ML18003B230
| ML18003B230 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1986 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18003B229 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605150556 | |
| Download: ML18003B230 (4) | |
Text
SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POMER PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 9.5 Other Auxiliar S stems 9.5.1 Fire Protection 9.5.1.1 Fire Protection Program Requirements Fire Protection Pro ram Staff fire protection guidelines of Section C.l.e(l) of Branch Technical Position (BTP)
CMEB 9.5-1 state that the fire protection program for buildings'toring new reactor fuel and for adjacent areas that could affect the fuel storage area should be fully operational before fuel is received at the site.
By letter dated October 14, 1983, Carolina Power 5 Light Company (the applicant) committed to meet the guidelines of. Section C.l.e.(l) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
By letter dated April 16, 1986, the applicant informed the staff that it could not meet this commitment because electrical penetrations in a new fuel storage area fire barrier will not be sealed before fuel is received at the site.
The new fuel storage area is located on elevation 286 feet of fuel handling building fire area 5-F-BAL.
The combustible loading in the area is negligible.
Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers will be installed in the vicinity of the new fuel storage area prior to receipt of new fuel in accord-ance with Section C.7. 1 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
The fire barriers enclosing the 960~
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@000+00 PDR ADOCK F"
fire area, including structural columns supporting the area, are 3-hour fire rated.
However, approximately 100 electrical penetrations through barriers bounding the new reactor fuel storage area will not be sealed before new reactor fuel is received at the site because the cable pulls will not be complete.
The new fuel area is separated from the unsealed electrical penetra-tions by at least 19,feet.
The applicant proposes to establish a continuous fire watch at fuel handling building elevation 286 feet as a compensatory measure until the electrical penetrations are sealed.
The applicant has indicated that the penetrations will be sealed by July 1, 1986.
The staff was concerned that;.a-'fire in the vicinity of the unsealed barrier penetrations would spread through the barrier and affect the new fuel storage area.
The staff evaluated conditions on both sides of the barrier and found no significant unmitigated fire hazards in the proximity which might represent-a threat to the new fuel storage area.
Moreover, establishment of a continuous fire watch when a barrier is not functional meets technical specification requirements and provides reasonable assurance that any fire will be discovered during its early stages and extinguished with available equipment before significant damage occurs.
The staff was also concerned that continuing construction operatio~s would result in the introduction of fire hazards that could threaten the new fuel storage area.
However, major construction activities are complete and the fuel storage area will be turned over to operations prior to receipt of new reactor fuel.
Therefore, the staff has reasonable assurance that fire hazardous construction activities, e.g., cutting and welding, will be adequately controlled.
On these
- bases, the staff concludes that, with the establishment of a continuous fire watch, the lack of fire rated electrical penetration seals does not significantly decrease the level of fire safety.
Furthermore, the applicant has committed to seal the penetrations by July 1, 1986.
This is therefore, an acceptable deviation from Section,C.l.e(1) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
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