ML18011A818
| ML18011A818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1995 |
| From: | Christensen H, Elrod S, Steven Roberts NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18011A816 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-95-02, 50-400-95-2, NUDOCS 9503090229 | |
| Download: ML18011A818 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1995002
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199
Report No.:
50-400/95-02
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
8ox 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
January
7 - February 4,
1995
Inspectors:
S.
1 od, Senior Resi
'nt
spector
License No.:
Da e Signed
D. Roberts,
Residen
nsp
tor
Approved by:
H
ristensen,
Section
ie
Reactor Projects
Section
1A
Division of Reactor Projects
Date Signed
Da e
igned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant operations,
review of nonconformance
reports,
followup of onsite
events,
maintenance
observation,
surveillance observation,
design
changes
and
modifications, plant housekeeping,
radiological controls, security,
and fire
protection.
Numerous facility tours were conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Backshifts tours
and observations
were conducted
on January
13,
16,
19,
21,
and 22,
and February 4,
1995.
Results:
0 erational
Safet
Control
room operations
and turnovers
were professionally conducted.
Operator
response
to annunciators
was observed to be thorough
(paragraph
3.b).
A diligent Shift Technical Advisor identified that the plant might be
outside
a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation
and
operators
responded
properly to the information (paragraph 3.b).
9503090229
950302
ADOCK 05000400
6
Maintenance
Maintenance activities observed
were well planned
and executed
(paragraph
4.a).
One maintenance
program inconsistency
related to mandatory
gC hold
points for permanent
safety-related
wire lugs but not temporary
ones
(paragraph 4.a).
Surveillance
performance
was satisfactory with proper
use of calibrated
test equipment,
necessary
communications
being established,
proper
notification/authorization of control
room personnel,
and knowledgeable
personnel
performing the tasks
(paragraph
4.b).
Violation 95-002-01
was identified for failure to adequately test motor-
operated
valve thermal overload protection per
(paragraph
3.b.(1)).
En ineerin
Activities
Violation 95-002-01
was caused
in part by previously inadequate
technical
reviews.
Auxiliary feedwater valve motor thermal
overload
bypasses
not being reasonably testable
per the
TS continued over
a
period of years
because
of failure to include the test switches in the
design
(even though previously-purchased
motor control centers
included
test switches).
This was coupled with inadequate
evaluation of
requirements
when this situation
was identified in 1989,
and continued
inadequate
evaluation in 1995,
when it was identified again
(paragraphs
3.b.(1)
and 5).
Plant
Su
ort
Plant support activities were adequate
(paragraph
6).
REPORT DETAILS
PERSONS
CONTACTED
Licensee
Employees
- D. Batton,
Manager,
Work Control
D. Braund,
Manager,
Security
- B. Christiansen,
Manager,
Maintenance
- J. Collins, Manager,
Training
J.
Dobbs,
Manager,
Outages
- J. Donahue,
General
Manager,
Harris Plant
R. Duncan,
Manager,
Technical
Support
- M. Hamby,
Manager,
Regulatory Compliance
- M. Hill, Manager,
Nuclear Assessment
- D. McCarthy, Manager,
Regulatory Affairs
- R. Prunty,
Manager,
Licensing
& Regulatory
Programs
W. Robinson,
Vice President,
Harris Plant
- G. Rolfson,
Manager,
Harris Engineering
Support Services
- H. Smith,
Manager,
Radwaste
Operation
B. White, Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Control
A. Williams, Manager,
Operations
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included office, operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chem'istry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
NRC Personnel
H. Christensen,
Acting Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects,
NRC
Region II
- S. Elrod, Senior Resident
Inspector,
Harris Plant
J.
Lenahan,
Reactor Inspector,
NRC Region II
C. Patterson,
Senior Resident
Inspector,
Brunswick Plant
R. Pichumani,
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
D. Roberts,
Resident
Inspector,
Harris Plant
R. Shewmaker,
NRC Office of Nuclear Materials Safety
8 Safeguards
NRC Contractors
R. Bryant,
Federal
Energy Regulatory
Commission
(FERC), Atlanta,
GA.
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
PLANT STATUS AND ACTIVITIES
a.
The plant continued in power operation
(Mode 1) throughout this
period,
ending the period in day 87 of power operation
since
startup
on November 8,
1994.
b.
During this period, Hr.
C. Patterson,
Senior Resident
Inspector at
the Brunswick Plant,
was
on site
on January
17-18,
1995, for
familiarization.
Inspectors
at his site are back-ups for the
Harris inspectors.
His activities included familiarization tours,
badging,
and organizational
interviews with managers.
There will
be
no inspection report for this activity.
During this period, Hr.
R.
Shewmaker,
of the
NRC Office of Nuclear
Materials Safety
& Safeguards,
was
on site
on January
23-24,
1995,
to conduct
an auxiliary reservoir
dam inspection.
He was
accompanied
by Hr.
R.
Pichumani of the
NRC Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation,
Hr.
R. Bryant of the Federal
Energy Regulatory
Commission
(FERC) Office in Atlanta,
GA., and Hr. J.
Lenahan of
NRC Region II.
They intend to issue
a report in several
months-
after receipt of the
FERC evaluation report.
Hr. Lenahan
remained
at the site until January
27, additionally inspecting pipe
supports.
His results
were documented
in IR 400/95-01.
During this period,
Mr. H. Christensen,
Acting Branch Chief,
Division of Reactor Projects,
NRC Region II, visited the site
on
January
25-26,
1995.
His activities included plant tours,
interviews with licensee
management,
and review of resident
inspector activities
and resident office administration.
3.
OPERATIONS
a ~
Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant continued in power operation
(Mode 1) for the duration
of this inspection period.
(1)
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed records
and discussed
various entries
with operations
personnel
to verify compliance with the
TS
and the licensee's
administrative procedures.
The following
records
were reviewed in part:
shift supervisor's
log;
control operator's
log; night order book; equipment
inoperable record; active clearance
log; temporary
modification log; chemistry daily reports;
and shift
turnover checklist.
In addition, the inspector
independently verified clearance
order tagouts.
The inspectors
found the logs to be readable,
well
organized,
and to provide sufficient information on plant
status
and events.
Clearance
tagouts
were found to be
properly implemented.
No violations or deviations
were
identified in this area.
(2)
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout the inspection period,
the inspectors
toured the
facility to observe activities in progress.
Inspectors
made
some of these
observations
during backshifts.
Also, during
this inspection period, the inspectors
attended
several
licensee
meetings to observe
planning
and management
activities.
Facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the
following areas:
security perimeter fence; control
room;
emergency diesel
generator building; reactor auxiliary
building; waste processing
building; turbine building;
battery rooms; electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the
technical
support center.
During these tours,
the inspectors
made observations
regarding monitoring instrumentation
- including equipment
operating status,
electrical
system lineup, reactor
operating
parameters,
and auxiliary equipment operating
parameters.
They verified indicated
parameters
to be per
the
TS for the current operational
mode.
The inspectors
also verified that operating shift staffing was in
accordance
with TS requirements
and that control
room
operations
were being conducted
in an orderly and
professional
manner.
The inspectors
additionally observed
shift turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the turnover
continuity of plant status,
operational
problems',
and other
pertinent plant information.
Licensee
performance
in these
areas
was satisfactory.
No violations or deviations
were
identified.
Onsite
Response
To Events
(93702)
(I)
On January
13,
a licensee
STA was reviewing 18-month
electrical
OSTs to ensure that
TS requirements
were met.
, This was
a follow-on action for a Fall,
1994,
TS violation
in the electrical surveillance
area.
During the review, the
STA perceived
an inadequacy
in the
OSTs that implement
"Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload
Protection", for six auxiliary feedwater valves.
The test
for these
valves verified actuation of the bypass relay but
did not seem to demonstrate
that the bypass relay contacts
actually bypassed
the thermal
overload contacts.
The
licensee
entered
the 8-hour action statement for TS 4.8.4.2
at 2:54 p.m.,
and
commenced
an intense
review of how to
satisfy the
TS by either testing these
valves or bypassing
the thermal
overloads
at power.
During this period,
the inspector reviewed the
TS and
determined that:
~
This licensee
had not obtained
a TS change,
announced
in 1987 in
GL 87-09, that addressed
how to respond to
the discovery that previous surveillance
actions
had
not been
accomplished
or were inadequate
on otherwise
normally-functioning systems.
That change would'have
given
a minimum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to develop
and accomplish
considered
actions vice the present
8-hour limit in
the existing
TS action statement.
~
For the Harris plant, the basis for TS 4.0.3 stated
that action statements
are entered
at the time
a
surveillance
should
have
been
performed rather than at
the time it is discovered that they were not
performed.
Therefore,
discovering
a long standing
surveillance failure usually required finding that the
unit had already
exceeded
the
LCO.
Finding that the
unit had already
exceeded
the
LCO usually forced
some
extreme condition - perhaps
immediate
shutdown.
Following discussion
with the licensee,
the licensee
recognized
the implications of TS 4.0.3
and, at 7:20 p.m.,
declared
the unit to have previously exceeded
the
8-hour action statement.
The licensee
entered
AFW system
TS 3.7. 1.2 action c,
and declared all three
AFW pumps to be
Such
a condition suspended
and all
other LCO-required actions requiring mode changes until one
pump was restored.
While continuing to review how to satisfy the
TS by testing
these
valves or bypassing
the thermal
overloads
at power,
the licensee
found objective evidence that:
These tests
had
been
reviewed
by licensee
persons
in
1989.
A condition
had
been identified where
one of the
steam-driven
AFW pump steam supply valves
had two
relays vice the one relay usually found,
and only one
of those
two relays
was being tested.
The condition was identified in 1989
as
a TS violation
and
was issued.
NRC inspection reports
400/89-08
and 90-02 reviewed
the licensee-identified violation and the
LER, closing
them
as satisfactory.
5
The licensee
noted at that time that the relay testing
involved in the "violation" and the
LER was clearly testing
of relay actuation vice testing of correct performance of
each circuit operated
by individual relay contacts.
The
violation involved not testing all the relays of one valve
of the many valves that were being otherwise correctly
tested.
The licensee
concluded
now in January,
1995, that,
while a "better" way of testing the relays exists
and
has
been
used in many cases,
the present
way has
been evaluated
by both the licensee
and
NRC and found to be satisfactory.
At 11:35 p.m.,
on January
13, the licensee
exited the
LCOs
and resumed
normal operations.
Subsequent
NRC inspector,
Region II, and Headquarters
review
of TS 3/4.8.4.2,
"Motor-Operated Valves Thermal
Overload
Protection";
TS definition 1.38
"TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE
OPERATIONAL TEST"; and
TS definition 1.21
"OPERABLE-
OPERABILITY", found quite clear the requirement to
demonstrate
that the
MOV thermal
overloads
were actually
bypassed
under accident conditions
by an operable integral
bypass
device.
"TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST" is defined
as
operating
the Trip Actuating Device [relay] and
verifying "OPERABILITY" of alarm, interlock and/or
trip functions.
"OPERABILITY" is defined,
in part,
as being capable of
performing its specified function(s).
~
The technical specification material
reviewed did not
imply that "cycling of the relay" was equivalent to
. "demonstrating operability of output functions".
The inspectors notified the licensee
on January
19 that the
NRC staff had determined that Harris was not meeting
TS
3/4.8.4.2,
"Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload
Protection".
The licensee
PNSC met on this issue
and,
following a Licensee
-
NRC Region II management
telephone
conference,
entered
the 8-hour action statement
for TS 3.8.4.2.
and proceeded
to install temporary modifications to
bypass
the thermal
overloads.
The modifications are
discussed
in paragraphs
4.a.
and 5.a.
The modifications
were completed
by ll:05 p.m.,
on January
19.
The licensee
then met the requirements
of the 8-hour action statement.
Failure to adequately test motor-operated
valve thermal
overload protection per
TS 4.8.4.2 is Violation
400/95-002-01,
"Inadequate
Testing of Motor-Operated
Valve
Thermal
Overload Protection".
On January
25, the licensee
found, through further review,
that three additional
thermal
overload devices
had not been
tested.
They immediately entered
and tested
them.
(2)
On February
2,
an operator
making rounds identified
a
lighted "Power Supply Failure" light on
a rod control
system
cabinet.
It was traced to a failed redundant
DC power
supply.
The licensee
responded
to the situation with
thoroughness
and
has subsequently
planned
an on-line repair,
including sending technicians
to the Westinghouse training
facility to practice
on, training equipment.
c.
Effectiveness
of Licensee
Control in Identifying, Resolving,
and
Preventing
Problems
(40500)
Adverse Condition and Feedback
Reports
(ACFRs) were reviewed to
verify that
TS were complied with, corrective actions
and generic
items were identified,
and items were reported
as required
by 10 CFR 50.73.
The
ACFR system
appeared
to be functioning well.
Many of the 347
items listed in January
were minor items, or feedback
items, or
not safety-related
or quality program related.
The licensee
has
encouraged
use of this program.
The listing of items with
assignments
and status
was easy to obtain,
making the program
appear fairly simple to manage.
During this period, control
room operations
and turnovers
were
professionally
conducted.
Operator
response
to annunciators
was
observed to be thorough.
A diligent STA identified that the plant might
be outside
a TS
LCO and operators
responded
properly to the information.
A diligent operator
found
a failed power supply in the rod control
system.
Violation 95-002-01
appeared
to be caused
by an inadequate
previous technical
review.
MAINTENANCE
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector
observed/reviewed
maintenance activities to verify
that correct equipment clearances
were in effect; work requests
and fire prevention work permits were issued;
and
TS requirements
were being followed.
Maintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
~
WR/JO 95-AAWCI, WR/JO 95-AAWDI, WR/JO 95-AAMFI, "Temporary
Modification 95-00039,
Bypass the Thermal
Overloads for
Motor-Driven AFW Pump Valves
IAF 55, 74,
and 93".
~
WR/JO 95-AAWBI, WR/JO 95-AAWE1, WR/JO 95-AAWF1, "Temporary
Modification 95-00058,
Bypass the Thermal Overloads for
Turbine-DriVen AFW Pump Valves
lAF 137,
143,
and 149".
In general,
the work performance
was satisfactory with proper
documentation of removed
components
and independent verification
of the reinstallation.
During the manufacture
and installation of the jumpers bypassing
the thermal
overloads,
lugs were crimped onto the jumper wires.
The inspector
had just reviewed
an
ACFR on another
system stating
that, contrary to site procedures,
shop personnel
were crimping
lugs without gC inspectors
witnessing.
There were
no
gC
inspectors
present for this job either.
The licensee
explained
that procedure
MHM-01, Rev 7,
"Maintenance
Conduct of Operations",
required
gC witnessing only if the lug was permanent.
Subsequently,
having considered
the inspector's
concern that
temporary lugs sometimes
actually carry out
a safety function
defined in the TS, the licensee
decided to initiate
a procedure
change to MHM-Ol to require
gC inspection for all safety-related
lugs, whether temporary or permanent.
Maintenance activities observed
were well planned
and executed.
The inspector identified one maintenance
program inconsistency
related to mandatory
gC hold points.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Surveillance
Obser vation (61726)
Inspectors
observed
and reviewed surveillance tests to verify that
approved
procedures
were being used; qualified personnel
were
conducting the tests;
tests
were adequate
to verify equipment
operability; calibrated
equipment
was utilized;
and
TS
requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
OST-1214, "Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump
IX-SAB Operability Test,
quarterly Interval."
The inspector
observed
the turbine-
driven
AFW pump being tested
on January
10 as part of a
continuing effort to troubleshoot
the cause of overspeed
events
from 1994.
The inspector
observed that the
pump
operated
smoothly
and that the system engineer
and operators
were diligently monitoring its performance.
Following a
troubleshooting
run, during which
a test recorder
was
installed to monitor various
pump performance
parameters,
the
pump was started
again in accordance
with portions of
the surveillance
procedure to verify its operability.
OST-1107,
"ECCS Flow Path
and Piping Filled Verification,
Monthly Interval."
This procedure satisfied monthly
requirements
contained
in TS 4.5.2.b.l
and
TS 4.5.2.b.2.
On January
12, the inspector
observed
the portion of this
procedure
which verified that the
ECCS piping was full of
water (void of air/gas pockets).
Operators
accomplished
this by installing
a test rig (consisting of a hose
and
water jug) at various high point vents
on
ECCS piping,
and
opening
system vent valves to allow water flow.
The
procedure
was performed within days of a modification which
replaced traditional vent pipe caps in the high and low head
safety injection systems with 3/8-inch diameter quick
disconnect
plugs.
These
new plugs facilitated quicker
installation
and removal of the test rig and lower
radiological
exposure to the operators
performing the job.
The inspector
observed that the operators
performed the job
in accordance
with the procedure
and that water flow from
the system vents
was evident.
The inspector considered
the
presence
of an
HP technician
who monitored the
new vent
plugs for unanticipated
leakage
hazards
to be beneficial
as
well.
~
FPT-3550,
"Fire Protection
Seal
Visual Inspection
18-month
Interval."
On January ll, the inspectors
observed
technicians
inspecting the control
room complex main
termination cabinets.
This inspection
was performed
on
cabinets for both safety
and non-safety related
cables
which
penetrated
the main control
complex from the cable spreading
area located at lower elevations.
The procedure
was
performed mainly to inspect the integrity of the cable
penetration fire protection seals.
While observing the work
performed
by the technicians,
the inspectors
observed
the
poor material condition of several
resistors
(mounted
on
terminal blocks) in Termination Cabinet
10B-SB (safety-
related),
and Termination Cabinet
13 (non-safety).
Several
resistors
had cracked covers, discoloration,
charred
edges,
or ends touching adjacent resistors.
The inspectors
asked
plant personnel
to investigate
the function of these
resistors
and their apparently heat-related
damage.
Licensee
personnel
initiated ACFR 95-00091 for these
cabinets with an initial assessment
of "potentially
inoperable" to facilitate an immediate investigation.
The performance of these
procedures
was found to be satisfactory
with proper
use of calibrated test equipment,
necessary
communications
established,
notification/authorization of control
room personnel,
and knowledgeable
personnel
having performed the
tasks.
No violations or deviations
were identified while
observing the surveillances
addressed
above.
Violation
400/95-002-01,
which is discussed
in paragraph
3.b. 1, applies to
the surveillance
area.
ENGINEERING
a 0
Onsite Engineering
- Design/Installation/Testing
of Modifications
(37551)
The inspectors
reviewed
ESRs involving the installation of new or
modified systems
to verify that the changes
were reviewed
and
approved
in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.59; that the changes
were
performed in accordance
with technically adequate
and approved
procedures;
that subsequent
testing
and test results either met
approved
acceptance
criteria or deviations
were resolved in an
acceptable
manner;
and that appropriate
drawings
and facility
procedures
were revised
as necessary.
ESRs documenting
engineering
evaluations
were also reviewed.
The, following
engineering
evaluations,
modifications and/or testing in progress
were inspected.
~
ESR 9500058,
"DC circuit jumpers for AFW valves".
~
ESR 9500039,
"AC circuit jumpers for AFW Valves".
No violations or deviations
were identified regarding these
ESRs.
The condition described
in paragraph 3.b.,
where the auxiliary
feedwater valve motor thermal
overload
bypasses
were not
reasonably
testable
per the TS, occurred
and continued
because
of
failure to include the test switches in the design
(even though
previously-purchased
motor control centers
included test switches)
coupled with inadequate
evaluation of requirements
when this was
identified in 1989,
and continued
inadequate
evaluation in 1995,
when it was identified again.
PLANT SUPPORT
a 0
Plant Housekeeping
Conditions
(71707)
- Storage of material
and
components,
and cleanliness
conditions of various areas
throughout
the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire
hazards
existed.
b.
Radiological Protection
Program
(71750)
- Radiation protection
control activities were observed to verify that these activities
were in conformance with the facility policies
and procedures,
and
in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors
also
verified that selected
doors which controlled access
to very high
radiation areas
were appropriately locked.
Radiological postings
were likewise spot checked for adequacy.
The licensee identified
a weakness
in communications
between
various plant organizations
regarding control of incore detectors
when persons
were in the area.
No unplanned
exposures
occurred,
but the licensee
is pursuing this matter.
The inspector discussed
this issue with the
NRC Region II Facilities Radiation Protection Section.
10
C.
d.
e.
Security Control
(71750)
- The performance of various shifts of
the security force was observed
in the conduct of daily activities
which included:
protected
and vital area
access
controls;
searching of personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and
retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols;
and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the inspector
observed
the operational
status of
closed circuit television monitors, the intrusion detection
system
in the central
and secondary
alarm stations,
protected
area
lighting, protected
and vital area barrier integrity,
and the
security organization interface with operations
and maintenance.
Fire Protection
(71750)
- Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment
were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate
and that fire alarms,
extinguishing equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
During plant tours,
areas
were
inspected
to ensure fire hazards
did not exist.
Emergency
Preparedness
(71750)
- Emergency
response facilities
were toured to verify availability for emergency operation.
Duty
rosters
were reviewed to verify appropriate
staffing levels were
maintained.
As applicable,
emergency
preparedness
exercises
and
drills were observed to verify response
personnel
were adequately
trained.
The inspectors
found plant housekeeping
and material condition of
components
to be satisfactory.
The licensee's
adherence
to radiological
controls, security controls, fire protection requirements,
emergency
preparedness
requirements
and
TS requirements
in these
areas
was
satisfactory.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in
paragraph
1) following the inspection
on March 1,
1995.
During this
meeting,
the inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the
inspection
as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis
on the Violation addressed
below.
The licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did not identify as
proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the
inspectors
during this inspection.
No dissenting
comments
from the
licensee
were received.
Item Number
Status
Descri tion and Reference
400/95-002-01
Open
VIO, Failure to adequately test
motor-operated
valve thermal
overload protection per
paragraph 3.b.(l).
ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS
ACFR
AFD
CFR
CSIP
ESFAS-
FPT
GL
IR
LCO
LER
MMM
NAD
NED
NPF
NRC
OST
PNSC
0PTR
STA.
TDAFW-
TS
VAC
VDC
WR/JO-
Adverse Condition and
Feedback
Report
Axial Flux Difference
Code of Federal
Regulations
Charging Safety Injection
Pump
Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control
Emergency
Core Cooling System
Engineered
Safety Feature Actuation Sy
Engineering Service
Request
Federal
Energy Regulatory
Commission
Fire Protection Test
[NRC] Generic Letter
[NRC] Inspection
Report
Limiting Condition for Operation
Licensee
Event Report
Motor Control Center
Maintenance
Management
Manual
Motor-Operated
Valve
Nuclear Assessment
Department
Nuclear Engineering
Department
Nuclear Production Facility [a type of
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Surveillance Test
Plant
Change
Request
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
guality Control
quadrant
Power Tilt Ratio
Reactor Auxiliary Building
Residual
Heat
Removal
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Technical Specification
Volts Alternating Current
Volts Direct Current
Work Request/Job
Order
stem
license]