ML18004B615
| ML18004B615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1986 |
| From: | Jape F, Mathis J, Taylor P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004B614 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-86-78, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8611260248 | |
| Download: ML18004B615 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1986078
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CPPR-158
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REGION II
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Report No.:
50-400/86-78
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Licensee:
Carolina Power,and Light Company
P. 0. Box,1551
Raleigh,
NC-- 27602
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Docket No.:, 50-400
Facility Name:
Harris I
Inspection
Co
cted:
ptember
29 - October
3 and October 8-11,
1986
Inspectors:
ay or
ate
igne
J.
.
at is
Approved by:
F. Jape,
Section Chief
Engineering
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
ate
igne
Dat
Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection
was
conducted
in the
areas
of
preoperational
test results
evaluation,
witnessing
engineering
safety features
functional test,
preoperational
test
procedure verification, followup on inspec-
tor identified items
and licensee
response
to IEB 84-03
and
a review of safety
injection function upon transfer to the remote auxiliary control panels.
Results:
No violations or deviations
were identified.
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REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
.
- C. S. Hinnant, Manager,
Startup
- D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory
Compliance
- J. L. Donity, Startup Supervisor, Electrical
- R. T. Biggerstaff, Principal Engineer,
Onsite Nuclear Safety
- M. G. Wallace, Specialist,
Regulatory Compliance
R. Delcastilho, Startup Engineer
C. Morgan, Startup
Engineer
B. Skaggs,
Startup Engineer
Y. Lee, Startup
Engineer
H. Stroup, Senior Training Instructor
4
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included technicians,
operators,
and
office personnel.
NRC Resident
Inspector
- S.
P. Burris
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
3.
The inspection
scope
and findings were summarized
on October
3 and 11,
1986,
with those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1 above.
The inspector described
the areas
inspected
and
discussed
in detail
the inspection findings.
No
dissenting
comments
were received
from the licensee.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the inspector during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item (400/86-26-02),
Inadequate
Direct Process
- Monitoring Functions
Provided in the Control
Room for Fire Related
Shutdown
Operations.
The licensee's
safe
shutdown
analysis
did not address
the availability of
RCS T-Cold instrumentation
for fire conditions
outside
the control
room.
The licensee's
analysis
indicated that they did not need
to protect T-Cold
since their
response
dated April 15,
1983, identified that
steam
generator
pr essure
was
an acceptable
alternative
to T-Cold.
This position
appears
to be in conflict with the process
monitoring criteria established
by IE Notice 84-09, Attachment I,Section IX.
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The
above
item
was
discussed
in
a
conference
call
between
T. Conlon,
Region II and A. Singh,
NRR,
on November 6, 1986.
NRR has
approved
the use
of steam
generator
pressure
as
an alternative for T-cold.
This will be
documented
in Supplement
No.
5 to Harris Safety Evaluation
Report.
This
matter is closed.
4.
Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Preoperational
Test Results
Evaluation
(70400,
70322,
70325,
70326,
70329)
The
inspectors
reviewed
the
following completed
preoperational
test
procedures:
0
1-1100-P-01,
Containment Isolation Valve Response
Time
1-1100-P-02,
Containment Isolation System
1-2060-P-04,
CVCS Reactor
Coolant
Pump Seal Injection Preoperational
Test
1-1065-P-01,
Rod Control
System Preoperational
Test
1-1065-P-02,
Rod Control
Systems
Alarms
1-5095-P-03,
Diesel Generator
IA/SA Endurance
Run and Hot Restart
1-5095-P-04,
Diesel
Generator
IB/SB Endurance
Run and Hot Restart
1-1090-P-02,
Reactor Protection
and Engineered
Safety Features
Response
Test
1-1090-P-03,
Engineered
Safety Features
Integrated
Test
The above completed test procedures
were reviewed to verify that:
Test
changes
were
approved
in
accordance
with administrative
procedures,
The test
changes
did not affect the basic objectives of the test,
Test steps
and data
sheets
were initialized and dated
as required,
Test data were within acceptance
criteria specified,
Test
deficiencies
had
been
resolved
including retesting,
where
required,
Management
had evaluated
the test results
as required
by .administrative
controls.
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Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
Preoperational
Test Procedure Verification (703118)
The inspectors
reviewed
the licensee's
preoperational
test procedure
status
reports
and
FSAR Chapter
14 test
abstract
completion
status
reports
to
confirm that the
preoper ational test
program
completion
status
for fuel
loading is acceptable.
The inspectors
reviewed
approximately
25K of the
completed test
procedures
in document control files and concluded that the
test
program
completion
status
is in good
agreement
with the licensee
documentation.
Presently,
219 preoperational
test
procedures
have
been
issued with 25 tests
remaining to be conducted.
Fifteen tests
are scheduled
to be completed prior to fuel loading with the remaining ten tests
scheduled
for completion after fuel loading.
These
tests
have
been identified in
letters
dated August 1,
1986 and September
29, 1986,
from R. A. Watson,
Vice
President,
Harris Nuclear Project to Dr. J.
Nelson Grace,
Regional
Adminis-
trator.
The delay of the ten tests until after fuel load and
mode scheduled
to be completed
has
been
reviewed
and found to be acceptable.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
Preoperational
Test Witnessing
(70315,
70316)
The inspectors
witnessed
the
performance
of Sections
6.7
and 6.8 of pre-
operational
test
1-1090-P-03,
Revision 2, Engineered
Safety
Features
Inte-
grated Test.
Test
Change
Notice
11 incorporated
Section 6.7
and 6.8 in to
the test
procedure
for the
purpose
of retesting
those
discrepancies
that
were noted with components,
equipment,
and load sequencer
timing during the
conduct
of sections
6.1
through 6.6.
Section 6.7
performed
a loss of
offsite- power with a simultaneous
manual initiation of all engineered
safety
features
actuation
signals
(ESFAS).
Section 6.8 was with offsite available
and
an
ESFAS manual initiated.
The inspectors verified that:
Latest revision
and procedure
changes
were incorporated
into the test
procedure prior to the test
Test prerequisites
were met
Test data
was recorded for evaluation
Problems
encountered
during the retest
were identified and
documented
for evaluation
The inspector
reviewed the completed test results
and noted that the retest
had corrected
the majority of the previously identified problems.
Minor
discrepancies
remaining for licensee to review and conduct
subsequent
retest
as appropriate.
(Closed) Inspector
Followup Item (400/86-74-01)
Review of ESF Test Data
When
Power
was Lost to the Plant Computer.
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During performance
of 1-1090-P-03,
Section
6.3
(Loss of Offsite Power with
ESFAS for Train A Only) as the test
was nearing completion the plant comput-
er batteries
reached
automatic
shutdown voltage.
It was initially felt that
the deenergization
of the plant
computer that recorded
times
and events
~ould be lost.
A subsequent
review of the plant computer disc archive files
showed that Section 6.3 data
had
been
stored.
The review of this data
indicated that
ESF components
change of state
was recorded to the mi llisec-
ond.
This item is considered
closed.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
8.
Followup on Inspector Identified Items
(92703)
a.
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup
Item
(400/86-10-01)
Clarify Procedure,
Provide Additional Training Concerning
Meaning
and
Use of AOP-004,
Alternate
Safe
Shutdown
in
Case
of
Fire
or
Control
Room
Inaccessibility.
The licensee
has
made revision to AOP-004 which provides for a more
orderly
used
of procedural
steps
for Section 3.2,
Shutdown
outside
control
room at the Auxiliary Control
Panels.
The inspector
reviewed
training
records
lesson
plans
and
held
discussions
with training
personnel
to confirm that licensed
operators
have received training on
the latest revisions to AOP-004.
This matter is closed.
b.
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup Item (400-86-26-03)
Provide Analysis
and
Methodology that Sufficient Time and
Manpower is Available to Perform
AOP-004 to Achieve Hot Standby Conditions.
The inspectors
reviewed
a letter to H. R. Denton,
NRR, dated July 16,
1984,
which provides
time requirements
to conduct
a
shutdown
from
outside
the control
room at the auxiliary control
panels
(ACP).
A
chart
was provided in the letter
which identified the times required
to:
(I) reach
the
ACP,
(2) obtain hot standby,
(3) hot shutdown
and
(4) subsequent
cold shutdown conditions.
Supplement
No.
3
Section 9.5. 1(g) identifies the
above
times
as
being acceptable.
The
inspectors
did discuss
the time interval
to reach
the
ACP (i.e., ten
minutes)
with the licensee
and
noted that this
time line
has
been
reduced to five minutes or less to show conservatism
in the event of a
control
room fire which could
induce
spurious
operation of equipment
such
as
a stuck
open pressurizer
PORV and the effects
on
RCS volume.
It should
be noted that spurious
events
are stopped
by a timely comple-
tion of the transfer opera'tions
to the
ACP..
This matter is closed.
c ~
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup Item (400/86-38-01)
Review Water
Hammer
Incident Main Feedwater
System.
During functional testing of main feedwater
pumps
and
system valves,
the main feedwater regulating valves inadvertently
became
unseated
and
a sudden flow 'of water toward the steam generators
occurred.
The steam
generators
were filled and
vented at the time of the incident.
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main feedwater regulating
valves
appeared
to have inadvertently
opened
due to the high differential pressure
across
the valve.
The licensee
has
completed
an inspection of piping, pipe hangers
and system
valves
and
no piping damage
was found.
The shifting of pipe clamps
and bent
hangers
were repaired.
The
main feedwater
valves
and
other
system
valves
have
been satisfactory retested.
This matter is closed.
9.
Safety Injection Capability at the Auxiliary Control Panels
(ACP) (92706)
a.
Documents
Reviewed
The inspectors
reviewed the below listed documents
and held discussions
with licensee
engineers
and Startup
Manager to determine
whether safety
injection (SI) is available
when transfer of control is made
from the
main
control
room to the
ACP.
The specific
documents
reviewed
included:
10 CFR 50, General
Design Criterion
(GDC)
19
Standard
Review Plan,
Section
7.4,
Safe
Shutdown
System
FSAR Section 7.4, Systems
Required for Safe
Shutdown
NUREG 1038, Safety Evaluation Report
Abnormal Operating
Procedure
(AOP) 004, Revision 3, Safe
Shutdown
in Case of Fire or Control
Room Inaccessibility.
Control Wire Diagrams
Sheet
141,
Low Pressurizer
Pressure
SI/Block/Reset
Sheet
455, Safety Injection Reset
Sheet
1009,
Low Steam Line Pressure
SI/Block/Reset
Sheet
1091-1094,
Transfer
Panel
Relays
b.
Overview of Safe
Shutdown
from Outside the Control
Room
GDC 19 requires that equipment,
instrumentation
and controls
at locations
outside
the main control
room shall
be provided with a
design capability for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor
and maintain
the unit in
a safe
condition during hot shutdown.
In addition,
a
potential
capability for
subsequent
cold
shutdown
of the
reactor
through
the
use
of suitable
procedures.
and
Section 7.4 discuss
instrumentation,
controls
and system required to
be
aligned for achieving
and maintaining
safe
shutdown of the reactor
under
non-accident
condition.
Startup tests
which will demonstrate
remote
shutdown
capability
from the
ACP are
planned
during
power
ascension
testing:
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The fact that the above
documents
consider non-accident
conditions for
the plant
and with the availability of the solid state
protection
system
and the engineered
safety .feature actuation
signals
the safety
injection capability from the
ACP is as follows:
Safety
injection is not automatically
blocked
by the transfer
scheme
to the
ACP.
Manual
SI actuation is available at the main control
board only.
If an
automatic
SI signal
should
occur (e.g.,
low pressurizer
pressure),
SI will initiate.
After 60 second
time delay,
SI can
be
reset
by the
operator
from the
ACP to block the
as
appr opriate.
NOTE:
An Attachment is provided to
show the basic logic and
transfer
scheme
associated
with the
ACP.
FSAR figure 7.4.1-8
identifies the manual
SI reset switch.
During operations
to obtain Cold Shutdown conditions
from the ACP,
AOP-004 requires
blocking low pressurizer
safety injection before
going below 2000 psig to prevent safety injection from occurring.
Low Pressurizer
Pressure
Safety Injection Block/Reset
Switch and
Steam
Line Pressure
Low Safety Injection Block/Reset
Switch is
located at the
ACP as
shown
on
FSAR Figure 7.4.1-8.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
10.
Followup on
IEB 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Seal
(92703)
(Closed)
By letter dated
Duly I, 1985,
CPSL provided
an evaluation. of the
potential for and
consequences
of
a refueling cavity water
seal failure.
Subsequent
questions
recorded
in Inspection
Report 50-400/86-61
were ad-
dressed
by the licensee
in their supplemental
response
dated
Septemb'er
23,
1986.
The inspector
reviewed
CPSL
supplemental
response
to
IEB 84-03 to
verify that the discrepancies
listed in inspection report 86-61
had
been
resolved.
Additional steps
were
added
to the General
Operating
Procedure
(GP-009)
to require monitoring of the seal
for leakage,
and actions
to be
taken if significant leakage
is detected.
The primary makeup water source
described
in the licensee's
original
response
was revised to reflect that
the
RWST could supply water
to the
Fuel Transfer
System using the residual
heat
removal
pumps.
This is consistent
with APO-031.
The supplemental
response
adequately
describes
how the two inflatable seals
are positioned
on
the
side of the ring girder.
In conclusion,
review of the
supplemental
response
adequately
resolve
the discrepancies
outlined in report 86-61.
Therefore,
IEB 84-03 will be closed out in this report.
ATTACHMENT'I
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