ML18004A319
| ML18004A319 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1986 |
| From: | Conlon T, Gibbons T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18004A317 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-86-50, NUDOCS 8607290090 | |
| Download: ML18004A319 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1986050
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/86-50
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
.
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
une 9-13,
1986
Inspector:
T. D. Gib ons
Accompanying Personnel:
C.
F rd
Approved by:
T. E.
Con on,
Se
>on Chief,
Engineering
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
License No.:
CPPR-158
7- fs-KD
Date Signed
ate Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection
conducted
in the
areas
of
instrumentation
work and work activities.
Licensee identified items, unresolved
items,
and heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems.
Results:
One violation was identified - Inadequate
corrective action to prevent
damage
to instrument tubing.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- J. L. Harness,
Assistant Plant General
Manager
- D. Tibbitts, Supervisor Regulatory
Compliance
- C. L. McKenzie, Acting Director gA/gC Operations
- R. W. Prunty, Jr., Harris Plant Engineering
Support
(HPES)
- N. J. Chiangi, Manager gA/gC
- K. V. Hate, Principal Engineer
gA
- J. L. Dority, Startup Supervisor
- H. L. Williams, Principal
Engineer
HPES
Other Organization
- R. L. Bryant, Resident
Engineer Construction - Daniels Construction
Company
(DCC)
NRC Resident
Inspector
- G. Maxwell, Senior Resident
Inspector
- Attended exit interview
.2.
Exit- Interview-
=
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on June
13,
1986, with
those
persons
indicated
in paragraph
1 above.
The inspector
described
the
areas
inspected
and
discussed
in detail
the
inspection
findings.
No
dissent'ing
comments
were
received
from the licensee.
The following new
items were identified during this inspection.
a.
Violation, 400/86-50-01,
Inadequate
Corrective Action to Prevent
Damage
to Instrument Tubing, paragraph
5.
b.
Inspector
Followup
Item 400/86-50-02,
Evaluation
of the
Walkdown
Program for Tubing Clearances,
paragraph
5.
The
inspector
examined
several
documents
which were
marked proprietary,
however,
none of the proprietary data
was used in the report.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
a.
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item 400/86-26-01,
Incorporation
of Instrument
Tubing Separation
Criteria.
The inspector
discussed
this issue with
HPES personnel
and
examined
drawings which show the plan view of all
tubing in
an area.
This plan
view drawing identifies all possible
\\
F
~
1
tubing separation.
The tubing isometric drawings
are
developed
using
the plan view to define the areas
where separation
may be
a problem.
The inspection
procedures
require that the tubing
be installed
by the
isometric
drawings.
These
drawings
contain
the dimensions
to insure
that tubing separation
requirements
are
met.
The inspector
has
no
further questions.
The licensee
has
substantiated
that there
are
no
ITE Type
HE-3-M040
breaker
on site
but
has
identified other
ITE molded
case circuit
breakers
which exhibit the
same
discrepancy
that is identified in
IEN 85-16.
'The site will test all
molded
case circuit breakers
installed.
A total of 411 breakers
have
been identified for testing.
To date,
373 have
been tested of which 12 were found not acceptable
and
have
been replaced.
4.
Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items were not identified during this inspection.
Instrumentation
Components
and System - Work Observation
(52053)
The
inspector
selected
the
following systems,
process
variables
and
components for examination:
Engineering
Safety Features
Actuation System
(ESFAS)
Variable
Device
b.
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item 400/85-24-03,
Overload Trips Setpoints of ITE
Type HE-3-M040 Molded Case Circuit Breakers
Pressurizer
Pressure
Level Transmitter
Level Transmitter
Pressure
Transmitter
Pressure
Transmitter
Pressure
Transmitter
(Associated
Instrument
1LT-462
1PT-457
Sensing
Lines)
Reactor Protection
System
(RPS)
Variable
Device
Reactor
Coolant
Flow
Flow Transmitter
Flow Transmitter
Flow Transmitter
(Associated
Instrument Sensing
Lines)
l'I
5
I
Safety-Related
Display Instruments
(SRDI)
Variable
Level
Components
in Storage
Device
Level Transmitter
Level Transmitter
Level Transmitter
Level Transmitter
(Associated
Instrument
Device
1LT-475
1LT-477
Sensing
Lines)
y
Flow Transmitter
(Barton Model 752/2468)
Flow Transmitter
(Barton Model 752/2466)
Pressure
Transmitter
(Barton Model 752/2661)
The following documents
provided
the
basic
acceptance
criteria for the
inspection:
a.
General
Documents
Carolina
Power
5 Light Company,
Corporate guality Assurance
Department
Procedure,
CQC-11, "Instrumentation
Inspection,"
Revision 7, March 19,
1986.
Carolina
Power
5 Light Company,
Corporate guality Assurance
Department
Procedure,
CgC-12,
"Mechanical
Inspection,"
Revision 16,
March 16,
1986.
Carolina
Power
8 Light Company,
Work Procedure,
WP-304, "Installation
of Safety-Related
and
Seismic
Process
Tubing
and Instrumentation,"
Revision 6.
Carolina
Power
5 Light Company,
Work Procedure,
WP-300,
"Instrument
Work Package
Preparation
and Control," Revision 9.
Carolina
Power
8 Light Company,
Work Procedure,
WP-302, "Installation
of Supports for Safety/Seismic
Related
Instrumentation,"
Revision 17.
Carolina
Power
5 Light Company,
Work Procedure,
WP-305, "Installation
of Tube Track/Impulse
Line/Instrument
Identification Markers/Tags,"
Revision 2.
Carolina
Power
5 Light Company, Technical
Procedure,
TP-54, "Inspection
of Instrumentation,"
Revision 2.
'
1
Carolina
Power 5 Light Company, Technical
Procedure,
TP-67, "Inspection
of
the
Installation
Seismic
Class
1
and
Seismically
Designed
Instrumentation
Support," Revision 0.
b.
System
Documents
ESFAS - (Pressurizer
Pressure)
Ebasco
Drawing - CAR-2165-G-801,
Revision
14
CPLL Drawing - IS/1-RC-245, Revision 8
RPS - (Reactor
Coolant Flow)
Ebasco
Drawing
CPRL Drawing-
CP8L Drawing-
CP8L Drawing-
- CAR-2165-G-800, Revision
13
IS/1-RC-231,
Revision
8
IS/1-RC-232, Revision
5
IS/1-RC-233,
Revision
7
SRDI - (Steam Generator
Level)
Ebasco
Drawing
CP5L Drawing-
CPSL Drawing-
CPKL Drawing-
CPRL Drawing-
- CAR-2165-G-044,
Revision
16
IS/1-FW-286, Revision
7
IS/1-FW-287, Revision
12
IS/1-FW-288, Revision
6
IS/1-FW-289, Revision
6
Each of the
components
listed
was
examined
and
compared
with applicable
quality documentation
to determine
whether receiving inspection activities
had
been controlled
and accomplished
in accordance
with approved
procedures.
The inspector verified that
component attributes
such
as identification,
physical condition,
and associated
quality documentation
were
as specified
by procedural
requirements.
For the
systems
listed
above,
the inspector
verified that Unit 1 components
had
been installed in the plant
and stored
in place pending plant startup.
Additionally, several
components
were
examined
in
warehouse
storage
locations
to determine
whether
the
proper
storage
activities
had
been
accomplished.
The
warehouse
storage
level,
component
identification,
storage
environment,
and
associated
licensee
inspection activities
were
determined
by the inspector
to
be in accordance
with applicable require-
ments.
With regard to the installation of instrumentation
components,
the
inspector verified that the proper procedures
and drawings
had been
used for
installation, that specified materials
were
used,
and that the components
were properly located
and mounted.
Component identification was clear
and
in accordance
with approved
design
documents.
The
examination
of
components
which monitor reactor
coolant
pressure
disclosed
that
several
safety-related
instrument
sensing
lines
routed
between
the reactor
pressure
vessel
and the secondary
shield wall have
been
damaged
by construction activity.
'Damage to the following sensing lines
has
resulted
in
a tube configuration which violates
engineered
slope require-
ments.
C1-R9-1-T31-LP
C1-R8-1-T27-LP
C1-R8-2-T27-HP
C1-R4-4-T27-LP
These violations
were
discussed
with licensee
personnel
who issued
Work
Request
and Authorization
Form 2005 to document
and correct this condition.
The licensee
also
produced
CP&L Nonconformance
Report
(NCR) 85'-2000,
dated
October
9,
1985,
and
a
subsequent
CPSL Corrective Action Report,
dated
November 4,
1985 which document
damage
to instrument lines similar to that
observed
by the inspector.
The documents
specify corrective action which
included repair of the instrument lines involved and issuance
of a letter to
craft
supervisors
and
area
superintendents
providing instruction
on
protection of permanent
plant equipment.
All corrective actions associated
with these
reports
were
completed
by
December
of 1985,
thus
the
damage
observed
by the inspector indicates that the corrective action taken to date
has
not
been
effective
in preventing
damage
to
these
safety-related
instrument lines.
While it is recognized that similar deficiencies
have
been identified by the
licensee,
and that procedures
are in place to identify future deficiencies,
the
frequency,
nature,
and
extent
of instrument
line
damage
observed
indicates
that additional
licensee
attention is required.
The corrective
action
established
by
NCR 85-2000
has
not protected
or prevented
the
recurrence of damage to instrument lines.
This is a violation identified as
400/86-50-01,
Inadequate
Corrective Action to Prevent
Damage to Instrument
Tubing.
The inspector also identified deficiencies with regard to spacing criteria
between
several
safety-related
instrument
sensing
lines
and hot pipe.
The
following instrument
lin'es
were
observed
in direct
contact
with the
reflective insulation of pipe 2CS3-83SN-l.
C1-R9-6- T33-HP
C1-R9-5-T33-LP
C1-R9-8-T34-LP
C1-R9-7-T34-L P
Discussions
with licensee
personnel
disclosed
that
an
ongoing
program of
inspection is being
performed
in accordance
with the requirements
of two
Harris
Plant
Engineering
Manual
of Instruction,
walkdown
procedures.
Regulatory
Guide
1.29, Verification Walkdown,
and
the Interdisciplinary
Clearances
Verification Walkdown procedures
were reviewed
by the inspector
and
found to
be 'thorough
and
comprehensive.
With regard to the specific
deficiencies
observed,
a review of historical
records
indicate that at the
time of the
most
recent
walkdown, reflective
insulation
had
not
been
installed
on pipe
Consequently,
the deficiencies identified
would not have existed.
As construction activity continues,
further walkdowns will be required to
assure
that similar conditions
are identified,
evaluated
and corrected.
This issue is considered
an inspector followup item pending evaluation of
the
walkdown program.
This inspector
followup item will be identified as
400/86-50-02,
Evaluation of the Walkdown Program.
6.
Licensee Identified Items
a ~
b.
(Closed)
Item 400/CDR-85-23
Standby
Diesel
Generator
- Intake
and
Exhaust
Yalve Springs
The final report
was
submitted
on Nay 29, 1986.
The report has
been reviewed
and determined
to
be acceptable.
The inspector
held discussions
with responsible
licensee
representatives
and
reviewed
supporting
documentation
to
verify that the corrective actions identified in the report
have
been
completed.
Transamerica
DeLaval
Incorporated
(TDI) notified the licensee
of
a
potential
problem with valve springs
which were not 'adequately
shot
peened
by the
Belts
Spring
Company.
The
licensee
identified
60
deficient springs
on engine
lA and
an additional five on engine
1B.
The licensee
also identified that the
2A and
2B diesel
engines
have
deficient springs.
The spring replacement for 1A and
1B is documented
on
Work Request
and Authorization
AEYU-1 and AEYT-l. It should
be
noted
that
the
two Unit 2 diesel
engines
in storage still
have
deficient springs.
(Closed)
Item 400/CDR 85-213,
Undetectable
Failures
in
The final report
was submitted
on December
13,
1985.
The
report
has
been
reviewed
and
determined
to
be
acceptable.
The
inspector
held discussions
with responsible
licensee
representatives
and
reviewed
supporting
documentation
to verify tHat the corrective
actions identified in the report
have
been completed.
identified this concern to the licensee
on Parch
28, 1985.
When
the
reactor trip breaker
is
opened
(Reactor
Tripped)
the
P4
permissive
permits
the operator to block actuation of Safety Injection
and to enter
the recirculation
mode.
The original
procedure
for
testing required
use of 'jumpers
and portable test equipment.
offered
the
licensee
an
optional
modification which
mounted
a switch
and meter to allow for testing without jumpers
and
portable
test
equipment.
During
an
evaluation
of the
optional
modification, Westinghouse
identified
a possibility of an undetectable
failure could remain.
issued
a field change notice
(FCN)
C(LM-10650 to correct this
item.
The licensee
incorporated
the
with the
work, performed
by
Work
Request
and
Authorization
Form
1-1065-NXJ.
The inspection
was documented
on
NCR 85-1251.
(Closed)
Item 400/CDR 85-220,
Standby
Diesel
Generator - Control
Panel
Wiring
The final
report
was
submitted
on
December
11,
1985.
The report
has
been
reviewed
and determined
to be
acceptable.
The inspector
held discussions
with responsible
licensee
representatives
and
reviewed
supporting
documentation
to verify that
the corrective action identified in the report have
been
completed.
TDI has identified that
a vendor
RTE Delta Corporation
(RDC) reported
that
some shielded'ire
insulation
was
cracking.
The
vendor
recommended
replacement
of the
cables.
The
licensee
issued
84-1940,
Field
Change
Request
(FCR)
E-5521
and
Work
Request
Nos.
85-AAWHI and 85-AAWJI.
The replacement
of the affected
17 cables
per unit was accomplished
and accepted
by gC.
(Closed)
Item 400/CDR 83-130,
Main Reactor Trip Breakers - Undervoltage
Trip Attachment
(UVTA) (10 CFR 50.55(e)).
The final report
was
submitted
on
March 29,
1985.
The report
has
been
reviewed
and
determined
to
be
acceptable.
The inspector
held discussions
with
responsible
licensee
representatives
and
reviewed
supportin'g
documentation
to verify that the corrective (action) identified in the
report have
been completed.
Westinghouse notified the licensee that
a deficiency existed concerning
the retaining ring groove
on
UVTA.
provided
new UVTA's
which had
a wider groove which will accommodate
the
new retaining ring.
The replacement" of the
UVTA's has
been accomplished
in accordance
with
the approved
design
documents
and work procedures.
The replacement
is
documented
on
WP-137-E-1240
Deficiency
and Disposition
Report
(DDR)
1480,
and
FCR I-973.
Close)
Item 400
CDR 86-226,
480 Volt Switchgear - Breaker
Failure
The final report
was submitted
on
June
12
1986.
The report
has
been
reviewed
and
determined
to
be acceptable.
The
inspector
held discussions
with responsible
li'censee representative
and
reviewed supporting
documentation
to verify that the corrective actions
identified in the report have
been completed.
A Brown Bovere
Corporation
(BBC) type
LK-16 circuit breaker failed
during hot functional test.
Investigation
by
BBC identified that there
were two factors which could cause this failure,
a 'design
change to the
blade
pivot point which
added
loading to the contact
opening
and
closing force and improper maintenance
which could cause
a accumulation
of f'iction
on
the
opening
spring
mechanism.
BBC
issued
two
installation bulletins
(IB) 8604,
Lubrication and'ontact
Cleaning
Procedure
for
BBC Type
LK Circuit Breakers
and
IB 8605 LK16, LKB16,
LKDK LK20, and
LKE20 Booster Spring Installation.
IB 8605
recommends
installation of booster
springs
to the existing tripping springs
to
offset the forces
due to the change
in the pivot point.
The booster
springs will restore
the opening force to the original design level
by
adding
56
pounds
of force.
The
change
was
incorporated
under
the
supervision of BBC representatives
and documented
in FCRE-6031.
BBC
1B
l
f,
ti
i
C
II
I
l
1
8604
provides
additional
detailed
maintenance
instructions for the
LK-16 breakers.
The licensee will have the site maintenance
procedures
revised to incorporate
188604 recommendations
by July 15,
1986.
f.
(Closed)
Item 400
CDR 85-214,
Standby Diesel
Generator - Control
Panel
Ventilation
The final report
was
submitted
on
November 15,
1985.
The report
has
been
reviewed
and determined
to be
acceptable.
The inspector
held discussions
with responsible
licensee
representatives
and
reviewed
supporting
documentation
to verify that
the corrective
actions identified in the report
have
been
complete.
Transamerica
DeLaval
Incorporated
(TDI) supplied
these
panels
which
were manufactured
by RTE-Delta Corporation
(RDC).
RDC informed TDI and
the licensee
that the exciter regulator
components
generated
more heat
than could
be dissipated
by natural
convection ventilation which was
provided.
RDC submitted
a design
using four ventilation
fans which
have
been qualified to
IEEE 323 and
had been approved
by Bechtel
Power
Corporation for another
licensee.
The
licensee
and its designer
accepted
the design.
The fans
were installed
under the direction of
RDC representative.
The following
FCRs
were -issued
to
document
installations
N-1729,
E-514TR1,
E-5135
and
I-2269.
The licensee
has
verified that the fans maintained
the
panel
below 120'F during
a
24
hour test of the diesel.
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems
(50100)
The inspector
reviewed
the
Environmental
gualification
Document
Package
(E(DP) for
a fan motor and solenoid
which is
used with an air operated
actuator.
The
EgDP
number
4.15
Hl was for eight
fan motors built by
Reliance
Motors.
The motors
are
model
TEAO built on
a
449T frame.
The
package
appeared
to be complete
and acceptable.
The inspector
examined
EgDP
42. 1SH1
on
17 Bettes
Pneumatic
Actuators of five varieties.
EgDP 3.2 for
the solenoids
which supply the pneumatic
pressure
to the actuators
was then
examined.
The inspector
examined
the
package
for Asco solenoids
models
NP-8316,
NP-8320,
and
NP-8321.
The
package
appeared
complete
and
acceptable.
Within the areas
examined,
there were
no violations or deviation identified.
e