ML18009A401
| ML18009A401 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1990 |
| From: | Dance H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A397 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-90-02, 50-400-90-2, NUDOCS 9003210065 | |
| Download: ML18009A401 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1990002
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/90-02
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conduc
d
Inspectors:
J.
Te row, Senior Resident
Inspector
C
a non.
si ent
nspector
~
~
Approved by:
a ce,
ection
)e
Division of Reactor
Projects
License No.:
27
Q
Da e
igne
~/~v
ate
)gne
/
a e
gned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by two resident inspectors
in the areas
. of plant operations,
radiological controls, security, fire protection,
surveillance observation,
maintenance
observation,
licensee
event reports,
review of an
NRC Bulletin, cold weather preparations,
and licensee action
on
previous inspection
items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted
and facility
operations
observed.
Some of these tours
and observations
were conducted
on
backshifts.
Results:
Two violations were identified:
Failure to properly implement procedure
OST-1039 resulting in inadequate
gPTR data calculation,
paragraph 2.b.(1);
Failure to calculate
the
gPTR as required
by TS 4.2.4.1,
paragraph 2.b.(l).
A weakness
is identified in paragraph 2.b.(1) concerning
the technical
support
staff's failure to properly implement plant procedures.
90032l0065
900227
ADOCK 05000400
Q
Licensee strengths
were identified relating to the administrative controls
established
for equipment clearances,
paragraph
2.a,
and plant housekeeping,
paragraph 2.b.(3).
Licensee identified violations are discussed
in paragraphs
5.f, 5.h, 5.m,
and 5.q.
REPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
D. Braund, Supervisor,
Security
J. Collins, Manager, Operations
- G. Forehand,
Director,
QA/QC
- C. Gibson, Director, Programs
and Procedures
- P. Hadel. Manager.
Maintenance
- C. Hinnant, Plant General
Manager
C. Olexik, Supervisor, Shift Operations
- R. Richey. Manager, Harris Nuclear Project Department
- J. Sipp, Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
- H. Smith, Supervisor,
Radwaste
Operation
- D. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- B. Van Metre, Manager,
Technical
Support
E. Willett, Manager
Outages
and Modifications
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included office, operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant resumed
100 percent
power operation after an inoperable
main
steam safety valve was returned to service
on January
6 and continued in
power operation
(Mode 1) for the duration of this inspection period.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed records
and discussed
various entries with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications
(TS) and the licensee
s administrative procedures.
The following records
were reviewed:
Shift Foreman's
Log; Control
Operator's
Log; Auxiliary Operator's
Log; Night Order
Book; Equipment
Record; Active Clearance
Log; Jumper
and Wire Removal
Log;
Shift Turnover Checklist;
and selected
Chemistry/Radiation
Protection
and
Radwaste
Logs.
In addition, the inspector independently verified
clearance
order tagouts.
The inspector
reviewed procedures
AP-20, Clearance
Procedure,
and
OMM-14, Operations - Operation of the Clearance
Center, to determine
the licensee's
administrative controls regarding
equipment
clearances.
Clearances
are'prepared
by a licensed operator
and
receive
an independent verification by another licensed operator for
accuracy.
The licensee utilizes
a shift foreman designee
(licensed
senior reactor operator)
to approve -the prepared
equipment clearance
to remove the administrative
burden
on the shift foreman.
The
licensee
also utilizes
a specification appraisal
computer to generate
the required.clearances.
After approval, clearance
tags are
hung on
required
components
by trained operating
personnel
(usually auxiliary
operators).
Components
important to the safe operation of the plant
receive
an additional verification that the tags are properly hung.
These
systems
are specified in procedure
PLP-702,
Independent
Verification.
After these verifications are made,
a work group
representative
physically verifies system status
and proper
positioning of tagged
components.
Restoration
positions of tagged
components
also receive
independent
verification by licensed operators.
When work on the affected
system
is complete,
the-tags
are
removed
and the component is repositioned.
Position is independently verified if applicable.
The licensee
performs
a weekly administrative audit of the clearance
forms with the clearance
index.
A more detailed monthly audit
includes physical verification that tags are in place,
undamaged,
and components
are in the required position.
The inspector considers
the licensee's
administrative controls for equipment clearances
to be
good
and should prevent personnel
injury or equipment
damage
from
occurring
due to improper system alignment.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Facility Tours and Observations
Throughout the inspection period. facility tours were conducted
to
observe operations
and maintenance activities in progress.
Some
operations
and maintenance activity observations
were conducted
during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
meetings
were attended
by .the inspectors
to observe
planning and
management activities.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel
generator
building; reactor auxiliary building; waste processing
building;
fuel handling building; emergency
service
water building; battery
rooms;
and electrical
switchgear
rooms.
During these tours, the following observations
were made:
(I)
Monitoring Instrumentation - Equipment operating status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system
lineup, reactor operating
parameters,
and auxiliary equipment
operating
parameters
were observed
to verify that indicated
S
parameters
were in accordance
with the
TS for the current
operational
mode.
As discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 89-34 on December 30,
1989 the resident inspector
noted that the nuclear instrument
(NI)-44 upper
and lower comparator
channels
were placed in
bypass.
The comparator
channels
are
used to calculate
the
Quadrant
Power Tilt Ratio
(QPTR) and provide input to the
alarm.
The inspector
was informed that during the reactor
power
increase
to 55 percent
on December 28, 1989, that the upper
and
lower QPTR channels
went into alarm.
OST-1039, Calculation of
Quadrant
Power Tilt Ratio,
was performed
on December
28, 1989,
and it indicated that the channels
were close to the alarm
setpoint.
The upper
and lower NI-44 detectors
were subsequently
placed in bypass
by operations
personnel.
Discussions
with the
operators
revealed that the NI-44 instruments
had not been
declared
no additional surveillance
requirements
were being performed,
and that the operator
logs did not
document
"when" and "why" the detectors
were placed in bypass.
The inspector
conducted
a review of recently completed
surveillances for calculating the Quadrant
Power Tilt (OST-1039)
including the
OST performed
on December
28,
1989.
The review
concluded that the detector current data recorded for OST-1039,
on December
28,
1989, per step 7.1,
was recorded in error by the
licensed operator.
Further discussions
with licensee
personnel
confirmed that the operator
had used the wrong scale
on the
meter to obtain the data.
With the plant operating at only
55 percent
power, the recorded current values
exceeded
the
100 percent
power normalized currents.
The normalized fractions
and average
normalized fractions should
have calculated out to
be approximately
55 percent.
A subsequent
review by two senior
licensed shift foremen failed to identify the inaccurate
data
obtained
from the control
room instrumentation.
It was also
noted that the operator
who recorded
the data
had recently
returned to shift work following assignment
to the procedure
writing group and may have been, somewhat unfamiliar in performing
this procedure.
The detector currents,
required
by step 7.1 of OST-1039,
were
improperly recorded
and
a subsequent
review by two senior
licensed shift foremen failed to identify the improperly
performed
TS surveillance.
Failure to properly perform
surveillance testing is contrary to TS 6.8.1.a
and is considered
to be
a violation.
Violation (90-02-01):
Failure to properly implement procedure
OST-1039 resulting in inadequate
QPTR data calculation.
Further review of OST-1039
by the inspector determined that the
100 percent
power normalized currents
recorded
on the
December
28,
1989 surveillance test were not the
same
as those recorded
on
subsequent
surveillances
completed during January
1990.
They
also did not correlate to current values
found at the end of
cycle two.
The procedure
used to obtain the normalized currents,
EST 717, Incore/Excore Detector Calibration, required that
reactor
power be at 75 percent to perform the calibration.
Discussions
with technical
support personnel
discovered that the
100 percent
power normalized currents
were calculated
based
on
a
35 percent flux map without utilizing procedure
EST-717.
The
inspector
concluded that plant procedures
were not utilized to
obtain the normalized current values;
Discussions
with the
discipline supervisor
indicated that
he was
unaware that
unauthorized
means
were used to obtain the normalized current
values.
The licensee
was recently issued
a violation (90-01-01)
involving the miscalibration of power range nuclear instruments
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/90-01.
One of the causes
for
that violation involved the failure of technical
support
personnel
to properly implement
a plant procedure.
The
inability of the technical
support staff to properly implement
plant procedures
is considered
to be
a weakness.
This problem
is not being cited in this report due to the recent
issuance of
violation 90-01-01
and insufficient time for the licensee
to
respond.
Following the receipt of the upper and lower gPTR alarms,
the
manual calculation of the
gPTR was performed.
Based
on the
manual
gPTR, operations
personnel
bypassed
the upper and lower
NI-44 channel
inputs to the
gPTR alarm circuitry.
Selective
removal of detector inputs in the
gPTR alarm circuit will
inhibit an active alarm,
and therefore sufficient justification
should
be made prior to removing any channel
from operation.
The alarm response
procedure
ALB-013-5-3 and ALB-013-5-4 both
detail bypassing
a faulty channel
and require the subsequent
removal of the channel
from service
by tripping various
bistables.
Only the bypassing
step
was completed
and no other
actions
were taken
by licensee
personnel.
By bypassing
an active detector
channel
the
gPTR comparator
circuitry was not capable of performing its intended function
which resulted in an inoperable
gPTR alarm.
With an inoperable
gPTR alarm,
TS surveillance 4.2.4.1.b requires
a manual
calculation of the
gPTR every
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above,
from 6:55 a.m.
on December 28,
1989 until approximately
2:25 a.m.
on December
30,
1989, the licensee failed to perform
the required
12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> TS surveillance,
which is considered
to be
a violation.
P
(2)
Violation (90-02-02)
Failure'o calcula'te
the
gPTR as required
by TS 4.2.4.1.
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance
with TS requirements
and that
control
room operations
were being conducted in an orderly and
professional. manner.
In addition, the inspector
observed shift
turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the continuity of
plant status,
operations
problems,
and other pertinent plant
information during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping
Conditions - Storage of material
and components
,and cleanliness
conditions of various areas
throughout the
facility were observed
to determine whether safety and/or fire
hazards
existed.
(4)
The inspector
accompanied
licensee
management
personnel
on an
inspection of the'emergency
service water building.
This team
of approximately
10 managers
was led by the plant general
manager
and focused
on the general
cleanliness
and the material
condition of equipment.
This type of management
involvement
has
had
a positive effect on plant housekeeping
and the general
good material condition of equipment.
Radiological Protection
Program - Radiation protection control
activities were observed routinely to verify that these
activities were in conformance with the facility policies
and
procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors
also reviewed selected
RWPs to verify that the
RWP was current
and that the controls were adequate.
Security Control .- In the course of the monthly activities, the
inspector included
a review of the licensee's
physical security
program.
The performance of various shifts of the security
force was observed
in the conduct of daily activities to
include:
protected
and vital area
access
controls; searching
of personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and
retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols;
and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the inspector
observed
the operational
status of Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) monitors, the
Intrusion Detection
system in the central
and secondary
alarm
stations,
protected
area lighting, protected
and vital area
barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with
operations
and maintenance.
Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment
were observed
to verify that fire brigade staffing
was appropriate
and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
3.
Surveillance Observation
(61726)
'urveillance
tests
were observed
to verify that approved
procedures
were
being used; qualified personnel
were conducting the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment operability; calibrated
equipment
was
utilized; and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following
EST-219
OST-1021
OST-1090
OST-1013
EST-717
OST-1039
tests
were observed
and/or data reviewed:
t
Personnel
Air Lock Door Seals
Local Leak Rate Test
Daily Surveillance
Requirements
lE Battery Weekly Test
Spent
Fuel
Pool Cooling System quarterly Interval
1A-SA Emergency Diesel
Generator Operability Test
Incore/Excore
Detector Calibration
Calculation of quadrant
Power Tilt Ratio
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed
maintenance activities to verify that
correct equipment clearances
were in effect; work requests
and fire
prevention work permits,
as required,
were issued
and being followed;
quality control personnel
were available for inspection activities
as
required;
and,
TS requirements
were being followed.
Maintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the
following maintenance
(WR/JO) activities:
Replace
exhaust
on the "B" Emergency Diesel
Generator
(EDG) in
accordance
with procedure
CM-M0150, Emergency Diesel
Generator
Cylinder Head Removal,
Disassembly
and Reassembly.
Verification of diesel fire pump battery operability in accordance
with procedure
MPT-E0019. Diesel Fire
Pump Battery Weekly Test.
Replace turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
pump exhaust rupture
disk.
Clean, inspect
and calibrate actuator for valve AF-19 in accordance
with procedure
PIC-1058, Calibration Check and Stroking of a
Milliampere Hydramotor Actuator.
Lubricate coupling on the "A" EDG auxiliary lube oil pump in
accordance
with procedure
PM-M0011, Annual Lubrication Schedule.
Repair fuel oil leak on ¹5 cylinder for "A" EDG.
4
-" 'Repair oil leak on 86 'cylinder fbr '"A"'DG'in'accordance with
procedure
CM-M0150, Emergency Diesel
Generator Cylinder Head
Removal,
Disassembly
and Reassembly.
Replace
hold-down bolts for the "A" EDG turbo-chargers
in accordance
with procedure
MPT-.M0024, Emergency Diesel Generator Turbocharger
Bracket Bolting Inspection.
Brown Boveri LK1600 Breaker Failure Testing.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect
trends,
and to determine
whether corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that were reported
immediately were reviewed
as they occurred to
determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance
with the current
a ~
(Closed)
LER 88-06:
This
LER reported
emergency
service
water
systems
due to isolation valve failure.
This event
was
previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/88-03
and was
the subject of an unresolved
item (88-03-01).
The licensee
issued
a
supplemental
report dated April 15,
1988.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of the licensee's
corrective action
as
stated
in the
LER.
b.
(Closed)
LER 88-21:
This
LER reported the automatic start of an
pump during
a surveillance test.
This matter
was also the subject of a violation (88-25-01) discussed
in NRC
'Inspection
Report 50-400/89-25.
For record purposes
the
LER will be
closed
and corrective action tracked
by the violation.
co
(Closed)
LER 88-23:
This
LER reported that the reactor coolant
system
was not adequately
vented during
a plant outage in August,
1988.
This event was previously discussed
in NRC Inspection Report
50-400/88-25
and the licensee
has
issued
a supplemental
report dated
September
13, 1988.
The inspector reviewed and verified
implementation of the licensee'0
corrective action as stated in the
LER.
d.
(Closed)
LER 89-06:
This
LER reported
a reactor trip which occurred
on March 14,
1989 due to the loss of a main feedwater
pump.
This
event is discussed
in more detail in
NRC Inspection Report
50-400/89-06.
Corrective actions for this event
have
been
completed.
e.
(Closed)
LER 89-07:
This
LER reported
an inadvertent isolation of
the containment ventilation system
due to personnel, error.
The
e
inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of the licensee's
corrective- action
as stated
in the
LER.
f.'Closed)
LER 89-08:
This
LER reported that testing of the thermal
overload
bypass circuit for motor operated
valve MS-72 was
inadequate.
The licensee identified this problem during an
independent
review of thermal overload
bypass testing procedures.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of the licensee's
corrective action
as stated
in the LER.
This matter is considered
to be
a licensee identified Non-Cited Violation (NCV) and is not
being cited because criteria specified in section
V.G.1 of the
NRC
Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NCV (90-02-03):
Failure to properly test thermal overload
bypass
circuitry for valve MS-72.
g.
h.
(Closed)
LER 89-13:
This
LER reported the inadvertent actuation of
a service water booster
pump during load sequencer
troubleshooting.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of the licensee's
corrective action
as stated in the
LER.
(Closed)
LER 89-14:
This
LER reported the emergency
core cooling
system piping was not being vented periodically as required
by the
TS.
The licensee
discovered this problem during a walkdown on this
system
and associated
procedures.
The inspector
reviewed
and
verified implementation of the licensee's
corrective action
as
stated
in the
LER.
This matter is considered
to be
a licensee
identified
NCV and is not being cited because criteria specified in
section
V.G.1 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NCV (90-02-04):
Failure to periodically vent emergency
core cooling
system piping.
(Closed)
LER 89-15:
This
LER reported that the fuel handling
building equipment
hatch
was not installed during fuel movement.
This matter was previously discussed
in NRC Inspection Report
50-400/89-21
and was considered
to be
a licensee identified
violation.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of
the licensee's
corrective action
as stated in the LER.
J
~
k.
(Closed)
LER 89-16:
This
LER reported the inadvertent start of the
"B" Emergency Service
Water
Pump during testing
on the load
sequencer.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of
the licensee's
corrective action as stated in the LER.
(Closed)
LER 89-18:
This
LER reported
a manual reactor trip due to
the cable failure on
a digital rod position indicator.
The
inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of the licensee's
corrective'ction
as stated
in the
LER.
l.
(Closed)
LER 89-19:
This
LER reported
system
actuation
caused
by a miscalibrated
main feedwater
pump switch.
The
inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of the licensee's
corrective action
as stated in the
LER.
m.
(Open)
LER 89-20:
This
LER reported that several
motor operated
valve gear
boxes
had been overfilled with grease
which damaged
= wiring and affected the operator's
environmental qualification.
The
licensee
has repaired the
damaged wiring for the identified valves
and
has
completed
an inspection of the remaining motor operators
inside the containment building and the steam tunnel.
The licensee
is planning to revise applicable maintenance
procedures
to provide
better guidance
on maintaining proper grease
levels in the limit
switch gear
boxes
and to train maintenance
personnel
on this
problem.
This matter is considered
to be
a licensee identified
and is not being cited because criteria specified in section
V.G.1
of the
NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NCV (90-02-05):
Failure to maintain proper grease
levels in motor
operated
valve gear boxes.
n.'Open)
LER 89-21:
This
LER reported
system
actuation
caused
by personnel
error in controlling feedwater flow.
This matter
was also discussed
in NRC Inspection
Report
50-400/89-34.
The licensee
has not yet completed all of the
corrective actions stated
in the LER.
The following items remain to
be accomplished:
Repair valve SP-226.
Revise
procedure
GP-005,
Power Operation
Mode
2 to Mode l.
to prohibit the simultaneous
transfer of all three
steam
generators
from bypass
flow feedwater control to main feed
regulating valve control.
Evaluation of the time delay relays for main feedwater
pump low
flow trip and response
time of the recirculation flow control
valve.
Training to applicable
personnel
on this event.
The
LER will remain open pending completion of this corrective
action.
o.
(Open)
LER 89-22:
This
LER reported the spurious
loss of a residual
heat
removal train during testing of interlocks.
The following
corrective action remains to be accomplished:
Revise test procedure
to ensure that the operating loop's
suction valve power supply breakers
are
open during installation
and removal of test equipment.
10
Pursue
TS changes
to eliminate the requirement for an
auto-closure
interlock.
This
LER will remain
open pending completion of this corrective
action.
p.
(Closed)
LER 89-23:
This
LER reported that power range nuclear
instrumentation
indicated non-conservatively
during a plant startup
in December,
1989.
This matter is also the subject of a violation
(90-01-01) in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/90-01.
For record
purposes,
the
LER will be closed
and further action tracked
by the
violation.
q.
(Open)
LER 90-01:
This
LER reported
a
TS violation regarding
response
time testing of Engineered
Safety Feature
(ESF) channels
in
a periodic rotation.
On January
5, 1990, during
a review by licensee
personnel
of procedure
NST-10645,
Group
2 of 2 Channel
RTS and
Response
Time Test, the licensee
discovered that testing performed
during the previous
1988 refueling outage failed to adequately
response
time test
ESF Channel III.
The other three
ESF channels
had
been tested satisfactory.
The licensee
determined that the cause for
this event
was
an inadequate
change to the surveillance
procedure,
which has subsequently
been revised.
Training will be provided for
personnel
responsible for writing and approving procedure
changes
and
Channel III will be tested
no later than February 1, 1992.
This
matter is considered
to be
a licensee identified
NCV and is not being
cited because criteria specified in section
V.G.1 of the
NRC
Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
NCV (90-02-06):
Failure to response
time test
ESF Channel III at
the correct periodicity.
This
LER will remain
open pending completion of required training
and testing of the
ESF channel.
6.
Review of NRC Bulletins (92703)
(Open)
Pressurizer
surge line thermal stratification.
This bulletin alerted licensees
to the potential for thermal stratification
to exist in pressurizer
surge lines during plant heatup
and cooldown
operations,
which could result in unexpected
piping movements
and
potential
high piping stress.
The licensee
has submitted correspondence
to the
NRC dated
December
29.
1989, addressing
the actions required
by the
bulletin.
A visual inspection of the pressurizer
surge line has
been
completed with no structural
damage identified.
The Westinghouse
Owners
Group performed
a bounding evaluation of this phenomenon for several
plants.
However, since this evaluation is not plant specific,
and
does not encompass
the full design lifetime of the surge line,
a
justification for continued operation of the plant was submitted.
This
justification concluded that continued plant operation
was acceptable
Cl
11
based
on the results of similar plants
analyzed
thus far, consideration of
concepts,
and results of non-destructive
examinations of
other pl ant pressurizer
surge lines.
Additional
moni toring and analysi s
are presently in progress.
The licensee
plans to obtain plant specific
surge line data
and update
the stress/fatigue
analysis to ensure
compliance with code requirements.
This action is expected
to be
completed
by December
29,
1990.
The bulletin will remain
open pending
completion of this additional action.
7.
Cold Weather Preparations
(71714)
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
preparations
and administrative
controls established
to protect plant equipment during cold weather.
The
licensee
implements
procedure
AP-301, Adverse Weather
Operations,
section
5. 1, Cold Weather Operation,
whenever
ambient air temperature
reaches
35 degrees
F.
This procedure
requires that freeze protection
devices for plant equipment
be verified operable to prevent
systems
and
equipment
from freezing.
The licensee utilizes portable
space
heaters for
critical instrumentation
cabinets without installed
space
heaters.
The
inspectors
walked through the procedure with licensee
personnel
and
observed
implementation of the procedure
during cold weather conditions.
t
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8..
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702
5
92701)
a.
(Closed) Violation 88-25-01
Failure to establish
and implement
procedures.
The inspector
reviewed and verified implementation of
the corrective actions
as stated in the licensee's
response letter
dated October 26,
1988.
b.
(Closed)
Violation 89-15-01
Improper flow orifice installation.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified implementation of the corrective
actions
as stated
in the licensee's
response letter dated
September
12,
1989.
c.
(Closed)
IFI 89-03-02,
Followup on diesel
generator injection
valve holder, inspections.
The spare
and installed delivery valve
holders
were inspected
and all discrepancies
have
been resolved.
d.
e.
(Closed)
IFI 89-03-01,
Implementation of PCR 3241 to resolve
low
temperature
overpressure
concerns.
Plant change
request
PCR 3241 was
completed
and turned over to operations
on November 28,
1989.
(Closed)
IFI 89-08-02
Throttle valve position verification.
Procedure
changes
were made to the following procedures;
OST-1216,
Component Cooling Water System quarterly Operability (1A-SA and
1B-SB pumps),
OST-1316,
Component Cooling Water System quarterly
'
l '
12
'Operability
(Pump 1C-SAB), and OST-1016,
Component Cooling Mater
.
System Monthly Operability, which now include specific component
cooling water to residual
heat removal
heat exchanger
valve positions
and signoff verifications.
f.
(Closed)
Violation 89-15-02. Failure to maintain
an active senior
reactor operator license.
The inspector
rev'iewed
and verified
implementation of the corrective actions
as stated in the licensee's
response letter dated
September
20,
1989.
g.
(Closed)
IFI 88-39-01
Review findings and corrective actions for
October 30,
1988 reactor trip.
The corrective actions,
developed
from the licensee'0
task force, were implemented within the time
specified.
Items included in the corrective action program were:
maintain current system descriptions,
provide operator retraining,
provide operator aids, modify booster
pump trip settings,
and
starting of auxiliary feedwater
pumps
on
a loss of one main feedwater
pump.
h.
(Open) Violation 89-28-02:
Failure to have
an adequate
procedure
for the performance of local leak rate testing which resulted in
instrument air contamination.
The licensee
has flushed
and
decontaminated
the instrument air system.
However,
due to the
possibility of hot particles still remaining inside the system,
use
of this system
was formally prohibited for breathing air purposes
by
procedure
AP-512,
Use of Respiratory
Equipment.
The licensee
has
further revised procedure
EST-212,
Type
C Local Leak Rate Tests,
to
require that any deviation from normal
system venting and draining
practices
be covered
by a temporary
change to the procedure.
The
licensee is evaluating
over time work of personnel
involved in testing
of safety related
equipment to develop appropriate guidelines
and is
developing
a plant general
order to specify controls
and exclusions
for use of the instrument air system.
This item will remain open
pending completion of the overtime guidance
and issuance
of the
plant general
order.
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted in paragraph
1)
at the conclusion of the inspection
on February
16, 1990.
During this
meeting, the inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the
inspection
as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis
on the violations addressed
below.
The licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during
this inspection.
Item Number
Descri tion and Reference
90-02-01
Violation:
Failure to properly implement procedure
OST-1039, resulting in inadequate
gPTR data
calculation,
(par agraph 2.b. (1) ) .
0
13
90-02-02
90-02-03
90-02-04
90-02-05
90-02-06
Acronyms and
ALB
EPT
ESF/AS
EST
IFI
LER
MPT
NI
NRC
OST
OMM
PLP
TS
WR/JO
Administrative Procedure
Alarm Response
Procedure
Corrective Maintenance
Engineering
Performance Test,
Engineered
Safety Feature
Actu
Engineering Surveillance Test
General
Procedure
Inspector Follow-up Item
Licensee
Event Report
Maintenance
Performance
Test
Maintenance
Surveillance Test
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Instrument
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Surveillance Test
Operations
Management
Manual
Plant Change
Request
Process
Instrument Control Pro
Plant Program
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Quadrant
Power Tilt Ratio
Residual
Heat Removal
Reactor Trip System
Radiation
Work Permit
Sampling
System
Technical Specification
Work Request/Job
Order
ation System
cedure
Violation:
Failure to calculate
the
QPTR as required
by TS 4.2.4.1,
(paragraph 2.b.(1)).
NCV:
Failure to properly test thermal overload
bypass circuitry for valve MS-72, (paragraph 5.f).
NCV:
Failure to periodically vent emergency
core
cooling system piping, (paragraph 5.h).
NCV:
Failure to maintain proper grease
levels in
motor operated
gear boxes,
(paragraph
5.m).
NCV:
Failure to response
time test
ESF channel III
at correct periodicity, (paragraph 5.q).
Initialisms