ML18009A899
| ML18009A899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1991 |
| From: | Christensen H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A897 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-91-06, 50-400-91-6, NUDOCS 9105210221 | |
| Download: ML18009A899 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1991006
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-40D/91-06
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
March 23 - April 19,
1991
Inspectors:
J.
e row,
endor
Resi
ent
nspector
License No.:
ate
>gne
r.
I
M. Shannon,, Resident
Inspector
Approved by:
g~H.
r1stensen,
ection Chic
Reactor Projects
Branch '1
Division of Reactor Projects
sZ5
Dat
Signed
5
at
gned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant operations,
radiological controls, security, fire protection,
surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
Licensee
Event Reports,
design
changes
and modifications, corrective action program,
and licensee
action
on previous
inspection
items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Some of these tours
and observations
were
conducted
on backshifts.
Results:
One violation was identified: failure to install
during
the performance of local leak rate testing
(paragraph
3).
Improvements
were noted in the licensee's
radiological protection
program
(paragraph
2.b(4))
and in the corrective action program (paragraph
7).
910521 0221
910502
ADOCK 05000400
G
REPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- P. Beane,
Manager, guality Control
- J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
C. Gibson,
Manager,
Programs
5 Procedures
- C. Hinnant,
General
Manager,
Harris Plant
D. McCarthy, Manager, Site Engineering
- B. Neyer,
Manager,
Environmental
5 Radiation Monitoring
- R. Morgan, Manager,
Project Assessment
- T. Morton, Manager,
Maintenance
- J. Nevill, Manager,
Technical
Support
- C. Olexik, Manager,
Regulatory
Compliance
R. Richey, Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
E. Willett, Manager,
Outages
8 Modifications
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included office, operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation,
and corporate
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
H. Christensen,
Section Chief Reactor Projects,
was
on site April 15 and
16,
1991, to tour the plant and hold discussions
with the resident
inspectors
and plant management.
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant began this inspection
period in cold shutdown
(Node 5).
At
10:57 p.m.
on March 25, the reactor vessel
head closure bolts were
detensioned
and the refueling condition
(Node 6) was entered.
At 4:30
a.m.
on April 4, the reactor vessel
was completely defueled.
The plant
remained in the defueled condition for the duration of this inspection
period.
a ~
Shift Logs
and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed records
and discussed
various entries with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications
(TS)
and the licensee's
administrative
procedures.
The following records
were reviewed:
Shift Foreman's
Log; Control
Operator's
Log; Outage Shift Manager's
Log; Night Order Book;
Equipment Inoperable
Record; Active Clearance
Log; Jumper
and Wire
Removal
Log; Temporary Modification Log; Chemistry Daily Reports;
Shift Turnover Checklist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
In addition,
the inspector independently verified clearance
order tagouts.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
b.
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout
the. inspection period, facility tours were conducted
to
observe operations,
surveillance,
and maintenance activities in
progress.
Some of these
observations
were conducted
during
backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
meetings
were attended
by the inspectors
to observe
planning
and management
activities.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the
following areas:
security perimeter fence; control
room; emergency
diesel
generator building; reactor. auxiliary building; reactor
contain'ment building; waste processing
building; turbine building;
fuel handling building; emergency
service water building; battery
rooms; electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the technical
support center.
During these tours,
the following observations
were made:
( I)
Monitoring Instrumentation - Equipment operating status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system
lineup, reactor operating
parameters,
and auxiliary equipment
operating
parameters
were observed
to verify that indicated
parameters
were in accordance
with the
TS for the current
operational
mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift
staffing was. in accordance
with TS requirements
and that control
room operations
were being conducted
in an orderly and
professional
manner.
In addition, the inspector
observed shift
turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the continuity of plant
status,
operational
problems,
and other pertinent plant
information during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping
Conditions - Storage of material
and
components,
and cleanliness
conditions of various
areas
throughout the facility were observed
to determine whether
safety and/or fire hazards. existed.
(4)
Radiological Protection
Program - Radiation protection control
activities were observed routinely to verify that these
activities were in conformance with the facility policies
and
procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The
inspectors
also reviewed selected
radiation work permits to
verify that controls were adequate.
I
The licensee
has
made. substantial
efforts to reduce radiation
levels in the plant.
A new
RCS shutdown chemistry control
program
was
implemented during this refueling outage to dissolve
activated corrosion products into the
RCS coolant for removal.
Further, efforts were noted to remove hot spots
associated
with
the treated
laundry and hot shower tanks.
These
tanks were
cleaned
and flushed with demineralized
water to remove hot
spots.
,The result of this flushing produced substantially
lower
radiation levels at the tanks.
This enabled
the licensee to
repost the areas
as
a radiation area
instead of a high radiation
area.
The
new chemistry control program utilized excess.RCS
coolant
and oxygen concentrations
in conjunction with
appropriate
temperatures
to create
a reducing/oxidizing
condition in which the corrosion product oxide layer becomes
soluble in the
coolant.
The coolant
was then purified via the
normal
letdown system to remove the corrosion products.
This
method
has
been utilized at other licensee
plants
and by the
Japanese
nuclear industry.
The long term objective of this
program is to achieve
lower component radiation
dose rates
over
several
fuel cycles, especially in the steam generator
channel
heads
where significant activities occur with resultant
high
radiation dose.
Although an actual
reduction in dose rate
was
not achieved, in these
components
by the licensee,
the absence
of
any increase
in dose rate from the previous refueling outage
was
encouraging.
The licensee's
efforts to reduce plant radiation levels
produced
positive results
which will lower personnel
exposures
and
be
beneficial to ALARA objectives.
Security Control - In the course of monthly activities, the
inspector
included
a review 'of the licensee's
physical security
program.
The performance of various shifts of the security
force was observed
in the conduct of daily activities which
included:
protected
and vital area
access
controls; searching
of personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and
retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols;
and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the inspector
observed
the operational
status of Closed Circuit Television
(CCTY) monitors,
the
Intrusion Detection
system in the central
and secondary
alarm
stations,
protected
area lighting, protected
and vital area
barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with
operations
and maintenance.
Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment
were observed
to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate
and that fire alarms,
extinguishing equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
C.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
Adverse Condition Reports
(ACRs) were reviewed to verify the
following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions
as identified
in the reports
were accomplished
or being pursued for completion,
generic
items were identified and reported,
and items were reported
as required
by the TS.
ACR 91-136 reported that the appropriate
action contained in
procedure
AP-301, Adverse Weather,
was not completed
upon receiving
a
severe
storm warning.
This procedure
requires all exterior doors in
the reactor auxiliary building and fuel handling building be closed
upon receiving
a tornado warning.
Due to outage work, numerous
cables
and pressure
hoses
were rout'ed through
an exterior door for
work inside the containment building.
On March 29,
a tornado warning
was issued for approximately
one half hour.
Actions were not
initiated to close the exterior door because
of insufficient time to
do so.
The licensee is presently reviewing this event to determine
appropriate corrective action.
Inspector
Followup Item (400/91-06-01):
Review the licensee's
corrective action to close exterior
doors during severe
storm
warnings'.
3.
Surveil lance Observation
(61726)
Surveillance tests
were observed
to verify that approved
procedures
were
being used; qualified personnel. were conducting the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment operability; calibrated
equipment
was
utilized; and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
EPT-176T
Temporary Procedure for Emergency Service Water System
Line Stop Installation,
Removal,
and System Operation with
Line Stop Installed.
MST-I0047 Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation
System
Power
Range
N44
OST-1013
lA-SA Emergency
Diesel
General Operability Test Monthly
Interval
OST-1823
1A-SA Emergency
Diesel Generator
18 Month Operability Test
EST-212
Type
C Local Leak Rate Tests
During the performance
on April 16,1991,
the
inspector noticed that the technician
connected
the leak rate monitor to
the instrument air header
as
a supply source to pressurize
for the pressurizer
sample
system.
The technician
was questioned
about
0
the validity of this action since
a previous
problem had occurred in
October,1989,
during which the instrument air header
was contaminated
while performing local leak rate testing.
The inspector
was informed that
this action was acceptable.
The licensee's
corrective action for the
October event
was. reviewed.
The licensee
had revised administrative
procedure
AP-005, Procedure
Format and Preparation,
step 5.6.1.15,
to
require procedures
be written such that
be installed
when temporarily connecting
a radioactive
system to the
instrument air system.
This procedure further required that plant
procedures
incorporate this action prior to the next performance of the
applicable
procedure.
The local leak rate test procedure,
EST-212, did
not incorporate this requirement.
Failure 'to properly implement procedure
AP-005 is contrary to the requirements
of TS 6.8.l.a
and is considered
to
be
a violation.
Violation (400/91-06-02):
Failure to install
a backflow preventer during
the performance of local leak rate testing.
When notified of this finding, licensee -personnel
took immediate
corrective action
and revised the testing
procedure to incorporate
the
and initiated an investigation into the root cause for
this incident.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed
maintenance activities to verify that
correct
equipment clearances
were in effect; work requests
and fire
prevention
work permits,
as required,
were issued
and being followed;
quality control personnel
were available for inspection activities
as
required;
and,
TS requirements
were being followed.
Maintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the following
maintenance
(WR/JO) activities:
Removal of reactor vessel
head vent piping and restriction orifice.
Disassembly of emergency
diesel
generator
"A" main bearings
in
accordance
with procedure
CN-N0152,
Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Main
Bearing Disassembly
and Reassembly.
Installation of refueling cavity seal
ring in accordance
with
procedure
CN-N0074, Reactor
Vessel
Cavity Seal
Assembly Installation
and Removal.
Emergency diesel
generator cylinder head
and valve reassembly
in
accordance
with procedure
CN-M0150,
Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Cylinder Head
Removal,
Disassembly
and Reassembly.
Disassembly,
inspection,
and repair of seat
leaks
on emergency
service water valves
and
1SW-274 in accordance
with
procedure
CM-N0017, Jamesbury Butterfly Wafer-Sphere
Valves (24-48")
Disassembly
and Maintenance.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential
generic impact,'to detect
trends,
and to determine whether corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that were reported
immediately were reviewed
as they occurred to
determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance
with
the current
HRC Enforcement Policy.
a.
(Closed)
LER 91-02:
This
LER reported
a violation of the technical
specifications
when two trains of reactor coolant
pump underfrequency
trip devices
were found to be inoperable.
.This event
was previously
discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/90-04
and was the subject
of a violation (400/90-04-03).
For record purposes,
this
LER will be
closed
and the licensee's
corrective action will be reviewed with the
violation.
b.
C.
(Open)
LER 91-04:
This
LER reported
the entry into TS 3.0.3 due to
both charging/safety
injection
pumps being inoperable.
This
situation arose
when the "A" safety injection
pump was under
an
equipment clearance for valve testing,
and the cooling water supply
system for the "B" pump failed
a surveillance test.
The licensee
is
presently
implementing corrective action which will include revising
the applicable surveillance test procedure
and
an evaluation to
assess
the method to verify. check valve closure.
The
LER will remain
open pending completion of the corrective actions.
(Closed)
LER 91-05:
. This
LER reported
the entry into TS 3.0.3 when
the "B" emergency
load sequencer
failed
a surveillance test with the
"A" charging
pump inoperable.
This event also rendered
both charging
pumps inoperable.
The faulty relay in the load sequencer
was
subsequently
replaced.
d.
(Open)
LER 91-06:
This
LER reported that
calculation
was not performed while testing the source
range nuclear
instruments.
The licensee attributed the cause of this event
as
misinterpretation of the
TS action statement.
The licensee
plans to
revise applicable surveillance
procedures
by adding
a caution step
alerting operators
to this requirement.
This
LER will remain
open
pending completion of the corrective action.
6.
Design'Changes
and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems
were reviewed to verify that the
changes
were reviewed
and approved
in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.59, that
the changes
were performed in accordance
with technically adequate
and
approved
procedures,
that subsequent
testing
and test results
met
acceptance
criteria or deviations
were resolved in an acceptable
manner,
and that appropriate
drawings
and facility procedures
were revised
as
necessary.
This review included selected
observations
of modifications
and/or testing in progress.
The following modifications/engineering
evaluations
were reviewed:
PCR 5851
Repair of Emergency Service Water
(ESW) Butterfly Valve
Pitting
PCR 5457
'ESW Branch Connections
PCR 5171
Modification to Add Digital Meters to Power
Range
Drawer
PCR 4488
Two CSIPs Available for Mid-Loop Operation/Evaluation
No violations or de'viations
were identified.
7.
Review of the Corrective Action Program
(40500)
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
corrective action program
and
recent
changes
that had
been
made.
This program includes
the reporting of
non-conforming conditions,
determinations
of event reportability, analysis
of event root cause,
action item tracking,
and evaluation of human
performance
problems.
As part of this inspection,
numerous
Adverse
Condition Reports
(ACR) and root cause
evaluations
were reviewed along
with the following procedures:
PLP-002
Corrective Action Program
PLP-618
Human Performance
Evaluation
System
AP-026
Action Item Tracking
AP-605
Root Cause
Evaluations
and Reporting
AP-615
Adverse Condition Reporting
The licensee
has recently
implemented
a
new non-conformance
reporting
system replacing the Significant Operational
Occurrence
Reports with ACRs.
The inspectors
reviewed all of the
ACRs and
have noted
a lower threshold
for reporting identified problems.
Another benefit of the the
new system
was inclusion of several
other previously independent
reporting systems
such
as the non-conforming reports
and field reports
generated
by the
gC
department.
This streamlined
the reporting system
and improved problem
trending abilities.
All other reporting
systems for specific types of
adverse
conditions (for example:
work request,
plant change
request,
security investigations/events,
radiation control feedback)
have
been
designated
as
subprograms
to the
ACR system with triggers established
for
transfer to the
ACR system.
This reporting
system
has
been
implemented
company wide by the licensee
and should
improve communication/problem
correction
between
the licensee's
nuclear plants.
The
ACRs will be
reviewed for adverse
trends
on
a quarterly basis,
however,
due to the
relatively recent, implementation of this system, .an adverse
trend report
was not yet available.
Training was given to appropriate
licensee
personnel
for conducting root cause analysis
and
human performance
evaluations.
Procedure
AP-026 contains
a provision for extending corrective action
due
dates.
Corrective .actions
which are not completed
by the due date are
reported to the Plant General
Manager.
The inspector
reviewed the latest
corrective action overdue. report.
Of the
27 items
on this list, several
items were
10 months
overdue for completion
and
one item was approximately
one year overdue.
It appears
that there is little effort required to get
an extension.
The inspector
considered 'that the lack of attention given
to corrective action
due dates
tended to reduce
the effectiveness
of the
corrective action process.
In conclusion,
the inspector considered
the changes
made to the corrective
action program to be improvements
and should produce'ositive
effects
on
safe plant generation.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702,
92701)
(Closed)
IFI 400/90-20-05:
Review the licensee's
activities regarding
wrong size starter coils in motor control centers.
During the investigation of this event'the
licensee
discovered
two
additional motor control centers
(1823-SB
and
1B31-SB) with 120
VAC
.
starter coils installed.
The licensee
has
completed
an engineering
evaluation,
PCR-5518,
120
VAC versus
110
VAC Starter Coils,
and has,
determined that the installed
120
VAC 'coils would properly pick up at
lower voltages.
Therefore,
the affected, equipment
remained operable.
The
licensee
is nevertheless
replacing the
120
VAC coils with the
110
VAC
coils in accordance
with plant design.
Exit Inte'rview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1)
at the conclusion of the inspection
on April 19,
1991.
During this
meeting,
the inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the
inspection
as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis
on the Violation, and Inspector
Follow-up item addressed
below.
The
licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did not
identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by
the inspectors
during this inspection.
Item Number
Descri tion and Reference
400/91-06-01
IFI:
Review the licensee's
corrective action to
close exterior doors during severe
storm
warnings,
paragraph
2.c.
400/91-06-02
10.
Acronyms and Initiali sms
VIO:
Failure to install
during the performance of local leak rate
testing,
paragraph
3.
ACR
CFR
EPT
EST
. IFI
LER
NRC
OST
PLP
QA/QC
TS
VAC
WR/JO
Adverse Condition Report
As Low As Reasonably
Achievable
Administrative Procedure
Closed Circuit Television
Code of Federal
Regulations
Corrective Maintenance
Engineering
Performance
Test
Engineering Surveillance
Test
Inspector
Follow-up Item
Licensee
Event Report
Maintenance Surveillance Test
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Surveillance
Test
Plant
Change
Request
Plant Program
Quality Assurance/Quality
Control
Radiation
Work Permit
Technical Specification
Volt Alternating Current
Violation
Work Request/Job
Order