ML17349A496
| ML17349A496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1992 |
| From: | Decker T, Gloersen W, Kuzo G, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17349A495 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-92-21, 50-251-92-21, NUDOCS 9211250022 | |
| Download: ML17349A496 (43) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1992021
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
NOY (3892
License Nos.:
and
Report Nos.:
50-250/92-21
and 50-251/92-21
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102.
Docket Nos.:
50-250
and 50-251
Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
4
Inspection
Conducted:
September
26 - October
1,
1992
Inspectors:
'",
lB
~ o
,G.
B.
o
W.
B. Gloersen
Approved by: ~~~~rmm
T.
R. Decker, Chief
Radiological Effluents
and Chemistry Section
Radiological
Protection
and
Emergency
Preparedness
Branch
Division of Radiati
n Safety
and Safeguards
Facilities
and Radiation Protection Section
Radiological
Protection
and
Emergency
Preparedness
Branch
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Date
Soigne
I0 PLI
Da e Signed
/l ~
Zc.
Da
e Signed
//7 rz
Da
e Signed
Scope:
This special,
announced
inspection
reviewed current Radiation Protection
(RP)
and
Emergency
Preparedness
{EP) program status,
and associated
preparation
and
recovery efforts conducted
in response
to Hurricane
Andrew and its aftermath.
Review of the
RP program included onsite health physics
(HP) staffing,
equipment availability, low-level radioactive
waste
(LLRW) and source control
and/or accountability,
and operational
controls; liquid and gaseous
effluent
monitor operability and surveillances;
and meteorological
and offsite
environmental
monitoring.
EP program areas
reviewed included
emergency
response facility status,
communications
systems,
call-out procedure for the
emergency
response
organization,
and portions of the Florida Power
and Light
Company
(FPRL) prompt notification system.
92ii250022 92iii3
ADOCK 05000250
8
Results:
As of October
1,
1992, the following completed
actions and/or status
regarding
the licensee's
RP and
EP programs
were verifie'd.
HP staffing was restored to
pre-storm levels.
No concerns
regarding
RP equipment availability/
operability,
source
and
LLRM control and/or accountability,
and operational
controls were identified.
The main liquid and plant stack gaseous
effluent
monitors,
as well
as the Unit 3 (U-3) spent fuel pool monitor were functional
and returned to service.
The meteorological
systems
and offsite environmental
monitoring and sampling programs
were restored
and,functioning properly.
Special
and routine dose rate
and contamination
surveys, effluent pathway
sampling
and analyses,
and preliminary environmental
monitoring results
indicated that radionuclide concentrations
in liquid and gaseous
effluents
were below regulatory limits and within expected
ranges
during and subsequent
to the storm.
The prompt notification and communications
systems
were
restored.
The call-out procedure to
FP&L emergency
response
organization
personnel
was revised to include
new telephone
or pager numbers.
The
Technical
Support Center
(TSC)
and Operational
Support Center
(OSC) were
restored
and operational.
Other licensee
emergency
response facilities were
fully functional during and after the hurricane.
Licensee restoration efforts
for the affected
emergency
response facilities, communications
and prompt
notification systems,
and emergency
response
organization
were considered
prompt
and well-organized.
This inspection identifi,ed the following instances
of loss of communication
and alert/notification capability
as
a result'f the storm damage.
Thus, the
facility could not make the notifications specified in 10 CFR Part 50.
However, it was not the
NRC's expectation that the systems withstand the event
that occurred
nor were they required to be designed
to do so.
Therefore,
no
enforcement
action is considered
to be appropriate.
Loss of capability to notify the responsible
State
and local
governmental
agencies
following an Alert declaration
at 09: 16 on
August 24,
1992,
in accordance
with 10 CFR 50, Appendix
E, Section
IV.D
criteria (Paragraph
7.b).
Inability to notify the
NRC following an Alert declaration
at 09:16 on
August 24,
1992, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72 criteria
(Paragraph
7.b).
Loss of capability to ensure that the administrative
and physical
means
for alerting
and providing prompt instructions to the public within the
plume exposure
pathway
EPZ was maintained in accordance. with 10 CFR 50,
Appendix
E, Section
IV.D.3 (Paragraph
7.c).
REPORT DETAlLS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- T
D.
p.
J'.
- J
L.
q*F
y*J
L.
- J
- L
- D
R.
- E
J.
Abbatiello, Manager, guality Assurance
Adams,
Environmental Specialist,
Environmental Affairs
Bailey, Health Physicist,
Corporate Office
Bates,
Support Supervisor
Danek,
Manager,
Corporate
Health Physics
Gibson,
Performance
Technician
King, Emergency
Preparedness
Coordinator
Kirkpatrick; Supervisor,
Emergency
Preparedness
Knorr, Licensing Engineer
Leon, Siren Coordinator
Lindsey, Supervisor,
Health Physics-
Pearce,
Plant Manager
Powell, Manager,
Services
Schuber,
Supervi'sor,
Radioactive
Waste
Weinkam,
Manager,
Licensing
Williams, Dosimetry
and Records
Supervisor
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included engineers,
technicians,
operators,
and office personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
+W. Cline, Chief, Radiation Protection
and
Emergency
Preparedness
Branch,
Region II (RII)
8+T, Decker, Chief, Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section,
RII
+W. Rankin, Chief, Facilities
and Radiation Protection Section,
RII
- R. Butcher,
Senior Resident
Inspector
- Attended October
1,
1992 Exit Meeting
+Participated
in October
28 and 30,
1992 teleconferences
PParticipated
in November 5,
1992 teleconference
Staffing (83526)
Health Physics
(HP) staff levels available to provide coverage for
special
and routine
HP surveillances
and tasks
subsequent
to the
August 24,
1992 hurricane
event
were reviewed
and discussed
with
licensee representatives.
Licensee
records
indicated that for the
initial week following the storm, approximately
60 percent of licensee
HP technicians
and supervisory
personnel
were absent.
Additional
Flori'da Power
and Light Company
(FPKL) corporate
and St.
Lucie Nuclear
(SLN)
HP staff arrived
on site by August
25 and 27,
1992, respectively,
to provide
RP assistance,
as needed.
Staffing levels were restored
to
their pre-storm
complement
by August 31,
1992.
By September
14,
1992,
an additional
71 contractor
HP personnel
were onsite
and available for
the start of the Unit 3 (U-3) outage.
Based
on review of special
HP surveys
conducted
immediately following
=the storm, verification of completion of routine September
1992
surveillances
and,
in addition,
comparisons
with licensee
and contractor
HP staffing levels utilized during previous
outages
of similar scope,
no
concerns with overall
HP staffing to provide coverage for both routine-
.
and outage activities during or subsequent
to the hurricane
were
identified by the inspector.
.No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
Facilities
and
Equipment
(83525,
83527)
Status of RP analytical
measurement
equipment
was reviewed with no
concerns identified regarding availability 'of portable survey
and
analytical laboratory measurement
instrumentation.
Calibrated portable
survey
and laboratory instruments
were available
as required.
Additionally, the inspector noted that the licensee
had leased
a vendor
stationary
bed geometry whole body counter to be used
as
a backup to the
licensee's
stand-up
geometry whole body counter.
The inspector
reviewed
licensee
actions
regarding operation of the whole body counting
equipment.
The vendor unit was calibrated
between
September
4 and 7,
1992, with source
checks
performed daily.
Whole body counter
performance
was manually checked
against pre-established
acceptance
criteria.
The inspector
reviewed Health Physics Letter of Instruction,=
HPLOI 92-006,
Operation
and Daily Calibration of the Helgeson Scientific
Services
Whole Body Counter,
Revision
(Rev.) I, September
8,
1992,
and
applicable training records
and verified that
11
HP analysts-had
been
trained to use the leased unit.
Further,
the inspector
reviewed energy.
calibration
and daily source
check records of the stand-up
whole body
counter
and noted that the system
was fully operational.
Although there
was
no apparent
damage to the stand-up
counter
as
a result of water
intrusion into the counting
room during the storm, licensee
representatives
stated that
new electronic
components
had
been ordered
to ensure
continued
system operability.
The inspector did not identify any concerns
regarding availability and
accuracy of radiation monitoring and surveillance
equipment.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Radiological
Controls
(83526)
The inspector
reviewed
and discussed
with cognizant licensee
representatives,
special
and routine
RP surveillances
and controls
implemented
in association
with the August 24,
1992 hurricane
and
'ubsequent
recovery efforts.
In particular,
records regarding general
- area
surveys
conducted
immediately following the storm,
subsequent
surveys of low-level waste processing
and storage
areas for contaminated
construction material,
special
evaluation of site boundary
thermoluminescent
dosimeters,
and radioactive
source accountability
and
control activities were reviewed in detail.
e
a I
Special
Surveillances
The inspector
reviewed
and discussed
with cognizant licensee
representatives
records of special
radiological. surveys
conducted
subsequent
to the storm.
The following special
s'urveys
conducted
subsequent
to the hurricane to evaluate potential
changes
in
radiological conditions within and outside the Radiologically
Controlled Area
(RCA) boundary were reviewed
and discussed.
Control,led Areas
and Walkway surveys
conducted
August 24,
1992.
Outside Facility and Construction
Area surveys
conducted
September
24,
1992.
Intake Water and Surrounding
Areas surveys
conducted
September
23,
1992.
Switch Yard and Associated
Area surveys
conducted
September
24,
1992.
Red 'Barn and Oil Storage
Tank Area surveys
conducted
September
24,
1992.
All survey results
were less
than
1 millirem/hour (mrem/hr)
and
ranged
between
5 -
10 microrem/hour (prem/hr) for areas
inside
and
outside of the
RCA, respectively.
All data were within expected
background levels or were similar to results
from surveys
conducted prior to the August 24,
1992 hurricane.
In addition,
the inspector
reviewed the licensee
document,
Summary
of Hurricane Andrew Radiological
Surveys,
dated
September
7,
1992.
Based
on surveillances
conducted
immediately following the storm,
the
summary concluded that,
excluding the residual
heat
removal
(RHR)
and heat
exchanger
(HX) equipment/areas,
there were
no
unexpected
changes
in dose rates
nor in contamination, levels
inside or outside of the
RCA as
a result of the hurricane.
As
a
result of water intrusion effects,
the
RHR pump
and
HX areas
were
posted
as contaminated.
In addition,
both U-3 and Unit 4 (U-4)
RHR pit areas
experienced
expected
dose rate increases
as
a result
of equipment operation.
Contamination
surveys of trash sorting
areas
and four empty SeaLand
(transportable
containers)
and other
containers
which were moved within or outside of the
RCA as
a
result of the storm were surveyed
and verified to be
uncontaminated.
Further,
the inspector
was informed of supplemental
exposure
monitoring utilizing thermoluminescent
dosimeters
(TLDs) conducted
at the
RCA'and protected
area
boundaries
which was initiated on
Harch 31,
1992.
This supplemental
program
was initiated to
provide
an accurate
dose rate data
base for determination of.
required actions regarding
implementation of the
new
10 CFR Part 20 requirements.
HP Surveillance
Procedure,
O-HPS-023,
Environmental
Radiation Monitoring, dated April 6,
1990, provides
instructions for control of TLDs placed within the
company
property of the Turkey Point Nuclear
(TPN) facility for the
purpose of ensuring
doses to unmonitored individuals outside the
RCA have not exceeded
expected
values.
Licensee representatives
stated that
on September
8,
1992,
52 of 76 TLDs previously placed
to monitor third quarter doses
at the
RCA and protected
area
boundaries
were recovered
and subsequently
analyzed.
Results
adjusted to the normal quarterly exposure period, with reported
values
ranging from 8 to 37 prem/hr,
were similar to data from
TLDs positioned in each monitoring location during the second
quarter
1992.
Licensee
actions regarding
special
surveys to evaluate potential
changes
in radiological releases
or exposure
from materials
stored
in the
RCA as
a result of the hurricane
were regarded
as
appropriate.
No effects of the storm on licensee
equipment or
facilities resulting in changes
to radiation
dose rates
or
contamination levels within/outside of the
RCA were noted.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Routine Surveillances
"The inspector reviewed
and evaluated
the licensee's ability to
implement selected
RP surveillances
required
by licensee
procedures.
Health Physics Administrative
(HPA) procedure,
O-HPA-004,
Scheduling of Periodic Health Physics Activities, dated
June
26,
1992,
provides guidance for establishing
a schedule of HP-related
activities, including routine surveillances.
Specified surveys
may be adjusted
plus
or, minus
25 percent to accommodate
normal
schedules.
During the onsite inspection,
licensee
implementation, of the
routine
HP surveillance
program
was verified.
Completion of the
following monthly surveillances
for August and/or September
1992
were reviewed
and discussed
with licensee
representatives.
Control Area Perimeter
U-4
RHR Pit
U-3 Turbine Deck
Dumpsters
Outside of Protected
Areas
U-4 Turbine Deck
I&C Shed in the
Auxiliary Building Roof
Liquid Effluent Discharge
Piping and Area
As of October I, 1992,
survey records
For the dumpsters
and
instrument
and calibration
{ILC) shed,
which were required to be
surveyed
in August
and September
1992;
had not been located.
Licensee
representatives
stated that they believed the surveys
were completed
and requested
additional time to locate the
appropriate
documentation.
Prior to leaving the site,
the
inspector
informed licensee
representatives
that pending review of
their document
search
and retrieval of the appropriate
records,
this issue
would be considered
an unresolved
item.
During
a
subsequent
October 7,
1992 teleconference
between
Mr. J.,Lindsey,
Radiation Protection Supervisor,
TPN,
and Mr. G.
B. Kuzo,
NRC,
Rll, licensee
representatives
reviewed
and discussed
records of
the applicable data, of which facsimiles
were transmitted
electronically to the inspector,
to verify that the appropriate
surveys
were completed in August
and September
1992, in accordance
with the procedure.
The inspector
informed licensee
representatives
that based
on receipt of these
data
no additional
review of this issue
was required.
The inspector
noted that based
on review of selected
records,
routine
HP surveillances
were being implemented properly and were
considered
adequate.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Control of Radioactive Calibration
and Source Material
Licensee Administrative Procedure
O-ADM-0-23, Inventory, Control
and Accounting for Radioactive
Sources,
dated'May
14,
1991,
provides instructions for radioactive
source receipt,
removal
and
entry of sources
into inventory,
and routine accountability.
From discussion with licensee
representatives,*
the inspector
was
informed of several
crosscheck
and calibration sources
recently
received
by licensee
representatives,
and temporarily held in
a
locked
and secured
storage
container maintained in the Central
Receiving
Warehouse
which was
damaged
as
a result of the
hurricane.
Licensee representatives
informed the inspector that
subsequent
to the storm, the secured
container
was verified to be
intact within the damaged building.
Access to the building was
controlled
by the licensee..
On September
25,
1992, all sources
temporarily stored in the Central
Receiving
Warehouse
were
accounted for and subsequently
transferred
to the
I&C and
groups'torage
areas.
Review of current inventory records
verified the location of the calibration
and crosscheck
source"..
Additionally, during discussions
regarding the physical
hazards
to
. personnel
required to retrieve the sources
from the damaged
Central
Receiving
Warehouse,
licensee
representatives
stated that
guidance to place radioactive materials within more physically
secure buildings
as part of routine hurricane preparations
would
be evaluated.
The inspector
informed licensee
representatives
that their evaluations
and action regarding guidance for
radioactive materials
storage
in preparation for future storms
would be tracked
as
an Inspector
Followup Item
( IFI)
{50-250, 251/92-21-01).
Additional review of the inventory of all sources
controlled by
the Reactor
Engineering
and Chemistry groups
was conducted.
Licensee
representatives
from each
group verified that following
the'storm,
the inventories
were checked
by direct observation,
and
determined
to be accurate.
Through discussions
with cognizant licensee
repr'esentatives
and
review of selected
inventory records,
the inspector verified that
radioactive
sources
were stored in accordance
with 10 CFR Part 20
requirements
and licensee
procedures.
No discrepancies
in the
current licensee's
source
inventory were identified.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Radioactive
Waste
and Contaminated
Material Storage
Licensee representatives
informed the inspector that quantities of
processed
resins containing low level radioactive
waste
(LLRW) and
dry active waste
(DAW) awaiting processing
or temporarily stored
on August 24,
1992,
were minimal.
Further,
licensee
representatives
informed the inspector'of radwaste
inventory
reduction efforts conducted
and noted that since
June
I992 the
volume of radioactive
waste stored
on site was reduced
from 52,000
to 2,500 cubic feet (ft').
This reduction included 375, 55-gallon
drums of contaminated dirt and asphalt
which were
removed from the
Dry Storage
Warehouse
and subsequently
shipped to
a waste
processing
vendor.
During tours of the Radwaste
Building,
Radioactive
Waste Storehouse,
and'DAW sorting area,
the inspector
verified a significant reduction in the volume of radioactive
materials
stored in those
areas
compared to previous inspection
activities conducted
February 24-28,
1992,
and documented
in
Inspection
Report (IR) 50-250,-251/92-06,
dated April 10,
1992.
During the storm, the only
LLRW onsite awaiting shipment to
a
licensed
disposal facility consisted
of one High Integrity
Container
(HIC) of solidified resins
from processing of waste
monitor tank liquids.
During and subsequent
to the hurricane,
the
HIC material
was stored in the resin processing
area of the
Radioactive
Waste
(Radwaste)
Building in an area not affected
by
the storm.
From tours of the Radwaste Building, the inspector
verified that the processed
LLRW awaiting shipment
was not
affected
by the storm.
Additional radioactive materials
remaining
onsite during the storm included approximately 2,500 ft'fDAW
and approximately
32 SeaLand containers
used for storage of
construction
equipment contaminated
with l,ow levels of radioactive
material.
During the storm, all SeaLand containers
having either
stored construction or
DAW materials
remained
secured
and
stationary.
Radiation surveys of areas
near the containers
indicated that there
were
no changes
in exposure
rates
and
no
contamination
was released
as
a result of the hurricane.
Additionally, the inspector
reviewed
and discussed
licensee
records
and evaluations
regarding
two, 55-gallon empty drums
having the radiation
symbol (tri-foil) which were found by divers
in the
TPN 'intake canal
on September
16,
1992.
Licensee
representatives
stated that the drums were surveyed
approximately
one year ago,
determined to be uncontaminated,
and subsequently
were released
from the
RCA to the Stores
Stockyard.
Further,
the
tri-foil marking
on the barrel
was not defaced
nor removed in
accordance
with 10 CFR 20.203(f)(4)
because
the barrels
were to be
refurbished for reuse.
The inspector
reviewed construction
work
order
(CWO) No.
5000404 dated
September
18,
1992,
and verified-the
temporary storage
status of the identified drums.
The inspector
noted that
when stored for extended
periods outside of the,RCA,
the clean but tri-foil marked
drums could result in significant
confusion regarding their radiological status.
Following
discussions
with the inspector,
licensee
representatives
noted
that guidance for defacing radioactive labels
on containers
which
may be stored outside the
RCA for -extended
periods of time would
be reviewed.
The inspector
informed licensee
representatives
that
their evaluation
and actions regarding current guidance for
removing 'containers
with radioactive markings and/or labels
from
the
RCA would be tracked
as
an IFI (50-250,.251/92-21-02).
No violations or deviations
were identified.
I
Radiological Effluent Measurement
Systems
(84523,
84524)
The potential for effluent releases,
and licensee
temporary
and final
corrective actions for any liquid and gaseous
effluent monitoring
systems
damaged
as
a result of the August 24,
1992 hurricane,
were
reviewed
and discussed
with licensee
representatives.
The review
included evaluation of liquid and gaseous
radiological
pathways
and
monitoring systems
and verification of area radiation monitor readings
for selected facility areas.
a ~
Liquid Effluent Honitoring
TS 3/4.3.3.5 details the limiting conditions for operation
and
surveillance
requirements
for liquid effluent monitoring
instrumentation, i.e., the liquid radwaste effluent line and steam
generator
(S/G)
blowdown effluent lines.
From discussion with selected
operators,
HP,
and Chemistry
personnel,
and from review of logbooks regarding effluent
monitors'perability status;
the inspector verified that all the
radioactive liquid pathways described
in the Final Safety Analysis
Report
(FSAR) were unaffected,
and that monitoring instrumentation
detailed in TS Table 3.3-7 was operable
during
and subsequent
to
the storm.
The main waste disposal
system liquid effluent and
SG blowdown
effluent lines were isolated
upon loss of offsite power.
In
addition, the inspector
reviewed with licensee 'representatives,
radioanalytical
results for
25 supplemental
S/G liquid blowdown
composite
samples
taken subsequent
to shutdown of U-4.
From
discussions
with licensee
representatives
and review of
supplemental
S/G blowdown sample results,
the inspector
concluded
that there
was
no indication of any primary to secondary
leakage
for the system.
Based
on isolation of the liquid effluent lines,
operability of the liquid effluent monitoring systems,
and from
discussion of supplemental
S/G blowdown sample results,
the
inspector concluded that there were no apparent
monitored nor
unmonitored releases
which occurred during or after the storm
through the liquid effluent pathways.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Gaseous
Effluents
TS 3/4.3.3.6 details
the limiting conditions for operation
and
surveillance
requirements
for the radioactive
gaseous
effluent
monitoring instrumentation.
The inspector noted that the main stack
can receive effluents from
the U-3/4 containments,
the U-4 Spent
Fuel
Pool
(SFP),
and the
RadWaste Building.
Hain stack monitoring utilizes
an in-stack
GH
detector
arid/or effluent samples
drawn to
a System Particulate
Iodine Noble Gas-4
(SPING 4) detector
located in the Auxiliary
Building Fan
Room.
Unlike the U-4 SFP ventilation, the U-3 SFP
exhausts directly to the atmosphere
and is equipped with separate
radiation monitoring instrumentation.
(SJAE) systems for each unit exhaust directly to the atmosphere
and are equipped with appropriate
monitoring instrumentation.
During review of records
and logs,
and discussions
of effluent
monitor operability, the inspector
noted that effluent monitoring
systems/equipment
affected or damaged
as
a result of the
August 24,
1992 hurricane
included the main plant stack gaseous
effluent monitors
and the U-3 SJAE exhaust
monitors.
Additionally, the ducting leading from the
RadWaste
Building to
the main stack was
damaged.
The inspector
reviewed licensee
supplemental
stack sampling
activities
and verified corrective actions for damaged
systems
and,
in addition verified operability of the U-3
SFP vent
radiation monitor.
Details of the selected
gaseous
effluent
monitoring, instrumentation
reviews are
as follows.
Main plant stack effluent release
monitors.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified completion of Plant Construction/
Maintenance
(PC/H) order 92-104,
Vent Stack
Frame Structural
Repairs,
dated
September
25,
1992.
Licensee
actions
9
included replacement
of the in-stack radiation monitor
(R-
14)
and associated
equipment,
and also replacement
of the
ducting leading from the stack to the SPING-4 detector
located
in the Auxiliary Building Fan
Room.
Selected
performance
and calibration data were reviewed for
the plant vent radiation monitors.
The inspector verified
completion of the process
radiation monitoring operability-
test for the R-14 monitor conducted
September
27,
1992.
For
the plant vent SPING-4 monitor, performance
data associated
with O-PHI-067.9
and 0-SHI-067 surveillances
conducted
September
28,
and September ll, 1992, to verify proper
electronic responses
to sources
and flow indication for the
replacement
equipment
were reviewed
and discussed
with
cognizant licensee
representatives.
Additionally, from
review of the appropriate
records,
the last
18-month
calibration of the SPING-4 detector located in the Auxiliary
Building and which was unaffected
by the storm was confirmed
to have
been
completed
Hay 3,
1991.
Both the plant vent
SPING-4
and
R-14 monitors were declared to be in service
as
of September
26 and September
27,
1992, respectively.
From review of selected
chemistry records
and discussions
with cognizant licensee
representatives,
the inspector
verified that prior to the monitors being declared
continuous
sampling of the main stack effluents
was
established
with grab
samples
collected
and analyzed
every
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />;
and particulate,
and tritium analyses
conducted
on
a weekly 'basis
in accordance
with the
operability requirements
of TS 3.3.3.6.
No abnormal
or
elevated
gaseous
effluent concentrations
were identified.
The following range of concentration
values
above analytical
detection limits were reported for selected
noble gas,
and particulate
analyses for main stack grab samples
collected
subsequent
to August 24,
1992.
Licensee
records
indicated that the only noble
gas
and iodine species
identified were xenon-133
(Xe-133)
and iodine-131 (I-131)
with concentrations
ranging from 7 E-8 to 1. I E-6
microcuries per cubic centimeter
(pCi/cc)
and 7.8 E-14 to
1.5 E-13 pCi/cc, respectively.
There were
no radionuclides
identified from particulate
samples
analyses.
Further,
the inspector verified that prior to and
immediately following landfall of the hurricane,
the
Radwaste
Building fan was secured,
thus effectively
preventing
any exhaust into the damaged
ductwork leading to
the main plant stack.
Licensee representatives
stated that
as
an additional
check to verify the absence
of releases
from the Radwaste Building, continuous
sampling of the
gaseous
effluent pathway leading to the damaged
ductwork was
initiated
on. September
5,
1992.
The inspector verified that
were collected
and analyzed
every
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />;
and
10
,samples collected for iodine, particulate,
and tritium were
analyzed
weekly.
In general,
concentrations
were less than the licensee's
analytical
detection limits, and concentrations
of total isotopes'in
the grab samples
ranged
from 1.6 E-7 to 2.5
E-,6 pCi/cc.
This supplemental
sampling was,terminated
on September
19,
1992,
subsequent
to repair of the ductwork leading to the
main plant vent.
The inspector
noted that for the gaseous
effluent analyses
conducted for both the main stack
and
RadWaste
Building
effluent sampling, all radionuclide concentrations
were less
than the detection limits specified in TS Table 4. 11.2.
Further,
the -inspector verified that based
on the worst case
dispersion
value
(minimum dispersion)
at the site boundary,
5.8 E-7 seconds-per
cubic meter, listed in the licensee's
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, dated
June
25,
1991,
radionuclide concentrations
would be significantly below the
10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table 2,
Column
1, limits of
3 E-7 pCi/cc and
1 E-10 pCi/cc, for Xe-133
and I-131,
respectively,
as required
by 10 CFR Part 20. 106;
SJAE exhaust monitors.
The U-3 SJAE monitor remained
but was not required to be in service
as
a result
of the U-3 outage.
Licensee representatives.
noted that
during the current
U-3 outage,
modifications
and repairs
were planned for this system.
The U-4 SJAE system
remained
intact and associated
monitors were operable
during
and
subsequent
to August 24,
1992.
Further,
the inspector
noted
that vacuum to the system
was dropped
when U-4 was reduced
in power,
thus eliminating the U-4 SJAE as
a potential
effluent pathway.
U-3 Spent
Fuel
Pool
Vent Stack.
As
a result of the planned
U-3 outage activities,
the inspector verified operability of
the U-3 Spent
Fuel
Pool Vent Stack Honitor.
The inspector
verified that the U-3 SFP fan was secured
August 24,
1992,
prior to the storm.
Further,
from review of records for
preventative
maintenance
conducted
September
9,
1992,
and
discussions
with licensee
representatives
the inspector
verified operability of the U-3 SFP radiation monitoring
system.
Area Radiation Monitors (ARHs).
The inspector
reviewed
selected
ARH results for 0:00 hours
on August
23 through
12:00 hours
on August 24,
1992.
Licensee
records of dose
rate values for ARMs located in selected
general
areas
wer'e
as follow:
U-3/4 containment refueling floor, approximately
5 millirem per hour (mrem/hr');
U-3 containment
personnel'
hatch,
1
-, 1.5 mrem/hr; U-3/4 SFP Buildings and transfer
canals,
0.5
- 8 mrem/hr;
and Auxiliary Building, 0.1-
0.5 mrem/hr.,
Review of the
ARM data collected during or
,
11
immediately subsequent
to the storm as
compared to pre-storm
values indicated that there were
no signific'ant changes
in
the measured
radiation values.
The inspector
noted that, licensee
actions
associated
with the
damaged
monitors met
TS requirements
and that radiological
concentrations
measured
for gaseous
effluents
wer e below
regulatory limits and within expected
ranges
during
and subsequent
to the hurricane.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Environmental
and Heteorological Honitoring Programs
(80521)
The licensee
meteorological
measurement
and environmental
monitoring
capabilities
were reviewed
and discussed
with cognizant licensee
individuals.
a ~
Heteorological,Heasurements
Instrumentation
10 CFR 50.54(q) requires that
a licensee
authorized to possess
and
operate
a nuclear
power reactor follow and maintain in effect
emergency
plans which meet the standards
and
the requirements
of Appendix
E of this part.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) requires that adequate
methods,
systems
and
equipment for assessing
and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences
of a radiological
emergency condition
be in use.
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.E.2 requires that Emergency
Plans
include adequate
equipment for determining the magnitude of and
for continuously assessing
the impact of the release
of
radioactive materials to the envi'ronment.
Section 5.1.3, of the Emergency Plan,'Heteorological
Systems,
states
that meteorological
data is collected at the Turkey Point
Land Hanagement
Site tower, the South
Dade Site Tower,
and the
Homestead Air Force
Base tower.
As
a result of hurricane
damage,
the licensee's
meteorological
system
was out-of-service
from approximately 05:00 hours
on
August
24 through
18:55 hours
on August 31,
1992.
Consequently,
the licensee
was unable to collect the meteorological
data from
any of the locations as"specified
in Section
5. 1.3 of the Turkey
Point Emergency
Plan in accordance
Section IV.E.2.
However,
Section
5. 1.5 of the
Emergency
Plan
allows use of conservative default values
based
on Final Safety
Analysis Report to be utilized if assessment
instrumentation
is
not available (i.e., offscale or inoperable).
During an October
30,
1992 teleconference,
the inspector
reviewed with licensee
representatives
Section 8.1.4 of the licensee's
Emergency
Plan
Implementing Procedure,
20126, Offsite Dose Calculations,
dated
e
12
April 7,
1992.
The procedure
provides details regarding the use
of default values
when other methods
are not available for
selected
plant conditions including loss of coolant,
steam
generator
tube rupture
and fuel handling accidents
using
conservative
assumptions.
During the onsite inspection,
the operability of the
TPN
meteorological
monitoring stations
was reviewed.
On September
26,
1992,
the inspector toured both the primary and backup
meteorological
tower locations
and observed
the meteorological
instrumentation currently in place.
In addition,
the inspector
verified that electrical
power had
been restored
to each tower and
noted that emergency diesel
generators
to supply backup
power were
available; if needed.
During subsequent
tours of, the
TPN control
room, the inspector
noted that the meteorological
data
were being
transmitted
and received in the control
room.
Records of calibrations
conducted
by the Florida Power
and Light
Company
(FP8L)
Land Utilization Staff for 'repaired/damaged
equipment at both meteorological
tower locations
were reviewed
by
the inspector.
Calibrations
were conducted
between
August 31,
and
September
2,
1992.
For the replaced/repaired
instrumentation,
the
inspector verified that calibrations
were within the tolerances
for the target units specified in Turkey Point Plant procedure,
Outside Plant Heteorological
Equipment Calibration,
as revised
July 1991.
Based
on direct observation of equipment
in place,
review of
records
regarding
equipment replacement
and subsequent,
calibration,
and from discussions
with cognizant licensee
representatives,
the inspector
noted that the meteorological
monitoring program
was functioning appropriately.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
b.
Radiological
Environmental Honitoring Program
(REHP)
TS 3/4. 12 details the specifications for conducting radiological
environmental
monitoring activities at the
TPN facility.
Required
exposure
pathways
and/or
samples for analysis
include direct
radiation,
airborne radioiodine
and particulates,
surface water,.
sediments,
fish and invertebrates,
and broad leaf vegetation.
Table 3. 12-1, Notation (1) allows deviations to the sampling
schedule if specimens
are unobtainable
due to circumstances
such
as hazardous
conditions,
seasonal
unavailability,
and malfunction
of automatic
sampling equipment or other legitimate reasons.
For
,. malfunctioning sampling equipment,
corrective actions
are required
to be taken prior to the next sampling period.
13
During the onsite inspection,
the effect of the storm and
subsequent
recovery actions,
current status,
and monitoring
results for the
REHP were reviewed
by direct observation of
sampling stations
and review of selected
records.
Details of the
selected
REHP areas
reviewed are
as follow.
Direct radiation.
Thirteen of twenty-one TS-required
and
five of nine licensee-established
supplemental
TLDs utilized
to monitor direct radiation were recovered
and subsequently,
processed.
Excluding the
NNW directional sector,
at least
one
TLD was collected
and processed
from each directional
sector.
Preliminary results
were similar to previous
values, with the maximum exposure rate of 7.9 microrem per
hour (prem/hr).
By September
14,
1992, all required
and
supplemental
TLDs had
been reestablished,
including an
additional five supplemental
TLDs.
During tours of the
environmental
monitoring stations
conducted
from
September
26-29,
1992, the inspector verified, by di'rect
observation,
the location of the
REHP direct radiation
monitors
as described
in licensee
records for
approximately'0
percent of the licensee's
current
TLD network.
All
sample stations
were reestablished
within several
hundred
feet of the pre-storm locations.
In addition, the inspector
verified the co-location of licensee
and
NRC TLDs at two
separate
sample locations.
Airborne Iodine and Particulates.
Four of the five air
sampling stations
required
by TS were rendered
as
a result of the storm.
As allowed by TS Table 3. 12.-1,
Notation I, the initial hazardous
environmental
conditions
and the lack of an electrical
power source for the sampling
equipment required the licensee to delay resumption of
routine airborne
pathway monitoring until September
9,
1992,
when limited monitoring was established
using three
sampling
stations
which were returned to service.
By September
19,
1992,
the licensee
had reestablished
and returned to
operation five air sampling stations.
Excluding sample
location T-57, the four damaged air sampling stations
were
r'eestablished
within several
hundred feet of their pre-storm
locations
and remained in the
same directional sector.
However,
sampler location T-57 in the
NW directional sector
was not usable
and
an alternate location, west-8, previously
established
as
a supplemental
air sampler
was 'selected
to
meet
TS conditions.
Other sampling matrices.
During tours of the environs
surrounding
the Turkey Point Nuclear
(TPN) site,
the
inspector verified access
to all sampling locations.
In
addition, licensee representatives
informed the inspector
that
on September
9,
1992,
both broadleaf
and water samples
were collected to meet
TS
REHP surveillance
requirements.
14
From discussions
with licensee
representatives
regarding
implementation of the
RENP program,
no additional
concerns
were noted.
Licensee representatives
stated that pursuant to TS Table 3. 12;1
Notation 1, all deviations to the sampling
schedule
would be
documented
in the Annual Radiological
Environmental
Operating
Report
and
any alternative
media
and locations utilized as
a
result of storm damage
would be identified.
The, inspector noted
that recovery actions for the
RENP met
TS requirements
and
no
monitoring concerns
were identified.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Status of the
Emergency
Response
Organization, Facilities,
and Equipment
Post Hurricane Andrew (82102,
82203,
82205,
82209)
a
~
Emergency
Response
Facilities
(82102)
Section 2.4 of the
Emergency
Plan,
Rev. -23, dated
October
21,
1991, describes
the facilities and equipment that the licensee
maintains
in readiness
for an emergency situation,
including the
control
room (CR),
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Technical
Support Center
(TSC), Operations
Support Center
(OSC), alternate
OSC,
and
Emergency
News Center
(ENC).
The inspector
reviewed
and verified the status
and readiness
of
the emergency
response facili,ties (ERFs) maintained
and operated
by the licensee.
The review included direct observations
of
onsite facilities and discussions
with licensee
representatives.
At the time of this inspection, all primary ERFs
had
been restored
to pre-hurricane
conditions
and were fully functional.
Table
1
,summarizes
the status of the
ERFs following the hurricane
and
shows the date
each facility was returned to service.
In preparation for the impending storm, the licensee
had decided
on the evening of August 23,
1992, to relocate
both the
TSC and
OSC to the cable spreading
room of the Auxiliary Building as
recommended
by Emergency
Plan
Implementing Procedure
(EPIP)
20106,
Natural
Emergencies,
Appendix D, to minimize the potential
hurricane/flood
surge effects.
As noted in Table
1, both'the
and
became
post Hurricane Andrew.
The TSC's
inoperability was
due primarily to the stability hazard
associated
with the Unit
1 fossil plant exhaust
stack which developed
fissures
in the concrete during the hurricane.
In addition,
the
TSC also experienced
problems with the air conditioning or
ventilation systems
due primarily to wind and water damage.
When
the licensee
declared
the Alert at 09:16
on August 24,
1992,
based
on
20101 Table
1, Category
16, Alert Condition A(2), as
a
result of a reduction in the level of safety of plant structures
or components within the protected
area,
licensee
management
elected
not to use the primary. TSC due to the structural
problems
15
of the Unit
1 stack resulting in a potential safety hazard to
personnel
occupying the facility.
The licensee
subsequently
relocated
the
TSC to the Nuclear Entrance Building (NEB) due to
the availability of emergency
diesel
generator-supplied
power.
However, the
TSC ultimately was relocated
to the second floor of
the Nuclear Administration Building (NAB) due to the availability
of communications
equipment
and more space.
The
OSC was
ultimately relocated to the first floor of the
NAB.
Both
facilities remained in use until the licensee
downgraded
the Alert
emergency classification at 23:22
on August 30,
1992.
The
relocations of the
and
TSC were not precluded
by EPIP 20106.
TABLE 1
~Facil it
CR
TSC2
Post
Hurricane
Status
fully
functional
out-of-
service
out-of
service
E ui ment Facilit
Dama
e
none
physical safety hazard
from U-1 stack
instability;
ventilation
water intrusion
Returned
to
Service
N/A'/5/92
9/23/92
9/02/92
fully
functional
fully
functional
lost water service
none
N/A
N/A
City
Sub-station
(assembly
area)
out-of
service
one communication line
8/28/92
(1) Not Applicable - Remained ln-Service
(2) First alternate TSC located in cable spreading
room of Auxiliary Building; second alternate
TSC relocated to NEB; third alternate TSC relocated to NAB.
(3) First alternate OSC located in cable spreading room of Auxiliary Building; second alternate
'SC
relocated to NAB.
The inspector discussed
with licensee
representatives
any changes
or enhancements
to the emergency
response facilities for improved
response
to natural disasters.
Although the licensee
was in the
process
of gathering
information and assessing
its response
to the
II
16
hurricane,
the following enhancements
were discussed:
- (1) full
activation of both the
EOF and
ENC for natural disasters;
(2) improved coordination with the National Hurricane Center;
(3) staffing the
TSC with a communications
expert during natural
disasters;
and (4) placing one of the
TSC power supplies
on vital
power.
The licensee
indicated that
a "lessons
learned",report
to
management
would be prepared.
During
a telephone
conference
with
licensee
representatives
on October 28,
1992,
the inspector
indicated that an'RC review of the "lessons
learned" report would
be tracked
as
an IFI (50-250,
251/92-21-03).
The inspector did not identify any apparent
problems with the
primary onsite
and noted that the facilities had
been
restored
to pre-hurricane
conditions
and were fully functional.
No violations'r deviations
were identified.
Notification and Communication
(82203)
Section 4.0 of the
Emergency
Plan,
Rev.
23, dated October 21,
1991, describes
the procedures
and methods
established
for initial
notification and followup communications within the licensee's
facilities and from the licensee to the appropriate
State,
county,
and Federal
response
organizations.
Section 4.6 specifies
the various communications
systems
used
by
the licensee,
including the following:
plant page
system
motor maintenance circuit
FP8L Intelligent Tandem Network (ITN) system
portable radio transceiver
sets
radio paging
system
company radio
FN system
State
Hot Ring Down
(HRD) telephone
National
Warning System
local government
radio system
emergency notification system
The inspector
reviewed
and verified the status
and readiness
of
the communications
systems
required
by the
Emergency
Plan through
discussions
with licensee
representatives
and
a review of records.
At the time of this inspection, all communications
systems
were
fu'nctional
and
had
been restored to either pre-hurricane
conditions or an enhanced
condition.
During the hurricane,
the licensee's
communications
systems
experienced
significant damage.
The following communications
systems
and/or equipment
were disabled during the August 24,
1992
storm:
17
all communications
systems
on Southern Bell aerial
wire along
Palm Drive (main access
road to TPN)
'all communications
systems
on Florida Power and Light
Company's fiber optic system
local government radio antenna
onsite
cellular phone
antennas
onsite
and offsite
900 8Hz truck/repeater'ystem
(onsite radio used for
communications within the plant)
The communication
systems relying on the Southern Bell aerial
. copper wire (plant telephone
system;
National Warning System to
State;
NRC Emergency Notifications System;
State
Hot Ring
Down
circuit;
NRC Health Physics
Network,
and
FTS-2000 emergency
telecommunications
systems)
were replaced
and enhanced
with an
underground fiber optic cable along
Palm Drive (main access
road
to TPN)
and returned to service
on September
5,
1992.
The communication
systems relying on the licensee's
fiber optic
network via the overhead line on the
240
KV transmission
structures
(plant telephone
system
and
Emergency
Response
Data
Acquisition and Display System
(ERDADS) to the
EOF) were restored
and returned to operational
status
on August 27,
1992.
A
microwave system
was
added to the
FP8L fiber optic system
as
a
backup
and placed into service
on September
4,
1992.
In addition,
two new radio systems
were installed following
Hurricane Andrew to facilitate offsite communications.
An ultra
high frequency radio
(450
HHz band
UHF) system
was installed
onsite with an antenna
rated to withstand wind speeds
up to 175
miles per hour (mph).
This system will be used
by the licensee
for storm response,
system operations,
and distribution and
transmission
trouble.
The system.was
installed for use
between
the
TPN facility and the
EOF.
Dade
and Honroe Counties
also
operated
a local government
network in the frequency
range
noted
above.
The second
system installed
was
a very high frequency
radio
(150
NHz VHF).
This system
was installed onsite with an
antenna
rated to withstand wind speeds
up to 144 mph.
The
system's
primary purpose will be to communicate with the
EOF.
The
licensee
had purchased
backup
antennas
for the two high
frequency'adios
described
above.
As noted
above, all communication
systems for notifying offsite
agencies
were lost for several
hours following the storm and thus
the capability was lost to notify the responsible
State
and local
governmental
agencies
following the Alert declaration
at 09:16
on
August 24,
1992,
as specified
Section
IV.D.3;
In addition,
the licensee
was unable to make the
NRC notification requirements
specified in 10 CFR 50.72.
Although
18
the communication capability was lost'emporarily
due to storm
damage
'and the notification times to offsite agencies
were
exceeded,
no enforcement is considered
appropriate
as discussed
in
the, Results
Section in this report.
No apparent
problems with the, recently installed
communication
systems
were noted.
The inspector verified that the
communications
systems
which were identified by the
Emergency
Plan
had
been restored to pre-hurricane. conditions
and were
operational.
In addition,
the licensee
improved communications
capability and reliability with telephone
and radio system
enhancements.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Alert and Notification System
(82203)
Section 5.2.8 of the
Emergency
Plan,
Rev.
23, dated October
21,
1991, describes
the alert
and notification system for alerting the
population of the need to take possible protective actions.
The
system
was installed
and maintained
by the licensee
and operated
by the
Dade
and Monroe County Emergency
Response
Directors.
The
system consisted
of 41 electronic sirens,
including three "mini"
(in-door warning devices)
plus 38 sirens,
located
throughout the plume exposure
pathway emergency
planning
zone
(EPZ).
These electronic sirens
also
have
a public address
(PA)
capability for voice messages.
Upon sounding the sirens,
the
affected public would be instructed via the
PA announcement
to
turn on their radios to the local emergency
broadcast
system
(EBS)
radio station
and await emergency
information.
The inspector
reviewed
and verified the status
and readiness
of
the alert
and notification system required
by the
Emergency
Plan
from discussions
with licensee
representatives
and
a review of
maintenance
and test records.
In general,
the alert
and
notifications siren system
was disabled
on August 24,
1992,
as
a
result of the hurricane.
At the time of this inspection, all
41 electronic sirens
had
been replaced
or repaired,
restored to
pre-hurricane
conditions,
and tested
in accordance
with the siren
test procedure
described
below.
The inspector
reviewed Turkey Point Nuclear Siren
System
(PTN)
Biweekly Patrol
Procedure,
September
19,
1992,
including the
"Biweekly Patrol Siren Test Records"
and verified that the
licensee
had tested
100 percent of the
41 sirens in the
EPZ.
The
inspector did not note any equipment failures, or problems.
The
licensee
had either repaired or replaced all
41 sirens to an
condition by September
19,
1992.
As of September
27,
.
1992,
87 percent of the sirens
were
AC powered while 13 percent
. were
DC powered.
Typically, battery
powered units could supply
enough
power for three blasts with messages,
As of September
30,
1992,
the licensee
had restored
AC power to 100 percent of the
19
siren system.
Since
September
19,
1992,
the licensee
was
continuing to test the entire'iren
system
on
a weekly basis in
accordance
with the Biweekly Patrol
Procedure.
In addition,
the inspector,
accompanied
licensee
representatives
and witnessed
the licensee verify the operability of seven sirens.
The verification included the observation of licensee
representatives
(Siren Coordinator
and
a technician)
performing
both
a visual test ("growl" test)
and
a. silent siren (electronic)
test
on the following sirens:
S-10, S-ll, S-12,
S-22,
S-26,
S-27,
and S-28.. Licensee representatives
used the Turkey Point Nuclear
Siren System Biweekly Patrol
Procedure
as identified above to
perform the tests.
The procedure
required the licensee to perform .
,both
a visual test ("growl" test)
and
a siren
sound test.
The
visual test involved the observation of the siren rotating to
a
desired position for testing
and stopping smoothly.
The inspector
did not observe
any problems with this portion of the test.
The
second portion of the test involved the siren
sound test.
The
procedure
specified that the siren
sound test could
be
accomplished
by performing either
a silent (electronic) test or an
air horn test.
Both tests
were considered
to be valid tests of
the equipment
and the procedure
allowed the licensee
to perform
one or both tests.
Although the licensee
had the option of
performing
an air horn test,
the local County officials requested
that this test not be performed at the time of this inspection.
The silent test,was
performed
and involved sending
the silent test
command signal either remotely via
a repeater
radio fr'om Dade
County or locally from a transmitter in the licensee's
test
vehicle.
The licensee visually checked
the silent test multi-
colored light emitting diodes
(LEDs) which were ordered
as
follows:
AC,
DC, Partial, Full, and Rotor.
If the ~ "Partial" and
"Rotor" LEDs come on, then -the siren is available.
The inspector
verified that both the "Partial" and "Rotor" LEDs were
on for all
seven sirens tested
and they were thus available.
Repeater
radio
capability from Dade County for siren locations
S-22
and S-12 was
verified by observing the licensee
request
Dade County repeater
radio operator to rotate-the sirens.
As noted
above,
the prompt notification system consisting of the
41 electronic sirens located throughout the plume exposure
pathway
EPZ was disabled following the hurricane
and thus this aspect of
the system
was lost for alerting
and providing prompt instructions
to the public within the plume exposure
pathway
EPZ as specified
in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.D.3.
Although a portion of
the capability for alerting
and providing prompt notification to
the public did not exist for a discrete
period of time,
no
enforcement
is considered
appropriate
as discussed
in the Results
Section of this report.
No apparent
problems with the restored alert
and notification
system
were identified by the inspector.
Based
on
a review of
records
at the time of this inspection, all
41 sirens identified
20
in the
Emergency
Plan were repaired
or replaced
a'nd the system
restored to pre-hurricane
conditions.
-No violations or deviations
were identified.
d.
Shift Staffing and Augmentation
(82205)
Section 4.0 of the Emergency
Plan,
Rev.
23, dated October
21,
1991, describes
the procedures
and methods established
for initial
notification and follow-up communications within the
FP8L Company.
Shift staffing and augmentation
requirements
are specified in
Table
2 of Supplement
1.to NUREG-0737.
EPIP 20104,
Duty Call
Notifications/Staff Augmentation,
specifies instructions for
activation of the
Emergency
Response
Organization.
The inspector verified that the call-out procedure to Emergency
Response
Organization personnel
was revised to inc'lude either
new
telephone
or pager
numbers
(Emergency
Response
Directory,
September
29,
1992).
The licensee
issued
an additional
80 pagers
and several cellular telephones
to emergency
response
personnel.
The licensee
had tested
response
times for selecte'd
individuals
assigned
to either
new telephone
or pager
numbers.
However,
a
full organizational call-out drill had not been performed.
The
licensee
indicated that
a call-out drill was being considered.
During a teleconference
with the licensee
on October
28,
1992, the
inspector indicated that the completion of the call-out drill
would be tracked
as
an IFI (50-250,
251/92-21-04).
In addition, the inspector verified that the licensee
had adequate
post-hurricane staffing levels to respond to an emergency.
Principal positions in the
Emergency
Response
Organization
were
staffed with either three or four individuals who were designated
to assume
the principal
Emergency
Response
Organization positions
to ensure
adequate
coverage.
The inspector did not identify any
apparent
problems in this area.
The post-hurricane
emergency
response
organization staffing levels
were satisfactory
and were equivalent to pre-hurricane
conditions
which exceeded
the staffing requirements
specified in NUREG-0737.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and results
were
summarized
on October
1,
1992,
with those
persons
indicated in Paragraph
I above.
The general
RP and
EP program areas
reviewed were discussed
in detail.
Licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and
no dissenting
comments
were received.
During an October
28,
1992 teleconference,
the inspector
informed
licensee
representatives
identified in Paragraph
1 that the items listed
21
below which were identified during the onsite inspection
would be
tracked
by the
NRC as IFIs.
In addition, during
a subsequent
teleconference
between
Hr.
R.
E. Cline, Chief," Radiation Protection
and
Emergency
Preparedness
Branch,
NRC, RII, and Nr. J. Kirkpatrick,
Emergency
Preparedness
Supervisor,
TPN,
FPKL, conducted
on October 30,
1992,
selected
issues
were discussed
as being considered
as potential
violations for which hurricane-related
was
appropriate.
The licensee
acknowledged
the comments
and expressed
their
opinion regarding
each.
Proprietary information was not reviewed during
this inspection.
During a November 5,
1992 teleconference,
Hr.
G. Kuzo,
NRC RII, informed
Nr. J. Knorr, Licensing Engineer,
TNP, that
as
a result of further
review of the inspection results, .the three issues
described
below were
being considered
as potential violations of 10 CFR 50 requirements for
which enforcement discretion
was being considered.
Based
on subsequent-
NRC review,
no enforcement
action is considered
to be appropriate
as
discussed
in the Results
Section of this report.
Loss of capability to notify the responsible
State
and local
governmental
agencies
following an Alert declaration
at 09: 16 on
August 24,
1992,
in accordance
with 10 CFR 50, Appendix
E,
Section
IV.D criteria (Paragraph
7.b).
Inability to notify the
NRC following an Alert declaration
at
09: 16 on August 24,
1992, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72 criteria
(Paragraph
7.b).
Loss of capability to ensure that the administrative
and physical
means for alerting
and providing prompt instructions to the public
within the plume exposure
pathway
EP2 was maintained
in accordance
with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3'Paragraph
7.c).
Item Number
50-250,
251/92-21-01
50-250,
251/92-21-02
50-250,
251/92-21/03
50-250,
251/92-21/04
Descri tion and Reference
IFI - Review licensee
evaluations
and
guidance
regarding radioactive material
storage
in preparation
-For future storms
(Paragraph
4.c).=
IFI - Review licensee
evaluations
and
actions
regarding
guidance for removing
containers with radioactive
markings and/
or labels
from the
RCA (Paragraph
4.d).
IFI - Review Hurricane Andrew "lessons
learned" report
(Paragraph
7.a).
IFI - Review post-hurricane
Emergency
Response
Organization .call-out drill
records
(Paragraph
7.d).
I'