ML18010A801

Summary of 920820 Meeting W/Util in Rockville,Md to Discuss Operability of high-head Safety Injection Sys

ML18010A801
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/15/1992
From:	Le N Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-M84220, NUDOCS 9210080290
Download: ML18010A801 (39)

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Docket No. 50-400 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 September 15, 1992 LICENSEE:

CAROLINA POWER

& LIGHT COMPANY FACILITY:

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1

SUMMARY

OF AUGUST 20,

1992, MEETING REGARDING HIGH-HEAD SAFETY INJECTION OPERABILITY (TAC NO. H84220)

A meeting was held on August 20, 1992, in Rockville, Maryland, with Carolina Power

& Light Company (CP&L or the licensee) to discuss the operability of the subject high-head safety injection (HHSI) system documented in Licensee Event Report (LER)91-008, as well as the staff concerns described in the NRC's August 14, 1992, letter regarding the operability of the alternate minimum flow (ANF) system.

These concerns were based on findings resulting from an NRC inspection team that was sent to Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) during the week of August 2, 1992, to review the effects and circumstances pertaining to the event described in the LER.

The licensee has committed to provide the staff with a written response to the August 14,

1992, NRC letter by September 4,

1992.

During the meeting, the licensee provided the staff with a brief background on the design basis for the alternate minimum flow (ANF)

system, and discussed, among other things, the facts, conclusions and corrective actions pertaining to each sequence of events that led to the failure of the HHSI on April 13,

1991, and reported in LER 91-08 on Nay 3,

1991, as supplemented Hay 15, 1991.

The licensee then discussed their bases for the 1991 operability determination and the current operability determination for the ANF system, as well as their planned actions to further address the NRC concerns on the HHSI operability issue.

The four questions in the staff's August 14, 1992, letter were discussed in detail.

These included (1) the absence of licensee's analysis on piping integrity, (2) the issue of water hammer downstream of relief

valves, (3) the potential for valve chatter/setpoint drift, and (4) the issue regarding operator ability to detect and mitigate an event.

ttme RV. I:ENTER CPV 92i0080290 920915 PDR ADOCK 05000400 P

PDR ',,i Due to damaged relief valves in their ANF system (see LER 91-008),

the licensee reiterated that they had determined the 1991 degraded HHSI to be a highly significant operational event.

The licensee considered their corrective actions implemented in 1991 and their requirement for periodic testing of the AHF system to be adequate to ensure operability for the both HHSI and ANF systems.

In addition, the licensee indicated that they had recently performed other evaluations, and the results also confirmed the AMF system operability.

I l1 t

September 15, 1992 During, the meeting, the licensee stated that existing plant emergency operating procedures (EOP's) and past operator training provides them the confiderice that a loss of HHSI would be mitigated should the event occur.

The licensee's future activities for ensuring HHSI system operability include the following:

(

(1) to continue with their requirements for quarterly testing of the AMF to ensure the p'iping is filled and to keep the relief valve's setpoint from drifting, (2) to conduct, additional flow testing on the AMF line to verify its proper, operation during the upcoming unit refueling outage (RF0-4),

and (3) to investigate alternative designs to eliminate the use of the relief valve to prevent charging pumps from deadheading during reactor repressurization during post-LOCA.

Following the meeting presentation, the staff concluded that the licensee's initial corrective actions, as i'mplemented during the 1991 refueling outage, were inadequate to assure operability of the alternate minimum flow system.

However, the licensee's temporary compensatory measur es, which include quarterly removal of air from the piping and operator response

training, appear to be adequate to assure plant safety through the current operating cycle.

Details of the licensee presentation are attached as Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 is a list of meeting attendees.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Enclosures:

Ngoc B. Le, Project Manager Project Directorate II-I Division of Reactor Projects I/II 1.

Licensee Handout 2.

Attendance list cc w/enclosures:

See next page OFC NAME PDI PAnd son PDII-I PM TLe7 PDII-I EAdens DATE

/92 92 7a92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME:

HAR84220.MTS

September 15, 1992 During the meeting, the licensee stated that existing plant emergency operating procedures (EOP's) and past operator training provides them the confidence that a loss of HHSI would be mitigated should the event occur.

The licensee's future activities for ensuring HHSI system operability include the following:

(1) to continue with their requirements for quarterly testing of the ANF to ensure the piping is filled and to keep the relief valve's setpoint from drifting, (2) to conduct additional flow testing on the ANF line to verify its proper operation during the upcoming unit refueling outage (RF0-4),

and (3) to investigate alternative designs to eliminate the use of the relief valve to prevent charging pumps from deadheading during reactor repressurization during post-LOCA.

Following the meeting presentation, the staff concluded that the licensee's initial corrective actions, as implemented during the 1991 refueling outage, were inadequate to assure operability of the alternate minimum flow system.

However, the licensee's temporary compensatory

measures, which include quarterly removal of air from the piping and operator response

training, appear to be adequate to assure plant safety through the current operating cycle.

Details of the licensee presentation are attached as Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 is a list of meeting attendees.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Enclosures:

Ngoc B. Le, Project Nanager Project Directorate II-I Division of Reactor Projects I/II 1.

Licensee Handout 2.

Attendance list cc w/enclosures:

See next page OFC PDI PD II-I/PN PDII-I WANE DATE PAnd rson

/

/92 TLeT

/t 92 EAdens 7/(I 92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUNENT NANE:

HAR84220.NTS

Mr. R. A. Watson Carolina Power 5 Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

CC:

Mr. H.

Ray Starling Manager Legal Department Carolina Power 8 Light Company P. 0.

Box 1551

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Resident Inspector/Harris NPS c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 1,

Box 315B New Hill, North Carolina 27562 Mr. Gerald E. Vaughn, Vice President Harris Nuclear Project Harris Nuclear Plant P. 0.

Box 165 New Hill, North Carolina 27562 Mr. H. A. Cole Special Deputy Attorney General State of North Carolina P. 0.

Box 629

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P.O.

Drawer 11649

Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. C. S. Hinnant Plant General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant P. 0.

Box 165 New Hill, North Carolina 27562 Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental, Commerce 5 Natural Resources P. 0.

Box 27687

Raleigh, North Carolina 27611-7687 Mr. R.

B. Starkey Vice President Nuclear Services Department Carolina Power

& Light Company P. 0.

Box 1551

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

DISTRIBUTION QD.ocket:Fi.l~e NRC 5 Local PDRs T.Murley/F. Miraglia J.

Partlow S.

Varga G. Lainas E. Adensam P. Anderson N.

Le NRC Participants w/o encl A. Chaffee OGC E. Jordan ACRS (10)

J. Wechselberger, EDO E. Merschoff PD21 Rdg File 14-E-4 14-H-3 osure 1

11-A-1 15-B-18 MNBB-3701 17-G-21 RI I

0 4

f) $

5 1k t

ENCLOSURE 1

EgcLoSu~e 8

HARRIS NUCLEARPROJECT HIGH HEAD Sl ALTERNATEMINIFLOW OPERABILITYMEETING

~c.<4" 4

,r CAROLINAPOWER Er LIGHT AUGUST20, 1992

0 ADDRESS THE SPECIFIC NRC QUESTIONS IN YOUR AUGUST 14TH LETTER.

~

PROVIDE BACKGROUNDON THE DESIGN BASIS FOR THE ALTERNATE W

SYSTEM.

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DISCUSS THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKENFOR PRECURSOR EVENTS.

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PROVIDE JUSTIFICATIONFOR

'CO D OPERABILITYOF THE HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM.

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~

k ~

TJ

PRESENTATION OUTLINE 0

PtTRODUCTION

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DESIGN BASIS FOR ALTERNATE MUUFIOWSTSIFM

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

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FACTS, CONCLUSIONS, AZ6)

CORIREC'I'IVE ACTIONS FOR EACH EVI~22T

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BASIS OF 1991 OPE&LSILITY DETERFDNATION VAUGHN VICE-PRESIDENT HARRIS NUCIk&RPROJECT G)Qk&BUSH

%VBTINGHOUSE HINNANT GENERAL MANAGER

%ORRIS NUCLEAR PLANT

~

RASIS OF CURRENT DETERlVDNATION OPERABILITY

- ANALYSISOF SYSTI<M PIPING VANMETRE IXI'EGRHY MANAGER

- WATER HAMMERDOWNSTREAM OF HAIIRISDESIGN RELIEF VALVES ENGDIEEIGNG

- FOTENTIALFOR VALVECHATIIIR AI'6)SETPOINT DRIFT

- OPERATOR ABILITYTO DETOX'.T ANDMITIGATEEVENT ACTIONS COL/NRC hLWAGEhCEN'I'O HINNY'B&ANT

0 CP&L 5GLÃAG CONSIDERS TEKE 1991 DEGRADE)ED HHSI ALTKRNAYK FLOW SYSTEM EVENT (DMfAGEDRELII!S

. VALVE)TO SE A HIGHLYSIGNIFICANT OPERATIONALEVEI'A'.

'l 0

PRECURSOR EVENTS WERE ADDRESSEES)

PGBIVIDUALLYUSING FACTS KNOWNAT Tj&'&XE.

XKESE EVENTS COLLEC'I'Vi%'LYWERE INSTRUMENTALIN DETE G 'IKE ROOT CAUSE 826) CORRECTIVE ACTIONFOR IKE 1991 EVENT.

O'W

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COMPACT&'EACTIONSDB'N1991 AZ6) PERIODIC 'I'%STING HAVEENURED OPE&kBILHPYOF HHSI ALTERNATE SYSTEM.

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RECEKI'VALUATIONSHAVECO THE OPEKLSILITYOF THE AL'IMVfATE OW SYSTEM.

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PRIOR TO TIKI-2' DESIGN

- ORIGINAL

-WAS ACCEPTABLE

- RELIANCE ON OPERATOR ACTION

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POST TMI-2

- NRC BULLETllN79-06A IDE D NEW CRITERj4L REGARDING OPERATOR ACTION WESTINGHOUSE REVIEWED SI TERIViHNATION CRITERIA AND REVEALEDA POTEXIYAB CONCERI'9

- NRC ISSUElED NRC BULLE'IlN80-18 ALTERNATE OW WAS DESIGNEE)

TO ADDRESS ISSUES IDE IN NRC BULLE'HIN80-18

- USE OF PORV's

- MODIFYPUMPS

- LOWER RCS PRESSURES

- OTEGiZR RELIKiTSYS'IKMS

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OTRER ALTERNATES CONSIDERED INCLUDED:

MODIFICATIONS ANCEAM)TKSTjINGREQ

- MOST COST BASED ON

Yl4'.

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THE ALTERNATE WWAS DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE CSIP's FOR THE FOLLOWING SET OF CONDITIONS:

- REACTOR COOLAI'A'UMPSOPKI4LTING

- DISSBGLAR CSIP's CULTS

- TWO CSIP's OPERATING

- SECONDARY SIDE HELS

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ALLCSIP's SKJQ L BE PROTEC'I%3) FROM DEADHEADING(60 GPM)

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OPERATOR ACTIONPRECLUDED FOR FIjRST 30

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MANGE OF CSIP's PERFORMANCE G%3RVFS ASSM4ED 0

CONSIDERATION FOR RELEASE OF WQ)IOAC

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TER'ODIFICATIONSEDLL ON SI SYSTFM PMQ'ORINANCE E EFFECT 0

THE MODIFICATIONSKtLLLNOT AFFECT CHARGING SYSTEM OPE&LBILI'IT, RELIABILITYAZG)

AINABILITT

~

AUGUST 6, 1984 - ANOTHER PL/8K EKPERH< NCED A COMPLETE CE OF TEE 2 INCH AUKHJARY LETDOWN CROSS4."ONNECTION BETWEEN RHR AT@)

CVCS AT A SOCKET WELD CONNECTION.

0 JUM< 11, 1985 INPO ISBN SER 2745 DESCRIBING TEE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE.

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NOVX2dBER 15, 1985 IE B NO. 8543 ON MOV COMMONMODE FAILURE.

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JAI'AJARY 17, 1986 TECHNICALSUPPORT ENGIMKR EVALUATEDSER 2745 AND PROVIDED RECO1LQdENDATIONS TO PREVXKT EVI<22T AT %BARRIS.

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AUGUST 7, 19SS ALTERNATE~W SYSTEM VIERATIONIWATERHAMMEREXPERIENCED DUESNG MOV STROKE TESTDIG WFHI HIGHD~

PRESSUM~:.

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NOVEMBER 7, 1987 - INADVERT$2G'I.

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MARCH 15, 1990 - DRAINLINEWELD uhOGLGE.

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APML 2, 2991 - POTENTIAL COMMON CAUSE POR ALTERNATE

% DAMAGE.

DIENTIMED

1KE5X 2-INCH PIPE FAluH) ATA SOCKET WXXBDUE TO A FATIGUE - INDUCED CRACK AND SUBSEQUENT WAXER HAMMK ChQ5E;

" TEK CAUSE OF THE WELD FAILURE PVAS FATIGUE INDUCED BY VIBRATION%ITHXN'I'HE SYSTEM. %RE ISOLATIONBLOCK VALVESIN THE CROSS-CONNECTION BET%)KEN THE MKRAND CICS SYSTEM ARE GLOBE VALVESTHATARE OPEN/SHUT ONLY AZG) CANNOT COXIROL FLOYV DUE TO 'IHEIR DESIGN.

" gNPO SER 27-85)

HAjRRIS TECWGCAL SUPPORT ENGINEER EVALUATEDTXKS OPERATIONS %XPERIRXCE FEEDBACKI&MAZG) RECOIVBdX26)ED HARRIS ACTIONS TO PREVENT MX~)C CE.

li I

~ I

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y~OO

~I==

gg C ~

'i

F

M~+UHUM)BYIE B TEST PROCEDURE EPT410T WAS RUN 8-746.

A~TC TRIT ICRT44 iBID ICS 144 USING "B" CSIP WITHFLOW IN REVERSE DIRECTION THROUGH KlHLOTEST VALVE.

OBSERVED LINEVIBRATIONANDNOISE WHEN MOV 1CS-746 WAS %KARST STROKES') ELECTRICALY. STOPPED TEST &6) REVISED PROCEDURE TO USE "C" CSIP TO PREVENT REVERSE FIX)WTHROUGH KIMLOTESTVALVE.

VALVE1CS-746 WAS MAWUAI2Y STROKED OPEN FOR TEK SECOND TRY WH'H NO KRJSUAL NOISE.

VALVES 1CS-745 AND 1CS-746 %1M<'LECTRICALLY STROKED AND TECI<&WITHNO UNUSUALNOISE.

"B" TKQN VALVEICS-75? WAS MANUALY STROMiD PARTIALLYOPEN CAUSING MINORVIBRATIONAI'6)

FLOW NOISE. VALVEWAS CLOSED AND CONTROL ROOM CONSULTED. ON SECOND MATUALOPENING NO

%BASALVIBRATIONSWERE OBSERVRZl.

VALVES 1CS-75? AND 1CS-753 %ERE )<XXX.TRICAI2Y STROKED AND TIMEDWl'IKNO K'6JSUAL NOISE.

~

SINCE HIGH VIBRATIONSWERE OBSERVED WHILE A~G TO BACK TIOW TTIROOGH KEROTETT VALVE,TE& ENGINEER WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED THE SER 2745 REVIEW, BELIEVI!!3)THIS ABNORMIALFLOW PATH WAS THE CAUSE OF 'IRE VIBRATIONS.

0 ONCE AIR WAS FLUSHED FROM THE "A"AND "B" LIII!ES~W WAS ESTABLISHED NO1QLALLYWEIILII:

STROKE TESTING MOU's WITHOUTRELY'ALVE CHATTER.

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LINES WERE WALKEDDOWN FOR SIGNS OF PIPE OR HANGER DAMAGE,NONEHl~.

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NO RELHH'ALVEDAMAGEWAS SU

ALj.

HHS)

S 1CS-214 1CS-182 CHafSI PLNP lA-SA S

RHR HX 1A-SA

~ C9Z Q C9 K LK u) ~

o>

y V o

1CS-210 S>>

1CS-196 CHS/Si PUtP lc-SAB S/

si iS CHSISi PLNP lh-SB s

lCS-755 1CS-752 PCS-748 1CS-745

~ S 1CS-744 1 CS-746

~

SI SIGNAL ON LOW STKLMLINE DUE TO IMPROPERLY ADJUS'IED STEAM DULIA COXIROLLER DURING PLANT START-UP INMODE 2.

~

THERE WERE NO PERSONNEX NF~ 'IRE ALTERNATE

% REuIM'ALVES826) NO REPORTS OF WATER HAMMEROR VIBRATION.

~

NO FACTS AT THE TIIVKFOl USED Ami22IIONON NEED TO INSPECT ALTERNATEMM-FLOWPIPING OR VALVES.

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HN USED ON RESOLVING AT'6) P OF 'IRE SI.

G THE CAUSE

b:

~

DURING THE OUTAGE IN APRIL 1991, BOTH RELIEF VALVESFARED TBE NOKIIALSURVEKLANCEISBT.

CURRRD ON ADRAINIINE.

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WELD FAILURE OC

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FOTENTIALFOR 'IBESE EVENIS HAVDIOA COMMON CAUSE AI'6)Tf&AFk!TCT THISKQ)ONHHSIOPERABILITY WAS HIENTBIIEDAND REFORTIHI.

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THESE FAILURES WERE CAUSED BY SOME FORM OF PIPE VIBRATIONOR WATER

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DANGED COMPDNE2HS WjERE REPAXRED.

~

EV&22T WAS THOROUGHLY

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OPERATORS WERE GATH).

ON TKKS EVENT.

0 ADDITIONALCO ACTIONS WIM<'NITIATED TO ENSURE HHSI WAS OPERABLK.

~

SYSTI<22f PIPING AhH) HANGER WALKDOWN.

~

DRAMLINES REPAmED AND SUPPORI'%3).

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RELIEF VALVESRIM'AIREDAND TFBTIH).

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CONHEMED IIIIHNIHTINGHOOSE INST INSTSIIEZI RELIEF VALVESWOULDNOT 1KPI< RII<224CE CHATTER.

0 PROC EDtGK TO HLL&6)

VII'IPING AFIXRRELIEF VALVEINSTALIWTION.

~

PROCEDURE TO REQUIRI< HI'LINGAND VEÃiTING PIPING FOLLOWINGANY ANCE WHICH COULD DRAMPIPING.

~

QUARTERLY TESTS PERI<ORMED TO ENSURE PIPING IS FILLEDAND VALVESETPOINT IS VERIFIED.

- BASED ON THESE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, WE WG)

COAX'IDENCETHE RELIFS VALVESA26) PIPING WOULDNOT BE DAMAGEDBY INITIATIONOF A SAFETY INJECTION ANDTHAT THIS ALTERNATE OW SYSTEM WOULDFUNCTION AS RE QUIS'.

0 SYSTEM DESIGN MARTS P'iDUSTRY REQ

~

DUE TO VALVEOPING TIlNEAND LINE SIZE, SIGN%'ICANT.WATKR LOADS TO CHALLENGEPIPE IXI'EGRITY ARE NOT LIKFXY

~

PIPING / H/LNGER INSPECTION

- LIQUIH)PENE 70 PIPE WELDS

- NO DEFECTS DETECTED VLcWALINSPECTION 25 EBLNGXRS

- NO DM4AGEDUE TO 'IWLNSIENTS

~

STATE OF THE ART TRANSIENT ANALYSIS WOULD BE LESS CONCLUSIVE THAN INSPECTION

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SYSTK'6 OPERABLE - NO FURTHER ANALYSIS REQUIRED.

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DETAjHED INSPECTION OF DOWNSTREAM PIPING - NO DAMAGE 0

PROGRESSIVELY LARGERPIPING DOWNS%%&AM OF RELIEF VALVES

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OPEN DISCEBQtGE PATH TO R%'ST

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DESIGN EVALUATION-CHA'ITIHtNOT Paxmevzn

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RELIC UALVEOPENS G&Q)UALLYVICE INS TAIPEI'AZ&OUSLY

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VALVESIZED TO OPEN &6)REMAINOPEN UI'6)ER SECONDARY BREAKWI'IHRCS KE-PRESSURIZED - NO CHATI'ER 0

$ ULLFLOW THROUGH VALVEIN EPT-010T-NO CHATI'RR

~

VALVEDESIGNEI9 TO PRECLUDE SETPOINX'JUFI'D QUARTERLY-NO DRIFT OBSERVH)

2600 2500 2400 300 2200 2100 2000 I

1900 1800 1700 1600 a ve 1

-755 ress uie 1500 05/10/91 08/01/91 11/27/91 02/21/92 05/29/92 08/19/92 Date IILiftPressure

2600 2500

-744 Pressure 2400 2300 2200 2100 2000 Q

1900 1800 1700 1600 1500 05/13/91 08/01/91 11/27/91 02/21/92 05/29/92 08/19/92 Date

-IILiftPressure

0 EMERGENCY OPE34&1NG PROCEDURES 0

EVENT SPECIFIC

- OPERATOR 6 ON EVE%I'S AND PO OPERATOR ACTIONS.

- USER'S GUjlDE PROVjlDES DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATE W AND PO DEGJRA8)ED SI $K,OW.

- USER'S GUSH)E CES PUMP CURVES FOR DETE G %]HEIFER RELIES VALVEFAIL%3)TO RESEAT.

FOR OM BASED PROCEDU3RE8 %OUIJA)

RESPOND TO INADEQUATEHHSI REGARDLESS OF CAUSE:

~ PATH PROCEDURES-IATE ACTIONS AI'6) DIAGNOSIS OF EVENT.

• EPP's - EVENT RELAYED.

• Hi?'s - MONITOR CRITICALSMARTY FUNCTIONS AND INMATES COMPENSATORY ACTIONS.

- EVENT DISCUSSED AT WOG MRXTINGAZQ)

NT WOG GUjtDELPlES AjRE APPROPKbLTE.

PROCEDDR%8 AISLE ADEQUATETO MITIGATETOGS EVE%I'.

~

CO QVARTERLYTEST TO EN%JRE PIPING IS HLLED&6)TO VERVET RELIES VALVESETPOIIW

~

FLOW TEST OF TEE ALTERNATE LB'NRFO-4 TO VERIEST PROPER SYSTEM OPFAU TION.

OW 0

EVALUATEALTERNATEDESIGNS TO ELIMINATEUSE OF RELIEF VALVES.

GENERICALLY,SYSTEM MAYBE SUSCEFL'IBLE TO PROBLEMS IF NOT OPF34LTEH) AND AIjNEDCORREL Y.

WE RECOG>tIXED ANDREPORT%) TjHE SAX'ETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPONjF2A'AILURES.

WE HAVETAl&'NPRUDENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

WE HAVE SHARED OUR EXPERIENCE KITH THE NRC A2'6) PG)USTRY.

~

BASED ON RECENT ADDITIONALINSPECTIONS AI'6) EVALUATIONS,%%'ONFIDENT IN THE ABILITYOF Tie ALYFN,NATE MPGFLOW SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS REQUII&DFUNCTION.

ADDITIONALTjES'IINC TO CO PROPER SYSTEM Al'6) COMPONENT OPERATION DMUNG'IHE NEXT RFO.

~

EXISTING BOP's 426) OPEEU TOR G

PROVIH)E CONFIDENCE 'IHATA LOSS OF MKBI EVENT VVOULDBE MITIGA'HH)SHOVING) IT OCCUR.

I

ENCLOSURE 2

ETTENNI'EE LI T

NRC/CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY MEETING August 20, 1992 NAMES Tommy Le G. Lainas Ernie Rossi Brian Grimes R. Benedict Stacey Rosenberg Horace K. Shaw Jeff Shakelford Jeff Jacobson T. A. Peebles Robert Jones Frank Orr Fred Paulitz Fred Manning Brian McFeaters J.

Wermiel Chu-yu Liang David Gamberoni Robert Schaaf Karen Marcus Loren Plisco Sheri Peterson Peter Koltay Fred Hebdon Renee Pedersen W, Beckner G.

Hammer M. Webb Kamal Manoly Y. Huang Brian Holian Suzanne Black E.

G, Adensam ORGANIZATIONAL TITLES NRC/NRR/Project Manager NRC/NRR NRC/NRR NRC/NRR/DRIS NRR/DOEA NRR/DREP NRR/EMEB NRC/RII NRC/DRIS NRC/RII NRC/NRR/SRXB NRC/NRR/SRXB NRC/NRR/SIC B NRC/AEOD/ROAB CP&L, Nuc.

Gen Group Analyst NRC/NRR/DLPQ/LHFB NRC/NRR/DST/SRXB NRC/NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRC/NRR/DRPW/PDIV-2 NRC/NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRC/NRR/DLPQ/LPEB NRC/NRR/DRPW/PDIV-1 NRR/SIB NRR/PD II-4 NRC/Office of Enforcement NRC/NRR/PRAB NRC/NRR/EMEB NRC/NRR/DRPE/PDI I-1 NRC/NRR/DET/EMEB NRC/NRR/DET/EMEB NRC/PDIV-2 NRC/NRR/PDIV-2 NRC/NRR/DRPE

NRC/CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY MEETING (cont'd.)

August 20, 1992 Tom Cleary Walton Jensen Lloyd Zerr Hel Shannon H.

D. Christensen R.

W. Prunty S.

S.

Galembush H.

R.

Hamby R.

B.

Van Metre D.

C. HcCarthy Ashley N. Lucas G.

B. Vaughn R.

B. Starkey, Jr.

R. A. Watson S.

Varga W. Haass J.

A, Norberg Northeast Licensing Utilities NRC/DST/SASG STS NRC/Harris/RI NRC/RI I/DRP CP&L/Hgr.

SHNPP Licensing Westinghouse CP&L/Project Spec.

Harris CP&L/Hang Harris Design Eng CP&L/Mgr. Nuclear Licensing CP&L V.P. Nuclear Services CP&L V.P. Harris Plant CP&L V.P. Nuclear Services CP&L SVP Nuc. Generation NRR/DRPE NRR/DRIS/VIB NRR/DET/ENEB

a