ML18004B869
| ML18004B869 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1987 |
| From: | Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004B867 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-87-21, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, NUDOCS 8707070202 | |
| Download: ML18004B869 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1987021
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/87-21
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
License No.:
Inspection
Con ucted:
May 20 June
20,
1987
Inspectors:.
t
G.
F.
Maxwe
1v
S.
P.
ur
a
Approved by:
/o
F edrickson,
Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Date Signed
>s-- 8.
Date Signed
c-zy- 17
Date Signed
Scope:
This routine,
announced
inspection
involved inspection
in the areas
of
Follow-up on Items of Noncompliance
and Bulletins, On-Site Follow-up of Events
and
Subsequent
Written
Reports
of
Nonroutine
Events,
Operational
Safety
Verification,
Monthly Surveillance
Observation,
Engineered
Safety
Features
Walkdown, Plant Tour, Monthly Maintenance
Observation,
and Other Activities.
Results:
One violation was identified - "Failure to Maintain an Operable Air
Lock Door Closed" - Paragraph
5.
PDR o>0202
870I22P9
8
ADOCK 0500040 0
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
G.
G.
J..M.
G.
L.
J.
L.
L. I.
G. A.
D. L.
R.
B.
R. A.
J.
L.
Campbell,
Manager of Maintenance
Collins, Manager,
Operations
Forehand,
Director, gA/gC
Harness,
Assistant Plant General
Manager,
Operations
Loflin, Manager,
Harris Plant Engineering
Support
Myer, General
Manager,
Milestone Completion
Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory
Compliance
Van 'Metre, Manager,
Harris Plant Technical
Support
Watson,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
Willis, Plant General
Manager,
Operations
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security
force
members,
engineering
personnel
and
office
personnel.
2.
Exit Interview
3 ~
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on June
19,
1987, with
the Assistant Plant General
Manager,
Operations.
No written material
was
provided to the licensee
by the resident
inspectors
during this reporting
period.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials
provided to or reviewed by the resident
inspectors
during this inspection.
The violation identified in this report has
been discussed
in detail with
thelicensee.
The licensee
provided
no dissenting
information at the exit
meeting.
Follow-up on Items of Noncompliance
and Bulletins (92702,
92703)
(Closed)
Violation 400/87-06-01
"Failure to Analyze
Pump Test
Data
Within the .Required
Time Period".
The
inspectors
evaluated
the
licensee's
initial and
supplemental
responses
to this
item,
dated
April 10,
1987
and
May 4,
1987, respectively.
The corrective action
included cooling the plant down to hot shutdown
(Mode 4), as required
by the
Operating
Technical
Specification
action
step
3.7. 1.2,
and
repairing
the
conditions
which
caused
the
pump
to
be
declared
The
Operations
Surveillance
Test
(OST)
1087
was then
completed
and
the results
indicated
that
the
pump
provided
the
required
flow rate at the prescribed
pressure.
The corrective steps
to
avoid
further
noncompliance
includes
providing
pump
flow
acceptance
test criteria
so the Operations shift foreman
can
compare
the test results
during or immediately following the completion of
pump flow rate tests.
Additionally, In-Service Inspection
personnel
have
been directed to conduct
more frequent
reviews of OST results,
therefore
assuring
that
prompt notification is
provided
to the
operators
when equipment test results
are unsatisfactory.
This item
is closed.
b.
(Closed) Bulletin 85-BU-01 "Steam Binding AFW Pumps".
The inspectors
discussed
this item with responsible
Region II personnel
and reviewed
report
50-400/87-02.
Based
on
the
review
and
discussions,
the
inspectors
determined that this item is closed.
4.
On-Site
Follow-up of Events
and
Subsequent
Written Reports of Nonroutine
Events
(92700,
93702)
The inspectors
evaluated
the following Licensee
Event
Reports
(LERs) to
determine if the details
complied with licensee
requirements,
identified
the root cause of the event
and described
appropriate corrective action:
(Closed)
LER 87-01
"Manual Reactor Trip/Digital Rod Position Indica-
tion System".
While the plant was in hot standby with shutdown
rod
banks
C and
D withdrawn, digital rod position indication (DRPI) was
lost for two
DRPI data
channels.
The loss
was attributed to loose
pin connectors
in DRPI data channels
A and B.
When the control
room received
the
alarms
indicating that
two
DRPI
data
channels
were experiencing
fai lures,
the reactor
shutdown
rod
banks
were
ordered
to
be manually tripped.
was
conducted
by the operators
to comply with Technical
Specifica-
tions
(TS) 3. 1.3.3
requirements.
When
DRPI
became
the
reactor
was already
shutdown
and was in the standby
mode.
The banks
remained
tripped until the affected
DRPI data channels
were repaired
and restored to comply with TS Section
3. 1.3.3 limits.
The inspectors
reviewed
the
above
LER and the supportive
documenta-
tion
and interviewed responsible
Operations
maintenance
technicians.
As
a result,
the inspectors
determined that the loss of DRPI indica-
tion
was
caused
by loose electrical
connectors.
The licensee
has
performed
a
100
percent
reinspection
of all
DRPI-associated
electrical
pin connectors
and
has
reworked all of those
which were
found to be loose.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
LER 87-02
"Staggered
Test Basis for Surveillance
Tests".
The
reactor
protection
system
(RPS) logic testing for the reactor
trip and bypass
breakers
was not properly staggered.
The licensee's
schedule
required
the
RPS train "A" and
"B" logic to
be tested
on
November
4 and 5,
1986.
The tests
should
have
been
staggered
so that
both trains were not tested at such close intervals.
The tests
are
now staggered
such that the
two trains are tested at
30-day
intervals.
The
licensee
is
auditing
the
staggered
test
program
at least
two times
a
month to
reduce
the likelihood of
recurrence.
The inspectors
evaluated
the audit
program,
and
as
a
result,
no similar instances
were identified.
This item is closed.
Operati onal
Sa fety Verificati on (71707)
On June
11,
1987 the inspectors
were
informed
by the shift foreman that
the plant
was experiencing
problems with the personnel
access
air lock
doors for the containment building.
On June
11,
1987, at about 3:00 p.m.,
both doors
had been declared
when they did not satisfactorily
pass
a
leak test
which
was
conducted earlier that day.
The plant
was
operating at about
100 percent reactor
power (Mode 1) when the doors were
declared
Since
both
doors
had
been
declared
Section 3.0.3 of the Technical Specification
(TS) went into effect.
The inspectors
reviewed the control
room logs and noted that the operators
began to make plans to reduce
reactor
power within the
one
hour specified
by TS Section 3.0,3.
the inspectors
were informed that the outer air lock
door
was returned
to the operable
status
at about
3:48 p.m.
on June
11,
1987.
Having
one air lock door inoperable
placed
the plant into the
action
statement
requirements
of
TS Section 3.6. 1.3.a.
The
action
statement
required
the inner .air lock door
to
be
returned
to operable
status
with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock the operable
door,
in this
case
the outer
door.
At about 8:00 p.m.
on June
11,
1987, the inner air lock door was declared
the containment
doors were
no longer
under the action statement
o'f TS 3.6. 1.3.a.
However, at about 9:55 p.m. the outer air lock door was
again declared
due to its gasket
seal
being loose,
placing the
doors back into the action statement
of T.S. Section 3.6. 1.3.a.
At about
10:00 p.m. the shift foreman
was informed that the seal
had
been repaired
but the door had not been tested for leaks,
and therefore
the outer
door
remained
and the action
statement
TS 3.6. 1.3.a.
was still in
effect.
The inspectors
interviewed Operations
and Maintenance
personnel
and noted
that
between
10:35 p.m.
and
11:20 p.m.
on
June
11,
1987,
the
action
statement
of TS 3.6. 1,3.a
had
been violated.
The violation occurred
due
to Health Physics
personnel,
on more than
one occasion,
opening the inner
air lock door,
when the outer door was declared
A review of
the control
room shift foreman's
logs indicated that the outer door was
not placed
back into operable
status
until about
3:47 a.m.
on June
12,
1987.
The licensee
management
is aware of the above
TS violation and has drafted
a Licensee
Event Report to assure
proper reporting,
evaluation,
tracking
and resolution.
This is
a
TS violation, "Failure to Maintain an Operable
Air Lock Door Closed" (50-400/87-21-01).
Monthly Surveillance Observation
(61726,
61700,
61710)
The
inspectors
witnessed
performance
of
OST
1073,
"Emergency
Diesel
Generator
(EDG) Operability Test Monthly Interval
Modes 1-2-3-4-5", which
was
performed
to
meet
the
commitments
as
outlined in
TS 4.8. 1. 1.2.a,
4.8. 1. 1.2.b. 1, 4.0.5
and
a portion of 4.8. 1.2.
This monthly surveillance
verified the operability of the
EDG system
and components.
The inspectors
observed
the entire in-process test
and reviewed the
OST procedure
and its
supportive
procedures
"Emergency
Diesel
Generator
System"
and
"Service Water System".
OST 1073 verified that the "B" EDG would
start
and
operate
within the
required
time constraints
and that
the
specified voltage
and amperage
ratings would be maintained.
While conducting
the prerequisites
for this
monthly surveillance,
the
operator
experienced operability problems with the diesel
engine
barring
device.
The operator
was in the process of rotating the diesel
engine
two
revolutions
as
required for the
engine
start
prerequisites,
when
the
barring device piston
ram could not overcome
the dead weight of the diesel
engine
flywheel.
Investigation
revealed
that
the
piston
ram
seal
was
leaking air in excess
of that required
to roll the flywheel.
The shift
foreman
was
informed
and
as
a result,
two Work Requests
WR87-AQNW1 and
W87-AQNX1 were
issued
to correct this deficiency.
WR87-AQNWl requested
that maintenance
remove the barring device
from the
"B" diesel
generator
and replace it with the unit "A" barring device to facilitate completion
of this surveillance.
After implementation
of
WR87-AQNWl,
operations
personnel
finished the prerequisites
and satisfactorily completed
OST 1073
on the "B" EDG.
WR87-AQNX1 required
"B" Diesel
Generator
barring device
to
be repaired.
The repair
was
completed
and the barring devices
were
returned to their prespective
diesel
~ generators.
During the conduct of the procedure
the inspectors
noted that
an Advance
Change
Notice
(ACN) to the
procedure
had
been
issued
on September
21,
1986,
which changed
the training requirements
for the person obtaining the
vibration data
under
these
surveillance
requirements.
In the original
procedure
the vibration data collector
was only stipulated
as
an operator,
however
a change
in the In-Service Inspection (ISI) Program required that
the data collector
be qualified in accordance
with changes
in ISI-111,
"Personnel
Training for
ASME Section
XI
Pump Vibration Measurements",
Vol. 6,
Part
B.
While reviewing
OST
1073 the inspectors
noted that the
actual
procedural
step still reflected that the data collector was to be
an operator.
When the shift foreman
was questioned
concerning this item,
he generated
a
new ACN to clarify the procedure.
The inspectors
reviewed the procedure
and witnessed
the quarterly interval
OST 1076, "Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump
1B-SB Operability Test
Modes 1-2-3-4".
This surveillance
test is performed
on
a staggered
test basis
every
92
days between
the
1A-SA and
pumps to ensure that
the
pumps will start
on
a start signal
and generate
the required
minimum
flow rates.
In addition,
the surveillance
verifies that
the
valves will stroke within the required time constraints.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
Engineered
Safety Features
Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors
verified the operability of one of the
Engineered
Safety
Features
(ESF)
systems
by performing
a
system
walkdown of the accessible
portions
of the
system.
This verification included witnessing
the
performance
of the monthly OST 1073,
as identified in Paragraph
6 of this
report.
The inspectors
walked
down the control
room
EDG section of the
main control board, diesel
generator
building local control
panel
and the
valves
and
components
in the diesel
generator
room.
The
inspectors'alkdown
was performed to ensure that:
there were
no abnormal
conditions
which
could
render
the
diesel
generator
inoperative,
there
were
no
excessive
oil, water
or
fuel
oil
leaks,
electrical
equipment
and
components
showed
no
apparent
sign
of
degradation,
water
and oil
temperatures
for both
operating
and
shutdown
conditions
were within
specifications,
valves
and electrical circuit breakers
were
in their
correctly aligned positions for an emergency start condition.
The inspectors verified that the valve lineup sheets
for this system were
completed
and maintained
on file in accordance
with Operation
Procedures
and OP-139 "Service Water System".
No violations or deviations
were identified'n the areas
inspected.
Plant Tour (71707,
71710,
62703)
The
inspectors
conducted
numerous
plant
tour s during this inspection
period to verify that the licensee
met the requirements
and commitments
as
specified in its license.
These tours were conducted to ensure that plant
operations
personnel
were
aware of current plant status;
equipment out of
service
was
properly
documented
and
tagged;
radiation
controls
were,
established
as required;
spare
equipment
and material
were properly stored
and controlled;
there
were
no
unusual
fluid leaks,
piping vibration,
abnormal
hanger
or
seismic
restraint
settings;
valves
and
breakers
required for safe
operation
were in the correct position; firefighting
equipment
was being maintained properly,
and equipment
requi ring calibra-
tion was current.
The tours
included
reviews of the shift foremen'
daily logs
and other
control
room logs, observation of shift turnovers,
interviews of on-shift
operators,
review of clearance
center
tagout logs,
system
status
logs,
chemistry
and health
physics
logs
and control
room daily status
board.
During all observed
instances,
the on-shift operations
personnel
appeared
alert and aware of changing plant conditions.
The inspectors
toured various plant
spaces
to verify that
these
spaces
were in a condition which would not degrade
the
performance
capabilities
of any required equipment.
Emphasis
was placed
on checking the condition
of electrical
and instrumentation
cabinets to ensure
that they were free
of foreign and loose debris,
or material.
The inspectors
evaluated
the site security measures
by observing
personnel
inside
the vital
and
protected
areas
to
ensure
that
personnel
were
authorized
access,
security personnel
were alert and attentive,
and those
persons
performing vehicular
searches
were thorough
and systematic,
and
that prompt responses
were provided to security alarm conditions.
During
a site tour
on May 20,
1987, the inspectors
noted that
a tornado/
fire door (D-801) was
open
on the
southeast
corner at elevation 261'f
the
radwaste
building.
The inspectors
investigated
the
reason
for this
door being
open while there
was
no apparent
movement of waste
to or from
the internal
area to the outside area.
Discussions with licensee
manage-
ment revealed that radiation controls
had
.been
established
but the shift
foreman
had
not
been
notified
as required
by the written instructions
which were posted
on the door.
Subsequently
the
licensee
has
taken
corrective
action
to
improve
communications
concerning
the status of fire doors.
These actions
include
requi ring on-shift fire technicians
to periodically brief
the shift
foreman
concerning
any
changes
to
the
overall
site fire protection
systems,
i.e.
fire doors
open
or fire
equipment
out
of
service.
Additionally, the status of all fire doors
has
been
included as
a part of
the shift turnovers
and documented
in the shift foreman's
log.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
9.
Monthly Maintenance
Observation.(62703,
62700,
37700)
Maintenance
activities
were
evaluated
during this inspection
period to
verify that
the
licensee's
activities
were
not violating
any limiting
conditions
for
operations,
procedures
were
adequate
for
the
work
activities being conducted,
tagout
and clearance
approvals
were obtained
prior to
work initiation,
personnel
involved
with
the
maintenance
activities
were
qualified
to
perform
the
necessary
work,
parts
and
materials
were
properly
documented
prior to
use,
gC hold points
were
established
and
observed,
any
post maintenance
testing activities
were
conducted
where
required,
and
the
equipment
was
properly
returned
to
service.
Those activities which were evaluated
are
as follows:
The inspectors
observed
in-process
maintenance activities which were
conducted
on the "B" main feedwater
pump.
The maintenance activities
were required
in order to repair the
pump casing
drain lines.
The
drain lines
had developed
a leak adjacent
to the point where
they
were fastened
to the main feedwater
pump casing.
The repair work was
authorized
by site Work Request
WR87-ARgG1.
The
inspectors
observed
in-process
maintenance
activities
on
the
turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
(AFW) pump discharge
line leading
to the "B" steam generator.
The work was authorized
by Revision
9,
to
a
Plant
Change
Request
(PCR-1286).
The
change
included
the
addition of
a check valve to each of the three
AFW pump discharge
lines for both the motor driven and turbine driven pumps.
During the
previous reporting period the licensee
satisfactorily
completed
the
check
valve
installations
for the
three
motor
driven
lines
as
documented
in Region II report
50-400/87-19.
While observing
the
installation of the
new check valve
between
the turbine driven
pump discharge
and "B" steam
generator,
the inspectors
reviewed
the
working
copy of
PCR-1286
and the hydrostatic
pressure
test
record
form
from Operations
Quality
Assurance
Procedure
OQA-304.
The
inspectors
noted that the assigned
system
pressure
of 1700 psig
on
~the test
form OQA-304 for the turbine driven
pump discharge line did
not appear to be correct.
The inspectors
informed the responsible
inspector that
he should verify this pressure
prior to performing the
test.
The
QC inspector
checked with .the responsible
design engineer
and found that the actual
system pressure
should
have
been
1600 psig.
All test
data
forms
were
changed
to correctly reflect the
system
design
pressure
values
before
performing
the
pressure
test.
This
condition
was
then
documented
by
QC personnel
on Field Reports
FR
87-024
and 87-25.
The inspectors will follow-up on this item during
future inspections.
In addition to the observation of the
new check valve being installed
between
the turbine driven
AFW pump and the "B" steam generators,
the
inspectors
assisted
Region II visiting inspectors.
The
areas
of
assist
included
a further evaluation of the licensee's
design
review
process
used
by engineering.
Emphasis
was
placed
on
any potential
unreviewed safety questions
(per
10 CFR 50.59) which may result
from
1286
and
a recent modification made to the internals of the
pumps'he
results
of the evaluation
of the design
review process
were documented
in Region II report 50-400/87-20.
The
inspectors
evaluated
the
work activities
associated
with two
recently closed
Work Requests.
Those
which were
evaluated
are
as
listed below:
Work Request
WR87-AKYR1.
This activity required repairs to the
"C" chemical
and volume control
pump lubricating system; oil was
leaking
around
the
pump bearing
cap.
The
cause
was attributed
to loose oil fittings which were easily tightened.
Work
Request
WR87-APZQl.
The
pressurizer
safety
relief
temperature
indicator (TI-469) failed.
The instrumentation
and
controls
(IKC) technicians
investigated
and
found that
the
process
instrumentation
circuit for the temperature
indicator
required
repai rs.
The repairs
were
completed
and the circuit
was retested
and returned to service.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
10.
Other Activities (94600)
On
June
10,
1987,
management
representing
Region II, the offices of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
and the Deputy Executive Director for Regional
Operations
met with the licensee
site
management'.
The agenda
included
a
briefing
by the
licensee
concerning
the
status
of the
condensate
and
systems,
conduct of operations,
engineering
and design results.
The briefing was followed by
a plant tour which included
a tour of the
control
room, security
access
monitoring station,
turbine building, fuel
handling building and auxiliary building.
After the tours the meeting
was
concluded
with
a
demonstration
of the
Engineered
Response
Features
Information System
and its capabilities.