ML18004B933
| ML18004B933 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1987 |
| From: | Burris S, Frederickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004B931 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-87-31, IEB-81-03, IEB-81-3, NUDOCS 8709140315 | |
| Download: ML18004B933 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1987031
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/87-31
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Shearon
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
July 20 - August.,20,
1987
\\
Inspectors:
5
'U ~" ~
G.
F.
Maxwe
License No.:
q)C> Iq
ate
igne
rri.s
Approved
b
.
re nc son,
ection
se
Division of Reactor
Projects
ate
igne
ish
ate
s
e
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced
inspection involved inspection in the areas of
Open
NRC Items,
Survey of Licensee's
Response
to Selected
Safety Issues,
Operational
Safety Verification, Monthly Surveillance
Observation,
and Monthly
Maintenance
Observation.
Results:
Two violations were identified - "Incorrect Position of a Compressed
Air Valve During Clearance
Restoration"
- Paragraph
5.b.(4),
and "Failure to
Report
an
ESF Activation Within Four Hours" - Paragraph
5.b.(5).
8709i40315
870908
ADOCK 05000+00
8
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
G.
G.
J.
M.
G. L.
L. I.
G. A.
D. L.
R. B.
R. A.
J. L.
Campbell,
Manager of Maintenance
Collins, Manager',
Operations
Forehand,
Director,
QA/QC
Loflin, Manager, Harris Plant Engineering
Support
Myer, General
Manager, Milestone Completion
Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory
Compliance
Van Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical
Support
Watson,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
Willis, Plant General
Manager,
Operations
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security
force
members,
engineering
personnel
and office
personnel.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were summarized
on August 24,
1987, with
the Plant General
Manager,
Operations.
No written material
was provided
to the licensee
by the resident
inspectors
during this reporting period.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the resident
inspectors
during this inspection.
The
violations identified in this report
have
been
discussed
in detail with
the licensee.
3.
Open
NRC Items
(92701,
36100)
a
~
(Closed)
NRC Circular 80-CI-13 "Grid Strap
Damage in Westinghouse
Fuel
Assemblies".
The inspectors
evaluated
the site fuel handling
procedure,
FHP-001,
Rev.
0,
"Handling Limitations for
New
and
Irradiated
Fuel
Assemblies",
and fuel management
procedure
FMP-107,
Rev.
0, "Irradiated
Fuel
Visual Inspection".'he
inspectors
found
the procedures
addressed
the Westinghouse
recommendations
identified
in Circular 80-CI-13.
Procedure
FHP-001
contained
the
recommended
precautions
to aid in
minimizing corner-to-corner
interaction
between grid assemblies.
The
procedure
included
a fuel
handling
sequence
which should
generate
only side-to-side
contact
between
the assemblies.
Procedure
FMP-107
provided detailed instructions
concerning
visual
,inspections
to
be completed
on fuel assemblies.
The instructions
included requirements
that the assembly
be inspected
and the results
documented
to record
the condition of the grids.
Based
on the
procedure
evaluation
and
interviews
with those
responsible
for
implementing
the
procedures,
the
inspectors
concluded
that
the
licensee
has considered
the recommended
actions
described in Circular
80-CI-13.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
10 CFR Part 21 Item P2185-01,
"AAF Intake Silencer
TDM or
FTDM for Diesel Generators".
The inspectors
evaluated
the licensee's
documentation
concerning this Part
21 item which was communicated
to
the
NRC by the vendor,
American Air Filter Company
(AAF).
In
September
1985,
the
licensee
received
a letter
from the
NRC
stating that the supplier of the air silencers
for the Harris Plant
emergency
diesel
generators
had reported
a potential
manufacturing
defect in the si lencers.
The potential
defect
was described
as
"an
internal
part not being
welded into place".
The
vendor further
indicated
that
the
part
which
was
not
welded
into place
was
identified as
an air baffle.
To as'sure that the potential defect
was
properly tracked
and resolved,
the licensee
documented
the vendor's
concern
on
a Nonconformance
Report
(NCR-85-1963).
In mid-October
1985,
the
licensee
dismantled
the installed air
si lencers
and
conducted
an extensive
detailed
visual
inspection of .
their internals.
The licensee's
inspectors
found that
the air
baffles located inside the air si lencers
had
been welded into place
as
required
by design
documents.
The licensee
concluded
that the
conditions
described
by AAF, in the vendor's
report to the
NRC, did
not apply to the air si lencers
which
AAF supplied for the Harris
Plant.
The licensee
closed
NCR-85-1963,
and the vendor's
Part
21
report
was
not considered
applicable
to Harris.
The inspectors
concurred with the licensee's
conclusion.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
10 CFR Part 21 Item P2184-02."Deficient
Valves for Auxiliary
Pump
Drive Turbine".
In
1984 the licensee
was
advised
through correspondence
from the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations
(INPO) that
a utility had experienced
problems with a motor-operated
semibalanced
globe
valve
supplied
by Gimpel
Machine
Works/Gimpel
Corporation.
The problem was identified during operability testing
of a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater
pump.
During the test the
turbine
steam inlet isolation valve would stop or hesitate
in the
mid-position
when the turbine
was operating
under
no load or minimum
load conditions.
The Harris
Plant
was identified
as
having
one of these
valves
installed
in the
steam
for the turbine-driven auxiliary
pump.
The supplier of the turbine,
Terry,
a part of
Ingersoll-Rand,
Inc.,
advised
the
licensee
that
a design
review
revealed
that
the installed
Gimpel
valve
could
be
repaired
by
increasing
the valve closure
spring tension.
Increasing'he
spring
tension
would eliminate the possibility of the valve stalling in a
mid-position.
The valve manufacturer
supplied
an improved closing spring to replace
the existing spring
on the installed
Gimpel valve.
The
new spring
installation
was
authorized
by
Work
Request
WR/85-AKHL1.
The
installation
was
completed
and
accepted
on
November
6,
1985.
The
inspectors
evaluated
the
documentation
associated
with WR/85-AKHLl
and interviewed responsible
licensee
personnel
concerning
the spring
replacement.
This item is closed.
4.
Survey of Licensee's
Response
to Selected
Safety Issues,(TI
2515/77,
92701)
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
marine growth control program with
respect
to biofouling of cooling water heat
exchangers
and verified the
following:
The licensee
had
a formal program which would monitor changes
in flow
capabilities of all open-cycle
systems,
including those closed-cycle
systems
which were capable of being cross-connected
to the open-cycle
systems.
The
program
included
monitoring
the
pressure
drop
instrumentation,
temperature'instruments,
and visual inspections
of
the heat exchangers
on a routine basis.
The licensee's
program identified above
was routinely reviewed
and
evaluated
against
design considerations
to ensure that any potential
marine
growth would be detected
prior to loss of
a heat exchanger
required
by safety equipment.
Incorporation of lessons
learned
from events
at other facilities was
conducted
by operations
personnel.
Specific
procedures
for the
degradation
of heat
exchangers
due to marine
growth
do not exist,
because
the licensee
considers
blockage of flow from.marine growth to
be
a loss of the heat exchanger.
The licensee
performs
routine periodic inspections
of the service
water
and fire protection
systems
in accordance
with its documented
surveillance testing
program.
During this
review the
inspectors
reviewed
"Flow
Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety
Components
by Coribicula Sp. (Asiatic
Clam)
and Mytilus
Sp.
(Mussel)", which was closed in
ISE Report 84-14.
The licensee
continues
to maintain
surveillance
for the control
and
removal of any identified marine growth at the Shearon Harris Plant.
5.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707,
71710)
a ~
Plant Tours
The inspectors
conducted
routine plant tours during this inspection
period to verify that the licensee's
requirements
and
commitments
were being
implemented.
These
tours
were performed to verify that
systems,
valves
and breakers
required for safe plant operations
were
in their correct position; fire protection equipment,
spare
equipment
and
materials
were
being
maintained
and
stored
properly;
plant
operators
were
aware of the current plant status;
plant operations
personnel
were
documenting
the status
of out-of-service
equipment;
security
and
health
physics
controls
were
being
implemented
as
required
by procedures;
there
were
no undocumented
cases
of unusual
fluid leaks,
piping vibration, abnormal
hanger
or seismic restraint
movements;
and all
reviewed
equipment
requiring calibration
was
current.
II
Tours
of the
plant
included
review of site
documentation
and
interviews with plant personnel.,
The inspectors
reviewed the shift
foreman's
log, control
room operator's
log, clearance
center tag out
logs,
system
status
logs,
chemistry
and health
physics
logs,
and
control status
board.
During these
tours the inspectors
noted that
the
operators
appeared
to
be alert
and
aware of changing
plant
conditions.
The inspectors
evaluated
operations
shift turnovers
and
attended
shift briefings.
They observed
that the briefings
'and turnovers
provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew.
The inspectors
verified that various
plant
spaces
were
not in
a
condition which would degrade
the
performance
capabilities of any
required
system or component.
This inspection included checking the
condition of electrical
cabinets
to ensure
that they were free of
foreign and, loose debris, or material.
Site security
was evaluated
by observing
personnel
in the protected
and vital
areas
to
ensure
that
these
persons
had
the
proper
authorization to be in the respective
areas.
The security personnel
appeared
to be alert
and attentive to their duties
and those officers
performing
personnel
and
vehicular
searches
were
thorough
and
systematic.
Responses
to security
alarm conditions
appeared
to be
prompt and adequate.
The inspectors
observed
that the licensee
had
established
additional
active
and
passive
security
measures
at the
correct levels, to be consistent with NRC Information Notice 87-27.
b.
Plant Events
(1)
On July 22,
1987
the licensee
notified the
NRC Duty Officer
concerning
an event that resulted
in an automatic actuation of
the engineered
safety features.
When the event occurred,
the
reactor
was critical and stable at approximately
two percent
power with the
"B" main feedwater
pump supplying feedwater to
the
steam
generators.
The
licensee
reported
that
the
motor-driven auxiliary feedwater
pumps
(AFW) started at
5 a.m.
as
a result of the "B" main feedwater
pump tripping.
Upon
losing
the
main
pump,
both
of
the
electrically-driven
pumps
started,
as
expected.
The
operators
maintained
water level with the
pumps until the
"A" main feedwater
pump was started.
The
pumps
were then
secured
and the
AFW system
was returned
to its
normal
emergency
standby condition.
The licensee first reported that the event
was initiated by the
circuit breaker for the
"B" main feedwater
pump motor tripping,
due to overcurrent.
However, the inspectors
were informed that
after
the
maintenance
technicians
inspected
and
tested
the
pump's
protective circuitry,
they
determined
that it was
unlikely that it tripped
on overcurrent.
The
inspectors
evaluated
the site electrical
drawings for the circuit breaker
and noted the following:
When the overcurrent relay energizes it causes
contacts
to
close which lockout the circuit breaker
once it has tripped
open.
The lockout device would then require resetting
before the
breaker could be operated
again.
The inspectors
interviewed the responsible
technicians
and were
told that the lockout device
was not activated
when the circuit
breaker tripped.
Based
on this observation
and the electrical
tests
which were conducted
on the
pump motor
and its circuits,
the technicians
determined that the main feedwater
pump did not
trip on overcurrent.
The circuit tests
and inspections
revealed
that
a mechanical
fastener
on the valve linkage for the "B" main
pump recirculating
valve
had vibrated
loose.
The
loose
valve
linkage
caused
a false
valve position to
be
indicated.
The false indication resulted
in a feedwater
pump
low flow alarm followed by a low feedwater
pump flow trip.
On July 23,
1987 the licensee
contacted
the
NRC and provided
a
correction to the initial report of this event.
The licensee
has
documented
the event
on
a Licensee
Event Report identified
as LER-87-46.
On July
24,
1987
the
licensee
experienced
a
loss
of the
Emergency
Response
Facility Information System
(ERFIS) computer.
The licensee
informed the inspectors
that the plant
had
been
experiencing
a "random" fault on the
"A" train
ERFIS computer.
The fault
had
been
identified
as
an input/output
processor
failure
in
the
"A" Central
Processor
Unit
(CPU),
which
effectively locked
up the ability of the computer to update, the
CRT (cathode
ray tube) monitors.
A lockup of one of the trains
of ERFIS will automatically shift the input/output to the other
train".
However,
a
computer
operator
was
in the
process
of
performing
a routine surveillance
on train "B" and therefore
the
automatic shift over did not occur.
Prior to this event the
licensee's
computer
personnel
were able to correct
the lockup
problems
by restarting
the
ERFIS program within 15 minutes.
The
0'
Plant
Emergency, Plan
allowed the licensee
15 minutes
to
be
without .the
ERFIS computer,
however,
on this date
the computer
operator
was unable to restart
the system within the specified
time.
The licensee
declared
an Unusual
Event at 1:15 a.m.
and
notified the appropriate
federal,
state
and local officials.
The
ERFIS computer
was returned'o
service at 1:42 a.m.
and the
licensee
began
an investigation
of the
cause
and corrective
actions for this event.
Subsequent
to this event the licensee
revised its
Emergency
Pl'an, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.54q.,
to allow an hour time period prior to making
a determination of
an
Unusual
Event
for all
future
computer
failures.
Acceptability of this
change will be reviewed during subsequent
inspections.
On July 25,
1987, at about
1:45 p.m.,
the site experienced
a
loss
of both trains
of the
ERFIS
computer.
The
licensee
declared
an
Unusual
Event,
and notified the appropriate
local,
state
and federal
agencies.
The "A" train of the
ERFIS computer
was repaired
and the site terminated
the
Unusual
Event at 1:58
p.m.
On July 27,
1987 the licensee
removed
both trains of the
ERFIS
computer for troubleshooting.
The troubleshooting
was performed
to try to locate
the
cause
of the previous
computer failures.
Removal
from service of the
ERFIS computer
was coordinated with
local, state
and federal
agencies
prior to system
deenergi zing.
Th'e troubleshooting
was
completed
and both
ERFIS trains
were
returned to service.
On July 31,
1987
the licensee
identified
a problem with the
containment
wide range level
(CWRL) instrumentation.
The
CWRL
system
is divided into
"A" and
-"B" trains
which
meet
the
redundant train requirements.
Operations
personnel
noted that
the
"A" train instrument
pegged
low and that there
was
an alarm
condition
on the
computer monitoring system.
The operations
section
generated
two Work Request
and Authorizations
(87-AYJT1
and
87-AYJU1) to locate
and correct these
problems.
With both
trains of the instruments
out of service, it placed the plant in
a
48-hour
Limiting Condition for Operation
(LCO)
action
statement
in
accordance
with Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.6.b.
Licensee
Instrumentation
and Control personnel
found
that the "8" train instrument loop had
a short to ground
between
and metal
housing,
which was repaired,
allowing
the
"B" train to be returned to service.
Correction of the "B"
train
ended
the 48-hour
LCO.
However, with only one loop of
instruments
available,
TS 3.3.6.a specifies
that the inoperable
loop must
be returned to service within seven
days, or the plant
must be in Hot Standby within the following six hours,
and in at
least
Hot Shutdown within the following six hours.
While operations
personnel
were reviewing the probable
causes
for the
"A" train failure, engineering
personnel
were reviewing
a Plant
Change
Request
(PCR),
PCR-2138,
which would replace
the
control
room meter with one capable of receiving direct signals
from
a sensing
device.
The analysis for the
PCR was
based
on
the following facts:
Location of the
detectors
inside
containment
would not
allow repairs
due
to high radiation
levels while the
reactor
was at power operation.
The
CWRL instrumentation
system
was
not normally
used
during routine plant operation.
A local
instrument in the reactor auxiliary building was
available
during all operational
and accident
phases
to
monitor the water level in the containment pit.
System reliability would not
be affected
by this change,
and
a
safety
evaluation
would
be
completed
prior to
implementation of the
PCR.-
The licensee
obtained
the replacement
meter
and
performed all
necessary
certifications
to ensure
that
the
meter
met site
specifications.
The
inspectors
evaluated
the
maintenance
activities
associated
with the
Work Request
(87-A2AG1) which
replaced
and calibrated
the sensing
device,
as specified in
PCR-2138,
and they found that the work performed
appeared
to be
satisfactory.
(4)
At 9:54 p.m.
on August 4, 1987, while the reactor
was operating
at
100
percent
power,
personnel
error
caused
the plant to
experience
a reactor trip when
the "B",train compressed
air
system
was
being
returned
to its
normal
valve lineup.
The
compressed
air system is composed
to two separate
trains,
each
consisting
of an air compressor,
an air dryer tower, support
equipment,
valves
and piping.
The
"A" train compressed
air
system
was out of service, with the
"B" train system supplying
plant air loads.
A clearance
was required to allow maintenance
personnel
to replace
the desiccant
material
in the
"B" air
dryer.
The clearance
(OP-87-1418)
removed
the
"B" air dryer
from service
by electrically isolating
the air dryer
power,
closing
the isolation
valves
and
opening
the
bypass
valve.
Bypassing
the air dryer allowed the
"B" train compressed
air
system to remain in service,
supplying all plant air loads.
When restoring the "B" train air dryer to service,
the clearance
center
mistakenly identified that the air dryer outlet valve
(1IA-852) was to remain closed.
With the air dryer outlet valve
shut
and
the air dryer
bypass
valve shut,
no flow path
was
available for compressed
air.
Based
on
a low air alarm in the
control
room,
the
control
operator
instructed
the auxiliary
operator
to
investigate
the
cause
for the
loss
of air.
Subsequently,
the
reduced
air
pressure
to
feed
flow
control 1 er
reduced
the
capabi lity to control
feed flow,
therefore
the
turbine
load
was
reduced.
During the
load
reduction
the plant experienced
a loss of both heater
drain
pumps
and
a trip of the "A" main feedwater
pump, resulting in an
automatic
runback.
After the runback,
the reactor tripped
on an
"A" steam generator
low level, coincident with a feed flow/steam
flow mismatch.
The "A" steam
generator
level
decrease
was
due
to the turbine throttle valves closing,
thereby
causing
the
steam
pressure
to increase
which led to a steam generator
shrink (decrease).
All safety
systems
started
as required.
The inspectors
reviewed
the
circumstances
leading
up to this
event
and
determined that the clearance
center operator failed
to appropriately
identify the correct position of
an outlet
valve
(1IA-852)
on
the
restoration
section
of clearance
OP-87-1418
in accordance
with Operations
Procedure
OP-151-01,
Compressed
Air System Operation, while returning the
system to
service.
The inspectors
informed licensee
management
that
failure to show the correct operational
position of this valve
on the
clearance
procedure
was
a violation of Administrative
Procedure
AP-020, Clearance
Procedure,
and will be identified as
"Incorrect Position of a Compressed
Air Valve During Clearance
Restoration"
50-400/87-31-01.
(5)
During the restart
of the plant
on the morning of August 5,
1987, at approximately 2:Ol a.m., following the reactor trip the
previous
day,
the
plant
experienced
an
actuation
of the
engineered
safety
features
(ESF)
s'stem.
While approaching
Mode
2 (Start-up)
from Mode
3 (Hot Standby),
the plant lost the
running
"A" main feedwater
pump which generated
an
ESF signal
for the standby motor-driven
AFW pumps to start
and supply the
necessary
steam
generator
feed
requirements,
as
designed.
Preliminary investigations .by the licensee
determined that the
cause for the main feedwater
pump trip was
due to high discharge
pressure..
The inspectors
interviewed licensee
personnel
and reviewed the
licensee's
documentation
for this event,
which included
Work
Request
and Authorization 87-AY2Rl, instrument calibration data
sheets,
and the initial Licensee
Event Report information.
The
inspectors verified that the licensee's
evaluation of this event
correctly identified the
reasons
for the main feedwater
pump
tripping.
The
inspectors
determined
that
the
event
was
initiated
due to incorrect settings
on the main feedwater
pump
discharge
pressure
switches.
These incorrect settings
were
a
result of the pressure
sensors drifting out of calibration.
9
The
event
was
evaluated
by
the
licensee
as
a
four-hour
reportable
event
under
the
requirements
of
However, the licensee
did not make the
"Red Phone" call to the,
NRC Duty Officer until approximately
9:44
a.m.
on August 5,
1987.
When
the
inspectors
inquired
about
the
licensee's
allowing nearly eight
hours to
pass
prior to reporting
the
event,
they were'nformed
by responsible
licensee
supervision
that failure to report this event within four hours
was
due to
personnel
incorrectly interpreting the reportable
requirements
of 10 CFR 50.72.
Additionally, the interpretation error was
a
result of not distinguishing this event
from the reactor trip
which occurred at 9:54 p.m.
on August 4,
1987.
The inspectors
informed
licensee
management
that
fai lure
to
make
the
appropriate
event
report
within
the
four-hour
reporting
requirement
is
a violation of
and will be
identified
as "Failure to Report
an
ESF Actuation Within Four
Hours" (50-400/87-31-02).
On
August
10,
1987
the
licensee
experienced
a loss of the
capability
to
collect
weather
data
from
the
onsite
meteorological
weather station
and therefore declared
an Unusual
Event at 5:36 a.m.
State
and local officials were notified in
accordance
with the
Emergency
Plan requirements,
and the Unusual
Event
was terminated at 9:00 a.m.
The cause of the event
was
attributed to the
power supply breaker for the meteorological
tower
modem
tripping.
The
breaker
was
reset
and
the
meteorological
tower station
was
placed
back in service.
The
licensee
is evaluating this event to determine
the root cause
for the loss of the power supply breaker.
On
August
15,
1987
the
licensee
identified that
the
ERFIS
computer
was
not
updating
plant
parameters,
as
designed.
Operations
personnel
initiated an investigation to determine
the
cause
and to correct the problem.
Plant management
declared
an
Unusual
Event at 4:41 a.m. in accordance
with the Emergency
Plan
and notified all appropriate
agencies.
The event
was terminated
at 5:15 a.m.
On August
15,
1987 the plant experienced
a loss of the
ERFIS
computer
and declared
an Unusual
Event at 12:15 p.m.
All local,
state
and federal
response
organizations
were notified within
the required
time period.
The licensee
repaired
the computer
and
returned it to service,
terminating
the
Unusual
event at
1: 12 p.m.
Both of the
ERFIS events
which occurred
on August
15
were attributed
to
a defective electrical
card in the
"B"
computer circuit.
The card provided
a path for the high speed
data link connecting
the
"A" and
"B" computers.
The computer
technicians
replaced
the
card
on the afternoon
of the 15th.
Replacement
of the defective
card appears
to have corrected
the
cause of these
two Unusual
Events.
0
10
Two violations were identified in the areas
inspected.
6.
Monthly Surveillance
Observation
(61726)
The inspectors
witnessed
the licensee
conducting maintenance
surveillance
test activities
on safety-related
systems
and
components
to verify that
the
licensee
performed
the activities
in
accordance
with licensee
requirements.
These observations
included witnessing selected
portions of
each
surveillance,
review of the surveillance
procedure
to ensure
that
administrative
controls
were in force,
determining
that approval
was
obtained
prior to conducting
the surveillance test
and the individuals
conducting
the test
were qualified in accordance
with plant-approved
procedures.
Other
observations
included
ascertaining
that
test
instrumentation
used
was
calibrated,
data
collected
was within the
specified
reauirements
of Technical
Specifications,
any
identified
discrepancies
were properly noted,
and the systems
were correctly returned
to service.
The following specific activities were observed:
The inspectors
reviewed
the test procedure
and witnessed
maintenance
personnel
during the
performance
of Maintenance
Surveillance
Test
MST-I-0001, Rev. 3, Train "A" Solid State Protection
System Actuation
Logic and Master
Relay Test.
This test verified operation of the
reactor trip breaker,
reactor trip bypass
breaker
and verification of
the
P-4 permissive.
MST-I-0001 also verified the requirements
of
Technical Specifications 4.3.2. 1, Table 4.3-2,
Sections
1.b, 2.b,
3.a.2, 3.a.3, 3.b.2, 3.c.2, 3.c.3, 4.b, 5.a, 5.c, 6.b, 6.d, 6.g, 7.a,
8.a
and 8.b.
Portions of Technical Specifications 4.3. 1. 1, Table
4.3-1,
Sections
20,
21
and
22
were
also verified during
the
performance
of this test.
FSAR commitments
3. 1.17-002, 7.3.2-044,
7.3.2-049,
7.3.2-051
and 15.0.6-003
were verified upon completion of
the test
and acceptance
of the test results.
The inspectors
obtained
a copy of the
MST procedure
and reviewed the
procedure
to ensure
the following:
a current
copy of the procedure
was
being
used
by personnel
performing the test; prerequisites
for
the test were met prior to commencing
the test; maintenance
personnel
performing
the
test
were
familiar with
the
precautions
and
limitations;
communications
for the
completion of the test
were
established
as required;
special
tools
and
equipment
were properly
obtained
and calibrated
as required;
acceptance
criteria were clearly
understood
by test
personnel;
procedural
steps
were
clear
and
progressed
logically throughout the testing
sequence;
data collected
by the test personnel
were formally documented
in the test procedure;
and all test data
sheets
were attached
to the test after completion
for proper review and acceptance.
The inspectors
witnessed
maintenance
and operations
personnel
during
the performance
of the
MST to verify that:
personnel
performing the
required activities were qualified to accomplish
the task; operations
personnel
performing selected
test portions
were
aware of any test
requirements
which would impact test results;
and personnel
involved
in the test
maintained
a professional
attitude
during
the test
performance.
Maintenance
personnel
completed
the test in accordance
with testing
requirements
specified
in the
procedure
and
documented
-the test
results
for acceptance/rejection
by plant
management.
All areas
observed
by the inspectors
appeared
to be satisfactorily performed
by
maintenance
and operations
personnel.
The inspectors
witnessed
portions of Operational
Surveillance
Test
OST-1026,
Rev.
2, Reactor
Coolant
System
Leakage
Evaluation - Daily
Modes
1-2-3-4.
The licensee
performed the test to verify that the
and identified leakage
of the reactor coolant
system
was within the
values
specified
in Technical Specification 4.4.6.2. 1.d.
Verification of these
leakages
is
accomplished
by
performing
an inventory water balance of the reactor
coolant system.
The inspectors
verified that operations
personnel
were in compliance
with the procedure,
in that test prerequisites
were met and signed
off prior to
data
collection;
precautions
and limitations
were
reviewed
by the necessary
operations
personnel
prior to starting the
test; operations
personnel
performed
and signed off on each
procedure
step
as required;
operations
management
reviewed
and verified that
the
test
data
and
calculations
met
the
acceptance
criteria
established
in the
procedure;
and
mathematical
review of the
calculations
used
for
determination
of
the
identified
and
unidentified leak rates
appeared
to be correct.
Portions
witnessed
and
reviewed
by the inspectors
appeared
to
be
completed in accordance
with site approved
procedures.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
7.
Monthly Maintenance
Observation
(62703,
62700,
37700)
The inspectors
reviewed
the licensee's
maintenance activities during. this
inspection
period to verify the following:
maintenance
personnel
were
obtaining
the
appropriate
tag
out
and
clearance
approvals
prior to
commencing
work activities, correct
documentation
was available for all
requested
parts
and material prior to use,
procedures
were available
and
adequate
for the work being
conducted,
maintenance
personnel
performing
work activities were'ualified to accomplish
these
tasks,
no maintenance
activities
reviewed
were violating any limiting conditions for operation
during the specific evolutions;
the required
QA/QC reviews
and
QC hold
points
were
implemented;
post-maintenance
testing
activities
were
completed,
and
equipment
was
properly
returned
to service
after the
completion of work activities.
Maintenance activities were evaluated for the "B" main feedwater
pump
motor.
The maintenance
was
performed to determine
and correct the
cause
for the motor's circuit breaker tripping open.
The work was
0
12
authorized
by
Work
Request
WR-87-AXMN1.
Maintenance
personnel
determined
that the circuit breaker
tripped
open
due to incorrect
signals
received
from the
flow circuit.
The incorrect
signals
were
caused
by
a loose fastener
located
on the feed
pump's
recirculating valve.
The fastener
was tightened
and the
pump
was
returned to service
on July 23,
1987.
CL,
Maintenance
acti vities
were
evaluated
for the
repl acement
and;>
calibration of the containment
wide range
sump level instrument..-,Thh>
work was authorized
by WR-87-A7AG1, which implemented
a Plant
Change':
Request
PCR-2138.
The
new level instrument
was installed
and pllce4.";
into service
on August 7, 1987.
r
Maintenance
activities
were
evaluated
for the
"A" main feedwater
pump,
which tripped
and
caused
an
ESF actuation.,
The work w9
authorized
by WR-87-AYZRl.
The
pump trip was
caused
by incorrect
settings
on the feedwater
pump discharge
pressure
switches
PS-2100Al,
2100A2
and
2100A3.
The
switches
were readjusted
and returned
to
service.
On August
7
and
8,
1987
the licensee
removed
the plant from the
electrical grid and placed the plant in Mode
2 (Start-up).
The plant
was placed in this
mode to allow maintenance
activities
on the main
turbine.
The maintenance
was authorized
by Work Request
WR-87-k CPl.
The inspectors
evaluated
the work associated
with the
Work Request.
The
maintenance
was
required
to repair
a
steam
leak.
The leak
developed
around
the weld which fastened
a three
inch drain line to
the main steam line for governor valve k'4.
The leaking weld was
ground out
and replaced
by qualified welders
using
a site
weld procedure
which
was
reviewed
and
accepted
by
Upon completion the weld was inspected
both visually
and by magnetic particle testing.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.