ML18010B010
| ML18010B010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1993 |
| From: | Christensen H, Darrell Roberts, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010B008 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-92-30, NUDOCS 9302160128 | |
| Download: ML18010B010 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1992030
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET,'N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/92-30
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Licensee
No.:
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection'onducted:
December
19,
1992 - January
22,
1993
Inspectors:
J.
T
row,
enior Resid
I
pector
ate Signed
H. Shannon,
den
I
pect
D te
igned
D. Robert
,
esident
specto
Accompanying
Pers nnel:
. Watkins, Intern Resident
Inspector
App
d tl':
A
~.
C r'ensen,
Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
D te
igned
j ze
93
Date Si
ed
SUNMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by the resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant operations,
radiological controls, security, fire protection,
surveillance observation,
maintenance
observation,
followup of onsite events,
licensee
event reports
and licensee
action
on previous inspection
items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Some
of these tours
and observations
were conducted
on backshifts.
Results:
One violation was identified:
Failure to properly tag out fan AH-26A prior to
working on electrical circuits, paragraph
4.a.
The licensee's
proactive measures
to identify and repair boric acid leakage
from the reactor coolant
system were considered
to be conservative,
paragraph
5.a.
A weakness
was identified concerning
operator performance
which resulted
in an
automatic turbine runback,
paragraph
5.b.
930216012B
930129
ADOCK 05000400
8
Use of a steam generator
"mockup" facility enhanced
leak repair efforts
and
was successful
in minimizing the radiation exposure
received
by plant personnel,
paragraph
2.b.(4).
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
J. Cribb, Manager, guality Control
- C. Gibson,
Manager,
Programs
and Procedures
C. Hinnant,
General
Manager,
Harris Plant
D. Knepper,
Project Engineer,
Nuclear Engineering
Dept.
- B. Heyer,
Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
T. Horton, Manager,
Maintenance
J. Moyer, Manager,
Project Assessment
- J. Nevill, Manager,
Technical
Support
A. Powell,
Manager,
Harris Training Unit
- W. Seyler,
Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
- H. Smith,
Manager,
Radwaste
Oper ation
- G. Vaughn,
Yice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
W. Wilson, Hanager,
Spent Nuclear
Fuel
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included office, operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
"Attended exit interview
2.
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations
{71707)
The plant continued in power operation
{Mode 1) for the duration of this
inspection period.
a ~
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed records
and discussed
various entries with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications
{TS) and the licensee's
administrative procedures,
The following records
were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's
Log;
Control Operator's
Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable
Record; Active Clearance
Log; Grounding Device Log; Temporary
Modification Log; Chemistry Daily Reports; Shift Turnover
Checklist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
In addition, the inspector
independently verified clearance
order tagouts.
The inspectors
found the logs to be readable,
well organized,
and
provided sufficient information on plant status
and events.
With
the exception of the example noted in paragraph
4.a of this
report,
clearance
tagouts
were found to be properly implemented.
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted
to
observe operations,
surveillance,
and maintenance activities in
progress.
5ome of these
observations
were conducted during
backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
meetings
were attended
by the inspectors
to observe
planning
and
management activities.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the following areas:
security perimeter fence;
control
room;
emergency diesel
generator building; reactor
auxiliary building; waste processing
building; turbine building;
fuel handling building; emergency
service water building; battery
rooms; electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the technical
support
center.
During these tours,
the following observations
were made:
(I)
Monitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system lineup, reactor operating
parameters,
and auxiliary
equipment operating
parameters
were observed
to verify that
indicated
parameters
were in accordance
with the
TS for the
current operational
mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating
shift stafFing
was in accordance
with TS requirements
and
that control
room operations
were being conducted
in an
orderly and professional
manner.
In addition, the inspector
observed shift turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the
continuity of plant status,
operational
problems,
and other
pertinent plant information during these
turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping
Conditions
- Storage of material
and
components,
and cleanliness
conditions of various
areas
throughout the facility were observed to determine whether
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
(4)
Radiological. Protection
Program - Radiation protection
control activities were observed routinely to verify that
these activities were in conformance with the facility
policies
and procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory
requirements.
The inspectors
a'iso reviewed selected
radiation work permits to verify that controls were
adequate.
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
planning for the
containment entry on January
7, to stop the
RCS leak
observed
on the "A" steam generator drain piping.
The job
planning, radiation work permit, post job critiques,
and
survey data sheets
were reviewed.
A power reduction to ten
percent
was performed to lower general
area radiation
dose
rates
from approximately eight rem per hour to less than two
rem per hour.
Training on
a mockup facility of the area
was
conducted
including full protective clothing dressout of the
participants.
These efforts were effective in limiting the
radiation exposure
received
by plant personnel
to 750 mrem
to repair the leak.
This exposure
was
much less
than that
expected
to be received
from a routine plant shutdown
an'cl
startup activity.
(5)
Security Control
- The performance of various shifts of the
security force was observed
in the conduct of daily
activities which included:
protected
and vital area
access
controls;
searching of personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and retrieval; escorting of visitors;
patrols;
and compensatory posts.'n
addition, the inspector
observed
the operational
status of closed circuit television
monitors, the intrusion detection
system in the central
and
secondary
alarm stations,
protected
area lighting, protected
and vital area barrier integrity,
and the security
organization interface with operations
and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection
- Fire protection staffing and equipment
were observed
to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate
and that fire alarms,
actuating controls, fire
fighting equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
During a tour of the reactor auxiliary building on
January
8, the inspector noticed several
drums were present
on the 305 foot elevation of the auxiliary building.
The
drums contained
charcoal
which had
been
removed
from several
plant
HVAC units nearby.
This matter
was discussed
with
licensee
personnel
to ascertain
the combustible loading in
this fire zone.
The plant
FSAR, section
9.5A contains the
fire protection hazards
analysis
and allows
combustible charcoal fire load of 14,088 pounds in this
area.
Since the drums contained only approximately
12,600
pounds of charcoal, this temporary condition was considered
to be acceptable.
Licensee
management
subsequently
planned
to remove the drums.
The inspectors
found plant housekeeping
and material condition of
safety related
components
to be good.
The licensee's
adherence
to
radiological controls, security controls, fire protection
requirements,
and
TS requirements
in these
areas
was satisfactory.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
Adverse Condition Reports
(ACRs) were reviewed to verify the
following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions
and generic
items were identified,
and items were reported
as required
by
Surveillance
Obser vation (61726)
Surveillance tests
were observed to verify that approved
procedures
were
being used; qualified personnel
were conducting the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment operability; calibrated
equipment
was
utilized;
and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
OST-1026
Leakage
Evaluation
OST-1081
HST- I0190
Containment Visual Inspection Prior to Establishing
Containment Integrity and After Each Containment
Entry
When Containment Integrity is Established.
Wide Range
Pressure
P-0402
Operational
Test of Train A CVCS Hiniflow Circuit
Containment
Pressure
(P-0951) Operational
Test
HST-I0238
Containment
Pressure
(P-0952) Operational
Test
HST-I0255
Reactor
Coolant
Loop Hot Leg Temperature
Instrument
Operational
Test
EPT-150
EST-221
ESW Flow Balance
Type
C LLRT of Containment
Purge Hake-up Penetration
(H-57)
The performance of these
procedures
was found to be satisfactory with
proper
use of calibrated test equipment,
necessary
communications
established,
notification/authorization of control
room personnel,
and
knowledgeable
personnel
having performed the tasks.
a ~
b.
Procedure
OST-1081
documented
the containment
closeout
inspection
which was performed following the containment entry on January
7,
to isolate the identified
RCS leakage
which is discussed
further
in paragraph
5.a of this report.
Some boric acid crystallization
was found in the area
around the "A" steam generator drain line
which had leaked onto
a nonsafety-related
air handling unit, the
"A" steam generator
seismic monitoring device,
and
on
a sample
valve.
The inspector
reviewed
a videotape
which was
made of the
area.
Licensee
personnel
evaluated
the equipment which was
exposed to the boric acid
and determined that it was acceptable
to
remain in this condition until the unit was shutdown for an
outage.
During a tour of the reactor auxiliary building, the inspector
noticed that several
service water valves
had two or three notches
scratched
on their valve positioner to mark the required throttled
position for the valve.
The inspector discussed
this observation
with licensee
personnel
who stated that the valves
had
been
throttled to the latest position during the performance of a
system flow balance test.
The inspector reviewed the latest valve
lineup sheet for the valves which specified that the valve
position
be established
while performing procedure
EPT-150.
The
latest procedure
EPT-I50 was also reviewed.
The test procedur'e
established
the, required flows through the various heat exchangers
and specified that the throttled position for the valves
be marked
with a paint stick.
This marking was intended to be
a rough
throttled position mark for subsequent
usage
by plant operators.
The inspector questioned
whether the correct throttled position
could be re-established
following valve repositioning with two or
three marks present
on the operators.
Licensee
personnel
agreed
to review their method of controlling the throttled positions for
these
valves.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Haintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed
maintenance activities to verify that
correct equipment clearances
were in effect; work requests
and fire
prevention
work permits,
as required,
were issued
and being followed;
quality control personnel
were available for inspection activities
as
required;
and
TS requirements
were being followed.
Haintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
~
Replacement
of the motor for air handler
AH-26A.
~
Troubleshoot
loud noise
from the S-IV Inverter and replacement
of
the inverter's transformer in accordance
with procedure
Replace Oil Filled and Electrolytic Capacitors
and/or Ferro-
Resonant
Transformer Assembly in Mestinghouse
7.5
KVA Static
Inverters.
~
Repair leakage
on the "A" and "B" spent fuel
pump casings
in
accordance
with procedures
Goulds
Pump 3405 Disassembly
and Haintenance,
and HPT-H0062,
Gould 3405
Pump Nonmetallic
'omponent
Replacement.
~
Replace defective
manual
override plate for valve lAF-19.
Determinate/reterminate
operator
as necessary
for replacement
and
perform post maintenance
testing
as per PIC-I058.
The performance of work was generally satisfactory with proper
documentation of removed
components
and independent verification of the
reinstallation.
The repairs
made to the spent fuel cooling pumps
improved the equipment
condition considerably
by stopping boric acid leakage
around the
pump
casing.
An exact replacement for the AH-26A motor could not
be located
so the
licensee
purchased
a similar motor from the equipment
vendor.
An
engineering
evaluation for the replacement
motor was performed
(PCR-6734,
AH-26-lA Replacement
Motor), which concluded that the
new
motor was acceptable
and more efficient.
The inspector
reviewed this
evaluation
and concluded that the licensee's
action
was appropriate.
a 0
On January
8,
1993, during the replacement of the motor for fan
AH-26, the inspector
observed
the post maintenance
testing
conducted.
Upon initial fan startup,
the fan/motor was observed
to rotate in the wrong direction.
While this situation
was being
discussed
among licensee
personnel,
an electrician proceeded'to
swap motor leads in the power supply junction box.
The
electrician did not utilize any electrical safety devices while
doing this work.
Operating personnel
noticed the electrician
and
stopped this activity; however,
the motor leads
had already
been
swapped
and reterminated.
The inspector questioned
licensee
personnel
whether
an equipment clearance
had
been established
for
changing the direction of fan rotation
and was informed that one
had not been obtained.
The fan had
been
secured
by turning off
the control switch.
The inspector considered
work on this 480
volt electrical
system without an equipment clearance
or use of
appropriate electrical protection devices to be dangerous,
considering
the fact that the fan could have received
an automatic
start signal which would have energized
the circuit.
The licensee's
administrative
procedures
AP-020, Clearance
Procedure,
and AP-003,
General
Plant Personnel
Safety
and
Housekeeping,
require plant personnel
to obtain
an equipment
clearance
to deenergize
electrical
equipment prior to work. If
the work is to be performed
on energized
equipment,
then the
procedures
require special
permission
and use of rubber gloves,
rubber mats,
insulated tools
and face shields for 480 volt
circuits.
Failure to properly tag out the power supply for AH-26A
prior to working on the circuit or to utilize appropriate
electrical safety devices to work on potentially energized
components
is contrary to procedures
AP-020 and AP-003,
and is
considered
to be
a violation of TS 6.8.l.a.
Violation (400/92-30-01):
Failure to properly tag out fan AH-26A
prior to working on electrical circuits.
Although licensee
management
was present during this maintenance
activity, the poor electrical safety practices
were not initially
noticed until the work had
been completed.
The subsequent
fan
start for post maintenance
testing
was performed with increased
management
personnel
present
and utilization of appropriate
electrical safety devices.
b.
On January
12,
1993,
the S-IV vital instrument
bus transformer
was
replaced after plant personnel
identified
a higher than usual
humming sound
coming from it.
The
same transformer
had just been
installed
as
a replacement
during refueling outage
number
4 in
October
1992.
During the last three years,
the transformers
associated
with the inverters for all four vital instrument
bu'sses
have
been replaced
due to failure or degradation.
The inspectors
noted that this failure rate
was excessive
and that to date
no
root cause determination
had
been
made.
Inspector
Followup Item (400/92-30-02):
Follow the licensee's
actions to determine the root cause of recurrent transformer
failures in the uninterruptible
AC power system.
Followup of Onsite
Events
(93702)
a ~
b.
On January
6, licensee
personnel
made
a containment entry to
identify the source of increased
The
licensee
had performed
leakage calculations
which showed that
was approximately 0.5 gpm.
This was of
concern, yet well below the
TS limit of
1 gpm.
Leakage
was
observed
coming from the drain line for the "A" steam generator.
Two drain valves
and
1RC-36) were leaking past their seats
and
a pipe plug to seal
the drain line was not in place.
On
January
7, licensee
management
conservatively
decided to reduce
power and attempt to stop the
RCS leakage.
Plant power was
reduced to
10 percent,
thereby lowering general
radiation levels
to facilitate access.
Operators
were able to access
the drain
valves, fully close them,
and stop the leakage.
In addition,
a
pipe plug was installed in the drain line.
Leakage calculations
performed following this activity indicated that the licensee's
efforts were successful
in reducing unidentified leakage to less
than 0. 1 gpm.
The licensee
plans to perform
a root cause
investigation to determine
why the drain line was leaking.
The
inspectors will follow the licensee's
activities during subsequent
routine inspections.
During the subsequent
power increase
on January
8,
a turbine
runback
was received at approximately
87 percent
power (turbine
first stage
pressure
of 535 psig).
Being in the control
room at
the time the runback occurred,
the inspector noted that the
runback condition lasted for a short time and lowered turbine load
by approximately
20
NW.
Operators
immediately suspended
the power
increase
and determined
the cause of the runback to be the failure
to have either heater drain
pump running.
The heater drain
pumps
were subsequently
started
and the plant power increase
resumed.
The inspector reviewed the power escalation
procedure,
GP-005,
Power Operation,
which was being used to control
the power
increase,
and noted that the procedure directed that both heater
drain
pumps
be started at approximately
50 percent
power.
The
heater drain
pumps were not started at this time due to problems
with pump seal
water flow.
The procedure
allowed continued
power
6.
escalation
while the problem with the heater drain
pumps
was being
fixed.
The licensee's
investigation into this event revealed that
the turbine runback setpoint
was actually lower than that
specified in setpoint
documents (i.e.,
90 percent
power or a
turbine first stage
pressure
of 555 psig).
The inspector discussed
this matter with licensee
personnel
and
discovered that the instrumentation
associated
with the runback
circuitry was not safety-related,
but did receive
a periodic
calibration
on
an
18 month frequency
as part of the preventive
maintenance
program.
The tolerance
allowed for the calibration
was
15 psig.
A review of the equipment
maintenance
history showed
that the instrumentation
had drifted from setpoint
on several
prior occasions.
Licensee
personnel
stated that they would review
this instrumentation for determination of an appropriate
calibration frequency.
Although the turbine runback signal
was received
a little
prematurely,
the inspector considered
that sufficient time and
margin existed for operators
to start
a heater drain
pump prior to
approaching
the runback signal setpoint.
The failure of operators
to start
a heater drain
pump prior to receiving
a turbine runback
is considered
to be
a weakness.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702
5
92701)
a 0
b.
(Closed) Violation 400/89-35-01:
Failure to perform inservice
testing
on check valves.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified completion of the corrective
actions listed in the licensee's
response letter dated
February
9,
1990.
Appropriate changes
have
been
made to the inservice testing
program
and testing procedures.
This item was discussed
with
Region II inservice testing specialists
who agreed that the
licensee's
actions
were appropriate.
(Closed)
IFI 400/91-13-02:
Follow the licensee's
activities
regarding the narrow margin for minimum flow from the turbine
driven
AFW pump.
The licensee
has reanalyzed
the design requirements
associated
with the turbine driven
AFW pump
and
has concluded that the
pump
must
be capable of supplying flow to all three
An adequate
decay heat
removal flowrate of 430 gpm to only two
is guaranteed
by the turbine driven
AFW pump in
conjunction with a motor driven
AFW pump or by two motor driven
AFW pumps,
assuming
a single failure of one of the pumps.
Therefore,
the setpoint of the turbine driven
AFW pump
differential pressure
controller does not severely restrict the
AFW flowrate near the minimum design.
Also the licensee
has re-
evaluated
the steam generator overfill analysis
and has
C.
established
a
new maximum flow limit of 550
gpm based
on
additional
PORV capacity.
The licensee
plans to revise
the sections
in the
FSAR which describe
using only one
AFW pump to
supply feedwater to the steam generators.
(Closed)
IFI 400/92-13-03:
Follow the licensee's
evaluation
o'
inaccurate
estimated critical positions.
The licensee
contacted
the nuclear
steam supply system vendor for
assistance
on the discrepancy
observed
between calculated
estimated critical positions
and the actual
rod positions
where
criticality was observed.
The vendor verified that the computer
program utilized by the licensee
was appropriate
and
recommended
new calculated
values for assumed
control rod worth.
The computer
core models tend to become less
accurate if a long continuous at-
power run is accomplished
and fuel burnup factors are introdOced.
Subsequent
plant startups with the
new revisions to the computer
program
have produced
estimated critical positions very close to
actual critical control rod position.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential
generi'c impact, to detect
trends,
and to determine
whether corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that were reported
immediately were reviewed
as
they occurred to determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed
in accordance
with the current
(Closed)
LER 92-14:
Pipe wall thinning in auxiliary feedwater
and main
systems
caused
by flow erosion.
This event
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-
27.
The licensee
issued
a supplement
to the
LER dated
January
15,
1993.
An analysis of the piping was performed
by the license's metallurgical
services unit who determined that the cause of the pipe wall thinning
was due to erosion corrosion.
The effectiveness
of the computerized
pipe wall thinning program was evaluated
by the Electrical
Power
Research
Institute (EPRI).
The program was
deemed to be accurate within
the assumptions
made from input data.
Input data
assumed
nominal wall
thicknesses
for piping at the time of installation.
Industry experience
shows that manufacturing tolerances
can create
instances
where initial
pipe wall thickness
are considerably less
than nominal.
Exit Interview {30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
I) at the conclusion of the inspection
on January
22,
1993.
During this
meeting,
the inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the
inspection
as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis
on the Violation and Inspector Follow-up Item addressed
below.
The
licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did
not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
10
by the inspectors
during this inspection.
No dissenting
comments
from
the licensee
were received.
Item Number
400/92-30-OI
400/92-30-02
Descri tion and Reference
VIO:
Failure to properly tag out fan
AH-26A'rior
to working on electrical circuits,
paragraph
4.a.
IFI:
Follow the licensee's
actions to determine
the root cause of recent transformer failures in
the uninterruptible
AC power system,
paragraph
4.b.
and Initialisms
ACR
- CFR
EPT
GPH
IFI
KVA
LER
HPT
NREM
HW
NRC
OST
TS
Alternating Current
Adverse Condition Report
Code of Federal
Regulations
Chemical
Volume Control
System
Engineering
Performance
Test
Emergency Service Water
Final Safety Analysis Report
Gallons
Per Minute
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
Inspector Follow-up Item
Kilovolt-ampere
Licensee
Event Report
Local
Leak Rate Test
Maintenance
Performance
Test
Hillirem
Megawatt
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations Surveillance
Test
Plant
Change
Request
Power Operated Relief Valve
Pounds
Per Square
Inch Gage
Reactor
Coolant System
Technical Specification
Violation