ML18005A838
| ML18005A838 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1989 |
| From: | Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-662 HO-890036-(O), NUDOCS 8904050011 | |
| Download: ML18005A838 (5) | |
Text
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DEMO~>TRAT104 SY~ TEN REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8904050011 DOC.DATE: 89/03/29 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WATSON,R.A.
Carolina Power
& Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Responds to NRC 890303 ltr re violations noted in Insp Rept 50-400/88-40.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL L SIZE:
TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response DOCKET 05000400 NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.
05000400 ~
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/DEIIB NRR SHANKMAN,S NRR/DLPQ/PEB 11 NRR/DOEA DIR 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 OE j
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME BECKER,D AEOD DEDRO NRR/DEST DIR NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/EPB 10 NRR/DRIS DIR 9A NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS1 RGN2 FILE 01 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR iENCL 1
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R3 ELQ%NATE YOUR NAME FROM DIG'HGEVZION LISTS FOR DOCUMENIS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 25 ENCL 25
Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O.
Box 165
, New Hill, North Carolina 27562 SIR 29 1988 File Number.'SHF/10-13510E Letter Number'HO-890036 (0)
Document Control Desk United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION NRC-662 Gentlemen:
In reference to your letter of March 3, 1989, referring to I.E.
Report RII:
50-400/88-40, the attached is Carolina Power and Light Company's reply to violation "B" ide tified in Enclosure 1.
It is considered that the corrective actions taken/planned are satisfactory for resolution of the item.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Very truly yours, MGW'tbb Enclosure
( ~)F R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nucleax Project cc'Mr. R. A. Beckex (NRC)
Mr, W.
H. Bradford (NRC " SHNPP)
Mr. S.
D. Ebnetex (NRC RII) qc'(tpO500 1 1 pOOCK O5OOO40O F'ltii Pfll (s
MEM/HO-8900360/1/OS1
Attachment to CP&L Letter of Res onse to NRC I.E.
Re ort RII:
50-400 88-40 Violation B'e
'orted Violation:
Technical Specification 6.8.1a requires that written procedures be implemented covering the procedures outlined in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev.
2, February 1978.
Administrative Procedures are identified in Appendix A of the Regulatory Guide.
Administrative Procedure
- 002, Rev.
3, Section 5.4,
- entitled, "Plant Conduct of Operations,"
requires that adherence to procedures shall be mandatory.
Administrative Procedure
- 020, Rev.
2, Section 5.2, entitled "Clearance Procedure,"
requires that when removing a
clearance, remove tags from handwheels of all
- valves, as
- required, and reposition manual valves as directed in the restoration line up.
Contrary to the
- above, on January 17,
- 1989, at 2:15 a.m.,
the valve realignment instruction in clearance OP-89-0071 was not followed in that valve 1SF-19 was required to remain closed.
Valve 1SF-19 was opened which allowed approximately five feet of water in the spent fuel pool to drain into the new fuel storage pools This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
Denial or Admission and Reason Eor the Violation:
The violation is admitted.
The clearance removal sequence required valve 1SF-19 be checked closed before reopening valve 1SF-ll (see attached sketch) thus ensuring no potential for water intrusion into the New Fuel Pool.
These valves are in the overhead about ll Eeet above the floor in a
dimly lit area.
The operator must either obtain a
ladder to gain access to the valve or climb the piping.
Ladders are available in the general area and the operators who placed the clearance used a ladder for access.
The operator who removed the clearance chose to climb the piping to gain access to the valve.
This required that he operate the valve from above the handwheel and turn the handwheel from an awkward position.
The operator could not observe the mechanical position indicator on the valve, while he was physically operating the handwheel.
He could not cause the handwheel to turn; therefore, he assumed that the valve was shut.
This method of verifying a valve in the shut position is consistent
'with plant procedures.
He then proceeded to open 1SF-11.
This allowed water to flow from the Spent Fuel Pool to the New Fuel Pool.
The loss of water could not be immediately detected by the operator because of the ambient noise in the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger room.
MEM/HO-8900360/2/OS1
Denial or Admission and Reason for the Violation: (continued)
The reason for the event.was the incorrect determination of valve position during the process of removing a clearance.
Valve 1SF-19 was verified closed when the clearance was placed.
Valve 1SF-19 was open when the clearance was removed.
The operator who removed the clearance did not change the position of the valve.
Operating logs and similar records were reviewed for evidence of circumstances that would suggest a reason for the change in valve position, but no explanation has yet been found.
An investigation of the change in the position of 1SF-19 is currently in progress.
(For further details see LER 89-002-00).
Corrective Ste s Taken and Results Achieved:
Valve 1SF-19 was shut by operations personnel approximately ten minutes after the event was initiated.
The spent fuel pool level was restored to normal level by 8:15 a.m.
on January 17, 1989.
Corrective Ste s Taken to Avoid Further Violations'.
Personnel involved in this event action was taken.
Appropriate training on the proper methods determining a
valve's position.
investigated to 'etermine the mispositioned.
were counseled and disciplinary operations personnel received and cautions to be used when The event continues to be cause of valve 1SF-19 being Date When Full Com liance will be Achieved:
Full compliance is pending completion of the ongoing investigation.
It is currently projected that the investigation will be complete by May 26, 1989.
MEM/HO-8900360/3/OS1
FUEL POOL PIPIIIG
lORl'IAl.
LEVEL 28 1.5EAA
~AW~MPMM~~WA1A AA OPER ATIIIG DECl'.S EL.286'ik 13'X 38'EV fUEL POOL (19,780 cu il) 260.08'OP OF STORAGE RACKS EL.
277.b'2" SFEtlT fUEL POOL 50' 27'51,000cu 0) 260 00'OP Of FUEL STORAGE RACKS EL. 2-l8' SF-19 (MORI IALLYx TO FUEL POOL
~
COOLlflO PUt'IP '8 SUCT10lt STRAlllER N~
EL. 256')