ML18009A872
| ML18009A872 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1991 |
| From: | Christensen H, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A870 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-91-04, 50-400-91-4, GL-89-13, IEIN-80-20, IEIN-84-69, IEIN-89-042, IEIN-89-064, IEIN-89-42, IEIN-89-64, NUDOCS 9104230340 | |
| Download: ML18009A872 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1991004
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.'W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
E
Report No.:
50-400/91'-04
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
=-P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
February
23 - Parch
22,
1991
Lead Inspector:
e row,
endor
e
ent
spector
Other Inspector(s):
N. Shannon,
Resident
Inspector
License No.:
ate
>gne
Approved by:
H. Christensen,
Section Chief
Reactor Projects
Branch
1
Division of Reactor Projects
0 te Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant operations,
radiological controls, security, fire protection,
nonconformance
reports,
surveillance observation,
maintenance
observation,
preparations
for refueling, licensee
event reports,
followup of onsite events,
'review of offsite power system,
and review of plant nuclear safety committee
activities.
Numerous facility tours
wer e conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Some of these tours
and observations
were conducted
on backshifts.
Results:
One violation was identified:
failure to maintain two reactor protection
system reactor coolant
pump underfrequency trip devices operable,
paragraph
6.
Two non-cited licensee identified violations were identified:
failure to
include reactor coolant system vent valves
and
a check valve in the inservice
testing program,
paragraph
2.c;
and failure to perform
a viscosity analysis
on
a diesel
generator
fuel oil shipment,
paragraph
5.
9i04230340
910402
ADOCK 05000400
G
REPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
p.
J.
C.
- C
D.
B.
T.
J.
C.
A.
R.
H.
'E.
W.
Beane,
Manager, guality Control
Collins, Manager,
Operations
Gibson, Director,
Programs
and Procedures
Hinnant, Plant General
Manager
McCarthy, Manager, Site Engineering
Meyer, Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
Morton, Manager,
Maintenance
Nevill, Manager,
Technical
Support
Olexik, Director, Regulatory
Compliance
Powell, Harris Training Unit Training Manager
Richey, Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
Smith, Manager,
Radwaste
Operation
Willett, Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
Wilson, Manager,
Spent Nuclear
Fuel
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included office, operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant began this inspection
period in power operation
(Mode 1).
On
March 15,
1991,
a plant shutdown
was
commenced to start
a scheduled
refueling outage.
The cold shutdown
(Mode 5) condition was reached
at
10:46 p.m.,
on March 17.
The plant remained in cold shutdown for the
duration of this inspection period.
a..
Shift Logs
and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed records
and discussed
various entries with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications
and the licensee's
administrative
procedures.
The
following records
were reviewed:
Shift Foreman's
Log; Control
Operator's
Log; Night Order
Book; Equipment Inoperable
Record; Active
Clearance
Log; Jumper
and Wire Removal
Log; Chemistry Daily Reports; Shift Turnover Checklist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
In addition, the inspector
independently verified
clearance
order tagouts.
2
b.
Facility Tours
and Observ'ations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
observe operations,
surveillance,.and
maintenance activities in
progress.
Some of these
observations
were conducted during
.
backshifts.
Also, during 'this inspection period, licensee
meetings
were attended
by the inspectors to observe planning
and management
activities.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the
following areas:
security perimeter fence; control
room; emergency
diesel
generator building; reactor auxiliary building; waste
processing
building; turbine building; fuel handling building;
emergency
service water building; battery rooms; electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the technical
support center.
During these tours,
the following observations
were made:
( 1)
Monitoring Instrumentation - Equipment operating status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system
lineup, reactor operating
parameters,
and auxiliary equipment
operating
parameters
were observed to verify that indicated
parameters
were in accordance
with the
TS for the current
operational
mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance
with TS'requirements
and that
control
room operations
were being conducted in an orderly and
professional
manner.
In addition, the inspector
observed shift
turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the continuity of
plant status,
operational
problems,
and other pertinent plant
information during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping
Conditions - Storage of material
and
components,
and cleanliness
conditions of various areas
throughout the facility were observed to determine whether
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
1
(4)
Radiological Protection
Program - Radiation protection control
activities were observed routinely to verify that these
activities were in conformance with the facility policies
and
procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors
also reviewed selected
radiation work-permits to
verify that controls were adequate.
(5)
Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the
inspector included
a review of the licensee's
physical security
program.
The performance of various shifts of the security
force was observed
in the conduct of daily activities which
included:
protected
and vital area
access
controls; searching
of personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and
retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols;
and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the inspector
observed
the operational
status of Closed Circuit Television monitors, the Intrusion
Detection
system in the. central
and secondary
alarm stations,
protected
area l'ighting, 'protected
and vital area barrier
integrity, and the security organization interface with
operations
and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment
were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing
was appropriate
and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
c.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
Adverse Condition Reports
and Nonconformance
Reports
were reviewed to
verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions
as
identified in the reports
were accomplished
or being pursued for
completion, generic
items were identified and reported,
and items
were reported
as required
by the TS;
ACR 91-060 reported that
RCS vent valves
(1RC-900,
1RC-'02,
and
an
RCS vent check valve (1RC-993)
were not required to be open stroke tested
and .forward flow tested
respectively,
by the licensee's
IST program procedure
ISI-203,
ASYiE
Section
XI Pump
and Valve Program Plan.
This matter
was identified
during the licensee's
corrective action regarding
LER 91-01 which
reported'hat
a control
room
HVAC check valve was not tested.
The
licensee's
corrective action included
a review of all other IST
system
check valves for similar problems.
Although the licensee's
approved
IST program stroke tested
the vent valves in the closed
direction, the open safety function of these
valves
was overlooked.
'imilarly, the check valve safety function to permit forward flow was
also overlooked during program development.
Since these
valves are
routinely operated,
and flow verified, during
RCS fill and vent
evolutions,
the licensee
believes
the valves are operable.
Appro-
priate testing will be performed during-the upcoming refueling
outage.
This matter is considered
to be
a licensee identified
and is not being cited because
the crit'eria specified in section
V.G. 1 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NCV (400/91-04-01):
Failure to include
RCS vent valves
and
a check
valve in the
IST program.
One non-cited violation was identified.
3.
Surveillance Observation
(61726)
Surveillance tests
were observed to verify that approved
procedures
were
being used; qualified personnel
were conducting the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment operability; calibrated
equipment
was
utilized; and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation
Power
Range
N44
OST-1042
OST-1119.
OST-1808
Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation
Source
Range
N31
Reactor
Coolant Loop 3 Flow Instrument Protection
Set II Operational
Test
Self Heating Test of Installed Resistance
Thermometers
Seismic Monitoring Operability Monthly Interval
Containment
Spray Operability quarterly Interval
Main Steam Isolation:
ESF Response
Time 18 Month
Interval
OST-1823
1A-SA Emergency Diesel
Generator
18 Month Operability
Test
EST-202
EST-212
Type
C Local Leak Rate Tests
EPT-171
EPT-177
EPT-311
C
CCW Pump Corrosion Inhibitor Addition
Flow Balancing
1X-SAB Trip and Throttle Valve
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed
maintenance activities to verify that
correct equipment
clearances
were in effect; work requests
and fire
prevention
work permits,
as required,
were issued
and being followed;
quality control
personnel
were available for inspection activities
as
required;
and
TS requirements
were being followed.
i
0
Maintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the
following maintenance
(WR/JO) activities:
WR91ADIB1 and 91ADICl Installation of Instrumentation
on the
CCW/SW
Heat Exchanger to perform monitoring required
by GL 89-13
WR91ACEY1'Dam'per rebuild and solenoid replacement
on AY-D14-1, an
area
Review of installation of monitoring equipment for VOTES testing of
valve 1AF-143, Auxiliary Feed to "B" SG.
Review of field installation for
PORV safety upgrade,
PCR 5044.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect
trends,
and to determine whether corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that were reported
immediately were reviewed
as they occurred to
determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance
with the current
(Open)
LER 91-03:
This
LER reported that following receipt of a fuel oil
shipment
on January
21,
1991, the licensee failed to determine
the
kinematic viscosity.
The condition was discovered
during
a documentation
review by the chemistry foreman.
The licensee attributed this event to
personnel .error caused
by a lack of familiarity to an infrequent evolution,
performed approximately
once every two years.
A satisfactory analysis for
kinematic viscosity was conducted
on the remaining oil sample
on
February
21,
1991.
Additional corrective action planned
by the licensee
will include additional training for chemi,stry personnel
and'
procedure
revision to require
a documented
comparison of the supplier's viscosity
and the viscosity determined
by the
HNP laboratory.
This matter is
considered
to be
a licensee identified
NCV and is not being cited because
the criteria specified'n section V.G.l of the
satisfied.
NCV (400/91-04-02):
Failure to perform
a viscosity analysis
on a diesel
generator fuel oil shipment.
One non-cited violation was identified.
6.
Followup of Onsite Events
(93702)
At 2: 12 a.m.,
on March 5,
1991, the licensee
declared
an unusual
event
due
to the failure of two channels
of the reactor protection system's
underfrequency trip circuit and resultant
TS required plant shutdown.
0
During the performance of surveillance testing,
the "8" train
underfrequency trip circuit associated
with the "A" RCP was found to be
inoperable at 12:45 a.m.
This inoperable
channel,
along with a previously
"8" train underfrequency
channel
associated
with the "C" RCP,
required the licensee to implement
a plant shutdown in accordance
with
Plans to reduce
power were formulated
and actual
power
reduction
commenced at 2: 12 a.m.
Upon reaching approximately
45 percent
power, troubleshooting activities in the
RCP breaker cubicles discovered
disconnected
umbilical cords for the "A" and "C" RCPs.
These
cords
complete the circuit between
the
RCP breakers
and the reactor protection
system for the "8" train underfrequency trip.
The cords were reconnected
and applicable surveillance testing
was completed satisfactorily at
5:03 a.m.
The plant shutdown
was stopped
and the unusual
event terminated.
The reactor protection
system
RCP underfrequency trip circuit is comprised
. of two underfrequency trip devices for each
RCP;
one supplies
a signal to
the reactor protection system train "A" and the other to train "8"
The
"A" train circuits utilize internal breaker switches
which touch side
panel
contacts
of the breaker cubicle for electrical continuity.
To
provide electrical
separation
between trains, the "8" train uses umbilical
cords which plug into the breaker.
These connections
allow breaker
removal
from the cubicles.
The licensee's
investigation into this event revealed that the
breakers
had last been
racked out of their cubicles during the November
1990 outage,
when mid-loop
RCS operations
were required to perform steam
generator
tube repairs.
Since the umbilical cords were unplugged for
this operation,
the licensee
believes that .the cords were not properly
reconnected
upon racking the breakers
back in during plant restart.
Plant procedures
did. not contain appropriate
steps for reconnecting
of
the umbilical cords.
Also,
a review of surveillance-testing
records
revealed
the following.
Surveillance testing
on these circuits is
performed every
92 days
on
a staggered
test basis.
The "8" RCP
underfrequency trip circuit had
been tested satisfactorily
on December
11,
1990.
During surveillance testing
on January
8, 1991, the "8" train
underfrequency
channel
associated
with the "C" RCP was found to be
This channel
was placed in the tripped condition and power
operation continued.
The performance of troubleshooting for this failure
was limited because
licensee
management
was sensitive to a previous
reactor trip which had occurred
when
a
RCP breaker cubicle was accidentally
bumped.
Although the source of this problem was determined to be at the
breaker cubicle,
no inspection
was performed inside the cubicle.
Following
the similar problem which occurred
on March 5, and with reactor
power less
that
50 percent,
troubleshooting
was allowed inside the breaker cubicle
where the disconnected
umbilical cords were found.
The failure to have
RCP underfrequency trip
devices
from the plant startup
on November 27, 1990, until
March 5,
1991 (approximately
98 days), is contrary to the requirements
of
TS 3.3. 1 and is considered
to be
a violation.
Violation (400/91-04-03):
Failure to "maintain two reactor protection
system
RCP underfrequency trip devices
The inspectors
considered
troublesh'ooting activities to also
be
deficient.
No .troubleshooting
was performed inside the breaker cubicles
during appropriate
windows which became available
on January
24 and
February
25 when reactor
power was reduced to less
than
30 percent for
other reasons.
This contributed'o the excessive
time for which the
problem existed,
and is considered
to be
a weakness.
One violation was identified.
7.'eview of Offsite Power System
(71707)
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
offsite power distribution system
and administrative controls for familiarization.
A tour of. the
was conducted,
administrative
procedures
reviewed,
and
licensee
personnel
interviewed.
In conjunction with this effort, the
licensee's
actions with respect to related industry events
were also
reviewed.
The offsite distributi'on system consists
of a 230
KV switchyard which
has'even
feeder lines from five different substations.
Two independent
startup transformers
receive
power from this switchyard through
underground
cables.
When the plant is online, the main generator
output
is transmitted to the switchyard through overhead lines.
Two auxiliary
transformers
also receive
power from the main generator
and supply power
to the onsite distribution system.
The .switchyard is divided into two
busses
which can supply power to either startup transformer.
Plant
operations
personnel
have direct control
os the six critical switchyard
breakers
which supply power to the startup transformers with the
dispatcher
having control of the remaining eleven breakers.
protection utilizes
a breaker
and
a half scheme to isolate faults with a
double breaker protection
scheme for the generating unit.
Breakers
have
redundant trip circuits powered
from two separate
batteries.
The
switchyard is physically protected
by a fence
and locked gate.
'Only
authorized
personnel
are allowed access.
Significant maintenance activities are reviewed
by an onsite
plant-transmission
activities coordinator.
This person
reviews major
modifications/system
outages for potential conflicts with plant
activities.
Minor routine activities are scheduled
through the shift
foreman.
Maintenance is usually planned at least
a week in advance.
Transmission
department
personnel
are required to notify the shift
foreman prior to comnencing
work and to inform the dispatcher prior to
breaker operation.
These
communications
have
been formalized with
required repeat
backs.
0
The licensee
has
an interdepartmental
procedure
(FG
8 PTG-TD-004) which
relates
the general
division of responsibilities with respect to
maintenance
of the switchyard, relays,
and associated
control equipment.
This procedure
was written for all the licensee's
plants
and provides
a
general
description of components for which the plants
are responsible
and those
under the cognizance 'of. the transmission
departments.
,Provisions
were also
made for technical
guidance
and administrative
advice.
The licensee is presently'pgrading
this procedure
through
a
customer/supplier
agreement
which will be site specific and clarify the
specific responsibility,of each group.
Due to numerous
industry events,
the licensee
has
formed
a project quality
team to recommend
improvements
to- enhance offsite power reliability.
Approximately 96 industry events
involving loss of offsite power were
reviewed
by thi.s team, including those discussed
in NUREG 1410, Loss of
Vital AC Power
and the Residual
Heat
Removal
System During Mid-Loop
Operations
at Vogtle Unit
1 on March 20,
1990;
Loss of Decay
Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse
Unit 1 While in a Refueling Mode;
Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages
not Covered
by Technical Specifications;
IN 84-69, Operation of Emergency Diesel
Generators;
IN 89-.64, Electrical
Bus Bar Failures;
and two events which
happened
at the licensee's
plants involving a loss of offsite power at
plant Brunswick on June
17,
1989,
and the generator/transformer fire at
plant Harris
on October 9, 1989.
Recommendations
from this team included
the completion of the customer/supplier
agreement,
closeout inspections
following maintenance
of electrical
equipment,
expansion of the
program to include major electrical
transmission
components,
and distribution of operating experience
feedback
information to the
transmission
department.
The switchyard is toured weekly by Operations
personnel
during a check of.
the offsite power system performed in accordance
with TS 4.8.1.1.3,.a
and
procedure
OST-1023, Offsite Power Availability Verification,
The check
includes
a physical verification that switchyard breakers
are in the
proper position.
In conclusion,
the inspector considered
the offsite power system to be
a
very reliable source of power.
Licensee efforts to improve this
reliability were considered
to be pro-active.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Review of Plant Nuclear Safety
Committee Activities (40500)
The inspectors
attended
PNSC meetings
which discussed
outage activities
to be performed during mid-loop operations of the
RCS.
A detailed review
of all maintenance activities scheduled
during mid-loop operations
was
performed.
All activities that could affect mid-loop operation
and
associated
systems
were identified as hold work items.
The individual
work crews were also notified that specific work request
could not be
worked during mid-loop.
The detailed review performed
by the licensee
should prevent
any problems related to mid-loop operations.
Meeting
minutes
were also reviewed to verify accurate
documentation.
No violations of deviations
were identified.
9.,
Licensee
Action on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702,
92701)
(Closed)
IFI 400/89-16-02:
Fuel 8asket
Removal
on August 9, 1989.
Followup of this item was performed
and documented
in Inspection Report
50-400/89-23,
paragraph
4.a, and was the subject of a violation
(400/89-23-03).
Subsequent
procedural
controls for fuel handling were
reviewed
hy the resident staff and found to be satisfactory.
Following
approximately
20 additional
shipments
no similar problems
have
been
encountered.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted in paragraph
1)
at the conclusion of the inspection
on March 22,
1991.
During this
meeting,
the inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the
inspection
as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis
on the Violation and the Non-cited Violations addressed
below.
The
licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did
not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this inspection.
Item Number
400/91-04-01
400/91-04-02
400/91-04-03
11.
and
ACR
AFh'LARA
Descri tion and Reference
NCV:
Failure to include
RCS vent valves
and check
vhlve in the
IST program,
paragraph
2.c.
NCV:
Failure to perform a viscosity analysis
on
a
diesel
generator fuel oil shipment,
paragraph
5.
VIO:
Failure to maintain two reactor protection
system
RCP underfrequency trip devices
paragraph
6.
Initialisms
Alternating Current
Adverse Condition Report
As Low As Reasonably
Achievable
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
10
CCW.
CFR
EPT
EST
GL
IFI
IN
KV
LER
NRC
OST
PNSC
QA/QC
'AB
RCS/RC
TS
YIO
WR/JO
Closed Circuit Television
Component
Cooling Water
Code of Federal
Regulations
'Engineering
Performance
Test
Engineering Safety Features
Engineering Surveillance
Test
Generic Letter
General
Procedure
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
Inspector
Follow-up Item
Information Notice
Inservice Inspection
Inservice Testing
'ilovolt
Licensee
Event Report
Naintenance
Surveillance Test
Non-Conformance
Report
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Surveillance Test
Plant
Change
Request
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Power Operated Relief Valve
Quality Assurance/Quality
Control
Reactor Auxiliary.Building
Pump
Reactor
Coolant System
Steam .Generator
Technical Specification
Violation
Work Request/Job
Order