ML18004B624
| ML18004B624 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1986 |
| From: | Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NLS-86-437, NUDOCS 8612030676 | |
| Download: ML18004B624 (17) | |
Text
REGULA
'RY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTI
'SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSIQNklBR: 8612030676 DQC. DATE: 86/11/21 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant>
Unit 1. Carolina 05000400 AUTH.NAME.-'UTHOR AFFILIATION ZIMMERMANiS:R.
Carolina P04ler 8c Light Co.
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTON> H. R.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director <post 851125
SUBJECT:
Submits addi info re electrical separation at facilitgi clarifying SSER 4 concerning fire wap used as electrical separation barrier. Revised FSAR page clarifying types of Lorap s used enc l ~
DISTR IBUT'ION CODE:
B001D COP lES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SI ZE:
TITLE: Licensing Submittal:
PSAR/FSAR *mdts Cc Related Correspondence NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed.
05000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PWR-A EB PWR-A FOB PWR-A PD2 PD PWR-A PSB INTERNAL: ACRS 41 ELD/HDS1 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 NRR BWR ADTS 04 RM/DDAMI/MIB EXTERNAL BNL'(AMDTS ONLY)
LPDR 03 NSIC 05 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
6 6
1 0
1 1
1 0
1 1
1 0
1 1
1 1,
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PWR-A EICSB PWR-* PD2 LA BUCKLEY'S B 01 PWR-A RSB ADM/LFMB IE FILE IE/DGAVT/GAB 21 NRR PWR-B ADTS NRR/DHFT/MTB RQN2 DMB/DSS tAMDTS)
NRC PDR 02 PNL GRUEL> R COP IES LTTR ENCL 2
2 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
0 1
1 1
0 1
1 3
3 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 36 ENCL 31
h 1
4 l
le l k
h I
'l b
4 k
vs
1 4 ~
- CSEE, Carolina Power 8 Light Company HQV Sj.
MSe SERIAL: NLS-86-037 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-000/LICENSE NO. NPF-53 ELECTRICALSEPARATION
Dear Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power R Light Company (CPttrL) hereby submits additional information concerning electrical separation at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP).
The following information is being submitted to clarify the recently issued NRC Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 0 (SSERO) concerning fire wrap used as an electrical separation barrier.
SSER 0, page 8-12, states in part, "The fire wrap and fire blanket barriers are tested and qualified in accordance with American Society for Testing and Materials Standard ASTM-E-119 for a rating of 1 or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The staff has been assured by the applicant that the fire wrap and fire blanket used for raceway installation at SHNPP have been tested and qualified in accordance with Standard ASTM-E-119." In actuality, three types of wrap systems are utilized (one-hour system, three-hour system, and thermal barrier wrap system) of which two are tested and qualified to ASTM-E-119. Each wrap system and its use is briefly described below:
A.
One-Hour Wra S stem The one-hour wrap system is typically applied to a tray or a conduit for fire protection reasons.
For electrical separation, this wrap is considered an acceptable barrier with no separation required between the wrap and the protected raceway.
B.
Three-Hour Wra S stem The three-hour wrap system is typically applied to a conduit for fire protection reasons.
For electrical separation, this wrap is considered an acceptable barrier with no separation required between the wrap and the protected raceway.
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1 Mr. Harold R. Dent NLS-86-037 / Page 2
" C.
Thermal Barrier Wra The thermal barrier wrap system is a Siltemp wrap applied with 100 percent overlap and covered with 3M No. 69 glass tape with 50 percent overlap. It is utilized on free air dropout cable as a steel tray cover is utilized to'enclose an open tray. This particular wrap and technique has been selected for the following reasons:
1.
The containment of the fault circuit is the primary concern.
2.
Per catalog information, Siltemp does not melt until temperatures exceed 3000'F, similar to steel (see Attachment A).
3.
Thermal conductivity is superior to steel barrier material (see Attachment A).
0.
The wrap technique utilized at SHNPP has been proof tested by Beaver Valley (PW-E wrap technique).
From the Beaver Valley testing, it is shown that this wrap type performs the function similar to a steel conduit (see Attachment B).
Attachment C contains a revised FSAR page to clarify the types of wraps used and to avoid confusion. It willbe reflected in a future FSAR amendment.
Based on the above information, CPRL requests that the SSER 0 discussion on electrical separation be supplemented to reflect this clarification.
If you have any questions on this subject or require additional information, please contact me.
Yours very truly, 3HE/bmc (5071 JDK)
Attachments S.. Zim erman ger Nuclear Licensing Section cc:
Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)
Mr. A. S. Gill (NRC-PAEI)
Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)
Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
0 l ~
ATTACHMENTA SILTEMP TECHNICALBULLETIN 3ULY 1982 (5071JDK/bmc)
0
'F
AMETEK HAVEC DIVISION FABRIC-CH-SR THERMAL BARRIER TECHNICAL BULLETINHS-117 JULY, 1982 CONTAINS NO ASBESTOS FGR HIGH-TEIII'ERATURE INSUI.ATION SILTEMps is a family of flexible high-silica textiles with outstandin thermal resistance. SILTEMp is similar to refractory material and does not melt until temperatures ex e
3000'F.
TYPICALAPPARENT THERMALCONDUCTIVITY 2.50 2.40 2.30 0-2.20 2.10 2.00
<O <
190 O~
180 O
1.70
~ I-1,60 1,50 I- 0:
ZM 140 130 z z I "0 K >
1,10 1,00
.90
.80 SILTEMP 188CH SILTEMP 84CH GUARDED HOT PLATE tested in accordance with ASTM C177.76 8 o ooooooooo 8 8 c5 8 8 o 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 MEAN TEMPERATURE, 'F.
SHT <
By.
DAT CHK DATE 55d/
We cannot anticipate all conditions under which this information and our products, or the products of other manufacturers ln corn.
binatlon with ourproducts, may be used. Usersare advised to make their own tests to determine the safety and suitability of each
~uchproduct or product combination for their own purposes.
. 19S4.
by AMETEK;be.
PRINTEotMU.S.A. =
ATTACHMENTB (The attached sheet has been extracted from Duquesne Light Co. Test Report No. 17666-02, Revision A, dated May 20, 1986.)
(5071 JDK/kts )
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TEST PROGRAM DESCRG'T1ON (Continued)
L2 Con5guratka Number 1 (Caatimacg These results generated the following conclusions:
During Test No. 1, the acceptability of design was demonstrated where two
. cables in free air come in contact with each other when a worst-ease electrical fault occurs to a cable inside either PW A or PW B.
The high temperature observed outside thc PW B end of the fault cable (88Z.1oF), during Test No. 1, did scortch the jacket on the target cables, but the capability of the target cables to conduct rated current at.480 VAC (power target cable),
120 VAC (control target cable), or 50 VAC (instrument, target cable), as applicable, or to successfully pass thc Insulation Resistance and High Potential Tests after the Overcurrent Test was not impared.
In addition, the high observed temperature was attributed to a chimney effect that occurred at the transition of the two wrapping materials.
20 The PW B, used in Test No. 1, is capable of precluding ignition of a cable subjected to thc worst case electrical fault when the, entire cable ls wrapped in this wrap.
Temperatures recorded inside thc wrapping material exceeded the 770oF self-ignition temperature of the fault cables insulation (Reference Okonitc Company ASTM D-1929-ZZ Report to Stone and Webster Enginccring Corporation dated August 24, 1984).
This cable did not ignite because the wrapping material limits the oxygen available to a level which is insufficient to sustain combustion.
3.
Thc equivalency of the PW B and PW A was not demonstrated by Test No. 1.
Thc utilizat!on of PW D, in Test No. 1A, does not provide sufficient mechanical integrity to withstand thc gas pressure that develops as thc faulted cable off-gasses.
Thc 3M No. 69 glass tape parted in the center of the wrapped section which permitted very heavy off~ing to occur at that point.
These gasses did ignite and subsequently ignited the outcr jacket on two of the ter et cables.
Ail target cables maintain their continuity of power during the Overeurrent
- Test, but the target cable separated by one inch failed the Post-Test Functional Tests.
The utilization of PW E, in Test No. 1B, does provide sufficient integrity to withstand the gas pressure that. develops as the fault cable off~asses and to prevent an external flame from tracking along the outside of the wrapping material.
The ignitions that occurred during this test were small and localized, outside the wrapping mitcrial. and occurred beeausc flaming insulation fell from
'he unwrapped portion of this cable onto the wrapped portion.
ATTACHMENTC (5071JDK/kts)
~ I I
SHNPP FSAR
- c. 'est Results The test results are detailed in Wyle Test Report No.
47879-02.
The minimum separation distances based on the test results are detailed in Table 8.3.1.10.
27 Where conduit separation distances are detailed in Table 8.3.1.10, it applies to any enclosed raceway (i.e., conduit, box, equipment enclosure,
- condulet, fitting, etc.)
~
(2)
~deal sis - Where the damage potential is contained within a conduit, and the Class lE cable(s) are in tray or are free air drop out cable, an analysis has been performed in accordance with the recommendations of Section 5.1.1.2 of IEEE-384-1974 to justify a minimum separation distance of one inch.
The results of the analysis indicate that provided one-inch separation is maintained, any damage potential associated with the conduit will have no adverse affects on the Class lE circuits.
(3)
Installation of Barriers Where the separation distances could not be justified by test or analysis suitable barriers/or approved protective coatings have been utilized, or cables have been installed in enclosed raceways which are suitable for protecting the cables.
The minimum separation distance between enclosed raceways or between barriers and the raceway/cable(s) is one inch.
(b)
Cable and Raceway Hazard Areas
. Analyses of the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, missiles, fire, and flooding demonstrate that safety related electrical circuits, raceways, and equipment are not degraded beyond an acceptable level.
~A5,cPA L\\P / I The analyses are referenced as follows:
High Pressure Piping Missiles Flammable Material Flooding (Section 3e6)
(Section 3.5)
(Section 9.5.1)
(Section 2.4)
In fire hazard areas outside the cable spreading
- rooms, where redundant safety related trays or safety related and non-safety related trays are exposed to the same fire hazard, protection has been provided by spatial separation, fire suppression
- systems, fire retardant coatings, fire barriers, or combination thereof.
8.3.1-40 Amendment No.
27
4 (J~
The following are suitable barriers to meet the intent of IEEE-380:
are
~SIT C
-T Y
ill* d p
I tl lih converges within the separation window of the tray. A top cover is used to protect above the tray and/or a bottom cover is used to protect below the tray.
1 harm~K L,rrie.< ~ca.p syste.w (b)
A cable is firewrapped to protect any raceway/cable which converges within the separation window of the cable.
One. hour wvk, +h~~e. hog/" k>ve.~pe,p <gcg4e.mg (c)
-RrwblaRM-One-hour and three-hour blankets are installed to meet the
+requirements of Section 9.5.l. These blankets are acceptable barriers.
u/At@
- Also, 1 inch of fireP4aMis also equivalent to I inch of air. Since greater than I inch thick, separation is not required between~~and protected raceways.
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