ML18010A524
| ML18010A524 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1992 |
| From: | Christensen H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010A522 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-91-27, NUDOCS 9202140111 | |
| Download: ML18010A524 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1991027
Text
UNITEDSTATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
50-400/91-27
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
License No.:
Inspection
Conducted:
December
21,
1991 - January
17,
1992
Inspectors:
~~ J.
Tedrow
Senior Resident .Inspector
~M. ShaI npn, Resident
Inspector
()
Approved by:
. Christensen,
Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
ate
igned
ate
igned
, zq/Zz.
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant
operations,
radiological
controls,
security,
fire protection,
surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
safety
system
walkdown,
design
changes
and modifications; licensee
event reports,
plant nuclear safety
committee activities, licensee self assessment
efforts,
and licensee
action
on
previous inspection
items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted
and facility
operations
observed.
Some
- of these
tours
and observations
were conducted
on
backshifts.
Results:
Three violations
were identified:
Failure to properly
implement
an
alarm
response
procedure,
paragraph
2.b.(l);
Failure
to properly
implement
a
radwaste
operating
procedure,
paragraph
2.c;
Failure to perform
TS required
audits at the required intervals,
paragraph
9.
Weaknesse's
involving the licensee's
Nuclear
Assessment
audit
process
were
identified in paragraph
9.
Deficient operator
control
board
walkdowns
were
noted,
paragraph
2.b.(1).
Good
performance of the auxiliary operating staff
was evident,
paragraph 2.b.(2).
'"
CICX OSOOO400
40iii 'II20i24
9
REPORT
DETAILS
II
1.
Persons
Contacted
2.
Licensee
Employees
P.
Beane,
Manager, guality Control
- J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
- C
G'bson
Manager,
Programs
and Procedures
- C. Hinnant, General
Manager, Harris Pla
1
ant
- D. McCarthy, Manager, Site Engineering
B. Meyer,
anager,
,
M
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
'*R. Morgan, Manager, Project Assessment
- T. Morton, Manager,
Maintenance
- J. Nevill, Manager,
Technical
Support
- C. Olexik, Manager,
Regulatory Compliance
A. Powell, Manager, Harris Training Unit
R. Richey,
Uice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
H. Smith, Manager,
Radwaste
Operation
E. Millett, Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
M. Milson, Manager,
Spent Nuclear Fuel
em lo ees
contacted
included
office,
operations,
'radiation
and corporate
personnel.
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistryira la ion
a
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms used
throughout
p
this
re ort are listed in the
last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
Node
1) for the- duration of this
The plant continued
in power operation
{Node
)
inspection period.
a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
nd discussed
various entries
with
The inspector
reviewed
records
an
s.
The following records
were
1
to verify compliance
with t e
licensee's
administrative
procedures.
e
o
o
reviewed:
Shift Superviisor's
Lo
- Control
Operator
s
og;
i
Order
ook; Equipment
Inoperab
e
eco d;
c
ve
ea
ist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
In
f'd
1
d
addition,
the
inspector
independently
veri ie
c e r
tagouts.
the lo s to
be readable,
well organized,
and
The inspectors
found
e
og
lant
status
and
events.
provl
rovided
sufficient
information
on
p an
s
a
u
Clearance
tagouts
were
found
to
be
properly
implemented.
No
violations or deviations
were identified.
b.
Facility Tours
and Observations
T
h t th
'pection
period, facility tours
were
conducted
to
hroug
ou
e in
observe
operations,
surveillance,
and
maintenance
ac 'ivities in
S
f these
observations
were
conducted
during
backshifts.
Also, during this'nspection
period,
licensee
meet
g
were attended
by the inspectors
to observe
planning
and
management
activities.
e
aci i
Th f 'lity tours
and observations
encompassed
the
emer
enc
f 11 's
security perimeter
fence; control
room;
em
g
y
d'
enerator
building;
reactor
auxiliary building;
o
owing area
.
waste
processing
building;
turbine
building;
fuel
h
'
r
'
',
'
'ndi in
building;
emergency
service
water
building;
battery
rrooms
electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the technical
support cente
.r.
During these tours,
the following observations
were made:
{I) Monitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating
status,
area
a mosp
t
heric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system
1
reactor
operating
parameters,
and auxiliary
equ 'pi ment
ineup,
ated
opera
ing
parameters
were
observed
to verify that indic
parameters
were
in accordance
with the
TS for the current
operational
mode.
During
observations
of control
room
instrumentation
on
J
13
1992
the
inspector
noted
that
a
nuclear
anuary
instrumentation
selector
switch to the
gPTR alarm
'circuitr
had
been
placed
in the defeat
(N-42) position.
This position
blocked
the
N-42 lower detector
signal
from the
gPTR alarm
circuitry and rendered
this alarm inoperable.
->lhen informed of
this finding, operations
personnel
immediately
restored
the
switch position to normal.
A
f the operator
logs revealed that on the previous
day
review
0
veral
alarms
had
been received
from this circuitry
g
durin
the
sever
downpower for maintenance
on
the
pre-heater
bypas s
valves.
Several
manual
gPTR calculations
had
been
performed
to verify
a equa
e
ux
d
t fl
profiles existed.
In accordance
with the alarm
response
procedure
ARP-ALB-013,
Main Control
Boar
,
rd
section
ALB-013-5-4, the selector
switch shall
be momentarily placed in
d f t
sitions to clear
the alarm
and
then restored
to the
'ormal position.
The alarm response
procedure further sp ecified
if the alarm could not be cleared,
then the selector
switch must
be placed in the position which indicated
the faulty detector.
The faulty detector
would
then
be
removed
from service
by
th
appropriate
bistables.
From discussions
with
operating
personnel
the inspector
determined that the switch had
been
inadvertently left in the defeat position after clearing
the last
alarm.
Failure
to properly
implement
procedure
ARP-ALB-013 by returning
the selector
switch to the
normal
position is contrary to the
requirements
of TS 6.8.1.a
and is
considered
to be
a violation.
Violation (400/91-27-01):
Failure
to properly
implement. an
alarm response
procedure.
The log review did reveal
that manual calculations of gPTR were
per orme
a
f
d
t least
once
- every
12
hours
as
required
by
TS 4.2.4.1.b for the inoperable
alarm because
the routine
y
seven
da
gPTR verification
was
scheduled
and
accomplished
during the
early morning of January
13.
Th
hift turnovers
which occurred during January
12,
12/13 failed
to notice the mispositioned
switch even
thoug
q
e
s i
h re uired control
board walkdowns
were performed.
These
walkdowns were therefore
considered
inadequate.
Sh'ft St ff
g - The inspectors
verified that operating shift
i
a
in
that control
s
a
ing w
t ff
was in accordance
with TS requirements
and th
room
operations
were
being
conducted
in
a
y
professional
manner.
In addition,
the inspector
observed shift
t r overs
on various occasions
to verify the continuity of plant
'
n
status,
operatio'nal
problems,
and
other
pertinent
plant
in orma ion
f
t'uring these
turnovers.
The inspectors
accompanied
auxiliary operators
on their daily plant tours to
y
rou ine
u ie
t'
t
s were being conducted
in accordance
with ONN-001,
Conduct of Operations.
These duties
included routine
eq
p
checks,
valve lineups,
and monitoring
parameters
outside
the
control
room.
The
inspectors
also verified that
equipment
malfunctions
or failures,
system leaks,
or safety
hazards
were
reported
to the control
room
and
tracked
in the licensee's
maintenance
and equipment repair system.
In recent
wee s,
k
the auxiliary operators
have discovered
lineup
discrepancies
and
equipment deficiencies
in safety-re
a
secondary
systems
which could
have
challenged
the
plant'SH
operating status.
These
included misaligned
in the
U
system
supplying air to the
"C" Charging/Safety
Injection
Pump
(CSIP)
room.
With the
misaligned,
the running fan
was
actually cooling
a spare
storage
room, providing minimal cooling
to te
h
"C"
CSIP
room.
On
the
secondary
side,
auxiliary
1
control
opera ors
i
t
d'scovered
obscure
deficiencies
with two f ow
valves
in the condensate
system which, had they gone unnot'ced
cou ld have
produced
resulting in reactor trips.
The
licensee
has
attributed
part of the
success
of the current
on-line plant status
to the diligence of the auxiliary operating
staff.
The inspectors
noted that
positions
and
the types of
discrepancies
discovered
in
the
secondary
system
are
not
and that the
normally monitored during auxiliary operator
rounds
and t
licensee's
performance
in this area
was good.
(3)
Plant
Housekeeping
Conditions
-
Storage
of materiyl
and
components,
and
cleanliness
conditio's
of various
areas
throughout
the facility were
observed
to determine
w et er
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
(4)
'
io ogica
(
)
'
d'
'
Protection
Program - Radiation protection control
verif
that
these
activities
were
observed
routinely to veri y
activities
were in conformance
with .the
y
p
facilit
olicies
an
d
nd in compliance with regulatory requirements.
e
proce ures,
an
in c
i
ion work
ermits to
,
inspectors
also
reviewed
selected
radiation
p
verify that controls were adequate.
(5)
S
ty Control -
The
performance
of variouss shifts of -the
ecuri
securi ty force
was observed
in the
conduc
y
u t of dail
activities
1
d d:
rotected
and vital
area
access
controls;
which inc u
e
p
searching
of personnel,
packages,
and vehic es,
g
and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols;
and compensatory
posts.
In addition,
the
inspector
observed, the operational
~
sta
us
o
~
t
f Closed
Circuit Television
(CCTV) monitors,
the
I 't
'
t
tion system
in 'the central
and
seconda
yr
alarm
n rusion
e ec
'
and vital area,
stations;
protected
area
lighting, protecte
barrier integri y,
an
't
d the security organization interface with
operations
and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities,
staffing
and
t
'
erved to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate
and
that fire alarms,
extinguis ing equip
actuating
controls,
fire
fighting
equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
(7)
During routine walkdowns of plant areas,
various deficiencies
were noted.
n
e
non-s
d
0
th
n-safety section of the
f'll
1
five mechanical
struts
were found disconnnected with
banding
straps
holding the piping in place
g
'
lne,
a ainst structural
suppor s.
e
t
When informed of this deficiency, licensee
personne
immediate'ly
removed
the
banding
straps
and
recon nected
the
mechanical
struts.
It was
a so
no
e
a
1
t d that the
emergency
diesel
generator
service
water
isolation valve,
1SW-176 indicated
p
p
and
should
have
been
locked in the
100 percent
open position.
S
b
q ent review
by operations
found that the valve
was
100
u seque
percent
open
but indicated
75 percent.
q
A work- re uest
was
gener
enerated
to repair the indication deficiency.
The
inspectors
found plant
housekeeping
a
p
nd
corn onent
material
'ondition
to
be
good.
The licensee's
adherence
to radio ogica
c ~
control s,
securi ty control s, fire
protecti on
q
re uirements,
and
TS
requirements
in these
areas
were satisfactory.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
(ACRs)
were
reviewed
to verify the
Adverse
Condition
Reports
(
)
TS were complied with, corrective
ac ions
m lished or being
pursued for completion,
td
d 't
'td
generic
items were identified. and reporte
,
an
i
e
as required
by the TS.
ACR 91-569 reported that the recycle evaporator
rator feed filter was found
to
be isolated with the
bypass
valve,
and filter inlet and out et
1
d.
This
abnormal
system
configuration
was
foun
y
a
search
for the
cause
of increased
b 'ld
0
b
15
irborne activity in the waste
processing
u
1991
The isolated filter caused
increased
system
pressur
radioactive
liquid leak
had
develope
evaporator
feed filter was placed in service
by opening
e in e
outlet valves
and the leak stopped.
The licensee's
investigation
into this
even
vent determined
that
the
with
rocedure
filter had recently
been
backwashed
in accordance
with proce ure
S stem
section
8. 1,
and
had not bien proper y
d 8115 of th's
o
d
returned
to service.
p
specify the appropriate
steps
to return
e
i
at -the fi.lter inlet and outlet valves
be
opene
an
d.
Failure to properly implement procedure
bypass
valve to be clos
1'
lemented corrective
considered
to
be
a violation.
, 1'men
,The licensee
imp emen
refore
this violation is not being ci
e
t
consisting
of procedure
clarifications
an
p an
appropriate
personnel.
Therefore,
because
criteria specified
in Section
V.A of the
Policy were satisfied.
NCV (400/91-27-02):
Failure
to properly
implement
a
radwaste
operating
procedure.
Surveillance Observation
{61726)
to verif
that approved
procedures
were
Surveillance
tests
were observed
to
'
e
ualified
ersonnel
were
conducting t e
es s;
ui ment
o erability'alibrated
equipment
was
ll wed.
The folio
tests
were
utilized;
and
TS requirements
were fo
owe
.
e
observed
and/or data reviewed:
OST-1007
CVCS/SI System Operability quarterly Intervals
OST-1014
Turbine Valve Testing Monthly Interval,
OST-1032
RAB Emergency
Exhaust
System Train
A
Oper
'
y
"A" 0 erabi
1 ity Monthly
Inter val
OST-1039
Calculation of gPTR Meekly Interval
OST-1070
Axial Flux Difference Monitoring and Logging
MST-I0169 Nuclear Instrumentation
System
Source
Rang
e
Ran
e
N31
Operational
Test
EST-221
Type
C LLRT of Containment
Purge
Make-up Penetration
(M-S7)
The
erformance
of these
procedures
was
found to
be satisfactory
with
f
1
b t d test
equipment,
necessary
communications
'
d
notification/authorization
of control
room persononnel
and
establis
e
,
no i icah
tasks.
No violations or deviations
knowledgeable
personnel
per forme
'
as
were observed.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
Th
inspector
observed/reviewed
maintenance
aactivities to verify that
.
e
effect
'work requests
an
ire
.
correct
equipment
clearances
were
in effec
,
'
wor
ermits,
as
required,
were
issued
and being
o
owe
nel
were available
for inspection activities
as
p
o
s
'
the following maintenance
TS re uirements
were
being
o
owe
.
ai
observed
and
work packages
were reviewed
or
e
o
(MR/JO)'ctivities:
Troubleshooting
and replacement
o
/
g
of lead!la
card in steam
generator
level
instrumentation
in accordance
with procedure
Generator
B Narrow Range
Level
Loop (L-0486) Operational
Test
h
Inspection
o
sa
e y
f
f t
injection
val,ve
in
accordance
wit
procedure
PM-I0020, Limitorque'perator Inspection.
Troubleshooting
and repair of the containment ventilation penetration
damper following the surveillance
EST-221 failure.
Calibration of
a
actuator
in
accordance
with procedure
PIC-I059, Calibration of ITT Hydramotor Damper Actuator Models
NH-
94,
5 96.
The
performance
of work was satisfactory
with proper documentation
of
t
d independent verification of the reinstallation.
removed
components
an
in e
er enc
diesel
generator
A
d tailed
review of control
room
and
emergency
'
deficiencies
indicated that many of the
de
e
deficiencies
can
be worke
y
e
time.
The deficiencies
were discusse
wi
maintenance
staff at this
ime.
maintenance,
operations
and technical
support
s
a
s.
deviations
were observed.
5.
Safety
Systems
Walkdown (71710)
down of the
Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Th
inspector
conducted
a walkdown
o
e
t
the
lineup
was
in
accor
ance
wi
d
th
license
d th t th
system
drawin
a
d
ed "as-built" plant conditions.
The materia
r
s stem
o erability
an
a
'
procedure
correctly reflecte
"as-
u
p
s were noted
on system drawings which were
present.
Also minor deficiencies
were
no
e
on
y
referred
to the
system
engineer
for corrections.
o
deviations
were identified.
6.
Design
Changes
and Modifications (37828)
ified s stems
were reviewed to verify that the
Insta lation of new 'or modi ie
sy
nce with technically
adequate
and
approved
roved in accordance
with
were
per ormed
in accordance
wit
e
t bl
d'th t
testin
and
tes
resu
lit
rocedures
were revised
as
necessary.
s were resolved
in an
accep
a
e
m
pp op
g
y
p
o
This review included selected
observations
o
mo i ic
in progress.
e
o
o
Th f ll wing modifications were reviewed:
PCR-6158
Preheater
Bypass
o
ss Control Valves Pneumatic
Control, Circuit Pressures
(Air Amplifier Failure
PCR-6192
End Caps for AK-10 ASB to Spare
Charging
Pump
Room
ver si ht and technical
support
involvement
was evident
ified air circuit components
Proper
er
r
with proper post-modification testing
erformance of work was satisfactory
wi
prop
done prior to re urning
t
t ming the valves to operable status.
7.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
ed for
otential
generic
impact, to detect
The following LER was
reviewe
or
po en
etect
1
Events that were reported
immediately
were reviewe
as
e
determine i
e
we
'f th
TS
re satisfied.
LERs were reviewe
in a
the current
orted the failure to adequately test sealed
icensee
has
subsequently
tested
the
sources
as required
by the TS.
The lic
ures
and conducting training for radiation
presently revising plant
p o
f this
orrectiv
a t'o
el to
revent
recurrence
o
is
e
remain open pending completion
o
is co
Review of Plant Nuclear
Safety Committee Activities (40500)
The
inspectors
attended
selected
PNSC
meetings
to
observe
committee
activities
and
verify
TS
requirements
with respect
to
committee
compos
ion,
u ies,
an
'
'*
d t
d responsibilities.
Minutes
from these
meetings
1
o
reviewed
to verify accurate
documentation.
e
'
considered
the
conduct
and
documentation
of these
meet'in s
to
be
satisfactory.
During the January
7
1992
PNSC meeting
an internal justification for
continued
operation
(JCO) for the three
steam
generator
preheater
bypa
d'
These
three
air-operated
containment
isolation
valves
are required
to- close
upon receipt of a main feedwater isolat'on
Th
l
utilize pneumatic
control circuitry to maintain
sufficient pressure
on air accumulators,
which in turn,
supp y
ressure
to close
the valves.
While troubleshooting
recent actuating air
bl
s
the
s stem engineer
discovered
that certain
components
1
es
un uestionably
in the circuit were non-safety
grade.
Since
the valve
q
erformed
a safety function, all three
were declared
pending
a
roval of the
JCO.
The
JCO covered
the next 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, following which a
modification would be installed to upgrade all air circuit components
to
safety-grade.
The
JCO
was
approved
based
on the
low probability of-
'
f the non;quality parts
over the next
3 days
and compensatory
measures
which were
established
to monitor t e
p
he
ressure
in the air
on
an
increased
two hour frequency.
Following approva
o
the
JCO, the valves
were considered
to be operable
on January
7.
Evaluation of Licensee Self Assessment
{40500)
NRC Inspection Report 50-400/91-18 identified two violations and
a program
wea
ness
wi
e
k
th the Nuclear
Assessment
Department's'mplementation
of the
quality assurance
audit program required
by technica
p
10 CFR 50 Appendix
B.
A subsequent
review of the audit program
was
performed
during this
inspection
period
which identified additional
deficiencies.
The
licensee
is required
by
to perform audits
of unit
activities
on
a periodic
basis.
A review of the audit program
on
1992
found that various audits
have not been completed within
January 15,,
oun
a
the required
times
specified in
The fo
o
'
llowin
items
were
identified:
TS 6.5.4. l.c requires
an
audit
of actions
taken
to correct
deficiencies
to
be
performed at least
once
per
6 months.
The most
recent
audit of actions
taken
to correct deficiencies/corrective
action
was dated April 10,
1991.
Licensee
personnel
were unable to
provide another audit report of this activity prior to January
15,
1992.
This audit
was
not completed
within the
allowed
time
as
required.
4.1.a
re uires
an audit of conformance
of unit operation
to,,
'
th
TS
nd applicable license, conditions
r
12 months.
The previous
operations
audit
was
ns contained wit in
e
a
ete
,
90
d th
last operations
audit
was
'ompleted
on January
9,
9
.
is
a
1 92
This audit was not completed within
the allowed time as required.
TS 6.5.4. l.b requires
an audit of training,,
qual'alifications
and
of the entire unit staff, at least
once per
bl t
d
th
This audit has not been
performed
ee
ersonnel
were
una
e
o pro i
of any audit reports
in this area.
is au i
a
as required for the entire unit staff.
TS 6.5.4. l.j requires
an audit of the emergency
p
'
lan and implementing
t least
once
per
12 months.
The last
emergency
plan
vember
21,
1990.
No additional
audit
l to
of th
dit
l eports
were available
to
docume
o
p
November
1990.
This audit
was also not performe
vii
in
e
time as required.
Violation (400/91-27-03):
Failure to perform
TS required audits at the
required intervals.
requires
that audit reports
encompasse
y
sed
b* TS 6.5.4.1 shall
be
ment
ositions within 30 days after
comp
e ion
forwarded to var ious
managemen
p
of the audit.
The operations
audit required
by
.
.
.
.a
mber
11
1991.
The operations
manager
did not receive t e
14
1992
which
exceeded
the
30-day
o erations
audit until
January
t.
A
revious fai lure to forward audit reports within 30
ay
(400/91-18-02).
The tardiness
in forwarding
was identified as
a violation (4
this operations
audit indicates
that this process
is
s i
no
adequately
and the forwarding process
is considered
to be weak.
10 CFR 50 Appendix 8,
Part I, requires
that organizations
pe for
ng
s shall
re ort to
a management
level
such t a
Audit re orts of site activities are
or anizational
freedom is provided.
Audit repor
s
o
si
e
used
as
a
qua i y ass
1 t
urance
function to report to corporate
managemen
.
re
bein
It was
no
e
y
t d
b
the
inspector
that draft audit reports
we
'
d'
'b t d t
the audited function manager prior to fin
o finalization of the
is ri u
e
o
audit report
and
subsequent
distribution to corpo
g
rate
mana
ement.
This
indicates
that
a lack of organizational
freedom exists
in the
au i
program and is therefore
considered
to be
a weakness.
A review of the
security
program audit r p
(
e ort
(SC-91-01)
was
also
i
a
eared
to be properly planned,
per orme
,
an
performed.
The audit
app
lude that security activities
umented
and in sufficient depth to conc
u e
a
were
adequately
per orme
an
f
d
d
security
functions
were
adequately
maintained.
10
Findin
s
(92702
8
10.
Licensee
Action on
revi
Previously Identified Inspection
'
g
92701)
a. 'Closed)
Violation 400/91-13-01:
Failurere to have
two operable
AFM
system flowpaths.
r "fied
corn letion of the corrective.
l
,
d
d
J l
25,
actions
listed in the licensee's
response
letter,
a
e
further review by the
NRC determined t
a
re ianc
s stem operable
The licensee
has
requirements
of TS to maintain the system
opera
e.
f
d t
o
x
t
o declare
the
AFM system
g ncy
o
o
w t
and
comply with appropriate
action
statements
w en
e
throttle/isolation valves are closed.
b.
(Closed)
Violation 400/91-21-01:
Failure
p
p
to
ro erly set
the
blowdown rings
on Crosby relief val'ves.
erified
corn letion of the corrective
The
inspector
reviewed
and verifie
p
lemented
a maintenance
checklist
and
a
d in the licensee's
response, letter,
a
e
o
t'l'aintenance
procedure
to address
pp op
i
when performing work on these
valves.
Training was
a so
p
these
procedures
to craft personnel.
d
Violation 400/91-24-02:
Failure to provide
an
adequate
d
f
boric acid system temperature.
surveillance test procedure
or
o
nd verified completion of the corrective
es
onse letter dated
December
26
action listed in the licensee's
response
e
er
a
e
1991.
The surveillance
procedure
was revised
on
ecem er
record temperature
maintenance
data
as
a.means
to veri y
e
o
flowpath minimum temperature.
d.
'(Closed)
Violation 400/91-24-03:
Failure to perform adequate
boric
acid
pump testing.
rified
corn letion of the corrective
The
inspector
reviewed
and
ve
i
p
action listed in the licensee'o
1991.
The licensee's
surveillance
test
schedu
ing sys
em
updated
to
p ace
e
s
1
th
urveillance test, on
a semi-quarterly
tes
frequency.
e.
(Closed)
Violation 400/91-24-04:
Failure to adequately
identify,
document,
and correct deficiencies.
nd verified completion of the corrective
onse letter dated
December
26
action listed in the licensee's
response
e
er
ed
real
time training
{91-054)
on
1991.
The
licensee
complete
r
to the significance of
December
11,
1991, to sensitize
the operators
o
e si
the temperature
monitoring circuits.
IFI 400/91-26-01:
Follow the
licensee's
activities
to
fl
margin
and evaluation of quarterly
increase
the charging
pump f ow margin
pump testing acceptance
criteria.
evaluation of the quarterly
pump
The licensee
has
completed
an evaluati
OST-1007,
CVCS/SI
nce criteria specified in procedure
0
the
lant's
TS and correctly reflect
thss
procedure
was obtained
from the
p an
hich is
reater
than the minimum speci
ie
y
su
lier.
The quarterly
pump testing
acceptance
b
t f t y'h'is
item will
criteria
was therefore considere
o
e sa
>s
c
remain
open pending completion of the licensee
s
e
or
o
increase
the flow margin.
11.
Exit Interview (30703)
nsee
re resentatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1)
The inspector s met with
1 ice
p
a
e
c
t the conclusion of the inspection
on January
summarized
the
scope
and
findings
o
'th
t'
h
are detailed
in this report,
wi
par
'
below
The
licensee
representatives
'd
t 'd t f
o
t
b
th .i
to
d 'h
s
r's
comments
and di
no
i en i
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
y,
e,in
inspection.
Item Number
400/91-27-01
400/91-27-02
400/91-27-03
12.
Acr onyms
and
ACR
CFR
CSIP
CVCS/SI
Descri tion and Reference
VIO:
Failure to properly implement
an alarm
response
procedure,
paragraph 2.b.{1).
NCV:
Failure to properly implement
a radwaste
operating procedure,
paragraph
2.c.
VIO:
Failure to perform TS required audits at
the required intervals,
paragraph
9.
Initial i sms
Adverse Condition Report
Alarm Response
Procedure
Closed Circuit Television
Code of Federal
Regulations
Charging/Safety
Injection Pump
Chemical
Volume Control System/Safety
Injection
12
EST
HYAC
IFI
JCO
LER
NST
NCY
NRC
'NN
OST
PN
PNSC
PPTR
RCS/RC
TS
VI0
WR/JO
,Engineer ing Surveillance Test
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
Inspector
Follow-up Item
Inservice Testing
Justification for Continued Operation
Licensee
Event Report
Local Leak Rate Test
Maintenance
Surveillance Test
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Management
Manual
Operations
Surveillance Test
Plant
Change
Request
Primary Instrument Control Cabinet
Preventive
Maintenance
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
quadrant
Power Tilt Ratio
Reactor Auxiliary Building
Reactor
Coolant System
Technical Specification
Violation
Mork Request/Job
Order