ML18009A799
| ML18009A799 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1991 |
| From: | Christensen H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A796 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-90-26, NUDOCS 9102110055 | |
| Download: ML18009A799 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1990026
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
/
Report No.:
50-400/90-26
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
License No.:
Facility'ame:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
December
15,
1990 - January
25,
1991
Inspectors:
edrow, Senior Resident
Inspector
. Shannon,
Resident
nspector
Approved by:
H.
C r>stensen,
Section
Chic
Reactor Projects
Branch
1
Division of Reactor Projects-
/ Po/vf
ate Signed
/3o
gl
Date
Soigne
ate Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was
conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant
operations,
radiological
controls,
security,
fire protection,
surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
licensee
event reports
and
10 CFR Part 21 reports,
design
changes
and modifications, followup of onsite
events,
and licensee
action
on previous
inspection
items.
Numerous facility
tours were conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Some of these tours
and
observations
were conducted
on backshifts.
Results:
Five violations were identified:
failure to maintain administrative control of
a high radiation
area
key, paragraph
2.b.(4); failure to properly implement
a
radiochemistry
procedure,
paragr'aph 2.b.(7);
a non-cited violation for improper
documentation
of. lifted electrical
paragraph
4;
a non-cited
licensee
identified violation regarding
a failure to test the containment
personnel
air
lock, paragraph 2.c.;
and
a non-cited licensee identified violation regarding
a
failure to make
a four hour report to the
NRC, paragraph
5.e.
The failure to
properly implement radiochemistry
procedures
shows
a continued
lack of attention
to detail
by the licensee's
chemistry department.
9102210055
910130
ADOCK 05000400
8
REPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
- C. Gibson,
Manager,
Programs
and Procedures
- C. Hinnant, Plant General
Manager
"B. Neyer,
Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
"T. Norton, Manager,
Maintenance
- C. Olexil;, Manager,
Regulatory
Compliance
"'R. Richey,
Vice President,
Marris Nuclear Project
E. Willett, Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
- L. Woods,
Manager,
Technical
Support
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
office,
operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel..
- Attended exit interview
,
and Initialisms
used
throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant continued
in power operation
(Mode 1) for the duration of this
inspection
period.
a.
Shift Logs
and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed
records
and discussed
various entries
with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance
with the
Technical
Specifications
(TS)
and
the licensee's
administrative
procedures.
The following records
were reviewed:
Shift Foreman's
Log; Control
Operator's
Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable
Record; Active
Clearance
Log; Jumper
and
Wire Removal
Log; Chemistry Daily Reports; Shift Turnover Checklist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
.In addition,
the inspector
independently
verified
clearance
order tagouts.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
b.
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout
the inspection
period, facility tours
were
conducted
to
observe
operations,
surv'ei llance,
and
maintenance
activities
in
progress.
'Some
of these
observations
were
conducted
during
backshifts.
Also, during this inspection
period,
licensee
meetings
were attended
by the inspectors
to observe
planning
and
management
activities.
The facility tours
and
observations
encompassed
the
following areas:
security perimeter
fence;
control
room;
emergency
diesel
generator
building;
reactor
auxiliary building;
waste
processing
building; 'turbine
building;
fuel
handling
building;
emergency
service
water
building;
battery
rooms;
electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the technical
support center.
h
During these
tours,
the following observations
were made:
(1)
Monitoring Instrumentation
-
Equipment operating
status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system
lineup,
reactor
operating
parameters,
and. auxi li'ary equipment
operating
parameters
were
observed
to verify that indicated
parameters
were
in accordance
with the
TS for the current
operational
mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors
verified that operating shift,
staffing was in accordance
with TS requirements
and that control
room
operations
were
being
conducted
in
an
orderly
and
professional
manner.
In addition,
the inspector
observed shift
turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the continuity of plant
status,
operational
problems,
and
other
pertinent
plant
information during these
turnovers.
(3)
Plant
Ho'usekeeping
Conditions
-
Storage
of material
and
components,
and
cleanliness
conditions
of
various
areas
throughout
the facility were
obser'ved
to determine
whether
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
(4)
Radiological
Protection
Program - Radiation protection 'control
activities
were
observed
routinely to verify that
these
activities
were in conformance
with the facility policies
and
procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory'equirements.
The
inspectors
also
reviewed
selected
radiation
work permits to
verify that controls were adequate.
On
December
10, at approximately
5:25 p.m.,
licensee
personnel
discovered
that
a high radiation
area
access
key
was missing
during
a routine shift inventory of administratively controlled
keys.
= Technical
Specification
6. 12.2 requires that accessible
areas
with radiation levels greater
than
1000 mR/hr at
18 inches
from a radiation source
be provided with locked doors to prevent
unauthorized
entry with keys
maintained
under administrative
control.
The missing
key
was
subsequently
found in the keyhole for the
door to the
drum storage
area
in the waste
processing
building
at approximately ll:30 p.m.'n
December
10.
Discussion with the
technician
who last
used
the
key determined
that the
key
had
been
in the
door
lock since
approximately
11:00
a.m.
on
December
10.
Based
upon
RWP and dosimetry records,
the licensee
does
not believe
an unauthorized
entry was
made into the locked
area.
Licensee
personnel
removed
the .key from the keyhole
and
initiated
a
SOOR
(SOOR
90-187)
to investigate
this incident.
The inspector
reviewed radiation
surveys
of the
drum storage
area
and discovered that existing radiation levels required that
this area
be locked in accordance
with the TS.
The licensee
has
recently
been
experiencing
problems with the
control of high radiation
areas.
SOOR 90-78 reported that
on
Ilay 25,
1990,
a
locked radiation
area
gate
in the reactor
containment
building was
found not to
be locked with the door
ajar .
SOOR
90-135
reported
that flashing lights,
used to
identify a high radiation area,
were found not to be functioning
on October
5,
1990.
SOOR 90-161 reported that
on November
13,
1990,
the restricted
high radiation
area
key box was improperly
accessed
by an unauthorized
individual.
All of these
problems,
which occurred
in
a relatively short period of time, indicate
the
need for the licensee
to review the controls associated
with
with appropriate
personnel.
The
missing
key event of December
10 is
a violation of
TS
.6. 12.2.
Although this matter
was identified by the licensee, it
is being cited due to recurrent
problems in this area.
Violation (400/90-26-01):
Failure to maintain administrative
control of a high radiation area
key.
Security Control - In )the course of the monthly activities, the
inspector
included
a review of the licensee's
physical security
program.
The
performance
of various shifts of the security
force
was
observed
in the
conduct of daily activities which
included:
protected
and vital area
access
controls;
searching
of personnel,
packages,
and
vehicles;
badge
issuance
and
retrieval;
escorting
of visitors; patrols;
and
compensatory
posts.
In addition,
the inspector
observed
the operational
status
of
Closed
Circuit Television
(CCTV) monitors,
the
Intrusion Detection
system
in the central
and
secondary
alarm
stations,
protected
area
lighting, protected
and vital area
bar rier integrity,
and the security organization interface with
operations
and maintenance.
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities,
staffing
and
equipment were observed
to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate
and
that fire alarms,
extinguishing
equipment,
actuating
controls,
fire
fighting
equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
'
(7)
Chemistry
Sampling
Program
-- Reactor
coolant
sampling
and
analysis
and boric acid tank analysis
were
observe'd
to verify
that
the
sample
was
representative,
appropriate
acceptance
. criteria
were
met, test results
were properl'y evaluated,
and
sampling
and
analysis
procedures
were utilized
and properly
'mplemented.
On January
8,
1991,
the inspector
observed
the sampling of the
" reactor
coolant
system which was
done for compliance with T.S.
4.4.7.
While the chemistry technician
was purging the
sample
lines,
the inspector
questioned
the length
of, the purge time.
The technician
stated
that
a
one to
two minute. purge
was
required prior to sampling.
Upon returning to the
chemistry'ab,
the inspector
reviewed chemistry procedure
CRC-100,
Reactor
Coolant
System
Chemistry Control,
Rev.
7,
and
noted that the
required
sample
purge
time per
step
10. 1. 1.6 was ten minutes.
The technician
was
again
questioned
about
the .length of the
purge
time
and
responded
that
during
previous
on-the-job
training,
she
had been'nstructed
to purge the
sample line for
one to two minutes.
The failure to purge the
sample line as
required
by procedure
CRC-100 is considered
to be
a violation of
Violation (400/90-26-02):
Failure, to properly
implement
a
radiochemistry
procedure.
This violation and violation 90-21-01,
continues
to show
a lack
of attention
to detail
by
the
licensee
in
implementing
radiochemistry
procedures.
When informed of this finding, the
licensee
implemented additional corrective action consisting of:
counseling
the 'chemistry
technician
and
foremen,
management
discussion
of
procedural
compliance
with supervisors
and
specialists,
initiation of spot checks of procedure
performance,
and corporate
chemistry department initiation of an independent
review of this incident and previous incidents.
c.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
Significant Operational
Occurrence
Reports
(SOORs)
and Nonconformance
Reports
(NCRs)
were
reviewed
to verify the following:
TS were
complied with, corrective actions
as identified in the reports
were
accomplished
or being
pursued
for completion,
generic
items
were
identified and reported,
and
items
were reported
as required
by the
TS.
SOOR
90-186
reported
that
a
TS required surveillance test
on the
personnel air lock was not performed
as required.
Following multiple
containment entries
on December
6,
1990, the licensee
was testing
the
I
personnel
air lock for overall
leakage
in
accordance
with
TS 4.6. 1.3.b.
This test
was satisfactorily
completed
on December
10.
Upon review of containment
entry logs, licensee
personnel
discovered
that periodic testing of the personnel air lock door seal, leakage
was
not performed
every
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />,
as required
by TS 4.6. 1.3.a.
Although
unofficial door seal
leakage
tests
were performed during the overall
leakage test,
these
tests
were not documented.
'All unofficial test
results
were satisfactory.
The licensee's
corrective
action to
prevent
recurrence
included
adding
a caution
note
to the testing
procedure
which specifies
the additional
requirement
to perform
a
door seal
leakage test.
This matter is considered
to be
a licensee
identified
NCV and
i's not being cited because
the criteria specified
in section
V.G. 1 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NC4 (400/90-26-03):
Failure to periodically test
the containment
personnel air lock every
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
3.
Surveillance
Observation
(61726)
Surveillance
tests
were observed
to verify that approved
procedures
were
being
used;
qualified
personnel
were
conducting
the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify . equipment
operability;
calibrated
equipment
was
utilized; and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
CRC-100
CRC-524
EST-702
Reactor
Coolant System Chemistry Control
Boron Using the Nettler DL40RC Nemotitrator
Noderator Temperature
Coefficient -
EOL Using The
Boron Nethod
EST-0719
EPT-160T
FNP-101
LP-T-6903B
NST-E0006
NST-E0039
Incore Versus
Excore Axial Flux Difference Comparison
Temporary Procedure for the Boundary Test for the
Emergency
Exhaust
System.
Incore Thermocouple
and Flux Napping
Loop Calibration Diesel Generator
Room
B Temperature
480
YAC Nolded Case Circuit Breaker Test
Pump
Relay
Channel Calibration
6,
NST-E0043
Reactor
Coolant
Pump
(1C-SN) Underfrequency
Relay
(KF) Channel
Calibration
NST-E0044
6.9
KV Emergency. Bus,
1B-SB Under'oltage
Channel
Calibration
NST- I0012
HST- I0088
NST-10122
NST- I0169
OST-1013
OST-1503
OST-1805
PIC-E004
Main Steamline
Pressure,
Loop
2 Channel
Calibration
Reactor
Coolant Loop
1 Hot Leg Temperature
Instrument
Calibration
Pressurizer
Pressure
P-04455 Operational
Test
Nuclear Instrumentation
System
Source
Range
H31
Operational
Test
1A-SA Emergency
Diesel
Generator Operability Test.
Monthly Interval
Pressurizer
PORV Operability quarterly Interval
Pressurizer
PORV Operability 18 Monthly Interval
General
Electric 6.9
KY Overcurrent
Relay Calibration
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The
inspector
observed/reviewed
maintenance
activities to verify that
correct
equipment
clearances
were
in effect;
'work requests
and fire
prevention
work permits,
as
required,
were
issued
and
being followed;
quality control
personnel
were available for -inspection activities
as
required;
and,
TS requirements
were being followed.
Maintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the following
maintenance
(WR/JO) activities:
Troubleshoot
slow start of the
"A" emergency
diesel
generator
in
accordance
with procedure
NPT-M0040,
Emergency
Diesel
Generator
On-Engine Starting Air Valve's Periodic Maintenance.
Replacement
of fan belt on the
RAB equipment
room fan AH-16A.
Disassembly
and cleaning of an
emergency
service water screen
wash
pump
and
post
maintenance
testing
in accordance
with procedure
OST-1214,
Emergency
Service
Water
System
Operability,
Train
A,
quarterly Interval.
Troubleshoot
BIT isolation
valve failure to
operate
per
corrective
maintenance
procedure
CM-I-004, Limitorque Calibration
Check
and Stroking,
and
CM-M-0050, Limitorque Valve Actuator Size
SMB-000 Disassembly.
Troubleshoot
the
non vital inverter due to voltage spiking.
Replacement
of S-4 fan
ITE breakers
with Westinghouse
breakers,
per
plant modification
PCR 4687..-
Troubleshoot of the
RCP underfrequency trip circuit failure.
Disassembly
and inspection of 1SI-2 BIT isolation valve
and
RHR Recirc valve.
On January
2,
1991,
the BIT Inlet Isolation Valve (1S1-1)
was disassembled
for corrective
maintenance
because
the valve would not stroke.
It was
found that
a locking ring which held the torque switch bearing in 'place,
was
missing.
This allowed
the
switch internals
to shift
and
prevented
valve movement.
The licensee
is conducting further inspections
of other torque switches to insure the locking rings are in place.
During disassembly,
the inspector
noted that the technicians
failed to
document lifted electrical
in the valve operator.
The licensee
was
issued
a
similar violation
in
NRC
Inspection
Report
50-400/90-20
(VIO 400/90-20-03)
in which lifted leads
were not properly documented.
Procedure
PLP-702,
Independent
Verification,
was
revised
following
Violation 400/90-20-03
to include
a log sheet
which would individually
document all lifted leads.
This sheet
was not completed
as required
when
the
were lifted.
However,
the licensee
has
not yet
completed
training all personnel
on the .procedure revision.. Therefore,
this matter will not
be cited,
but instead will be
considered
to
be
another
example of violation 400/90-20-03.
5.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
and
10 CFR Part 21 Reports
(92700)
The following LERs
and
10 CFR Part 21 Reports
were reviewed for potential
generic
impact,
to detect
trends,
and to determine
whether corrective
actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that were reported
immediately were
reviewed
as
they occur'red
to determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs
were reviewed in accordance
with the current
a ~
(Closed)
LER 90-05:
This
LER reported
an actuation of an engineered
safety
system
due to
a radiation monitor spike caused
by
a loose pin
connection.
This event
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/90-06.
The licensee
has
revised
the applicable test
procedure
to delete
the
unnecessary
loss of counts
test
thereby
reducing wear
on the coaxial
connector.
(Closed)
LER 90-10:
This
LER reported
inadequate
administrative
control of the
RAB emergency
exhaust
system ventilation boundary.
This matter
was
previously
discussed
in
NRC
Inspection
Report
50-400/90-10.
As
a result of the licensee's
corrective action to
review other ventilation systems for similar problems,
the licensee
discovered
- an inoperable
control
room ventilation
and
was
issued
a non-cited
licensee identified violation (NC4 400/90-14-02).
The licensee
submitted
a supplemental
report dated
September
5,
1990,
documenting
results of the review of the other ventilation systems.
The licensee
has
completed
testing of various ventilation 'boundary
doors
and determined
that the
system is not capable
of maintaining
the
required
negative
pressure
with
doors left open.
Plant
procedures
were revised to add administrative controls for specific
ventilation boundary doors.
(Closed)
LER 90-16:
This
LER reported
inadequate
testing of the
FHB
emergency
exhaust
system.
This event
was previously discussed
in NRC
Inspection
Report
50-400/90-13
and
was
the subject
of
a licensee
identified violation
(NC4 400/90-13-02).
The licensee
has revised
the test
procedure for acceptable
flow measurements
and
comparisons
of data collected.
(Closed)
LER 90-22:
This
LER reported that
a surveillance test
was
not
performed
on radiation monitor
REM-3542
due to
a procedural
deficiency.
This matter
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/90-24
and
was the subject of a licensee identified
(400/90-24-05).
The licensee
has
counseled
maintenance
procedure
personnel
on this
incident
and
has
tested
the
monitor with
satisfactory results.
(Closed)
LER 90-23:
This
LER reported
the inadvertent start of the
"A" emergency
diesel
generator.
This event occurred
due to personnel
error
on the part of
a licensed
reactor
operator.
The licensee
counseled
the operator
and will review self-verification techniques
with all operators
during their next annual training.
Although this
event
occurred
on
November
24,
1990, it was
not
verbally reported
to the
NRC Operations
Center until
November
26,
1990.
Initially, the shift foreman
and
STA did not consider
the
event to- be immediately reportable.
Further review of the event
by
the licensee's
compliance staff determined that the event should
have
been
reported
within
four
hours,
as
required
by
The licensee
reviewed this event with STA's
and
shift foremen
and plan to revise applicable
procedures
to require
independent
reviews for reportabi lity determination.
This matter is
considered
to
be
a licensee
identified
NCV and is not being cited
because
the criteria
specified 'in section
V.G.1 of
the
NRC
Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NC4(400/90-26-04):-
Failure to make
a four hour report to the
NRC
Operations
Center.
f.
(Closed)
LER 90-24:
This
LER reported that
inadequate
fuses
were
installed in safety related
125
VDC applications.
The licensee
has
replaced
the fuses with fuses properly rated for the application.
g.
(Open)
LER 90-25:
This
LER reported
a required plant shutdown
due to
excessive air leakage
through the containment
personnel air lock.
As
stated
in the
LER,
a plant
shutdown to Mode
5 (cold shutdoWn)
was
performed
on
December
8,
1990, following an unsatisfactory test
on
the personnel
air lock.
Subsequent
repairs
were performed
on the air
lock and testing
was satisfactorily
performed
on December
9,
1990.
The licensee
plans
to implement
a plant modification
(PCR-3877)
to
improve the reliability of the air lock.
The
LER will remain
open
pending completion of this modification.
h.
(Closed)
P2189-12:
This
10 CFR Part 21 Report,
dated
September
29,
1989, discussed
a problem with Limitorque SMB-000 and
SMB-00 CAN-type
switches with fiber spacers.
A plant modification,
PCR-4110,
was
implemented
to,replace
various affected
switches
during
the
1989 outage.
Additional. torque
switches
outside 'of containment
and the
steam
tunnel still contain fiber spacers,
however.
due to the
plant
design
that
bypasses
the
switch
during
an SI,
an
evaluation
has determined
that
no safety hazard existed.
i.
(Closed)
P2189-19:
This
10 CFR Part 21 Report,
dated
November
13,
1989,
discussed
a
problem
with potentially defective
pressure
reducing
supplied
as
spare
parts
for Pacific
Pumps
manufactured
by Dresser
Industries.
Two pump sleeves
were found in
the
spare
parts
warehouse,l
one of which
was
returned
to Dresser
Industries.
All sleeves
received
from the manufacturer will be
hardness
tested
as part of receipt inspection in the future.
6.
Design
Changes
and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems
were reviewed to verify that the
changes
were reviewed
and
approved
in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.59, that
the
changes
were
performed
in accordance
with technically
adequate
and
approved
procedures,
that
subsequent
testing
and test
results
met
acceptance
criteria or deviations
were resolved in an acceptable
manner,
and that appropriate
drawings
and facility procedures
were revised .as
necessary.
This review included selected
observations
of modifications
and/or testing
in progress.
The following modifications/design
changes
were reviewed:
PCR-5636
PCR-5610
PCR-5605
PCR-5549
Equalizing Valve Penetration
Plugging
CSIP-B Balancing Line Vibration Problem
ASCO Solenoid
Valve FT831654
125/250
YDC Fuse Voltage Rating
No violations or deviations
were identified.
10
7.
Followup of Onsite Events
(93702)
'I
8.
At 1:54
p.m.
on January
24
an
unusual
event
was .declared
due to
a
TS
required
plant
shutdown for excessive
leakage
past
containment
purge
isolation valves.
During the performance of a periodic local leak rate
test
on the
containment
purge
exhaust
licensee
personnel
discovered
excessive
seat
leakage.
This leakage
amount
caused
the total
combined
leakage
rate to exceed
the 'limits of TS 3.6.1.2.b
and
a plant
shutdown
was initiated.
At approximately
30 percent
power,
the
purge
isolation
valves
were
repaired
and
a local
leak rate test
completed
satisfactory.
At 4: 15 p.m.
the unusual
event
was terminated
and
a power
increase
back to 100 percent
was initiated.
Licensee
Action
on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702
5
92701)
a
~
(Clos'ed)
IFI 400/89-13-02:
Instantaneous
trip testing of molded case
circuit breakers.
The licensee
has
purchased
additional
breaker testing
equipment
and
has revised testing
procedures
to incorporate
the pulse trip testing
method versus
the run-up method.
b.
(Closed)-
YIO 400/89-21-01:
Failure
to,adequately
evaluate
the
suitability of
commercial
grade
items
used
in
safety
grade
applications.
The
inspector
reviewed
and verified completion of the corrective
action's listed,in the licensee's
response
letter dated
December
21,
1989.
The subject
breaker
models
were seismically tested
by Wyle
Test
Labs
and evaluated
to be satisfactory for seismic applications.
The critical characteristics
for breakers
already
installed
in
safety-related
applications
were
tested
with satisfactory
results.
Receipt inspection instructions for new breakers
have
been revised to
include appropriate
testing.
Finally, the licensee
reviewed this
incident
with
plant
and
NED
personnel
to
avoid
future
miscommunication
between
these
groups.
c.
(Closed)
IFI 400/89-30-01:
Review the
opening
stroke
time test
results for the pressurizer
power operated relief valves.
The licensee
performed
the test
procedures
for measuring
the
open
stroke time of these
valves with satisfactory results
on December
12,
1989.
d.
(Closed)
URI 400/90-13-04:
Failure to perform
a timely evaluation of
Boric Acid Pump Test data.
A review of this
item
found. that
the boric'cid
pump
remained
and
could
always
perform its
intended
function.
A
thoroughly
documented
evaluation
would have resolved
the boric acid
11
e.
pump
concern
much
sooner.
Technical
support
personnel
have
been
cautioned
to
document their decision
process
and
the
reason
for
coming to the conclusion that was reached.
(Closed)
IFI 400/90-21-03:
Follow the licensee's
activities to
prevent leaks
on the "B" charging/safety
injection pump.
Licensee
personnel
determined
that the failure of the balancing line
pipi ng for this
pump to
be
due to cyclic fatigue.
Vibration was
measured
on this pump's balancing line and compared with the identical
train "A" pump.
The "B" vibration was
an order'f magnitude higher.
The
licensee
installed
a modification
(PCR-5610)
to provide
a
temporary fix to dampen
and reduce
the balancing line vibration.
The
modification significantly
reduced
the vibration
by
an order of
magnitude.
The licensee
is considering
a more permanent fix which
could include
new mechanical
seals for the'pump.
f.
(Closed)
VIO 400/90-20-04:
'Failure to perform compensatory
actions
for an inoperable radiation monitor.
The
- licensee
has
submitted
LER 90-20
on this event.
For record
purposes
the violation will be closed
and further action tracked
by
the
LER.
g.
. (Closed)
IFI 400/89-34-05:
Follow the licensee's
activities to
replace
HVAC system actuators.
The licensee
has replaced/rebuilt
24 of the
37 affected actuators.
Due to extremely
long lead
times involved with the refurbishment of
these
components,
the licensee
expects
to complete
the remaining
13
by mid-1993.
The'icensee
continues
to perform compensatory
measures
and the justification for continued plant operation
remains in effect
until all actuators
are repaired.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted in paragraph
1)
at the conclusion of the inspection
on January
25,
1991.
During this
meeting,
the
inspectors
summarized
the
scope
and
findings of the
inspection
as
they are detailed
in this report, with particular
emphasis
on
the
violations
addressed
below.
The
licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this
inspection.
Item Number
400/90-26-01
Descri tion and Reference
VIO:
Failure to 'maintain administrative
control
of
a
high
radiation
area
key,
paragraph 2.b.(4).
12
10.
400/90-26-02
400/90-26-03
400/90-26-04
and Initialisms
VIO:
Failure to properly implement
a
radiochemistry
procedure,
paragraph 2.b.(7).
NC4:
Failure to periodically test the
containment
personnel
air lock every
72
hours',
paragraph
2.c.
NC4:=- Failure to make a'our hour report to
the
NRC Operations
Center,
paragraph
5.e.
BIT
CFR
CSIP
EOL
EPT
EST
.
FHB
FMP
IFI
LER
MPT
mR/hr
NCY
NED
NRC
OST
PLP
SOOR
TS
Boron Injection Tank
Closed Circuit Television
Code of Federal
Regulations
Corrective Maintenance
Chemistry Radiochemistry
Changing -- Safety Injection
Pump
End of Life
Engineering
Performance
Test
Engineering Surveillance
Test
Fuel Handling Building
Fuel
Management
Procedure
Heating, Ventilation and Air Con
Inspector
Follow-up Item
Licensee
Event Report
Loop Calibration Procedure
Maintenance
Performance
Test
Milliroentgen per hour
Maintenance
Surveillance
Test
Non-Conformance
Report
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Engineering
Department
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Operations
Surveillance Test
Plant
Change
Request
Primary Instrument Control
Plant Program
Procedure
Power Operated Relief Valve
Reactor Auxiliary Building
Reactor
Coolant
Pump
W
Residual
Heat
Removal
Radiation
Work Permit
Safety Injection
Significant Operational
Occurren
Technical Specification
di tioning
ce Report
13
VAC
VDC
WR/JO
Unresolved
Item
Volts Alternating Current
Voltage Direct Current
Violation
Work Request/Job
Order
E