ML17360A098

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Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status
ML17360A098
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 12/26/2017
From: Gerfen P
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
DCL-17 -109
Download: ML17360A098 (7)


Text

Pacific Gas and Electric Company December 26, 2017 PG&E Letter DCL-17 -109 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Paula Gerfen Station Director Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Information and Status

References:

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Mail code 104/5/502 P.O. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.4596 Internal: 691.4596 Fax: 805.545.4234

1. Letter from Greg Krueger (NEI) to John Lubinski (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Industry Resolution Plan Update (Project 689), dated August 4, 2017
2. Letter from Joe Pollock (NEI) to Brian Holian (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), NSIAC Concurrence on Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Industry Response Actions (Project 689), dated October 26, 2017
3. BWROG Topical Report TP-16-1-112, Revision 4, Recommendations to Resolve Flowserve 10 CFR Part 21 Notification Affecting Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Wedge Pin Failure

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

In Reference 1, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) provided the NRC with a resolution plan for the U.S. Nuclear Industry to address the known Anchor Darling Double Disk Gate Valve (ADDDGV) issues. Reference 2 indicated that each utility will provide a listing of their Anchor Darling valve population with active safety functions along with relevant valve information, including the results of susceptibility evaluations, repair status, and a repair schedule for each susceptible valve not yet repaired. The Enclosure with this letter serves to provide this information for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2.

The Enclosure to this letter contains the following information for each ADDDGV:

A member of the STARS Alliance Callaway

  • Diablo Canyon
  • Palo Verde
  • Wolf Creek

Page 2 PG&E Letter DCL-17-109 December 26, 2017 Plant Name, Unit, and Valve Identification (I D).

System.

Valve Functional Description.

Valve Size.

Active Safety Function (open, close, both).

Are multiple design basis post-accident strokes required (yes/no)?

Expert Panel Risk Ranking (high, medium, low).

Result of susceptibility evaluation (susceptible or not susceptible).

Is the susceptibility evaluation in general conformance with TP16-1-112R4 (Reference 3)?

Does the susceptibility evaluation rely on thread friction? If yes, was the coefficient of friction (COF) greater than 0.1 0? For cases where thread-friction was relied upon, information is provided whether the COF was above or below 0.1.

Was an initial stem-rotation check performed? If yes, include rotation criteria (i.e. :510 degrees or :55 degrees).

Was the diagnostic test data reviewed for failure precursors described in TP16-1-112R4 (Reference 3)?

The valve's repair status (i.e. repaired or not repaired).

PG&E makes no new or revised regulatory commitments (as defined by NEI 99-04) in this letter.

If you have questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. Hossein Hamzehee, Manager of Regulatory Services, at 805-545-4720.

Sincerely, a v-.-J IV] _A.,-; L {;;/__ f ~ ~ pc,J Paula Gerfen Station Director kjse/4328/50949534 Enclosure cc:

Diablo Distribution cc/enc: Kriss M. Kennedy, Region IV Administrator Christopher W. Newport, NRC Senior Resident Inspector R!:~ii\\AI!:Inf k"

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member of the STARS Alliance Callaway

  • Diablo Canyon
  • Palo Verde
  • Wolf Creek

Plant Unit Valve ID System Name DCPP 1

MS-1-FCV-95 Main Steam Safety DCPP 1

SI-1-880iA Injection Safety DCPP 1

SI-1-8801B Injection Safety DCPP 1

SI-1-8802A Injection Safety DCPP 1

SI-1-8802B Injection Safety DCPP 1

SI-1-8803A Injection PG&E Letter DCL-17 -109 Enclosure Pacific Gas and Electric Company/Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units 1 and 2 Anchor Darling Double Disk Gate Valve Listing Result of Is the susceptibility Does the susceptibility Was an initial stem-Valve Functional Valve Active Are multiple design Expert susceptibility evaluation in evaluation rely on thread rotation check Was the diagnostic test data Valve repair Size Safety basis post-accident Panel Risk general friction?

performed?

revieweq for failure precursors Description (inches)

Function strokes required?

Ranking evaluation conformance with If yes, was the COF greater If yes, include rotation described in TP16-1-112R4?

status TP16-1-112R4?(A) than 0.10?

criteria (Open, (High, (susceptible or (No),

(No),

(repaired or

Close, Medium, (Yes/No)

(Yes, >0.10),

(Yes, :510 deg.),

(Yes/ No)

Both)

(Yes/No)

Low) not susceptible)

(Yes, S0.10)

(Yes, ss deg.)

not repaired)

Main Steam Supply To Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 4

Open No High Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10(41 No Yes Repaired(1l Charging Discharge Isolation 4

Open No High Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10(4)

No Yes Not Repaired Charging Discharge Isolation 4

Open No High Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10(4)

No Yes Not Repaired Safety Injection to Hot Leg Injection 4

Both Yes Low Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10(4)

No Yes Not Repaired Safety Injection to Hot Leg Injection 4

Both Yes Low Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10'41 No Yes Not Repaired Charging Discharge Isolation 4

Open No High Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10(4)

No Yes Not Repaired 1

Plant Valve Functional Valve Active Unit Valve ID System Size Safety Name Description (inches)

Function (Open,

Close, Both)

Safety Charging Discharge DCPP 1

SI-1-8803B Injection Isolation 4

Open Safety Injection Pump Safety Discharge to Cold Legs DCPP 1

Sl-1-8835 Injection Isolation 4

Open Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge to Containment Containment Spray DCPP 1

CS-1-9003A Spray Header 8

Both Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge to Containment Containment Spray DCPP 1

CS-1-9003B Spray Header 8

Both Residual Heat Removal Pump Safety Discharge to ~harging DCPP 1

SI-1-8804A Injection Pump Suction 8

Both Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge to Safety Safety Injection Pump DCPP 1

SI-1-8804B Injection Suction 8

Both Residual Heat Residual Heat Removal Pump DCPP 1

RHR-1-8700A Removal Suction Isolation 14 Both Result of Is the susceptibility Are multiple design Expert susceptibility evaluation in basis post-accident Panel Risk general strokes required?

Ranking evaluation conformance with TP16-1-112R4?(AJ (High, (susceptible or (Yes/No)

Medium, not susceptible)

(Yes/No)

Low)

No High Not Susceptible Yes No Low Not Susceptible Yes Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes 2

Does the susceptibility Was an initial stem-evaluation rely on thread rotation check friction?

performed?

If yes, was the COF greater If yes, include rotation than 0.10?

criteria (No),

(No),

(Yes, >0.10},

(Yes, :510 deg.),

(Yes, :50.10)

(Yes, :55 deg.)

Yes, >0.10'41 No Yes, >0.1o'41 No Yes, >0.1o'41 No Yes, >0.1o'41 No Yes, >0.10'41 No Yes, >D.1o'41 No Yes, >0.1o'41 No PG&E Letter DCL-17-109 Enclosure Was the diagnostic test data Valve repair reviewed for failure precursors described in TP16-1-112R4?

status (repaired or (Yes/ No) not repaired)

Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Repaired' 21 Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired

Plant Valve Functional Valve Active Unit Valve ID System Size Safety Name Description (inches)

Function (Open,

Close, Both)

Residual Heat Residual Heat Removal Pump DCPP 1

RHR-1-8700B Removal Suction Isolation 14 Both Containment Recirculation Sump to Residual Heat Safety Removal Pump DCPP 1

SI-1-8982A Injection Suction 14 Both Containment Recirculation Sump to Residual Heat Safety Removal Pump DCPP 1

SI-1-8982B Injection Suction 14 Both Safety Safety Injection to Hot DCPP 2

SI-2-8802A Injection Leg Injection 4

Both Safety Safety Injection to Hot DCPP 2

SI-2-8802B Injection Leg Injection 4

Both Safety Injection Pump Safety Discharge to Cold Legs DCPP 2

Sl-2-8835 Injection Isolation 4

Open VAC-2-FCV-Containment Hydrogen Purge I DCPP 2

658 Ventilation Recombiner Isolation 4

Both Result of Is the susceptibility Are multiple design Expert susceptibility evaluation in basis post-accident Panel Risk general strokes required?

Ranking evaluation conformance with TP16-1-112R4lAI (High, (susceptible or (Yes/No)

Medium, not susceptible)

(Yes/No) low)

Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes Yes High Not Susceptible Yes Yes High Not Susceptible Yes Yes Low Not Susceptible Yes

. Yes Low Not Susceptible Yes No Low Not Susceptible Yes Yes Low Not Susceptible Yes 3

Does the susceptibility Was an initial stem-evaluation rely on thread rotation check friction?

performed?

If yes, was the COF greater If yes, include rotation than 0.10?

criteria (No),

(No),

(Yes, >0.10),

(Yes, SlO deg.),

(Yes, SO.lO)

(Yes, ss deg.)

Yes, >0.10(41 No Yes, >0.10!41 No Yes, >0.10(4)

No Yes, >0.10(4)

No Yes, >0.10!41 No Yes, >0.10(4)

No Yes, >0.10(4)

No PG&E Letter DCL-17-109 Enclosure Was the diagnostic test data Valve repair reviewed for failure precursors described in TP16-1-112R4?

status (repaired or (Yes/ No) not repaired)

Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Re paired !3l Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired

Plant Valve Functional Valve Active Are multiple design Unit Valve ID System Size Safety basis post-accident Name Description (inches)

Function strokes required?

(Open,

Close, (Yes/No)

Both)

VAC-2-FCV-Containment Hydrogen Purge I DCPP 2

659 Ventilation Recombiner Isolation 4

Both Yes VAC-2-FCV-Containment Hydrogen Purge I DCPP 2

668 Ventilation Recombiner Isolation 4

Both Yes VAC-2-FCV-Containment Hydrogen Purge I DCPP 2

669 Ventilation Recombiner Isolation 4

Both Yes Residua I Heat Removal Pump Discharge to Containment Containment Spray DCPP 2

CS-2-9003A Spray Header 8

Both Yes Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge to Containment Containment Spray DCPP 2

CS-2-9003B Spray Header 8

Both Yes Residual Heat Removal Pump Safety Discharge to Charging DCPP 2

SI-2-8804A Injection Pump Suction 8

Both Yes Residual Heat Removal Pump Discharge to Safety Safety Injection Pump DCPP 2

SI-2-8804B Injection Suction 8

Both Yes Result of Is the susceptibility Expert susceptibility evaluation in Panel Risk general Ranking evaluation conformance with TP16-1-112R4?(A}

(High, (susceptible or

Medium, not susceptible)

(Yes/No) low)

Low Not Susceptible Yes Low Not Susceptible Yes Low Not Susceptible Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes Medium Not Susceptible Yes 4

Does the susceptibility Was an initial stem-evaluation rely on thread rotation check friction?

performed?

If yes, was the COF greater If yes, include rotation than 0.10?

criteria (No),

(No),

(Yes, >0.10},

(Yes, :S10 deg.),

(Yes, :S0.10)

(Yes, :SS deg.)

Yes, >0.1d41 No Yes, >0.1d41 No Yes, >0.1d41 No Yes, >0.1d41 No Yes, >0.10'41 No Yes, >O.ld41 No Yes, >0.1d41 No PG&E Letter DCL-17 -109 Enclosure Was the diagnostic test data Valve repair reviewed for failure precursors described in TP16-1-112R4?

status (repaired or (Yes/ No) not repaired)

Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired

Plant Valve Functional Valve Active Are multiple design Expert Unit Valve ID System Size Safety basis post-accident Panel Risk Name Description (inches)

Function strokes required?

Ranking (Open, (High,

Close, (Yes/No)
Medium, Both) low)

Residual Heat Residual Heat Removal Pump DCPP 2

RHR-2-8700A Removal Suction Isolation 14 Both Yes Medium Residual Heat Residual Heat Removal Pump DCPP 2

RHR-2-8700B Removal Suction Isolation 14 Both Yes Medium Containment Recirculation Sump to Residual Heat Safety Removal Pump DCPP 2

SI-2-8982A Injection Suction 14 Both Yes High Containment Recirculation Sump to Residual Heat Safety Removal Pump DCPP 2

SI-2-8982B Injection Suction 14 Both Yes High (AJ Applied Wedge Pin Torque must bound anticipated design basis operating torque requirements and current maximum total torque.

Result of Is the susceptibility Does the susceptibility susceptibility evaluation in evaluation rely on thread general friction?

evaluation conformance with If yes, was the COF greater TP16-1-112R4?!Al than 0.10?

(susceptible or (No),

not susceptible)

(Yes/No)

(Yes, >0.10),

(Yes, ~0. 10)

Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.1o'41 Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10141 Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10141 Not Susceptible Yes Yes, >0.10141 Was an initial stem-rotation check performed?

If yes, include rotation criteria (No),

(Yes, ~10 deg.),

(Yes, ~5 deg.)

No No No No PG&E Letter DCL-17 -109 Enclosure Was the diagnostic test data reviewed for failure precursors Valve repair status described in TP16-1-112R4?

(repaired or (Yes/ No) not repaired)

Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired Yes Not Repaired 111 MS-1-FCV-95 was replaced in Unit 1 refueling outage 20 (Spring 2017) as a planned activity to address long-standing issues with valve seat leakage. New stem wedge connection torqued by vendor utilizing Flowserve maintenance guidance.

121 SI-1-8804A was repaired in Unit 1 refueling outage 20 (Spring 2017) due to indications of anomalous behavior on diagnostic test data. New stem wedge connection was torqued to the maximum allowable value for this size and class of valve.

131 Sl-1-89828 was repaired in Unit 1 refueling outage 20 (Spring 2017) due to indications of anomalous behavior on diagnostic test data. New stem wedge connection was torqued to a value greater than the anticipated operating torque.

141 Susceptibility Evaluation utilized a coefficient of friction (COF) value of 0.15.

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