o2,0 AT[A('AMCQr D P,W)s)od 1

PAAR

)

d

[-" 54 Attachment 1

Sheet 13 of 37 Page)of ~

REV.1 1 ~

DOES THE ACTIVITYREQUIRE A CHANGE TO THE OPERATING LICENSE OR TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONT

[ ) YES

[)() NO Basis:

5 e e P AGE 2.

OP Note: IfYes, and the scope of the activity Is limited to s Technical Specification/Operating Ucenslng change, then complete Section 66 of this form, and process per plant procedure.

Ifthe scope of the activity ls not limited to a Tech. Spec. or OL change, In addition to processing a Tech. Spec. or OL change request, continue the screening process.

IfNo, continue the screening process.

2.

IS THE ACTIVITY~ BOUNDED BYA PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED 10 CFR 5089 SAFETY EVALUATIONT [ ) YES ted[NO Evaluation g IA No Note: IfYes, attach a copy or provide document number for retrieval capability of the previously performed 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation and complete Section 5 of this form. IfNo, continue the screening process.

3.

~

DOES THE ACTIVITYMAKE CHANGES TO THE FACILITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE BART 5FE PAGE 2.

o)=

gYES

[ )NO UstSARltems/Sectlonsrevlewed:

FGA[l 5ECTIQih 9 5 A>> 9 5A TG Cn 5 l>t l+

(D 8 loh 4.

DOES THE ACTIVITYMAKE CHANGES TO PROCEDURES AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAR?

[ ) YES +NO SEE PA66 2.

cF Sf Ust SAR Items/Sections reviewed: F5'B['TIe 4 9 p APP 9.5A T5 io.fs, I.I.IL (n.S. I.h 5.

DOES THE ACTIVITYINVOLVE A TEST OR EXPERIMENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE BART

[ ) YES +NO Basis:

e

'2.

Ust SAR Items/Sections reviewed: P

('T 9.

p

.'5 5.1.[.la Q.S.I.

NOTE: Il sny question 3 through 5 Is answered YES, then mark Section s5 Not Applicable (N/A) and complete Unrevlewed Safety Question Determination, otherwise complete Section s6.

1st QSR:

Other QSR:

DISCIPUNE PRINT NAME SIGNATURE Date:

Date:

Other QSR:

2nd QSR:

Attach additional sheets If needed.

Date:

Date:

(Form AP41 I ~ 1 6)

AP-011 Rev.

12 Page 25 of 56

ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 2 of 54 CP8'cL 10 CFR 50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Screen ppg(,

This activity involves an evaluation of the Thermo-Lag fire barriers in the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms to ensure that these barriers willprovide adequate separation of redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire in accordance with the Fire Protection Program as described in FSAR Section 9.5. This activity does not require any changes to Harris Plant procedures or programs as discussed in Technical Specifications 6.5.1.1.1.a and 6.8.1.h and, therefore, the Operating License/Technical Specifications are not affected.

The activity is not bounded by a previously performed safety evaluation.

This activity involves the evaluation of the Thermo-Lag barriers in Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms to ensure that these barriers willprovide adequate separation of redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire, in accordance with the Fire Protection Program as described in FSAR Section 9.5. The FSAR currently refers to these Thermo-Lag fire barriers as three-hour fire barriers.

Fire testing of these barriers performed in accordance with ASTM E-119/NFPA 251, the testing methodology referenced in the FSAR for determining fire barrier ratings, indicates that portions of these barriers cannot achieve a three-hour rating. The various references to these barriers as three-hour barriers will need to be changed to accurately reflect the appropriate capability of these barriers.

This evaluation indicates that, even though these barriers cannot achieve a three hour fire rating, they do provide an adequate level of protection of safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire, which is commensurate with hazards in the area.

No procedures as described in the FSAR are affected by this activity. Also, no additional procedure changes are required for periodic maintenance or testing of these barriers.

The resolution to this evaluation does not introduce any new tests or experiments not described in the FSAR. FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.2 states that fire barrier ratings are based on standard fire tests performed in accordance with ASTM E-119/NFPA 251, "Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials". The fire tests performed for qualification of the "wall"and "ceiling" (floor) assemblies references ASTM E-119/NFPA 251 as the basis.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 3 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENTI 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation BACKGROUND, PROBLEM IDENTIFICATIONAND METHODOLOGY

~Bk d

NRC issued Generic Letter 92-08 to all utilities using Thermo-Lag 330-1 material.

This GL identified that testing had demonstrated that the fire resistant capability ofthe material had been declared indeterminate. The NRC issued additional requests for information associated with GL 92-08 which required that Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) outline Corrective Actions necessary to resolve this issue. SHNPP's response addressed each NRC concern related to the adequacy of Thermo-Lag materials. Numerous NRC issues, as well as other issues identiTied by CP&L during the course of its review, have already been resolved via separate ESRs. The Safety Evaluation Report, dated November 1983 (Ref. 1B6) issued by the NRC states:

"9.5.1 Fire Protection The staff ha reviewed the fire protection program forconformance with SRP 9.5.1 (NUREG -0800), which contains, in BTP CMEB 9.5. 1, the technical requirements ofAppendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 and Appendix R to 10CFR50."

Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5.1 (Ref. 1.2) provides the following definition of what constitutes an effective fire protection program:

"The purpose ofthe fire protection program is to provide assurance, through a defense-in-depth design, that a fire willnot prevent the performance ofnecessary safe plant shutdown functions and willnot significantlyincrease the risk ofradioactive releases to the environmentin accordance with General Design Criteria 3 and 5."

BTP CMEB 9.5.1 discusses defense-in-depth as follows:

"Nuclear power plants use the concept ofdefense-in-depth to achieve the required high degree ofsafety by using echelons ofsafety systems.

This concept is also applicable to the fire safetyin nuclear power plants.

With

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 4 of54 CP&L10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation respect to the fire protection program, the defense-in-depth principle is aimed at achieving an adequate balance in:

Preventing fires from starting; Detecting fires quickly, suppressing those fires that occur, putting them out quickly, and limitingtheir damage; and Designing plant safety systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention program and burns for a considerable time in spite offire protection activities willnot prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.

No one ofthese echelons can be perfect or complete byitself. Each echelon should meet certain minimum requirements; however, strengthening any one can compensatein some measure for weaknesses, known or unknown, in the others.

The primary objective ofthe fire protection program is to minimize both the probability and consequences ofpostulated fires. In spite ofsteps taken to reduce the probability offire, fires are expected to occur.

Therefore, means are needed to detect and suppress fires with particular emphasis on providing passive and active fire protection ofappropriate capability and adequate capacity for the systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown with or without offsite power."

With the issuance ofAppendix R and the differences in various license conditions contained in operating licenses, the NRC sought a way to allow facilities to revise the fire protection programs as approved by the NRC without prior approval.

Generic Letter 86-10, (Ref. 1.3) Section F, addressed the use of a generic licensing condition and 10CFR50.59 in changing previously approved fire protection programs as follows:

"The Commission believes that the best way to resolve these problems is to incorporate the fire protection program and major commitments, including the fire hazards analysis, by referenceinto the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) forthe faci%ty. In this manner, the fire protection

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 5 of54 CPEcL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation program, including the systems, the administrative and technical controls, the organization, and other plant features associated with fire protection would be on a consistent status with other plant features describedin the FSAR. Also, the provisions of 10CFR50.59 would then apply directly forchanges the licensee desires to make in the fire protection program that would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

In this context, the determination ofthe involvement ofan unreviewed safety question defined in f/50.59(a)(2) would be made based on fhe "accident....previously evaluated" being fhe postulated firein the fire hazards analysis forfhe fire area affected by the change.

The Commission also believes that a standard license condition, requiring licensees to comply with the provisions ofthe fire protection program as describedin the FSAR, should be used to ensure uniform enforcement offire protection requirements.

Therefore, the licensee should include, in the FSAR update...the incorporation ofthe fire protection program that has been approved by the NRC, including the fire hazards analysis and major commitments that form the basis forthe fire protection program... Upon completion ofthis effort...fhe licensee may apply foran amendment fo the operating license which amends any current license conditions regarding fire protection and

'ubstitutes the followingstandard condition:

Fire Protection (Name oflicensee) shallimplement and maintain in effect allprovisions of the approved fire protection program as described in fhe Final Safety Analysis Report for the facilily(or as describedin submiffats dated )

and as approvedin the SER dated (and Supplements dated

)

subject to the followingprovision:

The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval ofthe Commission onlyifthose changes would not adversely affect fhe ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event ofa fire.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 6 of54 CPRL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation The licensee may alter specific features ofthe approved program provided (a) such changes do not otherwise involve a change in a license condition or technical specification or resultin an unreviewed safety question (see 10CFR50.59), and (b) such changes do not result in failure to complete the fireprotection program as approved by the Commission..

As with other changesimplemented under 10 CFR 50.59, the licensee shall maintain, in auditable form, a current record ofall such changes, including an analysis ofthe effects ofthe change on the fire protection program, and shall make such records available to NRC inspectors upon request."

In accordance with the above philosophy, SHNPP's Plant Operating License (OL), Section 2.F, "Fire Protection Program", states:

"Carolina Power and Light Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facilityas amended and as approved in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated November 1983 (and supplements 1 through 4), and the Safety Evaluation dated January 12, 1987, subject to the followingprovision below.

The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection program withoutpriorapproval ofthe Commission onlyifthose changes would not adversely affect the abilityto achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event ofa fire."

S ecific Chan es to the Facili The purpose of the ESR is to evaluate the adequacy of the existing Thermo-Lag enclosures located in the AuxiliaryControl Panel (ACP) Room and Cable Spreading Rooms (CSR) A 8 B relative to SHNPP's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. This willinvolve revising the rating of the Thermo-Lag barriers in question from 3-hour rated to those which are suitable for the hazard.

The evaluation of the barriers constitutes a deviation of the following highlighted guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1:

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 7 of54 CPEcL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation "5.a(1) Fire barriers with a minimum fire resistance rating of3 hours should be provided to:

a)

Separate safety related systems from any pofential firesin nonsafety-related areas that could affect their ability to perform their safety function; b)

Separate redundant divisions or trains ofsafety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire; c)

Separate individual units on a multiple-unit site unless the requirements of General Design Criterion 5 are met with respect fo fires."

"T.c CableS readin Rooms A separate cable spreading room should be provided foreach redundant division. Cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors.

Each cable spreading room should be separated from others and from other areas of the plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of3 hours."

The NRC addressed whether it was acceptable to process deviations from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 in Question 8.21 of GL 86-1 0:

"8.2$ NRC A royal forBTP CMEB 9.5-1 Deviations QUESTION Do future deviations from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 guidelines require approval by the NRC? Do such deviations constitute a violation oflicense conditions?

RESPONSE

Compliance with guidelinesin fhe BTP is only required to the extent thaf they were incorporated in the approved Fire Protection Program as identiTied in the license condition.

(See Response 8.2)

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page S of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation (Response 8.2 refers back to the Section F dealing with the use of the fire protection licensing condition.)

This is interpreted to mean that a utilitywhose fire protection program was reviewed and approved against the provisions of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 shall maintain the program in accordance with the license condition, WHICH ALLOWS CHANGES TO THE PROGRAM (IN ACCORDANCE WITH 50.59 OF 10CFR50)

AS LONG AS THE UTILITYCAN DEMONSTRATE THERE IS NO ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE ABILITYTO ACHIEVEAND MAINTAINSAFE SHUTDOWN.

As noted in the SHNPP OL, CP8L may make changes to the fire protection program ifthose changes do not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Guidance provided in the licensing condition section of GL 86-10 states that these changes must not result in the failure to complete the fire protection program as approved by the commission.

This is interpreted to mean the protection of safe shutdown capability through the principles of defense-in-depth, in accordance with the guidance provided in BTP CMEB-9.5.1.

In order for the fire barriers to achieve defense-in-depth as defined in BTP CMEB-9.5.1, they must be able to provide the following functions:

t)

Limitation of fire damage; and 2)

Providing protection to plant safety systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention program and burns for a considerable time in spite of fire protection activities will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.

In addition to the above criteria the NRC has provided guidance on the analysis and qualification of fire area boundaries.

The barriers in question constitute the fire area boundaries between fire areas 1-A-CSRA, 1-A-CSRB, and 1-A-SWGRB, as opposed to fire barriers to protect redundant safe shutdown circuits within a fire area.

This is in accordance with BTP CMEB 9.5.1 which states:

3.

Establishment and Use ofFire Areas "Separate fire areas foreach division ofsafety-related systems willreduce the possibility offire-related damage to redundant safety-related

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 9 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation equipment.

Fire areas should be established to separate redundant safety divisions and isolate safety-related systems from fire hazards in non-safety related areas.

Particular design attention to the use of separate isolated fire areas forredundant cables willhelp to avoid loss of redundant safety-related cables..."

The BTP defines "fire area" as follows:

"Fire Area - that portion ofa building or plant thatis separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers."

As noted in the SER, BTP CMEB 9.5.1 incorporates the technical provisions of Appendix R. GL 86-10, "Interpretations of Appendix R" gives the following guidance related to fire area boundaries:

"4. Fire Area Boundaries Th t

'Y'<<

di App Ch*R

~If' bounded to withstand the hazards associated with the area and, as necessary, to protect important equipment within the area from a fire outside the area.

In order to meet the regulation, fire area boundaries need not be completely sealed floor-to-cei%ng, wall-to-wallboundaries.

However, all unsealed openings should be identified and considered the evaluating the effectiveness ofthe overall banier.

Where fire area boundaries are not wall-to-wall, floor-to-cei%ng boundaries with all penetrations sealed to the fire rating ofthe boundaries, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy offire boundariesin their plants to determine ifthe boundaries willwithstand the hazards associated with the area.

This analysis must be conducted by at least a fire protection engineer andif require,dasystem,s engineer Althouq.h not re uired licensees ma submit their evaluations for staff review and concurrence...

In any event, these analyses must be retained by the licensees forsubsequent NRC audits."

Section C. of GL 86-10 also states:

"C. Documentation Re uired to Demonstrate Com liance

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 10 of54 CP&L10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation The "Interpretations" document attached to this letter (GL 86-10) states that, where the licensee chooses not to seek priorNRC review and approval of, for example, a fire area bounda, an evaluation must be performed by a fire protection engineer (assisted by others as needed) and retained forfuture NRC audit. Evaluations ofthis type must be written and organized to facilitate review by a person not involvedin the evaluation.

Guidelines for what such an evaluation should contain may be found in: (1) Section B ofAppendix R and (2) Section C.1.b ofBranch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 Rev. 2 dated July 1981. All calculations supporting the evaluation should be available and all assumptions clearly stated at the outset... "

This demonstrates that the evaluation of fire area boundaries, evaluated as adequate for the hazard, are not considered by the NRC as requiring prior review and approval.

THIS SAFETY ANALYSISWILLDEMONSTRATE THATTHE DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH AS DEFINED IN THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM IS MAINTAINED,AND AS SUCH THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE ABILITYTO ACHIEVEAND MAINTAINSAFE SHUTDOWN. THIS WILL ENSURE THATTHE CHANGES DO NOT RESULT IN FAILURETO COMPLETE THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM AS APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION.

Summa of Evaluation Methodolo The evaluation methodology used to determine the adequacy of existing Thermo-Lag configurations in maintaining safe shutdown capability involves a multi-faceted approach consisting of full scale fire testing, multiple analytical approaches, and a review of the existing design features and administrative controls. This resolution strategy ensures that no single approach is relied upon to determine fire barrier effectiveness.

o The Thermo-Lag assembly details were reviewed and these details were utilized to design the test configurations.

In addition, field material thickness

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 11 of54 CP8cL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation measurements were taken under ESR 94-00379 to ensure the thickness specified in the fire tests truly bounded the field conditions.

o Fire testing in accordance with ASTM E-119 was conducted of bounding Thermo-Lag configurations. This testing involved three (3) separate fire tests.

One hour Thermo-La Wall Test The test wall successfully passed this 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire endurance test The wall system also maintained its integrity when subjected to the post fire hose stream test. This test assembly was considered the "Hose Stream Retest Sample" for later 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> "Wall"testing conducted.

Three hour Thermo-La Ceilin Test This test assembly successfully passed the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire endurance test.

The tested configuration is representative of the Thermo-Lag tunnel floor assemblies.

Three hour Thermo-La Wall Test The test wall exceeded the ASTM E-119 average temperature rise criteria at 108 minutes (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 48 minutes). Although the average temperature rise criteria was exceeded at 108 minutes, this test and data collection was continued for the full 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration. The collected data over the full 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> period was used for input into this evaluation. This establishes "worst" case conditions for the evaluation in that:

Inputs assume a fullyestablished fire since,ASTM E-119 fire data is used.

Tested Thermo-Lag Wall configuration is less fire resistive than the actual configuration installed in the field and is, therefore, conservative.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 12 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation The unexposed side temperature data used in the evaluation is that recorded at the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> point ofthe test. Use of this temperature data affords a more conservative relation of barrier performance to the ASTM testing that was conducted.

o Using the fire test data described above and the differences between the as-tested and as-installed configurations, a calculation (FP-0110) was performed to determine the temperature rise which could be expected ifthe as-installed configuration were tested. The calculation then determines the temperature rise on a tray side rail surface of a "target" tray located at a limiting distance of 1 inch from the unexposed surface of both the as-tested and the as-installed configurations. Results of this calculation were compared to the maximum allowable average raceway temperature rise acceptance criteria (250') stated in GL 86-10, Supplement

1. These calculations demonstrate that the maximum expected temperature rise for the raceway is well below that specified by Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement

1. This is an important consideration since maintenance of safe shutdown capability is dependent on ensuring the safe shutdown cables located on the unexposed side of the installed barriers willremain free of fire damage.

e A calculation (FP-0109) was performed to determine the maximum room heat-up temperatures using bounding cable heat release considerations.

First, enclosures with insufficient ventilation openings to support combustion are identified (ACP enclosure and bridge tunnel). Calculations are then made which determine the maximum expected area temperatures based on the ventilation characteristics of each remaining area.

The results of these calculations are then compared to the ASTM E119 fire test temperatures to demonstrate that significant margin exists between the calculated maximum room temperatures and the furnace temperatures recorded during the fire test. Finally, the expected fixed suppression response time (sprinklers) was determined for areas provided with fixed suppression based on the conservative cable heat release quantities used for development of the maximum room temperatures.

The purpose of calculating sprinkler system response time is to support further evaluation of actual defense in depth features for affected areas. Rapid sprinkler response time to a fullydeveloped

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 13 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation fire willlimitthe challenge a fire poses to an installed fire barrier by initiating suppression and cooling/quenching of the area.

The evaluation section of this ESR reviews the fire testing methodology and provides justification as to why the as-installed configuration is bounded by the as-tested configuration.

It also reviews certain deviations to the testing standards which were necessitated by the unique configurations which are utilized in constructing the Thermo-Lag barriers.

Finally, the ESR draws upon the calculation results described above and acknowledges existing fire protection features in each area to demonstrate where defense in depth measures further assure adequacy of the existing Thermo-lag fire barriers.

Fire detection capability and alarms, fire brigade response actions, fixed suppression (i.e., hose stations as well as sprinkler systems), fire resistance of materials (e.g., IEEE 383 cable) and control of transient combustibles in these areas are discussed in detail.

FUNCTIONALREQUIREMENTS Fire protection of safe shutdown features is achieved through the "defense-in-depth" philosophy, which provides multiple layers of protection. As discussed in BTP CMEB 9.5-1 (Ref. 1.2), the defense-in-depth principle is aimed at achieving an adequate balance in:

Preventing fires from starting; o

Detecting fires quickly, suppressing those fires that occur, putting them out quickly, and limiting their damage; and o

Designing plant safety systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention program and burns for a considerable time in spite of fire protection activities will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.

It is recognized that no one of these layers of protection can be perfect or complete by itself. however, strengthening any one can compensate in some measure for weaknesses, known or unknown, in the others.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 14 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Based on applicable NRC guidance (Ref. 1.2) and the current SHNPP licensing basis as above, the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures in the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms are required to be functionally capable of providing a fire resistance rating of three hours. Additionally, structural steel members forming a part of, or supporting these barriers must be protected to provide a three hour fire resistance rating. The basis for such fire ratings is required to be the ASTM E-119 / NFPA 251 test protocol (Ref. 4.1). However, for the inside of Thermo-Lag enclosures, an exception to this requirement was previously identified in the FSAR (section 9.5.1.2.4.3, page 9.5.1-39), i.e., localized bolted connection areas between cable trays and their support members.

In these areas, Thermo-Lag material coverage on structural steel support members was not extended onto adjacent cable tray surfaces to fullyattenuate potential (localized) heat transmission from exposed cable tray surfaces to attached support members.

REFERENCES 1.

NRC Documents 1.1 NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan, Section 9.5.1, "Fire Protection.

Program," Rev. 3, July 1981.

1.2 Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1, "Guidelines For Fire Protection For Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 2, July 1981.

1.3 Generic Letter 86-10, "Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements,"

April24, 1986.

1.4 Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1, "Fire Endurance test Acceptance Criteria For Fire Barrier Systems Used To Separate Redundant Safe Shutdown Trains Within The Same Fire Area," March 25, 1994.

1.5 Generic Letter 92-08, "Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers," December 17, 1992.

1.6 NUREG 1038, "Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant", dated November 1983.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 15 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation 2.

Ome a Point Laboratories OPL Fire Endurance Tests 2.1 OPL Fire Test Report 14980-97261, "Fire Endurance Test to Qualify a Wall Design as a 60 Minute Fire Resistant Assembly," November 7, 1994.

2.2 OPL Fire Test Report 14980-97668, "Fire Endurance Test to Qualify a CP8L Ceiling Design as a 180 Minute Fire Resistant Assembly," May 18, 1995.

2.3 OPL Fire Test Report 14980-98207, "Fire Endurance Test to Qualify a Wall Design as a 180 Minute Fire Resistant Assembly," May 23, 1995.

3.

SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection En ineerin, 2~ Edition 4.

Indust Standards Studies and Re orts 4.1 ASTM E-119-88 / NFPA 251, "Standard Methods of Fire Tests Of Building Construction and Materials" 4.2 Fire Protection Handbook, National Fire Protection Association, 17~

Edition 4.3 NFPA 72A-1975, "Standard for Local Protective Signaling Systems" 4.4 NFPA 72D-1977, "Standard for Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems" 4.5 NFPA 72E-1978, "Standard for Automatic Fire Detectors" 4.6 NFPA 14-1976, "Standard for Standpipe and Hose Systems" 4.7 ASTM E814, "Standard Test Method for Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire Stops," 1981.

4.8 Manual of Steel Construction, American Institute of Steel Construction, Inc., Seventh Edition.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 16 of54 CPEcL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation 4.9 B. Bresler, T.Y. Lin and J.B. Scalzi, "Design of Steel Structures," John Wiley & Sons, Second Edition.

4.10 IEEE 383, "Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," 1974.

4.11 FMRC, Categorization of Cable Flammability, Intermediate Scale Fire Tests of Cable Tray Installations, "Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-1881, August 1982.

4.12 NUMARCThermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Guidelines, October 12, 1993.

5.

Carolina Power & Li ht Documents 5.1 ESR 94-00379, Revision 1

5.2 DCN 650-697, Revision 6 5.3 DCN 650-724, Revision 2 5.4 DCN 650-742, Revision 2 5.5 DCN 650-789, Revision 1

5.6 ESR 95-00715, Revision 4 5.7 Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix 9.5A, Fire Protection Hazards Analysis 5.8 Individual Plant Examination of External Events, dated June 30, 1995 5.9 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Separation Analysis, Revision 1

5.10 Calculation FP-0110, "Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Enclosures Within the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms," Rev.0.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 17 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation 5.11 Calculation FP-0109, "Compartment Heat-Up Analysis for Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms," Rev. 0.

5.12 Procedure FPP-006, "Control of Ignition Sources - Hot Work Permit," Rev.

17 5.13 Procedure AP-302, "Fire Protection Housekeeping and Temporary Storage," Rev. 6.

5.14 Procedure FPP-004, "Transient Combustible Tracking," Rev.7.

5.15 DBD-306, "Fire Protection and Detection System," Rev. 4.

5.16 DBD-137, "Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC Systems," Rev. 6.

5.17 Fire Pre-Plan PFP/1ACSRA, Rev. 2.

5.18 Fire Pre-Plan PFP/1ACSRB, Rev. 2.

5.19 Fire Pre-Plan PFP/1AACP, Rev. 2 5.20 ESR 97-00562, Rev. 0 5.21 ESR 97-00563, Rev. 0 ANALYSIS Plant Area Ph sical Descri tion Cable Spreading Rooms A and B, and the ACP Room are located on the 286 ft.

elevation of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) and are each located within separate fire areas. As shown by Figure 1, page 47, the ACP Room (Fire Zone 1-A-ACP) is contained within Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB. Cable Spreading Rooms A and B comprise Fire Areas 1-A-CSRA and 1-A-CSRB, respectively. The fire area boundaries consist of one or more of the following:

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Attachment D Page 18 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Walls, floors, ceilings and structural columns constructed of reinforced concrete with a minimum fire rating of three hours, or; Fire barriers constructed of Thermo-Lag materials.

Installed Thermo-La Fire Barrier Enclosures The Thermo-Lag area enclosures in the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms are comprised of two general configurations. One configuration consists of full height vertical "wall"elements extending full height (17ft) from floor to ceiling in the ACP Room and in CSRA. The other configuration consists of two-sided enclosures (one Thermo-Lag "wall"and one Thermo-Lag "floor"), located in the overhead areas of the respective room. These type configurations include an approximately 5 ft high by 4 ft. wide by 2 ft. long enclosure in the ACP Room, an approximately 5 ft. high by 8 ft. wide by 7 ft. long enclosure in CSRB and two enclosures in CSRA, one approximately 6 ft. high by 4 ft. to 6 ft. wide by 44 ft.

long and one 3 ft. to 6 ft. high by 4 ft. wide by 59 ft. long. The concrete walls and ceilings in the room form the remaining sides of these enclosures.

The "walls" and "floors" of these configurations are constructed with one layer of Thermo-Lag panels installed on each side of metal lath and then bolted to a welded steel framing.

In addition, the "wall"panels are tie bolted to each other through the metal lath. Trowel grade material is applied over the welded steel frame and the bolts attaching the panels to the frame. The tie bolts holding the panels together have trowel grade material on the outside of the enclosure only.

The nuts and washers on the inside of the enclosure are not covered.

HVAC ducts, piping, conduit and cable trays passing through the barriers are sealed with penetration seal material.

Doors in the enclosures are securely attached to the structure or to the metal framing of the enclosure and are three hour rated doors.

Tested Thermo-La Fire Barrier Confi urations CPB L has sponsored three (3) separate full-scale fire endurance tests to evaluate the performance capability of the installed barrier enclosure configurations. Omega Point Laboratories, Inc. (OPL) in San Antonio, Texas performed all these fire tests. OPL is an independent and nationally recognized

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 19 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation testing organization, specializing in the conduct of fire endurance testing. Allof the fire tests utilized the standard time/temperature exposure prescribed by ASTM E119 / NFPA 251. These tests involved Thermo-Lag fire barriers constructed similar to those installed at SHNPP.

The tests involved a one hour test of a vertical "wall"element, a three hour test of a vertical "wall"element and a three hour test of a horizontal "floor"element.

The one hour test demonstrated that the vertical "wall"enclosures and vertical portions of two-sided enclosures as installed at SHNPP are capable of providing a minimum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of fullyrated performance in accordance with ASTM E119 /

NFPA 251. The three hour test of the horizontal "floor"element demonstrated that the horizontal "floor"portions of two-sided enclosures as installed at SHNPP are capable of meeting the temperature acceptance criteria of ASTM E-119 /

NFPA 251 for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration of exposure.

Although some areas of deviation exist between the test methods and acceptance criteria specified by ASTM E-119 / NFPA 251 and the tested Thermo-Lag fire barrier configuration, the discussions in the Review of Test Methods and Results section of this evaluation finds that the results are valid. Therefore, the fire test results can serve as a basis for comparison to installed barrier enclosures.

The three hour test of the vertical "wall"element demonstrated that the vertical "wall"enclosures and vertical portions of two-sided enclosures as installed at SHNPP are capable of providing a minimum of 108 minutes (1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) of fullyrated performance in accordance with ASTM E119 / NFPA 251. Moreover, of particular significance, was that the barrier was capable of providing a level of thermal and structural performance such that even following 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of fire exposure, heat and hot gas penetration to the unexposed side of the barrier was not sufficient to ignite cotton waste as required by the testing standards.

Additionally, this test demonstrated that the performance of installed Thermo-Lag barriers would not be reduced, or limited by, the presence of through penetrations, which are sealed commensurate with the designs utilized in the test.

Review ofTest Methods and Results This section willcompare the test methodology and acceptance criteria prescribed by ASTM E119 / NFPA 251 to that utilized for conduct of the three fire endurance tests. The objective of this comparison is to determine ifthe methods used to perform these tests and their associated results can serve as a valid

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Attachment D Page 20 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation technical basis for evaluating the performance capability of installed barrier configurations.

One Hour Wall Test Ref. 2.1 This test demonstrated that the vertical "wall"enclosures and vertical portions of Two-sided enclosures as installed at SHNPP are capable of providing a minimum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of fullyrated performance in accordance with ASTM E119 /

NFPA 251 (hereafter termed the "test standard").

The acceptance criteria for "Nonbearing Walls and Partitions" were applicable to this test. The only deviation from test methods outlined by the test standard was for conduct of the hose stream test. Specifically, standard practice of performing the hose stream test would have resulted in subjecting the test assembly to the required 2-1/2 minute hose stream duration immediately following fire exposure. Instead, for this test, the assembly was subjected to hose stream exposures in two parts. The first 1 minute of hose stream application was applied immediately after the test specimen was removed from the test furnace. The final 1-1/2 minute of hose stream application occurred approximately 90 minutes after the first application.

No projection of water through the barrier occurred during either portion of the hose stream test. Based on the 1/8 to 3/8 in. thick layer of unreacted Thermo-Lag material remaining on the exposed side of the barrier, application of hose stream test for the full 2-1/2 minutes immediately following fire exposure would not have resulted in passage of water through the barrier. Additionally, the approximate 90 minute lapse between the first and second applications allowed the Thermo-Lag material to absorb water from the initial application and subsequently soften. Therefore, applying the second portion of the hose stream test 90 minutes later may have been a more severe test of the barrier to withstand the impact and erosion effects of the hose stream. Therefore, the ability of the barrier to withstand a hose stream test for a total duration of 2-1/2 minutes satisfied the hose stream acceptance criteria prescribed by ASTM E119

/ NFPA 251 for both a 1 and 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire endurance rating. On this basis the deviation from the test standard is not significant.

Three Hour Wall Test Ref. 2.3 This test demonstrated that the vertical "wall"enclosures and vertical portions of two-sided enclosures as installed at SHNPP are capable of providing a minimum

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Attachment D Page 21 of54 CPEcL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation of 108 minutes (1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) of fully rated performance in accordance with ASTM E119 / NFPA 251. Moreover, of particular significance, the barrier was capable of providing a level of thermal and structural performance such that even following 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of fire exposure, heat and hot gas penetration to the unexposed side of the barrier was not sufficient to ignite cotton waste.

Additionally, this test demonstrated that penetrations through installed barriers could be effectively sealed, such that they would not adversely affect the performance of Thermo-Lag barriers. Alternately stated, the performance of installed Thermo-Lag barriers would not be reduced, or limited by, the presence of through penetrations which are sealed commensurate with the designs utilized in the test.

As with the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> test, the acceptance criteria for "Nonbearing Walls and Partitions" were applicable to this test. With the exception of failure to satisfy the unexposed side temperature increase criterion, no areas of deviation from the test standard occurred for conduct of this test.

The temperature rise acceptance criteria and test results for the assembly are as follows:

ASTM Acceptance Criteria Average Unexposed Temp Rise 250' Max Single Temp Rise 325' Penetration Seal (4" LDSE) 325' Test Results 400' 684' 466' Time Temp.

Criteria Was Exceeded 108 minutes 123 Minutes 171 Minutes As noted, the barrier successfully prevented the passage of flames or hot gases sufficient to ignite cotton waste.

Three Hour Floor Test Ref. 2.2 This test demonstrated that the horizontal "floor"portions of two-sided enclosures as installed at SHNPP are capable of meeting the temperature acceptance criteria of the test standard for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration of fire exposure.

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Attachment D Page 22 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Specifically, the average temperature increase on the unexposed surface of the barrier was only 157'F, compared to 250'F allowed by the standard. The maximum temperature increase recorded by a single thermocouple was 291'F, compared to 325'F allowed by the standard. No hose stream test was required by the test standard, or performed for this barrier assembly.

Review ofthe conduct of this test indicates three issues that conflict with the test methodology and acceptance criteria prescribed by the standard. The issues are as follows:

1. The test specimen was not subjected to fire exposure under a loaded condition representing the maximum load that the assembly would experience in its "as-installed" configuration.

2. The number and position of thermocouples placed on structural steel members were not in accordance with those required by the standard.

3. The conditions for acceptance pertaining to sustaining the applied load throughout the fire exposure duration, and temperatures recorded by structural steel members throughout the fire exposure duration were not explicitly considered.

The first issue stems from a misclassification of the tested barrier assembly.

Specifically, as installed at SHNPP, these horizontal elements ostensibly form the "floor"portions of two-sided barrier enclosures located in the Cable Spreading and ACP Room overhead areas. However, the test performed on this barrier apparently treated the barrier as a "ceiling" assembly. When classified as a ceiling, the test standard does not require subjecting the assembly to load under fire exposure conditions. When classified as a floor, the section of the standard entitled "Floor and Roof Assemblies" applies, which states in part:

"Throughout the fire endurance test, a superimposed load shall be applied to the specimen to simulate a maximum load condition. The maximum load condition shall be as nearly as practicable the maximum load allowed by the limiting condition of design under nationally recognized structural design criteria".

As installed at SHNPP, the structural steel angle members to which the Thermo-

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Attachment D Page 23 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Lag panels forming "floor"elements of two-sided enclosures are attached, carry at least a portion of the load of the bottom cable tray within the enclosure. A load was not applied to the tested barrier assembly to represent this condition.

Further, as described below for the third issue, the ability of the barrier assembly to withstand the applied load under fire exposure conditions is a condition for acceptance of the test as defined by the standard.

The second issue pertains to how and where temperatures are measured for acceptance purposes. As described previously, structural steel angle members were used to form the perimeter frame and cross members of the test assembly.,

The steel angle cross members were spaced 2 ft. 6 in. on center. For this type of construction, the standard states:

"For specimens using structural members (beams, open-web steel joists) spaced at 4 ft on center or less, the temperature of the steel in these structural members shall be measured by four thermocouples placed on each member. No more than four members shall be so instrumented.

Place the thermocouples at significant locations, such as at midspan, over joints in the ceiling, over light fixtures, etc.".

In performing the test, thermocouples were not installed in accordance with this requirement. Specificall three (3) thermocouples were equally spaced across a single support member, located in the approximate center of the barrier assembly. These thermocouples were positioned on the face of the support member oriented away from the test furnace. This meant that the thermocouples were covered by the two layers of Thermo-Lag panels. The surfaces of all support members facing the test furnace were covered with Thermo-Lag trowel grade material to a thickness commensurate with installed configurations (i.e.,

0.75+ 0.06 in.). In performing the test, these three thermocouples were considered "forengineering purposes" and the temperature data obtained by these thermocouples was not considered in the conditions for acceptance.

At the conclusion of the test, the temperatures recorded by these thermocouples were 1654'F, 1604'F and 1600'F. Although the specifi number and location of thermocouples on support members deviated from that specified by the standard, representative temperature data for the structural supports was nonetheless obtained during the test, thereby satisfying the intent of the standard. The complication with this issue therefore becomes how this

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Attachment D Page 24 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation temperature data should be considered within the conditions for acceptance defined by the standard. This is addressed by the third issue.

The third issue involves the conditions of acceptance invoked by the standard for floor and roof assemblies.

However, in specifying applicable acceptance

criteria, the standard distinguishes between floor or roof assemblies that, in their installed configuration, are "restrained" or "unrestrained" against thermal expansion. The standard defines these conditions as follows:

"A restrained condition in fire tests...is one in which expansion at the supports of a load-carrying element resulting from the effects of fire is resisted by forces external to the element. An unrestrained condition is one in which the load-carrying element is free to expand and rotate at its supports...For the purposes of this guide, restraint in buildings is defined as follows: Floor and roof assemblies and individual beams in buildings are considered restrained where the surrounding or supporting structure is capable of resisting substantial thermal expansion throughout the range of anticipated elevated temperatures.

Construction not complying with this definition is assumed to be free to rotate and expand and therefore is considered as unrestrained".

The installed configurations of two-sided Thermo-Lag enclosures are secured to the surrounding concrete structure on at least two sides and therefore would be restrained from thermal expansion on those sides. Additionally, the welded connections between support members and bolted connections of support members to the concrete structure willprovide substantial rotational restraint upon exposure to elevated temperatures.

On this basis the two-sided barrier enclosures would be redominatel restrained from thermal ex ansion.

However, ifthe installed two-sided barrier enclosures are conservatively considered to be only partially restrained, interpretation of the test standard would lead to at least considering the conditions of acceptance for unrestrained floor assemblies, which are more severe than for restrained assemblies.

The conditions of acceptance specified by the standard for restrained and unrestrained assemblies are as follows:

For both "restrained'nd "unrestrained" assemblies, the specimen shall have sustained the applied load during the classification period without

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Attachment D Page 25 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation developing unexposed surface conditions that willignite cotton waste.

For both "restrained" and "unrestrained" assemblies, transmission of heat through the specimen during the classification period shall not have been such as to raise the average temperature on its unexposed surface more than 250'F above its initial temperature.

For "restrained" assemblies using steel structural members (e.g. beams, open-web steel joists) spaced 4 ft or less'on center, the average temperature recorded by all joist or beam thermocouples shall not have exceeded 1100'F for a period of 1 1/2 hours.

For "unrestrained" assemblies using steel members (e.g., beams, open-web joists) spaced 4 ft or less on center, the average temperature recorded by all joist or beam thermocouples shall not exceed 1100'F during the classification period.

The following willassess these conditions of acceptance as they pertain to the tested barrier assembly.

Im osition of Maximum Load Although the fire barrier assembly was tested without a superimposed load to simulate its maximum loaded condition, the test results are valid. This is based on the following:

o The tested barrier did not exhibit structural failure or collapse during the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration of ASTM E119 fire exposure. The maximum temperature increase developed on the unexposed side of the barrier was only 291'F over the initial temperature, and the barrier prevented the ignition of cotton waste applied just prior to termination of the test.

o As a test standard for generic building construction and materials, the requirement for imposition of maximum loaded conditions for fire endurance qualification is intended for structural load bearing building floor and roof systems. This is due to that fact that the loaded conditions of floor and roof assemblies within buildings can change over time due to changes in

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Attachment D Page 26 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation occupancy, repositioning of machinery and equipment, etc. The nature of the installed Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures represents a unique case that is not explicitly contemplated by the standard. Specifically, the barrier support members do not carry building structure loads, and the loads imposed on the barrier supports by attached Thermo-Lag panels, cable trays, etc. will not undergo significant change over the life of the plant.

o For the limiting case installed configuration where the bottom support members of an enclosure carry a portion of the load of a cable tray, the resulting loads are not significant in relation to the extent of the overall support system. Specifically, the bottom cross brace angle members are typically spaced at 18 to 28 in. intervals, which are less than the 30 in. cross brace member spacing for the tested configuration. Unlike the tested configuration, on one end, the installed cross brace members are welded to other structural steel members that are attached to concrete walls via anchor bolts or welded to embedded steel plates. On the other end, the installed cross brace members are welded to vertically oriented structural steel members which are secured to the concrete ceiling structure.

o The adequacy of physical attachment of the Thermo-Lag panels to respective support members via nuts, bolts and washers has been demonstrated by fire test, and such means of connection will not be affected by minor loads imposed on the support members.

Therefore, the fact that the barrier assembly was not tested under loaded conditions does not adversely affect the fire endurance qualification basis of the barrier assembly.

Heat Transmission As described above, this condition of acceptance was satisfied by the tested configuration. The average temperature increase on the unexposed side of the barrier assembly was less than 250'F.

Tem erature Increase of Steel Su ort Members for Restrained Assemblies As described above, the number and specific placement of thermocouples on

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Attachment D Page 27 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation the steel cross brace angle members was not in accordance with the standard.

However, representative support member temperatures were nonetheless obtained during the test via the three thermocouples positioned on a single centrally located support member. Therefore, the intent of the standard was satisfied. Moreover, the temperatures on this support member, as recorded at the 1 1/2 hour mark during the fire test, were less than the 1100'F (maximum) temperature required by the standard for restrained assemblies.

Specifically, the temperatures recorded by these thermocouples were 611'F, 946'F and 895'F.

Tem erature Increase of Steel Su ort Members for Unrestrained Assemblies For floor and roof assemblies classified as unrestrained, the standard requires that the temperature of steel support members not exceed 1100'F for the entire duration of the fire test (i.e., 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />). The temperatures recorded by the three thermocouples installed on the structural member at the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> mark during the test were 1654'F, 1652'F and 1600'F. The 1100'F maximum temperature invoked by the standard is based on the fact that at room temperature, the design working stress of structural steel is approximately 60%. In contrast, at 1100'F the yield stress (and Modulus of elasticity) decreases to a value approximately equal to the originally allocated design working stress of 60%.

Since the reduced yield stress value is approximately equal to the original design working stress (60%), steel is considered fire resistive at temperatures up to 1100'F without the need for fireproofing material (Ref. 4.8).

The steel framework for support of the installed Thermo-Lag enclosures is based on combined bending (due to dead weight and seismic considerations) and axial loading (due to seismic). The dead load includes the weight of the support members themselves, the weight of Thermo-Lag materials, the weight of the expanded metal lath and the weight contributed by cable tray loading. As analyzed by Reference 5.10, the seismic loads are based on 2.5g vertical and 0.88g horizontal acceleration. The member with the highest stress has a stress interaction of 0.781 (i.e., 22% margin) based on the allowable stresses of F, (axial compressive) =12.1 ksi and F, (bending) =18.5 ksi. The stress interaction for dead weight only is conservatively 0.22 (i.e., 0.781/(1+2.5)), yielding a 78%

margin. Since F, and F, are functions of F(yield stress), and since Fdecreases with increasing temperature, it is obvious that the design margin of the limiting case support member willdecrease with increasing temperature. The stresses

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Attachment D Page 2S of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation on the steel members supporting the installed Thermo-Lag barrier enclosures range from 3 ksi for lightly loaded members, to 4 ksi for the heaviest loaded member (Ref. 5.10). The tensile strength of ASTM A-36 steel at 1400'F is between 7-15 ksi (Ref. 4.9). At temperatures in the range of 1600'F, it is between 5-12 ksi with a very slow drop beyond that. Therefore, based on actual load conditions, it is reasonable to expect that the installed barrier support members are capable ofwithstanding temperatures in the range measured during the full 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire test duration.

Finally, the 1100'F temperature limitprescribed by the standard is intended for.

structural load bearing members supporting floor and roof assemblies.

The unique nature of the installed Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures represents a

special case application (i.e., non-structural load bearing) that is not explicitly contemplated by the standard. Therefore, the fact that the temperatures recorded on the structural support member during the fire test, exceed the 1100'F limitspecified by the standard does not adversely affect the fire endurance qualification basis of the barrier assembly.

S an Su ort Durin Testin During the test it was noted that the assembly started to undergo deflection on an unsupported side of the assembly.

This portion of the assembly was at the interface between the CP8 L test configuration and an adjacent configuration being tested simultaneously for another utility. This configuration led. to an unsupported span of 12 feet. As a result, the assembly had to be supported during the test through the use of a chain fall. This is not considered to adversely impact the application of the test results, since the assembly in the field is structurally supported one side through attachment to a concrete wall, and on the other side through attachment to structural steel which is supported from the floor and/or the ceiling. As a result, the spans in the field do not approach that encountered in the test.

In addition, supplementary bracing is supplied in the field which further adds strength to the assembly.

Conclusions Although some areas of deviation exist between the test methods and acceptance criteria specified by the test standard and the tested Thermo-Lag fire

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Attachment D Page 29 of54 CPEcL IOCFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation barrier configurations, the results are valid. Therefore, the fire test results can serve as a basis for comparison to installed barrier enclosures.

Com arison of Tested and Installed Barrier Confi urations A comparison of the construction attributes of the as-installed barriers to the as-tested barriers indicated that there are no significant differences between tested and installed Thermo-Lag fire barriers that could result in installed barrier enclosures providing a level of protection less than that demonstrated during fire endurance testing.

The following are the differences between the installed and tested vertical "wall" elements:

o The Thermo-Lag material thickness of tested assemblies is less than that for installed configurations so the tested bounds the installed.

o The tested assemblies did not utilize the /~ in. thick layer of metal lath between the two layers of Thermo-Lag 330-1 panels, whereas installed configurations are constructed with the metal lath. There is minimal thermal benefit from the lath, but it does provide additional rigidityto the barrier assembly which will help keep the Thermo-Lag panels in place.

o The tested assemblies did not utilize /4 in. tie bolts (including nuts and fender washers) between the two Thermo-Lag panel layers, whereas installed configurations are constructed with tie bolts. The bolts are covered with Thermo-Lag trowel grade material on the outside surfaces of the enclosures, but the nuts and washers on the inside surfaces of the enclosures are not covered with trowel grade material. The tie bolts will provide increased rigidityand stability for the installed Thermo-Lag enclosure.

The effect of not covering the bolts with Thermo-Lag on the inside of the enclosures was evaluated in Reference 5.10 and found not to adversely affect the thermal performance of the barriers.

o The largest Thermo-Lag panel size utilized for installed vertical "wall" elements is approximately 34 in. by 67 in. The largest panel size used to construct the tested assemblies was 45 in. by 75 in. Therefore, the maximum

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Attachment D Page 30 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation panel size tested bounds the maximum installed panel size.

o The size of the steel duct penetration utilized in the tested configuration was 24 in. by 24 in. While this size is larger than most through sleeves that penetrate installed barrier enclosures, sleeves with dimensions up to 4ft. 6 in.

exist for installed enclosures.

The larger penetrations reduce the free area and unsupported spans of installed seal configurations and unsupported spans of installed seal configurations.

Additionally, the tested duct penetration achieves a higher rating (171 minutes) than the rating of the tested barrier (108 minutes). Therefore, there is sufficient assurance that sleeves of larger sizes will not adversely affect the performance of installed barrier enclosures.

o The design of the structural steel supporting framework for the tested "wall" configurations was based on the structural framework supporting the installed barrier enclosures (Ref. 5.2 through 5.5). Additionally, the same methods for attachment of the Thermo-Lag panels to the framework were utilized for the tested configurations as was used to construct the installed enclosures.

Therefore, the structural integrity of installed enclosures would be expected to be maintained under fire condition, commensurate with the configurations tested.

o To conduct the test, the wall was positioned such that the side with the steel angle support members covered with Thermo-Lag trowel grade material was exposed to the test furnace environment.

This was conservative since on this side the Thermo-Lag coverage was significantly less than on the side away from the furnace.

The following are the differences between the installed and tested horizontal "floor"elements:

o The Thermo-Lag material thickness of tested assemblies is less than that for installed configurations so the tested bounds the installed.

o The largest Thermo-Lag panel size utilized for installed horizontal "floor" elements is approximately 25 in. by 66 in. The largest panel size used to construct the tested assemblies was 30 in. by 69 in. Therefore, the maximum

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Attachment D Page 31 of54 CPAL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation panel size tested bounds the maximum installed panel size.

o The design of the structural steel supporting framework for the tested "floor" configuration was based on the structural framework supporting the installed barrier enclosures (Ref. 5.2 through 5.5). Additionally, the same methods for attachment of the Thermo-Lag panels to the framework were utilized for the tested configuration as was used to construct the installed enclosures.

Therefore, the structural integrity of installed enclosures would be expected to be maintained under fire condition, commensurate with the configuration tested.

o To conduct the test, the "floor"was positioned such that the side with the steel angle support members covered with Thermo-Lag trowel grade material was exposed to the test furnace environment.

This was conservative since on this side the Thermo-Lag coverage was signiTicantly less than on the side away from the furnace.

Fire Hazards Anal sis for Cable S readin Rooms A and 8 Fire Protection Features Physical separation of redundant electrical Safe Shutdown Trains A and B within CSRA and CSRB is achieved by three hour rated reinforced concrete walls, or Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures. Automatic fire detection system capability is provided throughout all areas of CSRA and CSRB, including within the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures. The fire detection system provides local notification of fire alarm, trouble and fire suppression system actuation conditions, and also provides notification of these conditions to the Main Fire Detection Information Center (MFDIC). Ionization type fire detectors are provided for incipient stage alarm and notification, and rate compensated thermal detectors are also provided throughout all areas, including within Thermo-Lag enclosures, to initiate the flowof water into the pre-action sprinkler system. Additionally, manual pull stations are provided at egress routes and other key locations in the rooms, for fire alarm system activation. Finally, a local graphic display annunciator panel is provided inside CSRB, which gives the fire zone layout of the ionization type fire detectors installed in the Cable Spreading Rooms, including ionization detectors located within the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures. This graphic display panel

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Attachment D Page 32 of54 CPEcL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation facilitates plant fire brigade response to a fire condition by operating on a "first-out" alarm annunciation basis, whereby illumination of an indicator lamp represents the initiallyactivated detector. A Field evaluation of fire detection and suppression system coverage in the areas was performed by ESR 97-00563 (Ref. 5.21). As a result of this field evaluation, relocation of one ionization type fire detector in CSRB was required to achieve compliance with NFPA 72E (Ref.

4.5) for specified distance of fire detector placement from walls. This ionization type fire detector was relocated via ESR 97-00562 (Ref. 5.20).

An automatic pre-action sprinkler system is installed within CSRA and CSRB.

Sprinkler system coverage is not provided within the Thermo-Lag enclosures.

The sprinkler system is electrically supervised with alarm notification provided for control valve position, supervisory air pressure, and waterflow conditions. An electrical signal from rate compensated thermal detectors located throughout the rooms, including areas within the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures, will automatically trip the sprinkler system deluge valve iftemperatures approach 135'F to 140'F. The deluge valve controlling waterflow into the sprinkler system distribution piping can also be tripped manually, via pull stations located throughout the protected area, and at the valve location (286-Fw-41 Exit in the Demin. Resin Fill Area). Individual sprinkler heads willfuse open to enable water discharge, iftemperatures reach the 212'F rating point of the sprinklers. This type of sprinkler system is designed to minimize the potential for inadvertent actuation, since trip of the deluge valve and operation of one or more sprinkler heads are required to enable water discharge. Manual fire suppression capability is provided throughout the rooms by Hose Stations 286-C-39 and 286-Fw-42, and portable fire extinguishers (CO, and pressurized water) that are readily accessible for use by fire brigade members. The effects of fire suppression system activation and manual fire-fighting actions in these rooms have been considered. Specifically, accumulation of water is minimized by provision of a floor drainage system. Floor water surcharge is estimated to be insignificant, since excess water can overflow to adjacent areas, with runoff directed to the storm drainage system.

Separate ventilation systems are provided for CSRA and CSRB. The normal ventilation mode for both areas is recirculated type. Ionization type smoke detectors are provided in the return air ductwork for the rooms. These detectors willsense incipient-stage products of combustion, actuate an alarm in the

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 33 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Control Room and automatically shut down the supply fans for the respective room, thereby preventing circulation of smoke (Ref. 5.15, 5.16). The ventilation system can also be switched to once-through (purge) operation to prevent propagation of smoke via the ductwork to unaffected areas. The change from normal ventilation to smoke purge is manually initiated by the control room operator (Ref. 5.16). Therefore, smoke, heat and products of combustion can be effectively removed from all areas, including the Thermo-Lag enclosures, except for the "bridge" enclosure within CSRB (see Figure 1 on page 47), which is a relatively small enclosure (approximately 7 ft x 8 ft x 5 ft), and is non-ventilated.

Analysis of Hazards for CSRA and CSRB Except for the specific quantities of combustible materials, such as exposed electrical cabling and Thermo-Lag fire barrier materials, the hazards in CSRA and CSRB are essentially the same. Therefore, the following hazards analysis is applicable for both rooms. As described in FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.14, the cable spreading areas do not contain high energy equipment such as switchgear, transformers above 480v or rotating equipment, and are not used for storage of flammable materials. As such, the hazards in the rooms consist primarily of exposed electrical cable insulation for cables routed in cable trays.

Class IE electrical cables and connector assemblies have been qualified in accordance with IEEE Standard 383(Ref. 4.10). The cables in these areas are for low voltage power, control and instrumentation applications. The potential for self-ignition of these cables is considered minimal due to their relatively low voltage levels, and that they are primarily used for intermittent duty (i.e., not continuously energized). The low voltage power and control cables are constructed of ethylene-propylene rubber (EPR) type or cross-linked polyethylene (XPE) insulation with flame resistant jacketing. Instrumentation cables are constructed of EPR or XPE insulation with hypalon jackets, or ETFE fluoropolymer insulation and jacket. Non-Class IE cables are routed in separate raceways from Class IE cables with a separation distance of 1 ft for trays separated horizontally, 3 ft for trays separated vertically, or alternate separation criteria per FSAR Table 8.3.1-10 is provided. Cable splices in cable trays are prohibited, and cable fillin trays is maintained below the side rails unless specifically evaluated and addressed on a case-by-case basis.

/

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 34 of54 CP&L10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation The combustible loading in the rooms is considered high, when determined by simply compiling the heat of combustion values for exposed in-situ combustibles and evenly distributing the total Btu content over the floor area of the respective room. However, this approach for assessing the hazards in the areas is misleading in that the methodology assumes that all of the energy released during a fire is evenly distributed throughout the floor area, ignoring the effect of having a concentrated fire impacting the barrier. A more appropriate assessment of the hazards in the rooms is obtained by considering the potential energy which can be transferred to a representative section of the barrier based on a conservative heat release rate for the actual combustibles in the area. This determines the expected amount of thermal energy the material willbe exposed to. This approach is also conservative because an actual fire involving IEEE 383 cabling would be slow to develop.

To mitigate the potential for cable fires, adequate means for circuit protection are provided. As part of the Safe Shutdown Separation Analysis (Ref. 5.9), the methods for circuit protection for safe shutdown essential circuits and associated circuits were reviewed and determined to be acceptable and properly coordinated. Additionally, for purposes of this ESR evaluation, the fuse/breaker schemes for a random selection of 55 cables routed in non-safety related cable trays in CSRA, CSRB and the ACP Room were reviewed. The results of this review were that all cables were either 1) protected by fuses or breakers, 2) associated with circuits that did not contain devices (i.e., amplifiers or power supplies) that could potentially fault and cause high energy arcing, sparking or overheating, or 3) were low level instrumentation or annunciator circuits.

The IPEEE performed for SHNPP (Ref. 5.8) calculated the overall core damage frequency from fires originating in these rooms to be 5.6E-8 per year. The IPEEE states, "Review of the ignition source data sheet indicates that there are no significant ignition sources (i.e., ignition sources with capability of generating significant heat) located in these fire areas (Analysis File 2Y57.F/05)." Finally, procedures are established to administratively control potential ignition sources (e.g., hot work permits), housekeeping and temporary storage, and transient combustibles (Ref. 5.12 through 5.14) for these rooms. There are no radioactive sources in these areas.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 35 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Postulated Fire Scenarios in CSRA and CSRB Based on the hazards in.these areas, the most credible scenario involves a cable tray fire on one side of the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures. To assess the resulting room temperatures from such a fire, Calculation FP-0109 (Ref.

5.11) was prepared. One purpose in performing this calculation was to derive conservative room temperatures resulting from a cable tray fire, that could be compared to the standard ASTM E119 temperature exposure profile used during the fire tests performed to evaluate the performance of the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures. lfconservatively derived room temperatures under postulated fire conditions are significantly lower than those of the ASTM E119 test exposure, a margin of safety beyond that demonstrated by the Thermo-Lag barriers under test conditions can be realized. Another purpose for performing the calculation was to determine the approximate time required for the sprinkler system in CSRA and CSRB to activate based on the most credible fire scenario of a postulated fire developing in these areas (i.e., outside of the Thermo-Lag enclosures). The methodology used to perform this calculation is embodied in Section 10 (Chapter 11) of the NFPA Handbook (Ref. 4.2) and Section 3 (Chapter 6) of the SFPE Handbook (Ref. 3). These mathematical formulas are based on correlations of experimental fire data that developed reasonable predictions of approximate peak room temperatures based on postulated cable tray fire scenarios. The mathematical correlations are state of the art approximations and have been used for design and litigation applications in general industry.

The results of the calculation demonstrated that approximate potential temperatures reached during a postulated fire in CSRA, CSRB and the Thermo-Lag "tunnel" enclosure in CSRA would be significantly lower than the ASTM E119 exposure temperatures used for fire endurance tests of the Thermo-Lag barriers. Additionally, the results of the calculation correlate with the data obtained by the FMRC/EPRI testing (Ref. 4.11), which demonstrated that the peak temperatures developed in the flame region immediately above the surface of a burning cable tray array were in the vicinityof 1500'F. Therefore, based on the very conservative postulated fire scenario used in the calculation, the installed Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures would be expected to provide a level of protection beyond the 108 minute duration of fully rated performance capability demonstrated during the vertical "wall"test (Ref. 2.3). Additionally,

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 36 of54 CPEcL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation based on the peak room temperatures determined by the calculation, a fire of sufficient intensity to challenge the load bearing capability of structural steel members supporting the Thermo-Lag enclosures in these rooms is not credible.

Moreover, water discharge from the fixed suppression system and/or hose streams would prevent development of temperatures required to challenge the integrity of the steel support members. Specifically, for the cable fire scenario used to derive the peak room temperatures, a fire developing within CSRA or CSRB (outside of the Thermo-Lag barrier enclosures) was calculated to result in activation of the automatic sprinkler system in approximately 60 seconds.

In performing Calculation FP-0109, the temperatures resulting from a fire in the Thermo-Lag "bridge" enclosure in CSRB, were not calculated. This enclosure is relatively small in comparison to the CSRA "tunnel" enclosure and unlike the "tunnel" enclosure, has no forced ventilation or other unsealed openings.

Therefore, a postulated fire within the "bridge" enclosure would not have sufficient oxygen to develop into a flaming fire, which could produce temperatures anywhere near those of the standard ASTM E119 exposure used for conduct of the Thermo-Lag barrier fire tests.

To further evaluate the level of protection afforded by the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures, Calculation FP-0110 (Ref. 5.10) was performed. This calculation used the temperature data obtained during the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire test of the vertical "wall"barrier (Ref. 2.3), in conjunction with heat transfer analysis techniques to assess the ability of the barrier to maintain acceptable temperatures on raceways located on the unexposed side. Specifically, the objective of Calculation FP-0110 was to determine the temperature increase that would be anticipated on side rail surfaces of a "target" cable tray located at a lateral distance of 1 in. from the unexposed side of a vertical Thermo-Lag fire barrier, when subjected to a temperature of 1925'F. The 1925'F temperature represents the maximum temperature developed during a standard 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ASTM E119 exposure test and is therefore conservative. Evaluating the temperature increase on a cable tray located 1 in. from the unexposed side of the barrier is also conservative, since in no instance are installed cable trays located closer than 1

in. to barrier surfaces. Additionally, the nuts and washers located on the "inside" surfaces of installed wall enclosures are not covered with Thermo-Lag trowel grade material. To address this issue, the calculation conservatively assumes that the postulated fire occurs "outside" the enclosure, and the "target" cable tray

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 37 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation

("inside" the enclosure) is situated adjacent to the exposed nuts and washers.

In performing Calculation FP-0110, two barrier configurations were evaluated.

One configuration was the specific vertical "wall"section tested. However, some differences exist between the wall barrier tested and those actually installed.

These differences include greater installed Thermo-Lag material thickness, presence of 1/4" thick metal lath between the two layers of Thermo-Lag panels, and the exposed nuts and washers on installed enclosure "inside" surfaces.

Therefore, using temperature data obtained from the fire test, the calculation also evaluated the performance of the as-installed wall barrier configuration.

Although the unexposed average surface temperature of the tested wall section exceeded the 250'F increase prescribed by ASTM E119, the actual function of the installed barriers is to preclude a fire on one side of the barrier from damaging redundant trains of electrical cabling required for safe shutdown (predominately routed in cable trays), located on the unexposed side of the barrier. The acceptance criteria for fire barrier systems installed directly on raceway commodities, such as cable trays, specified by Supplement 1 to GL 86-10 (Ref. 1.4), limits the average temperature increase on protected raceway surfaces to 250'F.

The cable tray side rail temperature increase was calculated using the average temperature recorded on the unexposed side of the tested wall section at 180 minutes (458'F). The resultant cable tray side rail temperature increase was determined to be 187'F. This increase is below the 250'F average temperature increase acceptance criteria allowed for by Supplement 1 to GL 86-10.

As an added measure of confidence, the cable tray side rail temperature increase was also calculated for the actual installed barrier configuration using the 458'F unexposed surface temperature recorded during the test. The resultant cable tray side rail surface temperature increase was 106'F. This suggests that even more margin exists relative to the GL 86-10 Supplement 1

average temperature increase acceptance criteria for actual as-installed vertical "wall"barrier configurations.

It is clear that the temperature increase on installed cable trays, located at a limiting-case distance of 1 in. from unexposed vertical barrier surfaces, willbe

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 3S of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation significantly less than that allowed by the GL 86-10 Supplement 1 raceway surface temperature increase acceptance criteria. Therefore, installed Thermo-Lag wall fire barrier enclosures will provide adequate protection to cable trays situated nearby.

Fire Event in CSRA and CSRB In the event of a fire in these rooms, activation of one or more of the ionization detectors installed throughout the areas willoccur and provide early warning to the Control Room. An operator willthen be dispatched to the appropriate room to investigate the nature of the alarm. Should the operator detect evidence of a fire condition (i.e., flame, smoke or other products of combustion), the Control Room will be notified to dispatch the site fire brigade. A fire releasing sufficient products of combustion to activate one or more ionization type fire detectors within the Cable Spreading Rooms would also be expected to activate ionization detectors provided in the return air ductwork for the affected room. This willalso transmit an alarm to the Control Room, and automatically trip the supply air fan(s) for the room. Should an alarm signal be initiated via activation of a thermal type fire detector, the fire brigade willbe dispatched immediately. However, since a fire in these rooms would be anticipated to be a slowly developing fire, activation of a thermal detector prior to an ionization type detector is unlikely. In the event that the fire undergoes significant growth, and based on the most credible scenario, the fire originates outside of the Thermo-Lag enclosures, the installed automatic suppression system would actuate to suppress or control the fire until the fire brigade's arrival. Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are readily accessible outside the affected room for fire brigade use. Additionally, as part of this ESR, applicable fire pre-plan procedures (Ref. 5.17, 5.18) were revised to direct fire brigade members to watch for indications of charring or other visible fire-induced degradation of the Thermo-Lag enclosures within the rooms.

Therefore, should visible degradation of a Thermo-Lag enclosure be detected, the fire brigade training requires that hose streams be directed at the enclosures to cool them. The extent of damage within, and beyond, the affected room willbe limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke and products of combustion by switching the applicable ventilation system to purge mode. A fire of insufficient heat release to activate the suppression system would not compromise the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures prior to extinguishment, based on the severe conditions under which the barriers have been tested.

In summary, the Thermo-

Cl

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 39 of54 CP&L10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Lag fire barrier enclosures are capable of maintaining adequate physical separation for redundant trains of safe shutdown cabling based on the following:

o Cable trays containing safe shutdown cables are not in actual contact with vertical barrier surfaces. As demonstrated by analysis (Ref. 5.10), without a direct conductive path, acceptable temperatures willbe maintained on surfaces of cable trays containing safe shutdown cables for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration.

o The barriers were not breached during conduct of the fire endurance tests.

This assures that cables required for safe shutdown located on the unexposed sides of the enclosures will not be subjected to the effects of a fire originating on exposed sides of barrier enclosures.

Therefore, based on the fire prevention program in place, the nature of the hazards in the areas and the fire protection defense in depth features provided, it is concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures within CSRA and CSRB are adequate to ensure the ability to achieve and maintain fire safe shutdown is not adversely impacted.

Auxilia Control Panel ACP Room Fire Protection Features Physical separation of redundant electrical Safe Shutdown Trains A and B within the ACP Room is achieved by a Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosure. A concrete wall and a normally closed "A"rated double door assembly provide physical separation for the ACP Room from adjacent Switchgear Room B. However, through wall openings for cable trays, are located above the door assembly and in other locations in the wall, which result in the ACP being partially exposed to the adjacent switchgear room. Collectively, these rooms constitute Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB. Automatic fire detection system capability via ionization type fire detectors is provided throughout Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB, including the ACP Room and the Thermo-Lag enclosure within the ACP Room. Although fire detection capability was not previously provided within the Thermo-Lag enclosure located in the ACP Room, ESR 97-00563 (Ref. 5.21) was issued

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 40 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation which determined that ionization type detection was needed in the enclosure and ESR 97-00562 (Ref. 5.20) was issued to add ionization type fire detection inside this enclosure.

Additionally, manual pull stations are provided at egress routes and other key locations in the area, for fire alarm system activation.

Fixed fire suppression system equipment provided for the ACP Room is located in Fire Area 1-A-CSRB and consists of Hose Station 286-C-39, which is supplied by a dedicated Class ll standpipe system, designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 14 (Ref. 4.6). Waterflow through the riser supplying the hose station activates an alarm at local fire detection panel LFDCP4 which is also annunciated at the MFDIC and in the Control Room. The hose station is equipped with 100 ft of 1-1/2 in. diameter fire hose, that can easily reach all portions of the ACP Room and the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosure within the room. Should this hose station be out of service, coverage can readily be provided by Hose Station 286-E-38, located in adjacent Fire Area 1-A-5-HVB.

Portable CO, fire extinguishers are provided inside and immediately outside of the ACP Room. Automatic sprinkler system coverage is not provided to preclude spurious actuation of such a system from damaging the ACP. Water that may accumulate during manual fire fighting operations can migrate to adjacent areas equipped with floor drains.

The ventilation system for Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB normally operates in a part recirculation mode. Under accident conditions the position of damper assemblies changes such that the system can operate in the full recirculation mode (Ref.

5.16). ionization type smoke detectors are provided in the return air ductwork for the Switchgear and ACP Rooms. These detectors willsense incipient-stage products of combustion, actuate an alarm in the Control Room and automatically shut down the supply fans, thereby preventing circulation of smoke (Ref. 5.15, 5.16). The ventilation system can also be switched to once-through (purge) operation to prevent propagation of smoke via the ductwork to unaffected areas.

The change from normal ventilation to smoke purge is manually initiated by the control room operator (Ref. 5.16). Therefore, smoke, heat and products of combustion can be effectively removed from all areas, except the Thermo-Lag enclosure within the ACP Room, which is non-ventilated.

Analysis of Hazards or ACP Room

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 41 of54 CPAL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Switchgear Room B contains 6.9 kV and 480V emergency switchgear, DC panels, Transfer Panel B, exhaust fans, battery chargers, and associated wiring in conduit and cable trays. In-situ combustibles located in Switchgear Room B include normally expected amounts of cable insulation associated with cabling routed in trays, and limited amounts of cable insulation within enclosed electrical equipment. Therefore, the hazards in the Switchgear Room consist of energized electrical equipment and exposed IEEE 383 qualified cabling. The ACP Room is physically located approximately 25 ft from the nearest 480V switchgear enclosure, around a 90'orner formed by the stairwell enclosure in the Switchgear Room. Therefore, although unsealed wall openings are present, the ACP Room is physically separated from direct exposure to energized switchgear hazards. The ACP Room contains the AuxiliaryControl Panel and the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosure. On this basis, in-situ combustibles and hazards in the ACP Room are limited to normally expected amounts of IEEE 383 qualified cabling routed in trays, limited amounts of cable insulation within the ACP and the Thermo-Lag materials forming the fire barrier enclosure. Transient materials are limited and controlled in Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB by administrative control procedures (Ref. 5.13).

The combustible loading in Switchgear Room B is considered moderate, when the heat of combustion values of combustibles within the room are viewed in relation to the floor area, which is in excess of 5,000 sq. ft. However, the combustible loading in the ACP Room is considered high when the heat of combustion values for exposed in-situ combustibles in the room are distributed over the small floor area of the room (approximately 300 sq. ft). However, this approach for assessing the hazards in the ACP Room is misleading in that the methodology assumes that an equal area under the standard time-temperature fire exposure curve equates to equivalent fire performance, and that the combustible load is the only important factor in determining the intensity of a postulated fire. A more realistic and accurate assessment of the hazards is obtained by considering the potential heat release rate for combustibles in the room, in lieu of the total heat of combustion. This approach is also conservative because an actual fire involving IEEE 383 cabling would be slow to develop.

As with CSRA and CSRB, most cables within the ACP Room are for low voltage power, control and instrumentation applications. The potential for self-ignition of these cables is considered minimal due to their relatively low,voltage levels, and

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision I Attachment D Page 42 of54 CP8cL 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENTI 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation that they are primarily used for intermittent duty (i.e., not continuously energized). However, as part of this ESR, a review was performed to determine ifcircuits associated with the ACP panel could serve as a credible ignition source for a postulated fire. This review evaluated 126 cables associated with operation of the ACP panel. The results of the review were that the cables were either 1) protected by fuses or breakers, 2) associated with circuits that did not contain devices (i.e., amplifiers or power supplies) that could potentially fault and cause high energy arcing, sparking or overheating, 3) were associated with low level instrumentation circuits, or 4) were associated with annunciator circuits that are not normally energized.

The IPEEE performed for SHNPP (Ref. 5.8) calculated the overall core damage frequency from fires originating in the Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB to be 4.0E-6 per year. The lPEEE also states, "Significant fire ignition sources for this area include electrical cabinets, transformers, and battery chargers." Fires originating in electrical cabinets were evaluated as part of the lPEEE, and it was determined that the AuxiliaryControl Panel was not a contributor to the loss of B division of power.

Finally, procedures are established to administratively control potential ignition sources (e.g., hot work permits), housekeeping and temporary storage, and transient combustibles (Ref. 5.12 through 5.14), and there are no radioactive sources in this fire area.

Postulated Fire Scenarios in the ACP Room Based on the hazards in these areas, the most credible scenario involves a cable tray fire on one side of the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosure in the room.

Consistent with the approach used to assess fire scenarios in CSRA and CSRB, Calculation FP-0109 (Ref. 5.11) derived conservative peak temperatures resulting from a cable tray fire in the ACP Room, that can be compared to the standard ASTM E119 temperature exposure profile used during fire endurance tests ofthe Thermo-Lag barriers. The same assumptions and inputs as used for the postulated fire scenario in CSRA and CSRB apply to the ACP Room calculation.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 43 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation The results of the calculation demonstrated that approximate potential temperatures reached during a postulated fire in the ACP Room would be significantly lower than the ASTM E119 exposure temperatures used for fire endurance tests ofthe Thermo-Lag barriers. Additionally, the results of the calculation correlate with the data obtained by the FMRC/EPRI testing (Ref.

4.11), which demonstrated that the peak temperatures developed in the flame region immediately above the surface of a burning cable tray array were in the vicinityof 1500'F. Therefore, based on the very conservative postulated fire scenario used in the calculation, the installed Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosure would be expected to provide a level of protection beyond the 108 minute duration of fullyrated performance capability demonstrated during the vertical "wall"test (Ref. 2.3). Additionally, based on the peak room temperatures determined by the calculation, a fire of sufficient intensity to challenge the load bearing capability of structural steel members supporting the Thermo-Lag enclosure in the ACP Room is not credible. Moreover, water discharge from hose streams would prevent development of temperatures required to challenge the integrity of the steel support members.

In performing Calculation FP-0109, the temperatures resulting from a fire in the Thermo-Lag enclosure in the ACP were not determined. This enclosure is relatively small in comparison to the CSRA "tunnel" enclosure and unlike the "tunnel" enclosure, has no forced ventilation or other unsealed openings.

Therefore, a postulated fire within the Thermo-Lag enclosure in the ACP Room would not have sufficient oxygen to develop into a flaming fire, which could produce temperatures anywhere near those of the standard ASTM E119 exposure used for conduct of the Thermo-Lag barrier fire tests.

Additionally, the results of Calculation FP-0110 (Ref. 5.10) are applicable for assessment of the ability of the barrier in the ACP Room to maintain acceptable temperatures on raceways located on the unexposed side. The analysis determined that the resulting average temperature increase on the side rail surface of the "target'able tray would be 106'F. This calculated increase in average temperature is less than the 250'F limitfor average temperature increase on the surfaces of protected raceways as specified by Supplement 1 to GL 86-10 (Ref.1.4). Therefore, although the average temperature increase on the unexposed side of the tested barrier exceeded 250'F at approximately 108 minutes, this evaluation demonstrates that the performance of the barrier was

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 44 of 54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation sufficient to have maintained acceptable temperatures on adjacent raceway surfaces for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration.

Fire Event in the ACP Room In the event of a fire in Switchgear Room B or the ACP Room, activation of one or more of the ionization detectors installed throughout the fire area willoccur and provide early warning to the Control Room. An operator willthen be dispatched to the appropriate room to investigate the nature of the alarm. Should the operator detect evidence of a fire condition (i.e., flame, smoke or other products of combustion), the Control Room willbe notified to dispatch the site fire brigade. A fire releasing sufficient products of combustion to activate one or more ionization type fire detectors within Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB, would also be expected to activate ionization fire detectors provided in the return air ductwork for the area. This willalso transmit an alarm to the Control Room, and automatically trip the supply air fan(s) for the area. A fire in Switchgear Room B or the ACP Room would be anticipated to be a slowly developing fire. However, in the event that the fire undergoes significant growth, the installed Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosure willbe capable of maintaining adequate physical separation for redundant trains of safe shutdown cabling until the fire brigade's arrival. This is based on the severe conditions under which the barriers were tested, in which the barriers were capable of providing fully rated performance in accordance with ASTM E119 for a duration of 108 minutes (1.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />). Additionally, Calculation FP-0109 (Ref. 5.11) conservatively demonstrated that peak temperatures resulting from a cable tray fire in the ACP Room willbe significantly less than those experienced during the fire tests. Upon arrival of the fire brigade, portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are readily accessible for use throughout the area. Additionally, as part of this ESR, the applicable fire pre-plan procedure for this fire area (Ref. 5.19) was revised to direct fire brigade members to watch for indications of charring or other visible fire-induced degradation of the Thermo-Lag enclosure within the ACP Room. Therefore, should visible degradation of the Thermo-Lag enclosure be detected, the fire brigade training requires that hose streams be directed at the enclosure to cool it. For the most credible scenario of a fire originating outside of the Thermo-Lag enclosure, the extent of damage within, and beyond the affected room willbe limited by controlled removal of heat, smoke and products of combustion by switching the ventilation system to purge mode. In summary, the Thermo-Lag barrier enclosure in the ACP Room is

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 45 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation capable of maintaining adequate physical separation for redundant trains of safe shutdown cabling based on the following:

Cable trays containing safe shutdown cables are not in actual contact with vertical barrier surfaces. As demonstrated by analysis (Ref. 5.10), without a direct conductive path, acceptable temperatures willbe maintained on surfaces of cable trays containing safe shutdown cables for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration.

o The barriers were not breached during conduct of the fire endurance tests.

This assures that cables required for safe shutdown located on the unexposed sides of the enclosures willnot be subjected to the effects of a fire originating on exposed sides of barrier enclosures.

Therefore, based on implementation of ESR 97-00562 to install ionization type fire detection capability inside the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosure within the ACP Room, the fire prevention program in place, the nature of the hazards in the areas and the fire protection defense in depth features provided, it is concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosure within the ACP Room is adequate to ensure the ability to achieve and maintain fire safe shutdown is not adversely impacted.

CONCLUSION The protection provided by the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures within the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms willensure the plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions under postulated fire scenarios.

The FSAR shall be changed to revise the rating of the barriers from a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier to one which is adequate for the hazard.

The existing Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures installed in the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms do not explicitly meet the current functional and licensing basis requirements.

However, based on fire endurance test results, as supplemented by evaluation and/or analysis performed by qualified fire protection engineers as described (or summarized) herein, the installed Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures are adequate to ensure the plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions under postulated fire scenarios.

Moreover, the

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 46 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation previously described enhancements to the fire detection system capability in CSRB and the ACP Room, field verification of overall fire suppression and detection system coverage adequacy and upgrade modifications to penetrations in the Thermo-Lag barrier enclosures (performed via ESRs 97-00562, 97-00563 and 95-00715 respectively), provide further assurance that adequate levels of fire protection are provided. Based on completion of these ESR activities, the fire prevention program in place, the nature of the hazards in the areas and the fire protection defense in depth features provided, it is concluded that the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures within the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms are adequate to ensure the plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions under postulated fire scenarios. Therefore, an adequate technical basis exists for modifying the current licensing basis requirement for the subject Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures.

Specifically, explicit reference to these barrier enclosures as being capable of providing a three (3) hour fire endurance rating in accordance with ASTM E119 / NFPA 251, should be modified to state that the barriers are capable of providing an adequate level of protection that is commensurate with the hazards in the respective areas.

The protection provided by the Thermo-Lag fire barrier enclosures within the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms willensure the plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions under postulated fire scenarios.

The FSAR shall be changed to revise the rating of the barriers from a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier to one which is adequate for the hazard.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 47 of54 CP&L 10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation SRIOGE (S'W HIGH)

N STAIRWELL 1-A-GGR-5 TUNNEL 1-A-5WGR-5 ROOM CASLE VAULT 1-A-CGR-A C

42 SEE FIGIIRE 2 FOR SECTION VIEWS TUNNEL ROOM FIGURE 1

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 48 of54 CP&L10CFR50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation 451 THERMO.~

5ARRIER THERMO-LAG 5ARRIER THERMO.lAG 5ARRIER fIN. FL EL256'IN F SECT1ON A - A SECllON 5-5 THERMO TAG 5ARRIER~

THERMO~

5ARRIER EL RXF EL 295'HERMO LAG 5ARRIER FIN. FL EL256'IN. FL EL256'IN. FL EL 256'ECllON C - C SECTlON D - D SECllON E - E

ESR. ']5-OO42O REIIStod ATTAc,HrhE:QT t0 VASE +U r-"IF ~'~

~7.

Attachment 1

Sheet 14 of 37 Page l of CPEL 10 CFR 50.59 Guideline A%IACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 5 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Unreviewed Safety Question Determination Form

1. May The Probability Of Occurrence Of An Accident Previously Evaluated In The SAR Be Increased2

[ ]YES +NO Basis:

EE P

C,F

~"SCF

2. May The Consequences Of An Accident Previously Evaluated In The SAR Be Increased7

[]YES +NO Basis:

SEE P

E 5:~

F S

3. May The Possibility Of An Accident Of A Different Type Than Any Previously Evaluated In The SAR Be Createdf

[]YES +NO Basis:

SATE PAC E 5 )

C)F Sq

4. May The Probability Of Occurrence Of A Malfunction Of Equipment Important To Safety Previously Evaluated ln The SAR Be Increased2

[ ]YES 00NO Basis:

'5 EC.

PAGE 5 9 OP' 4.

AP-011 Rev.

12 Page 26 of 56

EsR 95-oo42o REGIS Iod ATT'ACAQEAT b PA6E so oF 5+

safety Evaluation serial:

7-Attachment 1

Sheet 15 of 37 CP&L 10 CPR 50.59 Guideline ATlACHMENT 1 Page 3 of 5 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Unreviewed Safety Question Determination Form Page 2. of "

5.

May The Consequences Of A Malfunction Of Equipment Important To Safety Previously Evaluated In The SAR Be Increased?

[ ] YES Q NO Basis:

SEE PA E 5+ oI=

5+

6.

May The Possibility Of A Malfunction Of Equipment Important To Safety Of A Differen Type Than Any Previously Evaluated In The SAR Be Created?

[ ] YES Pg NO Basis:

6EB P

E. b'I oF 58 7.

Is The Margin Of Safety As Defined In The Bases Of Any Technical Specification Reduced?

Note: The basis may be discussed in the SAR.

[]YES PANO Basis:

SE:E P

E 54 c)F AP-011 Rev.

12 Page 27 of 56

Safety Evaluation Serial ESg, 'I5. oobZo P,avis)oA 1

ATrWC.H+saT n PAce s) oF s+

a2

~~5~

Attachment 1

Sheet 16 of 37 CPEL 10 CFR 50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 Page 4 of 5 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Unreviewed Safety Question Determination Form Page ~ of (

[]YES* NNO

• IfYES, PNSC review is required.

lfthe answer to any of the questions in this evaluation is yes, then a potential Unreviewed Safety Question exists for the activity as proposed.

Mark question 8 yes and sign this form.

8.

IS THERE A POTENTIAL USQ INVOLVED?

REFERENCES:

('o..l.l.

SEcT) og I 4 D)X,

9. 5A P

C ll orb(

b)T Al 7

KA('-65 Other QSR:

/ J..Q~Qs Other QSR:E 2

C

/

2ND QSR:

G;H

~

/

a s~s/

REVIEWERS:

Discipline Print Name Sl nature 1st QSR: 'E(.F-c X.c

/BARRY L. Lu.A Date:

~S

"/07 Date: ~8iE'1 v ate: ~P Date: ~Bi."'7 NOTE: If all of the questions are answered "No,,the first reviewer shall complete a

10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Transmittal (Attachment 3 of this procedure) and transmit a

copy of the completed Unreviewed Safety Question Determination to the Nuclear Assessment Section (per TS 6.5.3.9) and to Licensing/Regulatory Programs.

Attach additional sheet for other QSRs if needed.

AP-011 Rev.

12 Page 28 of 56

ESR. 95-oobZ.o 5aM lsiod 1

ATTwc.HNGQT D PA,C,C SZoF s+

~!.!.5!

Attachment 1

Sheet 17 of 37 CP&L 10 CFR 50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 Page 5 of 5 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation PNSC Unreviewed Safety Question Determination Form Page 4k of t-"

ActivityIdentification DETERMINATION:

Rev.

BASIS:

ACTION TAKE PNSC Chairman:

Date:

AP-011 Rev.

12 Page 29 of 56

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 53 of 54 CP&L 10 CFR 50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Pc.g ~

S The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.

This activity evaluates the Thermo-Lag fire barriers in the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms to ensure that these barriers willprovide adequate separation of redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire in accordance with the Fire Protection Program as described in FSAR Section 9.5. This ESR evaluates the fire resistance of the Thermo-Lag enclosures to establish that the change from a fullyrated 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier to one suitable for the hazards is acceptable.

Since this change is limited to the Thermo-Lag barrier fire rating and does not involve any changes, additions or deletions of field installed components, equipment or combustibles, this change does not impact the probability of occurrence of a fire previously evaluated. However, the probability of breaching this barrier and affecting two redundant trains of safe shutdown cables must be reviewed due to the change in the barrier rating. This evaluation demonstrates that, even though portions of the Thermo-Lag barriers are not capable of achieving a fullthree hour rating in accordance with ASTM E-119 / NFPA 251, the Thermo-Lag barriers are capable of providing an adequate level of protection to ensure that, in the event of a fire on one side, redundant safe shutdown cables located on the unexposed side of the barriers will remain free of fire damage.

Therefore, the probability of a fire breaching the Thermo-Lag barriers has not increased.

The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.

The FSAR has evaluated the potential for loss of redundant safe shutdown systems due to fire. The ESR evaluation demonstrates that when taking into consideration the actual and anticipated (future) fire hazards in the area of these enclosures, the differences between the installed versus tested configurations and the defense-in-depth features provided, the performance capability of the barriers is sufficient to prevent the loss of redundant safe shutdown components.

This is, therefore consistent with the scenario currently evaluated by the FSAR.

This ESR does not create the possibility of a different type of accident than previously evaluated in the FSAR. The Thermo-Lag enclosures are still fire barriers so there is no change in the type of accident being evaluated.

This ESR demonstrates that these fire barriers in the Cable Spreading and ACP Rooms can perform their intended function as indicated in the FSAR.

Safety Evaluation Serial: 97-255 ESR 95-00620 Revision 1

Attachment D Page 54 of 54 CP&L 10 CFR 50.59 Guideline ATTACHMENT1 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation p<4) (~

Q Cf The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.

This ESR evaluation demonstrates that the installed barriers are capable of providing an adequate level of protection to ensure that, in the event of a fire on one side, redundant safe shutdown cables located on the unexposed side of the barriers willremain free of fire damage.

Therefore, the probability of malfunction of the barriers as previously evaluated in the FSAR has not increased.

The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been increased. This ESR evaluation demonstrates that when taking into consideration the actual and anticipated (future) hazards in the area of these enclosures, the differences between the installed versus tested configurations and the defense-in-depth features provided, the performance capability of the barriers is sufficient to prevent the loss of redundant safe shutdown equipment or increase the consequences of an evaluated malfunction.

This ESR does not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type that any previously evaluated in the FSAR. The Thermo-Lag enclosures are still fire barriers so there is no change in the type of malfunction. This evaluation considers the potential for thermal and non-thermal damage of fire including products of combustion and smoke.

The evaluation demonstrates that the installed barriers are capable of providing an adequate level of protection to ensure that in the event of a fire on one side, redundant safe shutdown cables located on the unexposed side of the barriers willremain free of fire damage.

Therefore, the possibility of barrier malfunction of a different type to that previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created.

The margin of safety as defined in the bases of any Technical Specification is not reduced.

The ESR evaluation demonstrates that the installed configurations, portions ofwhich are not capable of achieving a full three hour rating in accordance with ASTM E 119/NFPA 251, are none the less capable of providing an adequate level of protection to ensure that in the event of a fire on one side, redundant safe shutdown cables located on the unexposed side of the barriers will remain free of fire damage.

Therefore, the margin of safety for these barriers has not been reduced.

7lpl00)pg LICENSEE ACTIONS NEEDED ON CATEGORY I AUXILIARYRESERVOIR DAM ENCLOSURE 1 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400 Based on the audit'onducted on January 24, 1995, the following actions should be taken by Carolina Power and Light Company, if not already addressed and corrected, to ensure the continued safety of the Auxiliary Reservoir Dam consistent with the Fedeial Guidelines for Dam Safety (1979) and the Dam Safety Program Act defined in the Water Resources Act of 1996.

A written response is requested within 180 days of the date of this letter to provide information on the current status of these items and to describe the schedule for any future actions, except as noted.

1.

During the audit it was noted that vegetation has been allowed to establish itself on the crest roadway and in the riprap.

All vegetation should be removed from these areas and the areas should be maintained free of the vegetation to preclude root entry into the impervious core which, after the end of life of the individual plant, will leave entry paths of precipitation, etc. into the core.

Subsequent freeze-thaw cycles can then began to degrade the as-built integrity of the impervious core.

This process repeated numerous times over the years can lead to an increasing depth of the degradation of the core as a progressive attack.

The vegetal growth may also attract certain animals that will burrow into the dam elements'.

Such animal activity can also lead to degrading conditions at a dam.

In addition, vegetal growth on the dam surfaces can mask subtle changes that may be occurring in the geometry of the dam surfaces and prevent adequate visual inspections and evaluations from being conducted.

2.

The audit revealed that trees and brush have become established along the downstream abutment groin and along the toe of the dam that is not permanently submerged in the Main Reservoir.

Additionally, the erosion process along the abutment groin has initiated, with some erosion channels up to 16 to 18 inches or more in depth, and the process continues to be active.

The erosion process along a portion of the toe of the dam has been made more pronounced because the natural ground slopes toward the toe of the dam.

This results in surface runoff being channeled toward the toe which in several areas has resulted in erosion of materials from under the riprap at the toe.

Areas were observed where the riprap appears to have settled as the underlying materials were eroded.

These areas should be cleared of trees and brush, and regrading should be accomplished so that surface runoff is not directed toward the toe.

It is suggested that a toe ditch be installed to adequately direct the runoff away from the toe of the dam.

All areas, of regrading and those existing without adequate cover should be protected to prevent erosion.

3.

During the audit it was noted that there was an area of spalled concrete on the right (west) spillway wall at the construction joint above the spillway crest.

It also appeared that the area was part of a larger area that had been repaired previously.

,This spalled concrete should be repaired.

Protection of the newly repaired area as well as the old repair area with a high quality concrete sealer/waterproofing may help in stabilizing the repaired area by retarding water entry into the concrete, thus reducing the weathering effects on the repair area.

4.

A review of the periodic data collected and analyzed -by Carolina Power and Light Company personnel indicated that piezometer ADP-21A is included in the monitored instrumentation as defined in Engineering Periodic Test, EPT-811, "SHNPP Dam/Dike/Retaining Wall Monitoring Procedure,"

dated 7/22/91, with Rev.

2, 1/22/93.

The as-built drawings do not reflect the existence of ADP-21A.

The as-built drawings should be revised to accurately update.the actual installation and should include information on the piezometer location,

diameter, depth, depth to seal and the depth range of the slotted pipe section.

5.

Records that were reviewed during the audit included data from the piezometers and survey monument movements that had been put into graphical form. It was noted that data plots were made for each year reflecting the quarterly<<data.

In order to clearly reflect" the historical data and to identify trends or anomalies, at least 4 or 5 years of data should be included on the plots and the scaling should be such as to readily highlight the changes.

It is also suggested that the vertical movement/settlement of the survey monuments be plotted separately from the horizontal mov'ement/deflection of the survey monuments and that an amplified scaling of the values be used.

The data should be reflected on the plots at the same frequency the data are recorded from the field and not held until several new sets of data are available.

Consider incorporating these suggestions into the existing procedures.

C ly Ewccosua~

2

NATDAM INVENTORY OF DAMS INVENTORY DATA SHEARON HARRIS AUXXLIARYDAM NC-WAKE COUNTY PAGE 1/3 5/15/97 DAM INFORMATION NATIONAL INVENTORY FIELDS DAM NAME~ ~ ~

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SHEARON HARRIS AUXILIARYDAM 2

OTHER DAM NAMES.......

CAT I EMERGENCY COOLING WATER 3 ~

4 5.

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10 11 12.

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LATITUDE DEG...

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LATITUDE SEC'.-.'....

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LONGITUDE DEG..-...

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LONGITUDE MIN.......

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LONGITUDE SEC....

SECTION,TOWNSHXP,RANGE.....

COUNTYo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

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RIVER OR.STREAM..

NEAREST CITY-TOWN..........

DISTANCE CITY-TOWN(NILE)........

NRCNC2 NC83102 35 37 44 78 5S 13

, WAKE TOM JACK CARY 12 16.

17.

18.

19.

20-21 22 23-24 25.

26 27.

28 29.

30 i::

34.'WNER NAME...

OWNER TYPE...

NONFED DAM ON FED PROP.

DAM TYPE...

PURPOSE

~

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~ ~ ~

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YEAR COMPLETED......-...

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DAM LENGTH

( FT )

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l)AM HEIGHT

( FT ) ~ ~

~ ~

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STRUCTURAL HEIGHT (FT) ~

HYDRAULIC HEIGHT

( FT )

~

MAXIMUM DISCHARGE (CU FT MAXIMUM STORAGE (ACRE FT NORMAL STORAGE (ACRE FT)

SURFACE AREA (ACRES) ~

~

DRAINAGE AREA (SQ MILES)

DOWNSTREAM HAZARD.....

EMERGENCY ACTXON PLAN...

PHASE I INSPECTION......

INSPECTION DATE.....

CAROLINA POWER

& Light CO.

NO ER 0-CAT I EMERGENCY COOLING WATER 1979 3900 50 5030 7200 5OOO

'403'.43 LOW NR.

NO' 1/24/95

I' DPM NAME:

SHEARON HARRIS AUXlLXARYDAM COUNTY:

WAKE

~

~

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NATIONAL ID: NC83102 INVENTORY DATA PAGE 2/3 DAM INFORMATION NATIONAL INVENTORY FIELDS 35.

36

37. ~

38.

39.

40.

41

'2

~

43

'4,

~

45.

46,

.47.

48.

49.

SPILLWAY TYPE..--...;......

SPILLWAY WIDTH (FT)........

VOLUME OF DAM (CU YARDS)...

NUMBER OF LOCKS..........

LENGTH OF LOCKS.

~.

~...

~

~

~

~

~

WIDTH OF LOCKS (FT) ~.

FED AGENCY XNV FUNDING.....

FED AGENCY XNV DESIGN......

FED AGENCY XNV CONSTRUCTION FED AGENCY XNV REGULATORY..

FED AGENCY XNV INSPECTION..

.FED AGENCY INV OPERATION...

FED.AGENCY XNV OWNER.......

FED AGENCY XNV OTHER...'...

. FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCY..

UNCONTROLLED 170 0

0 0

NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO USNRC OWNER INFORMATION

. 1.

OWNER NAME.................,

CAROLINA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY 2.

OWNER TYPE..........

~

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ELECTRIC UTILITY 3.

4

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5.

6.

7.

CONTACT NAME...........

CONTACT TITLE..........

CONTACT SALUTATION..

ADDRESS1.............,.

ADDRESS2....................

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P.O.

BOX 165-MAIL CODE:

ZONE 1; NEW HILL, NC 27562-0165 8.9.

10.

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ADDRESS3....

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DAIE lllse ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ o

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PAM NAME:

SHEARON HARRIS AUXILIARYDAM COUNTY:

NC-'WAKE NATIONAL ID: NC83102 INVENTORY DATA PAGE 3/3 I

RES EARCH COMPLEgg (Y/N).

2.

NOTE:

Awaiting additional information from the owner.

INSPECTION INFORMATION 1.

GENERAL CONDITION '

~

~

~ Inspection on 1/24/95 by NRC/FERC noted areas where vegetation must be removed, erosion in the groin and the toe regions from surface flow to be corrected, regrading for improveddrainage to be completed.

The general condition of the dam was very good.

The owner has probably completed another inspection in 1995 by an independent con-DAM NOTE sultant on the five year cycle.

Ewccosuaz 3

33 'IHE NATX)AMFIELD DEFINTTION: FIVE PARTS I

There are forty-aine Gclds included in thc program for thc update of the National Inventory of Dams.

The dcGnition for each Geld consists of Gve parts:

o AjiddinmQer indicating the order in which the data is to appear in thc NATDAMdatabase management Glc.

The fseM lubd, indicating the standard name used for each Geld item.

For example, Latitude Deg.

The fieMtype, including alphanumeric, number, or date.

o The fidd size indicating either a designated size or a variable size with a designated range, which will be supported in the National Inventory of Dams.

Fields transmitted with a Geld size larger than that indicated in the definition, willbe truncated and data lost when the file is added to the national inventory.

o A deaHycins ofAc~ standardizing the infornuition transmitted for individual data items.

As indicated in the previous discussion of the NATDAM Gle stnicture, some Qczibiiity has been provl ovidcd in Geld sizes and in thc date format. In addition, for a fcw Gchis, alternative data entries arc supported. Ifan ahcrnative data entry is provided, it willbc designated withinthc GeM item dcGnition.

The alternative data cntrics willbc convcrtcd to the standard form byPBMAprior to incorporation into thc National Inventory of DamL

3.4 LIST OF FIELD DEHhHTTONS The NATDAMforty-nine Geld dcGnitionsi are as foUows. Thc expression included within parenthesis is used to indicate the type and size of the Geld. For example, the phrase, Dam Name (Alphanumeric, 65 var)'csignatcs an alphanumeric Geld and a variable Geld size, with a designated range of 1 to 65.

FIELD DEFXNIHONS (1)

Dam Name (Alphanumeric, 65 var)

Enter the ofGcial name of thc dam. Do not abbreviate unless thc abbreviation is a part of the of6cial name.

For dams that do not have an oKcial name, usc thc popular name.

(2)

Other Dam Names (Alphanumeric, 65 var)

Enter thc reservoir name, foHowed by (res). Also, ifthcrc are names other than thc ofBcial name of thc dam in common use, enter the names m this space.

Separate the names using a semi~ion: Leave blank ifnot applicable.

(3)

Federal agency ID (Alphanumeri, 15 var)

Enter thc of6ciai agency idcntiGcatic n number for the dam.

'cte. Rdd dehdtke itetne 41-34 ee thtQar ttt tbe fha 3S 5dd itettN hchded h tbe the ICODS Subcomtniaee Meahg November, SN.

aa a tcgtlt of

(4)

Natlooal H) (Alphanumeric, 7)

Enter the oKcial national identification number for the dam.

7h&ir a mildred jkld', and mgsr have os cnoy jar coch dam incJhfcd in AtN¹fona/ hrvensery ofDamt.

The National ID is thc Corps Idcntlflcvtlon No. assigned to each dam that was used on the 1981 National Inventory of Dams.

For those dams that were not included on thc 1981 National Inventory Of dams, an identificatio number willaced to be generated, Each federal agency willbe assigned a range of numbers that may bc used to generate new National ID numbers.

7/zz~rpagp ~/// 4+ ~<<-7> +

Bpenrq 4 c m4 Ha/f e~~

/Arsgd AJ'p~g r/aws

~i'n )AJ

~~fu ~c, The Grst two characters of thc identity willbe the appropriate state two letter abbreviation, based on the location of thc dam. Thc last five (5) characters of thc identity willbe a unique number in the agency's assigned range.

See Fige 3-2, 1981 Nanonal lnventey'of Dams, Cogrs Idtntificution Numbers By Start, for an example listing by state of National ID's used in the 1981 inventory.

Please contact the National Inventory Coordinator for the range of numbers assigned to your agency for the generation of National ID numbers.

In some cases, it is anticipated that federal agencies willbe assigning numbers to dams already added to thc database by another agent.

As such cases arc idcntified, you villbe notified and asked to adjust the National ID number as ncedcd.

(5)

Letitade Deg (Number> 2)

(6)

Latitude Miri (Number, 4 var)

(7)

Latitude See (Number, 2)

Latitude may be entered in onc of two ~ys, The standard Geld entry gives latitude in dcgrces, minutes and seconds.

An alternative Geld entry is provided for thc convenience of those agencies who track latitude in degrccs, minutes and tenths of a minute. If thc alternative form is used, FEMAvol convert it to thc standard form prior to inclusion in the national inventory.

Wtitude Standard Entry: Enter htituc'c in degrees, minutes and seconds, using thc three designated Gelds.

For example, ifthe dam is located at htitudc 38 dcg52 min30 scc.,

enter:

Latitude Dcg: 38 Latitude Mia 52 Latitude Sce: 30 Latitude Alternative En~ Enter thc latitude in degrees mmutes and tenths of a minute by entering. the Ckmrecr value in Latitude Dcg and thc minuter ueif tend+ ofa minute value in Latitude Min. Transmit the Latitude Scc Geld as a blank Geld. For example, ifthe dam is located at Latitude 38 deg525 minenter.

Latitude Dcg: 38 Ltttitudc Min: 525

(8)

Loogltadc Dce (Number, 3)

(9)

Longitude hJn (Number, 4 var)

(10)

Longitude Scc (Number, 2)

Longitude many be catered 'a oae of two ways. Ifthe alternative form is used, FEMAwill convert it to thc standard form prior to inclusion in thk aatioaal iavcatory.

Longitude Standard Entry:

Enter loagitiidc in dkgrecs, minutes and secoads, using thc three designated fields. For example, ifthe dam is located at longitude 82 dcg36 mia0

~ cafcie Longiaidc Dcg. 82 Longitude Mia: 36 Longitude Sec: 0 Longitude Alternative Entry: Enter the longitude in degrees minutes and tenths ofa minute by catering. the dcyees value ia Loagitiidc Dcg and thc nmuircr and tenet oja minute value in Longitude Mia. Triuismit thc Longituilc Scc Geld as a blank Geld. For example, ifthc dam is located at Longitude &2 deg3&0 miaeater.

Longitude Dcg. 82 Longitude Min: 363)

Loagitudk Scc:

(II) Section, Township, Range Location (Alphanumeric, 30 var)

This is an oIeonal Geld. Ifyour agcacy tracks the dam locate by Section, Township, and

Range, please cater the iaformatioa.

Eater the information m any form that is imderstandablc and that dearly dcsigaatcs the iadividual values. For example, g2I, T2N, RNiK Ifthe meridian location is needed to locate the dam within the agency, include it m the Geld. For example, S21, TDN, K68W of thc Sixth Princqol Meridian.

I/1/%1 (12) County {Alphanumeric, 30 var)

Eater the name of the county ia which thc dam is locattAL (l3) River or Stream (Alphanumeric, 30 var)

Thc River or Stream dcsignatioa may be catered in oac of two ways, An alternative Geld entry is provided which is consistent with thc 'tributary aad oKstrcam designatioas used ia thc 1981 National Inventory of Dams. Ifthe alternative form is used, FEMA willconvert it to the standard form prior to iaciusioa ia the national mvcntory.

River or Stream Standard Kntry: Eater thc official name of the river or stream on which.

the dam is builL Ifthc stream is unnamed, identify it as a tributary to a named river, c.g.,

Snakc-?R. Ifthc dam is located offstrcam, enter the name of the river or stream plus -OS, c.g., Snakc-OS.

River or Stream Alternative Entry; Enter thc oQicial aame of the river or stream on which the dam is built. Ifthc stream is unnamed, identify it as a tributary to a named river, c.g.,

TR-Snakc. Ifthe dam is located offstream, enter the name of the river or stream plus the word, OFFSTI~,

c.g., Srurkc OFFS?REAL (14)

Nearest City-Tom (Alphanumeric, 30 var)

Eater the name of thc nearest downstream city, town, or vBiage that is most Bkely to be affected by floods resulting from thc failure of the dam.

{15) Distance Nearest City.Tom (Miles) {Number, 3 var)

Enter thc distance from the dam to the aearest dowastrmn affected City-Town-ViQage, to thc nearest mBc.

(16) ~ Name (Alphanumeric, 50 yap)

Enter the name of the ovmcr of thc dam.

(17) Orner Type (Alphanumeric, 1)

Enter thc codr to indicate the type of owner, F for Federal; S for State; L for LocId Government; U for PabUc UtSty; or P for Fr&ate.

(18)

NoaFed Dam Oa Fed Prep (Alphanumeric, 1)

Enter thc eafc indicating Wether this dam is a non-federal dam located on federal property, Y for Yea; or N for No.

(19)

Dam Type- (Alphanumeric, 6 var)

Enter oae or more of thc folhwing codes to 'mdicate the type of dam, RE for Earth; ER for lhddE; PG for Gnnlty; CB for Battreaa; Vh for hach; MVfor MaltMmh; CN forC~~

MS for Maaoa~

ST for Stooc, TC for Thnber Crtb; and/or OT for Other.

I For cxamplc, thc entry CHCB would indicate a concrete buttress dam type.

(20)

Purposes (Alphanumeric, 8 var)

Enter mc emcee ofabc foRswg coder to indicate the purposes for which thc reservoir is used:

l for Irrigation; H for Hydroelectric; C for Flood Control had Storm Water Management; N for Navigation; S for Water Supply; R for Recreation; P for Fire Protection, Stock, Or Smail Farm Pond; F for Fish had WildlifePond; D for Debrh Control;'I

~I T for Tailings; and/or

'<rp;~

<pe/rrr lrs A 0 for Other.

The order should indicate the relapse dcaeasing inqertartce of the purpose.

For example, SCR would indicate the primary purses, Wate Sup~ aud Hood CotttroMnd Storm Water Manugencnt, foGowed by Rtcreancn.

(21) Year Cotnpleted (Number, 4)

Enter the year when thc original main dam structme was completed.

(22)

Dam Length (Feet)

(Number, 7 var)

Enter, m feet, thc'length of thc dam, which is deGned as:

the length along the top ol'hc dam. This also includes the spBtway, powerplant, navigation lock, Gsh pass, etcwhere these 4/1/st 0

form part of the length of thc dam. Ifdetached &om thc dam these structures should not be included.

Items 23-2$ : Dam Height, HydrauOc Hdght, Structural Height Enter a corresponding value for the I~ Geld(s) that most closely corrcspond to the 'Height of thc Dam definitio used by thc agency. Ifthc agency database contains values for morc than one type of height, cuter thc value for each corresponding height Geld.

Thc height field(s) that do not presently correspond to agency data, may be left bbLnk, This inforau~n should be added as it beer mes avaBable for near dams.

(23)

Dam Height (Feet) (Number, 6 var)

Enter, in feet, thc height of thc dam, which is dcfined as: the vertical distance between the lowest point on thc crest of thc dam and thc lowest point in the original strcambed.

(24) Structural Hdght (Feet)

(Number, 6 var)

Enter, in feet, thc strtueml height of thc dam, which is deGned aL'hc vertical distance from the lowest point of the excavated foundation to thc top of the dam.

(25)

HydranUc Height (Feet)

(Number, 6 var)

Enter, in feet, thc hydrauhc height of the dam, which is defined aL the vertical difference between thc maximum design water level and thc lowest point m the orilpnal strcambecL (26) Maxima>a DIsclmrge (Cn Ft/Sec) (Number, 7 var)

Enter the number of cubic feet per second (cu f't/scc) which the spBtway is capable of discharging when the reservoir is at its maximum desi'ater sttrhce elevation.

(27) Maximum Storage {hen-Feet) (Number, 10 var)

Enter, in acre-feet, the maximum storage, which is dcGncd as:

thc total stot'sgc space in a rcscrvoir below the maximum attainablc vrater surface elevation, mcluding any surcharge storage.

(28) Normal Storage {here-Feet)

(Number, 10 var)

Enter, in acre-fcct, thc normal storage, which is dcGned as:

thc total storage space in a reservoir beloved thc normal retention level, including dead and inactive storage and excluding any flood control or surcharge storage.

(29)

Surface brea {haes)

(Number, var)

Enter, in acres, the surface area of the impoundment af its normal retention leveL (30)

Drainage brea {Squaw Mlles) (Number, 10 var)

Ent 'les, the drainage area of the dam, which is dcGncd aL the area that drains to a particular point (in this case, thc dam) on a river or stream.

(31)

Downstream Haxard (Alphanumeric, 1)

Enter the axfc to indicate thc potential hazard to thc downstream area rcgdtingfrom failure or mi~peratioa of the dam or faciIi6es, L for Lour, S for SignR t, or 8 for Kih.

&) 'rgtmcy~on Phn (Y/N/NR) (Alphanumeric, 2)

Enter the cad4 indicating whether this dam has an Emergency Acnon plan~) which is de6ned as:

a plan of acnon to be taken to reduce the potential for property damage and loss of life in an area affected by a dam failure or hrge Good.

Leave bianit ifunimown.

Enter the code:

Y for Yes; N for No; or NR for Not ReptlraL Enter thc code NR ifan EAP is not required for this dam under the agency raptirements.

(33)

Phase I Inspection (Y/N) (Alphanumeric, 1)

Enter thc uxk indicating whether this dam was inspected in thc Phase IInspection Program, National Program of Inspection of Non-Federal Dams g L.92-367).

Leave blank if unknown. Enter the code Y for Yes; N for No.

(34% Last Inspection gate (D~ 11 var)

Enter the date when thc most recent mspcctice ofthe dam was performeL Enter the date, in one of thc following formats:

o In the fmn MUNP. The month abbreviations sup~ected by thc I'Kdh database are:

~'AN,FBI, MAR,APR, MAY,JUN, JUL, AUG, SEP, OC!', NOV, DEC.

o mm/dd/yy (06/31/87);

o mm/dd/yyyy (06/31/1987); and

yyyynundd {19870631), the form used by Db~ ~ @~

Ifonly the iaqmtim~ is known, indicate the inspection date as the Grst day of the year.

For cxamplc, inspections performed during the year 198S would bc entered m the form 01JANSS.

Ifonly the inspccncn th month and year arc known, indicate thc inspection date as the Grst day of the month. For exampu-mspcctions con lc, 'cctions conducted in March, 1988 would bc entered in thc form 01MAIMS.

(35)

SpOtway Type (Alphanumeric, 1 var'.

Enter the one letter code that describe the type of spillway; C for Controlled U for Uncontrolled N for None (36)

SpGbray Width (Feet)

(Numeric, 4 var)

Enter the width of the spiltway, to thc nearest foot, avaBable for discharge when the reservoir ts at its maximum dcsigncd water surface elevabon.

(37) Volume Of Dam {Cubic Yards) (Numeric'2 var)

Enter thc total number of cubic yards occupied by the materials used in thc dam structure.

Include portions of powerhouse, locks and spiltways, only ifthey are an integral part of the dam and required for structural stability.

(38) Number CXLodcs {Numeric, 1)

Enter the number of existing navigation locks for the project. Maximum of 4.

I 4/1/st e 22 0

P9)

Length of Locks (Feet)

(Numeric, 4)

Enter to thc acarest foot the length of the primary navigation lock.

(40) Width ot Locks (Fcct',

(Numeric, 3)

Enter to the nearest foot thc width of the primary navigation lock Items 41~ Federal Agency Involvemeat Fields Eight Geids, ¹41&48 are provided to indicate federal agency iavolvement in a dam. ht least~

In Gelds ¹41 - ¹48, iadicate agency iavolvcment with rcspcct to a dam, by entering thc code:

Y for Ycs; or N for No.

(41)

Fed hgeacy lnv Funding (Y/N) (Alphanumeric, 1)

(42)

Fed Agency Inv Deslga (Y/N) (Alphanumeric, 1)

(43)

Fed Agency Inv Construction (Y/N) (Alphanumeric, 1)

(44) FUI Agency Iav Regulator (Y/N) (Alphanumeric, 1)

(45)

Fed hgeacy lar Inspec5oa (Y/N) (Alphanumeric, 1)

(46)

Fed hge33cy lav Operation (Y/N) (Alphaamncric, I)

(47)

Fed Alycncy Inv Orner'Y/N) (Alphaaumeric, 1)

(48)

Fed Qlency Inv Other (Y/N) (Alphanumeric, 1)

S

(49)

Federal Agency Code (Alphanumeric, 9)

Eater the Federal Agency Code for each dam. Thh ls a required 5eld,'>and mnat have an entry for each data included la!be National lnven~ of De!as,

0

ENcLosURE 4

.I

OPERATION INSPECTION REPORT for THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection by THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION Atlanta Regional Office Date of inspection Januar 24 1995 Dam (name)

Auxiliar Reservoir Dam Location Harris Nuclear Station Wake (Facility)

(County)

NRC Licensed Project Shearon Harris Nuclear Station North Carolina (State)

Licensee Carolina Power and Li ht Com an CP&L Features of the Dam and Impoundment Inspected Embankment S illwa and Reservoir Inspected by Robert L. Br ant Accompanied by Messrs.

R.

E.

Shewmaker and Raman Pichumani NRC-H Joe Lenahan NRC-RII Bob Marler and Charles Smart CP&L Weather Clear tern eratures in the mid 30s 0-4 C

~aammar Based on a review of project design documents, maintenance and instrumentation

records, discussions with NRC representatives and Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) employees, and observations made during the inspection, no conditions were found that should be considered an immediate threat to the safety and permanence of the project structures.

However, observations made during the field inspection revealed problems relating to undesirable vegetation, erosion and poor downstream drainage.

These conditions could lead to significant long-term safety problems if not corrected in due course of time.

A complete list of recommendations is included in the text of the report.

Submitted gUN 80 1995

)gp>H Robert L. Bryant, P.E.

J

~

~4~<<(>> P

<<~

Pro ect Descri tion The Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Auxiliary Reservoir Dam was constructed to provide an adequate source of emergency cooling water for the plant's reactor.

The site is located on Tom Jack Creek approximately 16 miles (mi) {26 kilometers (km)} southwest of Raleigh, North Carolina.

Effluent from the dam's spillway discharges into the plant's main reservoir which is impounded by the main dam located downstream on Buckhorn Creek.

Buckhorn Creek is a tributary of the Cape =Fear River.

Normal surface water elevation in the auxiliary reservoir is 252 feet (ft) {76.8 meters(m)).

Normal surface water elevation in the main reservoir is approximately 220 ft (67.3 m).

The downstream toe of the Auxiliary dam is submerged in the waters of the main reservoir.

The Auxiliary reservoir was constructed by building a dam across the flood plain of Tom Jack

Creek, creating a

lake of approximately 0.63 square miles (mi ) {1.6 square kilometers (km )) at the base of a

2.43 mi (6.3 km )

watershed (drainage area).

The principal structure consists of a

random rockfill dam

,with an impervious core.

The core is protected on each side by transition filters.

A cutoff trench was excavated into the rock (siltstone) below the core.

A grout curtain was injected into the foundation rock along the centerline of the dam.

The rockfill was obtained from excavation of the spillway channel and local borrow areas and is primarily a clay shale.

This clay shale weathers when exposed to the elements, but remains relatively unaffected when protected.

Upstream and downstream slopes are protected by riprap in the areas potentially affected by wave action and by larger stones areas not. affected by wave action.

from the random rockfill in those A gravel surface road is located

"along the crest of the dam.

The road ends at either side of the

~

~

~

spillway.

There is no bridge across the spillway.

Harris Nuclear Station is operated by CP&L.

Figure 1 is a plan view of the dam and major features.

Figure 2 provides cross section views of the spillway and dam.

TABLE 1 Pertinent Data Reservoir Drainage area 8

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

2 ~ 43 ml

. (6 ~ 3 km

)

Normal water surface elevation................

252.0 ft (76.8 m)

Surface area 9 el..252.0 ft. (76.8 m)........

0.63 mi. (1.6 km )

Volume 9 el. 252.0 ft. (76.8 m)......

5,000 acre-ft (6.17x10 m

)

Maximum storm surcharge...........................

6.0 ft (1.8 m)

Dam Type............................

Random rockfillwith impervious

core, designed for normal and seismic loadings.

Upstream slope..........................................

2.5H:1V Downstream slope.......................................

2.5H:1V Crest elevation...............................

260.0 ft (79.2 m)

Maximum height....................................

50 ft (15.2 m)

Length at crest.................................

3900 ft (1188 m)

Nidth at crest....................................

20 ft (6.1 m)

Slope protection........ Riprap on upstream and downstream slopes Spillway.... Uncontrolled, reinforced concrete over in-situ rock Length.....................................

170 ft (51.8 m) f Crest elevation.............................

252 ft (76.8 m)

Downstream slope....................................

3.33H:1V NATDAMNumber.............................................;..NC 83102 HazardPotential.........

~.......................................

Low NOTE: All elevations are mean sea level.

0

EL.252 AUXILIARY RESERVOIR N

SPILLWAY (CREST EL.252)

EL.252 CREST ROAD (EL.260)

SPILLWAY CHANNEL AUXILIARY DAN EL.220 EL.220~

MAIN RESERVOIR SHEARQN HARRIS AUXILIARY DAM SITE PLAN F IGURE I

EL.252 WINGWALL CREST

~SPILLWAY WALL QNSTRUCTION JOINTS

~ RUCKy APRON

~

EL.197.5.

SPILLVAY CROSS SECTION

+ ROCK g ELZ52 OVERSIZED ROCK FROM RANDOM ROCKFILL RIPRAP ELZ60 OVERSIZED ROCK FROM RANDOM FILL

RIPRAP, BEDDING RANDOH ROCKFILL FILTER IMPERVIOUS CORE FILTERS RANDOM ROCKFILL EL220 CUTOFF TRENCH

~ GROUT CURTAIN

-TYPICAL DAN CROSS SECTION SHEARON HARRIS AUXILIARY DAN AND SPILLVAY CROSS SECTIONS FIGURE 2

A.

Safet of the Pro'ect.

1.

Dams Dikes and A

urtenant Structures.

The inspection team 'walked the crest and downstream toe of the Auxiliary dam, the abutments and accessible areas of the spillway.

No conditions were

~ ~

observed that should be considered an immediate threat to the safety and permanence of the project'tructures.

a.

'Auxiliar Reservoir Dam.

The upstream slope of the Auxiliary dam is protected by riprap (Photographs 1

3).

No indications of movement of the upstream slope such as

sliding, sloughing, or subsidence were observed.

The crest and roadway along the top of the dam appeared to be in good condition, with no indication of cracking, sliding, or subsidence (Photograph 2).

The downstream slope appeared to be in good condition (Photographs 10

& 11).

The slope is protected by riprap at. the lower levels where the slope meets the main reservoir water level (tailwater) and by large stone from the random rockfill on the upper slope.

Some indications of movement and/or subsidence of the riprap were observed near the juncture'f the

.abutments and the toe of the downstream slope (Photographs 8

& 9).

These areas appear to be the result of erosion along the toe of the dam.

The erosion appears to have been caused by poor drainage that channels runoff from the abutment to the toe of the Auxiliary dam (Photographs 8

& 9).

h.

~S illwa.

The spillway is a reinforced concrete nn-controlled overflow type structure located near the right (west) abutment (Photographs 16 21).

Reinforced concrete abutment walls extend into the reservoir and along the downstream slope into the outlet channel.

Overflow passes through the spillway structure, down

w ~

0

~an outlet channel and into the main reservoir.

A buoy supported boat

~

~

~

barrier is located upstream of the spillway wingwalls (Photograph 16).

The spillway, abutment walls, and outlet channel appeared to be stable and in good condition.

c.

Abutments.

The search for possible seepage areas along the intersection of the 'downstream toe and both abutments was adversely affected by standing water due to erosion and poor drainage (Photographs 11 14) and by overgrown vegetation (Photographs 8, 9 12,

& 17) in the areas downstream of the Auxiliary dam toe.

Areas downstream of'he toe along both abutments were found to be

wet, probably from the recent snow melt.

Overgrown vegetation along the toe of the dam and the abutments needs to be removed and both abutments reworked (regraded and protected) to improve drainage.

Once the drainage is improved, eliminating standing surface water, the areas can be inspected for 'indications of seepage.

d.

Reservoir.

Portions of the reservoir shoreline were inspected from the dam and abutments.

No indications of active shoreline erosion or accumulations of floating trash or debris were observed.

2; Instrumentation.

Project instrumentation includes surface monuments and piezometers.

Monuments are. located along the crest of the dam to. monitor horizontal and vertical movement.

Photograph 4,

shows a typical location of a survey reference point and piezometers with protective barriers.

Piezometers are located along the crest of the dam and downstream of the toe.

The piezometers located along the core and foundation.

represent the water levels in the foundation or core, whichever is crest measure-pore pressures at or near the interface of the impervious Readings from these piezometers will likely

r

~

0 t

L

~ higher.

Accurate measurement of the Auxiliary dam embankment (core) phreatic surface will require installation of additional piezometers with screens (or slotted pipe) installed completely in the core and adequately isolated from the foundation.

Monuments. are surveyed and*

the results are recorded quarterly.

An anomalous reading appeared in the monument deflection measurements made in 1985.

Readings indicated higher than normal downstream deflection at monument AM-5.

Subsequent readings have been consistent with previous data and compatible. with readings made for other monuments.

Possible explanations for the anomaly include survey error and/or damaged (disturbed) monument.

CP&L will continue to monitor this monument closely.

Piezometer readings are also made and recorded quarterly.

No other anomalies or changing trends were revealed by field observations or instrumentation data reviews made during the inspection.

3.

Hazard Potential Classification.'ince the Auxiliary dam is located on the headwaters of the main dam reservoir, failure of the Auxiliary dam would result in an increase of.approximately 1.5 ft (0.46 m) in the level of the main reservoir.

The increase is not considered significant enough to,upgrade the hazard classification.

The Auxiliary dam is therefore classified as a "Low" hazard dam.

No conditions weie observed during this inspection that would warrant a

change of classification.

4.

Consultant's Bafet Ins ection Re ort.

Prior to 1990-(1981-1986),

annual consultant's inspections were made by EBASCO.

The first (and most recent) five-year independent consultant's inspection was made by Law Engineering Testing Company on December 18, 1990.

The consultants found the project to be in good condition.

No problems affecting the safety of the project were observed.

The report noted

'he need for removal of vegetation from the riprap, some erosion of the west (right) abutment, some hairline cracks in the, spillway walls and

apron, and two areas of spalled concrete on the spillway walls.'he next five-year independent consultant's inspection is scheduled for.,

1995.

5 ~

Licensee's Ins ection Pro ram.

The following table summarizes'he "licensee's inspection program:

Inspection.

Visual Piezometers Monuments, Operation/Safety Frequency Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly 5-Year Performed By CP&L-HESS CP&L-HESS CP&L-HESS Consultant Last Inspection 01/04/95 01/04/95 12/19/94 12/18/90 HESS Harris Engxneerxng Support Section The inspection schedule appears to be appropriate for the project size and complexity.

B.

0 eration and Maintenance.

The project appeared to be effi-ciently operated and adequately maintained, with the exception of some drainage and erosion problems which will be discussed below.

The

-reservoir level was approximately 252 feet (77.0 m), at the spillway crest.

Tailwater elev'ation (surface elevation of the main-reservoir) was approximately 220 ft (67.3 m).

1.

Dams Dikes and A

urtenant Structures.

The upstream riprap appeared to be, in good condition.

The riprap appeared to be P

relatively free of vegetative growth.

Downstream slopes are protected by riprap= near the waterline (main reservoir) and by large rock (segregated from the random rockfill) on the upper portion of the slope.

There was evidence of some dormant vegetative growth in the riprap near the waterline.

The abutment areas immediately downstream of the dam were heavily overgrown with trees and brush; there were several areas of erosion, and areas of standing water.

The natural ground slopes toward the toe of the dam, channelling runoff toward the toe, and resulting in erosion of materials from under the riprap at the toe.

Several areas were observed where the riprap appears to have settled following erosion of underlying materials.

2.

8 illwa Gates and Standb Power.

The project has no spillway gates.

The spillway is 'an uncontrolled, reinforced concrete structure.

The flow passes over the spillway into an outlet. channel.

The outlet channel directs water into the main reservoir.

The right (west) spillway wall had a small area of spalled concrete at the construction joint above the crest.

This spalled area appeared to be a small portion of a previously repaired area.

3.

Power Plants.

There is no hydro plant at this site.

The pond is used to provide emergency cooling water for the nuclear power plant.

4.

Reservoir.

Areas of the reservoir observed during this inspection appear to be clean and free of debris.

No indications of erosion were observed.

Operation and maintenance of the reservoir appear to be in accordance with good engineering practice.

5.

Records.

Design/construction/as-built drawings and opera-tion records are 'maintained by CP&L at the site.

,Summary design/

construction records are also maintained at the NRC-HQ offices in Washington, D.

C.

6.

Emer enc Action'lan.

Since the auxiliary pond dam is classified as a "Low" hazard

dam, no emergency action plan is required.

C.

Environmental Public Use and Safet No environmental,

r~

Cl

~ public use, or safety problems were noted during the inspection.

The

~

~

dam and reservoir are closed to the public.

The area is fenced and access road gates are locked.

A boat barrier supported by buoys is located upstream of the spillway.(Photograph, 16).

Existing public safety devices appear adequate and are properly maintained.

No 5

additional actions to protect life and property were required as a

result of the inspection.

D.

Pindin s and Followu Actions..

The inspection team observed no conditions that might adversely affect the immediate safety of the project, however several conditions were observed that could lead to safety problems if left uncorrected.

A meeting was held at the r

site on the morning of January 25, 1995 and the following observations and recommendations that FERC will make to NRC were discussed with NRC and CP&L representatives:

0 A review of excerpts from the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 90-18 revealed that the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) for the Auxiliary dam drainage basin was based on outdated information.

The FSAR noted that the PMP was 36.32 inches (in) (92.2 centimeters (cm)) based'n a

36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> storm duration.

A review of the National Weather Service Hydrometeorological Report 52 revealed that the current chart for the all-season PMP for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and a

10 mi (25.9 km )

storm is approximately 41 in (104 cm) for the project site.

o Computerized instrumentation data plots for piezometers should include 4 to 5 years (or more) of historical data and should be scaled to readily identify trends and anomalies.

Separate plots should be provided for monument deflection and settlement data.

Horizontal and vertical (deflection and

n settlement) movement data should be amplified to show trends.'ata should be added to the plots on the same frequency as they are collected.

o The piezometers located in the impervious core portion of the embankment all have tips based at or near the foundation/core interface.

Readings taken from these piezometers will most likely represent the higher of the water levels from the foundation or the core.

If it should become necessary to accurately measure the phreatic surface of the impervious core, additional piezometers should be installed in the core and isolated from the foundation.

0 As-built drawings should be updated to accurately depict the location, depth, depth to seal, and slotted pipe depth range for piezometer 21A.

0 Remove all vegetation from the riprap and crest road.

0 Repair spalled concrete area at right (west) spillway abutment wall construction joint above the spillway crest.

0 The abutments along the toe of the dam should be cleared of trees and brush, graded to drain, and protected from erosion.

A toe ditch should be installed to channel runoff away from the toe of the dam.

Jw

EL.252

.AUXILIARY RESERVOIR 83 ~

SPILLWAY (CREST EL.252) 20~

CREST ROAD (EL 260)

EL.252 SPILLWAY CHANNEL 13 ~12 ~11 AUXILIARY DAM EL.220 4

6 22 EL,220~

~F5~8 9 MAIN RESERVOIR Sl-lEARON HARRIS AUXILIARY DAM Pl-lOTOGRAPl-I LOCATION PLAN

V.y J 0

Photograph No.

1 01/24/95 Upstream slope of dam as seen from near the left abutment.

Note undesirable vegetation along the crest of the dam.

Photograph No.

2 01/24/95 Crest and upstream slope of the central portion of the dam.

Photograph No.

3 01/24/95 Upstream slope showing the spillway and the right (west) abutment.

Photograph No.

4 01/24/95 Crest

road, piezometers 5

12, monument AM9.

Note undesirable vegetation.

Photograph No.

5 01/24/95 View downstream (main reservoir) from near left abutment.

Y Photograph No.

6 01/24/95 Downstream view from near the center of the dam.

j

<<9~&.Q~~lfg<<~

4 1

~'s+ 'a~

(

p4

=a@

Photograph No.

7 01/24/95 Downstream slope as seen from near the left abutment.

Photograph No.

8 01/24/95 Toe of dam and left abutment.

Note low area between toe and natural ground.

E l~

I Photograph No.

9 01/24/95 Eroded area under toe at left abutment.

Note higher elevation of natural ground.

Photograph No.

10 cr V

I 01/24/95 Downstream slope and tailwater (main reservoir).

"I 1

IV

\\

1 Photograph No.

11 01/24/95 Downstream slope at. right abutment.

~ll hqp.( /+I g4 fg~

I Photograph No.

12 01/24/95 Downstream slope at right abutment.

Note undesirable vegetation.

Photograph No.

13 Erosion of right abutment.

01/24/95 fl~

i

~

C e

Ify Photograph No.

14 Erosion of right abutment near spillway.

01/24/95

/,

0

)

1 i

~

~

Photograph No.

15 I

'kh 1

C.~4

,~j~yyah I~

,'1 01/24/95 Riprap placed on abutment east of spillway.

Note undesirable vegetation, no bedding material.

<<y ~

g ~+$~~ p yl rak~a,'l

~ 'p E

y, '<<%

y Photograph No.

16 01/24/95 View of spillway looking toward right abutment.

~

p~r f

\\ V Photograph No.

17 01/24/95 View of spillway wall looking toward right abutment.

Note undesirable vegetation.

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II I Photograph No.

18 01/24/95 View of left spillway abutment wall looking toward outlet channel.

Note tree.

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~l Photograph No.

19 View of spillway from left abutment wall.

01/24/95 c'hotograph No.

20 01/24/95 View of spillway from right abutment wall.

Photograph No.

21 01/24/95 View of spillway from right abutment wall.

Photograph No. 22 01/24/95 View of reservoir as seen from near the center of the dam.

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I Photograph No.

23 01/24/95 View of reservoir as seen from the spillway right abutment wall.

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D2SI/RIMS RLB:ejb File Name:

A:(NRCHARIS.095

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