ML18009A748
| ML18009A748 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1990 |
| From: | Carroll B, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A747 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-90-21, GL-88-05, GL-88-5, NUDOCS 9012170038 | |
| Download: ML18009A748 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1990021
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REG ION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/90-21
m
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
October
20 - November
16,
1990
Inspectors:
J.
e row,
enior
esi
t
spector
M. Sha
non,
esi ent
pect
Approved by:
ar o
,
cting
ection
ie
Divis on of Reactor Projects
License No.:
Da e
igne
Da
e
igne
h
9o
go
Da
gne
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant
operations,
radiological
controls,
security,
fire protection,
surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
safety
system
walkdown,
review of nonconformance
reports, visit to the public document
room, midloop/
reduced inventory activities, review of the spent fuel shipping program,
review
of the boron corrosion program, operator license review,
and licensee
action
on
previous inspection
items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted
and facility
operations
observed.
Some of these
tours
and observations
were conducted
on
backshifts.
Results:
Three violations
were identified:
failure to properly
implement
a radio-
chemistry procedure,
paragraph
2.b.(7);
failure to perform
a written safety
evaluation,
paragraph
9;
and failure to notify the
NRC
upon
employment
termination of a licensed operator,
paragraph
11.
A non-cited
licensee
identified violation concerning
an improper change to
a
surveillance
procedure
was identified, paragraph
6.a.
q012170038
5000400
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pop
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6
The licensee's
decision to shutdown
the plant
and repair
minor leakage
was
considered
to
be conservative,
paragraph
2.
,Improvements
were
noted in the
licensee's
boron corrosion
program,
paragraph
10.
Mockup training for the
installation
of
steam
generator
nozzle
dams
reduced
personnel
exposure,
paragraph
4.
REPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
'icensee
Employees
- J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
- G. Forehand,
Manager,
gA/gC
C. Gibson, Director, Programs
and Procedures
- J. Hammond,
Manager,
Onsite Nuclear Safety
C. Hinnant, Plant General
Manager
J. Nevill, Manager,
Technical
Support
- C. Olexi k, Manager,
Regulatory
Compliance
A. Poland,
Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Control Support
- R. Richey,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
- J. Sipp,
Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Control
H. Smith, Manager,
Radwaste
Operation
- M. Wallace, Sr. Specialist,
Regulatory Compliance
- E. Willett, Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
- W. Wilson, Manager,
Spent Nuclear Fuel
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
office,
operations,
"
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms
used
throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant
began this inspection
period in power operation
(Mode 1).
On
November
10,
1990,
a plant shutdown
and cooldown was
commenced
to repair
a
small
primary to secondary
steam
generator
leak
and to perform general
reliability related
maintenance.
At 10:55 p.m.,
on November
12, the cold
shutdown
(Mode 5) condition
was
reached.
The plant remained
in the cold
shutdown condition for the duration of this inspection period.
The licensee's
decision
to shutdown
the plant to repair the small leak,
even
though
leakage
was far below regulatory limits, was considered
to be
conservative
and beneficial to safe plant operation.
a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed
records
and
discussed
various entries
with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance
with the
TSs
and
the
licensee's
administrative
procedures.
The following records
were
reviewed:
Shift Foreman's
Log; Outage Shift Manager's
Log; Control
Operator's
Log; Night Order Book; Equipment Inoperable
Record; Active
Clearance
Log; Jumper
and Wire Removal
Log; Shift Turnover Checklist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
In addition,
the inspector
independently
verified clearance
order tagouts.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
b.
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout
the inspection
period, facility tours
were
conducted
to
observe
operations
and
maintenance
activities in progress.
Some
operations
and
maintenance
activity observations
were
conducted
during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection
period,
licensee
meetings
were
attended
by the
inspectors
to observe
planning
and
management activities.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the following areas:
security
perimeter
fence;
control
room;
emergency
diesel
generator
building; reactor auxiliary building; reactor
containment building;
waste
processing
building; fuel handling building; emergency service
water building; battery
rooms;
and electrical
switchgear
rooms.
During these tours, the following observations
were made:
( I)
Monitoring Instrumentation
-
Equipment operating
status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system
lineup,
reactor
operating
parameters,
and auxiliary equipment
operating
parameters
were
observed
to verify that indicated
parameters
were
in accordance
with the
TS for the current
operational
mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors
verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance
with TS requirements
and that control
room
operations
were
being
conducted
in
an
orderly
and
professional
manner.
In addition, the inspectors
observed shift
turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the continuity of plant
status,
operational
problems,
and
other
pertinent
plant
'nformation during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant
Housekeeping
Conditions. -
Storage
of material
and
components,
and
cleanliness
conditions
of various
areas
throughout
the facility were
observed
to determine
whether
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
(4)
Radiological
Protection
Program - Radiation protection control
activities
were
observed
routinely to verify that
these
activities
were in conformance
with the facility policies
and
procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The
inspectors
also
reviewed
selected
RWPs to verify that the
was current
and 'that the controls were adequate.
3
(5)
Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities,
the
inspectors
included a,review of the,licensee's
physical security
program.
The
performance
of, various shifts of the security
force
was
observed
in the
conduct
of daily activities
to
include:
protected
and vital area
access
controls; searching
of
personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and retrieval;
escorting
of visitors; patrols;
and
compensatory
posts.
In
addition, the inspector
observed
the operational
status of CCTY
monitors,
the Intrusion Detection
system
in the central
and
secondary
alarm stations,
protected, area lighting, protected
and
vital
area
and
the security organization
interface with operations
and maintenance.
On October 28,
1990, the inspector
noted
problems with a control
room security
door failing to properly latch.
On
three
different visits to
the
control
room
the
inspector
noted
problems with the door latching.
Each time
a security guard
was
summoned
to
check
out
the
door for proper operation.
The
inspector
discussed
this matter with licensee
management
on the
following day.
Initial licensee
actions
did not appear
to
be
adequate
for resolving
the
problems.
This
item
has
been
discussed
with regional security personnel
who will review it in
more detail during
a routine security inspection.
(6)
(7)
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities, staffing,
and
equipment
were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate
and
that fire alarms,
extinguishing
equipment,
actuating
controls,
fire fighting
equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
Sampling
Program - Selected
performance
of reactor
coolant
sampling
and boric acid tank sampling
were observed
to verify
that the sample
taken
was representative
of the substance
being
sampled,
appropriate
acceptance
criteria were met, test results
were properly evaluated
and trended,
and sampling
and analysis
procedures
were
utilized
and
properly
implemented.
The
deficiencies
addressed
below were noted.
On October
24,
1990,
the inspector
observed
the sampling of the
"A" steam
generator
to determine activity.
This, sample
was
performed
to calculate
the magnitude
of
a small
primary to
secondary
leak which had developed.
The inspector noticed that
procedures
were not routinely referenced
by the technician
to
draw
or
analyze
the
sample.
Upon
sample
completion,
the
inspector
requested
the
technician
to
walk
through
the
appropriate
procedures.
When
procedure
RCP-660,
Sample
Preparation
for Determination of Radioactivity,
was referenced
by the technician,
the inspector
found that not all of the steps
required
by the procedure
had
been performed.
Specifically step
10.3.1.2.2
required
the addition of 2 ml of nitric acid to the
sample prior to sample'nalysis
for activity.
When questioned
4
about this omission,
the technician stated that
he had forgotten
this step
but that the
omission
should
not have
negated
the
sample results.
On October
26,
1990,
the inspector
observed
a routine reactor
coolant
system
sample
performed
as required
by TS 4.4.7.
Again
procedures
were
not periodically
referenced.
During the
preparation
of thi's
sample for a
gamma
scan, nitric acid
was
also not added.
The inspector
researched
procedure
RCP-660 for
the preparation
of this
sample
and
found that step
10.3. 1. 1.3
specified
the addition of 0.5
ml of nitric acid prior to the
activity analysis.
These
two -observations,
which involved different samples
by two
different technicians,
indicate the inadequate
implementation of
a radiochemistry
procedure
and are considered
to be examples
of
a violation.
Violation (400/90-21-01):
Failure to properly
implement
a radiochemistry
procedure.
One violation was identified.
3.
Surveillance
Observation
(61726)
Surveillance
tests
were observed
to verify that approved
procedures
were
being
used;
qualified personnel
were
conducting
the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment
operability;
calibrated
equipment
was
utilized; and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
OST-1004
OST-1020
RST-201
RST-204
EPT-167
Power Range
Heat Balance Daily Interval
Remote
Shutdown
Monitoring
and
Accident
Monitoring
Instrumentation
Channel
Check Monthly Interval
Steam
Generator
3C Narrow Range
Level (L-0496)
Protection
Set III Operational
Test
Boron Concentration
Surveillance
of the Boric Acid and
Refueling Water Storage
Tanks
Reactor
Coolant
System
Chemistry
and
Radiochemistry
Surveillance
Secondary
Leak Test
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector
observed/reviewed
maintenance
activities to verify that
correct
equipment
clearances
were
in effect;
work requests
and fire
prevention
work permits,
as
required,
were
issued
and being followed;
quality control
personnel
were available for inspection activities
as
required;
and
TS requirements
were being followed.
Maintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the following
maintenance
(WR/JO) activities:
Calibration of ground fault relays
associated
with feeder
breakers
for
MCC-1A33-SA
and
MCC-1A23-SA in
accordance
with procedure
PIC-E019,
ITE
GRC Ground Fault Relay Calibration.
Repair
leak
on
the
balancing
line for the
"B" charging/safety
injection pump.
Installation of steam
generator
nozzle
dams
and
mockup training in
accordance
with procedure
CM-M0176,
Steam
Generator
Primary Nozzle
Dam Installation, Operation
and Removal.
Replacement
of various valves associated
with "A" essential
chiller.
The
inspectors
observed
licensee
preparations
for installing
steam
generator
nozzle
dams.
A mockup of the steam generator
was utilized and
practice
sessions
held
on installing and removing the nozzle
dams.
This
training
was very realistic,
using full protective clothing dressout
and
formal communications.
As
a result of this training, workers were able to
quickly perform the installation of the nozzle
dams in this high radiation
field and thereby received
less
personnel
exposure.
This type of training
is considered
to
be
a strength
of the
maintenance
and radiological
protection
programs.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Safety Systems
Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors
conducted
a walkdown of the cold leg accumulator
safety
injection system to verify that the lineup was in accordance
with license
requirements
for system
operability
and that
the
system
drawing
and
procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
Also, accessible
piping inside
containment
was
walked
down for the auxiliary feedwater
system.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
6.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
(71707)
SOORs
and
NCRs were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied
with, corrective actions
as identified in the reports
were accomplished
or
being pursued for completion,
generic
items were identified and reported,
and items were reported
as required
by the TS.
a.
SOOR
90-143
reported
that
procedure
OST-1004
was
revised
using
unqualified or approved
information.
Procedure
OST-1004
was changed
to permit
a heat
balance calculation with continuous
blowdown remaining in service.
To account for the heat dispersed
by
the
blowdown system,
an engineering
calculation
was
performed
to
provide the 'method for determining this.
To assist
in the procedure
revision
process,
a draft of this calculation
was
provided
to
procedure writers.
Procedure
OST-1004
was revised
and
approved
on
October 28,
1990, utilizing the draft calculation which had not yet
been adequately
reviewed
and approved
by engineering
personnel.
Upon
discovery of this situation
on October
29,
1990, operating
personnel
performed another heat balance
using the previous
method of isolating
the
blowdown
system.
The draft calculations
were
subsequently
reviewed,
approved,
and
deemed
to be satisfactory.
The licensee
is
presently
performing
an
HPES evaluation to determine
the root cause
for this event.
This licensee
identified violation is not being
cited because criteria specified in Section
V.G. 1 of the
NRC Enforce-
ment Policy were satisfied.
NCV (400/90-21-02):
Failure to use
approved calculations for revising the heat balance
procedure.
b.
SOOR 90-155 reported that
a leak
had developed
on the balancing line
piping of the "B" charging/safety
injection
pump
on November 3,
1990.
The
pump
was
secured
and piping was replaced
to stop the leak.
On
November 12, another
leak developed
in the
same
general
area of the
balancing line.
A review of work history associated
with this
pump
revealed
numerous
leaks
on this piping which included
a cracked
in August 1988,
and
a cracked
pipe in January
1989.
The licensee
is
presently performing
a root cause
evaluation to prevent repetition of
this event.
IFI (400/90-21-03):
Follow the licensee's
activities to
prevent leaks
on the "B" charging/safety
injection pump.
One non-cited violation was identified.
7.
Visit to the Public Document
Room (94600)
The inspector visited the community's public document
room on October 25,
1990.
This facility is located at the
Cameron Village Public Library in
Raleigh,
NC.
The inspector
examined
the type of information available,
the condition of this information,
and the filing system
used for access
to this information.
Selective microfiche and
hardcopy files of various
documents
were reviewed.
The public document
room was found to be orderly
and information accessible.
8.
Nidloop/Reduced
Inventory Activities (71707)
In response
to
a
NRC
Region II memorandum
dated
July 27,
1990,
the
inspectors
reviewed
the licensee's
preparations
for operation of the
in a reduced
inventory condition.
These actions
were previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report
50-400/90-08.
Loss of
Decay, Heat
Removal,
and
the
current
revisions
to plant
procedures
governing midloop operation
were reviewed.
The inspector also discussed
this matter with licensee
management
and emphasized
that due to the large
number of administrative
controls
in place
governing
operator
actions
while in this
condition,
shrewd
operator
diligence
was
essential.
Licensee
management
stated
they would review their controls
and procedures
with operations
personnel.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Review of the Spent
Fuel Shipping Program
(71707)
As
a followup to the observations
mentioned
in
NRC Inspection
Reports
50-400/90-17
and 50-400/90-20,
the inspectors
continued to review spent
fuel shipping activities.
The problems
associated
with the
BWR fuel crud
continued to grow with the receipt of two more refueling shipments.
Following the receipt
and
head
removal of cask
IF-303,
the
spent
fuel
water clarity degraded
to the point where fuel transfer
could not take
place.
The operators
were
unable
to see
the fuel
and therefore
fuel
transfer
was delayed for approximately
10 days while the cobalt
and iron
particulate settled
out of solution.
Following the transfer of fuel from the other cask (IF-304), it was noted
that approximately
18 inches of crud had settled
in the bottom of the fuel
cask.
Radiation levels in the bottom of the cask were found to be
as high
as
1260
RAD using underwater
detectors.
By using
a suction
hose
and
pump
the licensee
transferred this crud to vacant spent fuel pool "D".
The inspector
reviewed
previously
performed
surveys
following the last
three fuel shipments
and
noted
a steadily increasing
crud loading in the
shipping
cask.
The
spent
fuel
cask
( IF-304)
surveys
completed
on
August 8,
1990
averaged
370
RADs;
on
September
13,
1990,
averaged
576
RADs;
and
on
November 6,
1990,
averaged
797
RADs.
The
second
cask
( IF-303) revealed similar increases
and following the surveys
completed
on
October 30,
1990, the cask
averaged
483
RADS.
Following the latest
BWR fuel transfer,
the
BWR fuel baskets
were removed
and replaced
with
PWR fuel baskets.
The transfer
was successful
in that
no personnel
or area
contaminations
resulted.
It was noted,
however, that
area radiation levels
approached
100
MR on spent fuel pool monitors during
the
basket
removal
from the
cask.
The .licensee
took the appropriate
precautions
to limit personnel
exposure
during this evolution.
Following the loss of clarity in the spent fuel pools
and transfer canals,
the inspectors
performed
a detailed
review of water chemistry require-
ments.
The
FSAR table
11. 1.7-1 lists the design concentration of specific
activity (uci/gm) for various
nuclides
in the
spent
fuel pools.
The
following table lists, in part,
the nuclide,
design activity, and actual
measured activity for nuclides of interest:
FSAR Table 11.1.7-1
Nuclide
Design Activity Concentration
Sam le on October
12,
1990
measured
Concentration
NN-54
2.6
x 10 -8 uci/gm
1.3 x 10 -4 uci/gm
CO-58
1.0 x 10 -6 uci/gm
1.3
x 10 -4 uci/gm
1.3 x 10 -6 uci/gm
2.3
x 10 -3 uci/gm
The
inspector
noticed
that
the
measured
values
exceeded
the
design
concentration
values
by as
much
as
5000 times.
FSAR Section
11. 1. 1 states
that design
basis
source
terms
have
been
used for shielding
and facilities
design
and for calculating the consequences
of postulated
accidents.
Section
11.1.7
states
that
the
maximum
spent
fuel
pool fission
and
corrosion
product specific activities are given in Table
11. 1.7-1.
This
section
also states
that the fuel pools will be
used for storage
of
and
BWR spent fuel from other
CPSL nuclear plants
and that the spent fuel
would not contribute significantly to the fuel pool fission and corrosion
product activities.
10 CFR 50.59 requires
the licensee
to maintain records of changes
in the
facility.
These
records
must include
a written safety evaluation
which
provides
the basis for the determination that the change
does
not involve
an unreviewed
safety question.
The spent
fuel from other
CP&L nuclear.
plants is causing
a significant increase
in the fuel pool activity in that
concentrations
of cobalt
and
activity have
exceeded
the
design activity concentrations.
Although this practice
constitutes
a
change
in the operation of the facility as
described
in the
FSAR, the
licensee
failed to perform
a written safety evaluation
as
required
by
This is identified as
a Violation (400/90-21-04):
Failure
to perform
a written safety evaluation.
One violation was identified
10.
Review of Boron Corrosion
Program
(92701).
The licensee's
boron corrosion
program which implements
the requirements
of
NRC Generic Letter
Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel
'eactor
Pressure
Boundary
Components
in
PWR plants,
was
previously
discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/90-10.
During this outage
the
inspector
noted
some
improvements
in the implementation of this program.
A detailed upfront visual inspection of containment
was performed early in
the outage
to identify boric acid leakage
so that appropriate
and timely
corrective action could
be accomplished
within the outage
schedule.
This
inspection identified several
leaks,
but
no corrosion
was found.
Another
area
of improvement
was
a revision to procedure
OST-1081,
Containment
Visual Inspection.
This procedure
now clearly defines
the requirement to
identify boric acid
leakage,
initiate work requests
for repair,
and
notification of the system engineer for corrective action.
This procedure
revision strengthens
the overall
boron corrosion
program.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
11.
Operator License
Review (71707)
During
the
week of October
15,
1990,
a
review of operator
license
applications
from another
nuclear facility was
conducted
in the
NRC
Region II office.
It was
noted that
one
SRO candidate
(docket
number
20019)
had previously
held
an
operator
license
at the
Shearon
Harris
facility and
had terminated
employment in September
1989.
Further review
of the docket revealed that the licensee
had not notified the
NRC of this
fact.
10 CFR 50.74 requires
the licensee
to notify the
NRC within 30 days of
termination of any operator or senior operator.
Failure to notify the
NRC
of employment termination for a senior reactor operator is contrary to
10
-CFR 50.74
and is considered
to be
a violation.
Violation (400/90-21-05):
Failure to notify the
NRC of employment termination of an
SRO.
One violation was identified.
12.
Licensee
Action on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702
5
92701)
a.
(Closed)
URI 400/90-20-01:
Periodic calibration
check of installed
thermocouples.
The
licensee
provided
the
inspector
with their position
on the
testing of thermocouples.
In an internal corporate
memorandum
dated
August 9,
1984,
the licensee
stated their position that for primary
sensing
elements
which are inherently resistant
to drift, such
as
thermocouples,
a verification of operability of the primary element
and
a calibration of the rest of the instrument string would suffice.
The
inspector
discussed
this
reasoning
with
NRC Headquarters
personnel
and
Region II personnel.
The licensee's
current practice
of periodically checking
thermocouples
was
deemed to be appropriate.
A review of the, previously questioned
RHR cooler outlet temperature
and
recombiner
temperature
revealed
appropriate operability
verifications with the string calibrations.
b.
(Closed)
Violation 400/89-34-02:
Failure to adhere
to the require-
ments of plant procedures.
This
item
was
previously
discussed
in
NRC
Inspection
Report
50-400/90-06.
The licensee
has
revised
applicable
procedures
to
provide caution
notes
to prevent
the establishment
of inadvertent
flowpaths
between
the
RWST and the
RCS or other systems.
Ih
10
c.
(Closed) Violation 400/90-13-03:
Failure to follow plant procedures
during
the
performance
of nuclear
instrumentation
calibration
procedures.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of the corrective
actions
as
stated
in
the
licensee's
response
letter
dated
September
6,
1990.
The licensee
has
revised
applicable
procedures
and
counseled
plant
reactor
engineering
personnel
to
prevent
repetition of this event.
13.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted in paragraph
1)
at the conclusion of the inspection
on
November
16,
1990.
During this
meeting,
the
inspectors
summarized
the
scope
and
findings of the
inspection
as
they are detailed
in this report, with particular
emphasis
on the Violations,
and the Inspector Follow-up Item addressed
below.
The
licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did not
identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by
the inspectors
during this inspection.
Item Number
Descri tion and Reference
400/90-21-01
400/90-21-02
400/90-21-03
400/90-21-04
400/90-21-05
VIO:
Failure
to
properly
implement
a
radiochemistry
procedure,
paragraph 2.b.(7).
NCV:
Failure to use
approved calculations
for revising
the
heat
balance
procedure,
paragraph
6.a.
IFI:
Follow the licensee's
activities to
prevent
leaks
on the
"B", charging/safety
injection pump, paragraph
6.b.
VIO:
Failure to perform
a written safety
evaluation,
paragraph
9.
VIO:
Failure
to notify the
NRC of
employment termination of an
SRO,
paragraph
11.
14.
and Initialisms
CFR
EPT
GL
HPES
Boiling Water
Reactor
Closed Circuit Television
Code of Federal
Regulations
Engineering
Performance
Test
Final Safety Analysis Report
Generic Letter
Human Performance
Evaluation
System
11
IFI
NRC
OST
QA/QC
RCS/RC
SOOR
TS
YIO
WR/JO
Inspector Follow-up Item
Maintenance
Surveillance Test
Non-Conformance
Report
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Surveillance Test
Primary Instrument Control
Pressurized
Water Reactor
Quality Assurance/Quality
Control
Radiochemistry
Procedure
Reactor
Coolant System
Residual
Heat
Removal
Radiation
Work Permit
Refueling Water Storage
Tank
Significant Operational
Occurrence
Report
Senior Reactor Operator
Technical Specification
Unresolved
Item
Violation
Work Request/Job
Order