ML17348B245

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Insp Repts 50-250/91-35 & 50-251/91-35 on 910826-30. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Equipment Qualification,Chemical & Vol Control Sys Calculations & Sequencer Relay Failure Evaluations
ML17348B245
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/12/1991
From: Hunt M, Shymlock M, Casey Smith, Taylor P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17348B243 List:
References
50-250-91-35, 50-251-91-35, NUDOCS 9111220056
Download: ML17348B245 (5)


See also: IR 05000250/1991035

Text

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UNITEDSTATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.:

50-250/91-35

and 50-251/91-35

Licensee:

Florida Power

and Light Company

9250 West Flagler Street

Miami,

FL

33102

Docket Nos.:

50-250

and 50-251

Facility Name:

Turkey Point

3 and

4

Inspection

Conducted:

August 26-30,

1991

Inspectors:

M.

.

unt

P..

yo

License Nos.:

DPR-31

and

DPR-41

ate

~

ne

~ib>

WJ

ate Signed

t

C.

F. Smith

Approved by:

yAp>>l+ii'"~

hym oc,

ie

Plant Systems

Section

Engineering

Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

a

e S)gned

ll-iZ

ate

igne

SUYiNARY

Scope:

This routine

announced,

inspection

was

conducted

in the

areas

of equipment

qualification, chemical

and volume control system calculations,

sequencer

relay

failure evaluations

and power mismatch circuitry.

Results:

0

In the areas

inspected,

one violation was identified.

Violation 50-250,251/91-35-01,

Failure to maintain current

and

accurate

Eg

Documentation

Package

(Paragraph

2a).

The

review of

CVCS calculations

and

the

operation

of the

power

mismatch

circuitry was initiated during the inspection.

These

areas

required further

inspection

at

FPSL

Corporate

Engineering/Design

Groups.

Accordingly the

inspection

results

for these

areas

are

documented

in

NRC Inspection

Report

50-250,

251/91-45.

91112~c;0056

91111'DR

ADDCIi 050002".yo

8

PDB

REPORT

DETAILS

1.

Persons

Contacted

Licensee

Employees

  • J. Aries, Vice President Assistant
  • S. T. Hale, Engineering

Manager

  • J. Hartzog,

SPEAKOUT Superviso

J.

Hardy,

I8C Supervisor

, H. Johnson,

Operations

Supervisor - Nuclear

  • L. W. Pearce,

Plant Manager

  • T. F. Plunkett,

Vice President

  • D. R. Powell, Licensing Superintendent

Other

licensee

employees

contacted

during this

inspection

included

engineers,

operators,

and administrative

personnel.

NRC Resident

Inspectors

  • R. Butcher

L. Trocine

  • Attended exit interview

2.

Engineering/Design Activities (37700)

a.

Review of Environmental qualification Files

The

inspectors

reviewed

16

Documentation

Packages

(Doc Pacs)

to

verify the status of the documentation

used to establish

10 CFR 50.49

qualifications

for

selected

equipment

and

to

evaluate

the

effectiveness

of the

change

process

used for revising/updating

the

Doc'acs.

Based

on

these

reviews

the

inspectors

determined

that

changes

to

the

Doc Pacs

involving editorial

type

changes

are

generally

completed

in

an expeditious

manner.

Changes

involving

design

basis

information,

however,

need

to be accomplished

through

the

ANSI N45.2. 11-1974

design

controls

and

implemented

via

PC/M

packages.

Most of the

Doc

Pacs

were determined

not to be current

'ecause

of

PC/M packages

that were still in the

process

of being

implemented

or not yet closed out.

The inspectors

performed

independent

design reviews of selected

PC/Ms

to verify the traceability for the plant modifications,

the design

basis

information specified

in the

PC/M,

and

to

comfirm that

provisions

had

been

made

to incorporate

these

changes

in the

Doc

Pacs.

Additionally, the

Nuclear

Safety

Evaluations

performed

pursuant to the requirements

of 10 CFR 50.59 were critically reviewed

to ensure

that

no degradation

of environmental

qualifications

had

occurred

during the

PC/Ms preparation.

The following Doc Pacs

and

related

PC/Ms were reviewed:

Doc Pac 6.0

Doc Pac 6.2

Doc Pac

10. 0

Doc Pac

17.2,

Doc Pac

24. 1

Doc Pac 26.0

Doc Pac 31.5

Doc Pac 33.0

PC/M 90-494, Revision

1

PC/M 90-484, Revision

1

PC/M 81-157,

CRN-12

PC/M 85-35,

CRN-)56

PC/M 85-36,

CRN-J72

PC/M 85-109

PC/M 90-484,

Revision

1

PC/M 89-206

PC/M 88-468

PC/M 91-029

PC/M 88-463

Based

on the above reviews, the inspectors

identified two issues

with

potential

safety concerns.

The first involved Doc Pac 6.2 and

PC/Ms

85-35

and

85-36

where

a modification

was

made

in the field by the

licensee

to

CONAN RTDs identified as

model

7M118-10001-01.

Pursuant

to this field modification

a similarity analysis

was not performed to

demonstrate

that the installed

RTDs were environmentally qualified

per

10 CFR 50.49(f)(2).

This issue

was

resolved

when the vendor

transmitted

information to

the licensee

which provided

a basis for

similarity to, the tested

specimen.

The other

issued

involved

a

deficiency in the Safety Evaluation of PC/M 85-109 which failed to

provide

a design

basis for installing

a signal

transmitter

in

a

potential radiation harsh

environment.

This issue

was resolved

when

the

licensee

provided

a

design

basis

radiation

dose

calculation

contained

in

Doc

Pac

1001,

Appendix

Q, which clearly demonstrated

that the instrument location is in a radiation mild environment.

The inspectors

concluded that eight Documentation

Packages

were not

current

during

the inspection,

in that Plant

Change

Modification

Packages

were

not closed

out in

a timely manner

to facilitate

revision

of

the

Documentation

Packages.

Additionally, design

controls

inadequacies,

such

as failure to implement the requirements

of Plant

Change

Modification 81-157,

Change

Notice

No.

12,

has

resulted in

EQ documentation

inaccuracies

since at least August 1989,

in that

EQ qualification requirements

for

RTDS are

shown to

be

simultaneously

satisfied

by different Documentation

Packages.

The

inspectors

identified this area

as Violation (50-250, 251/91-35-01),

Failure to maintain current

and accurate

EQ Documentation

Packages

as

required

by

10 CFR 50.49.

FPIIL management

in recognition of these

concerns

in the

EQ Program controls

issued

a

memorandum

from the

Engineering

Project

Manager,

dated

August 30,

1991,

identifying

actions

planned to ensure

EQ documentation

is accurate

and kept up to

date.

The inspector

reviewed objective evidence

presented

by the licensee

to

prove that

some staff

members

had

been

indoctrinated

in the

requirements

of the

EQ Program.

A formal

EQ Training Program

has not

b.

been

developed

by the licensee.

The inspectors

were informed that

actions

required to do so were presently

ongoing.

It is licensee's

management's

intention

to

- have

all

personnel

involved

in

Eg

activities properly trained,

however,

'a schedule

for completing

Eg

training of site

personnel

has

not been established

because

of the

present

dual unit outage.

Sequencer

Relay Failure Evaluation

Review

During the

performance

of Pre-operational

Test

0804.043

(logic

. testing)

for Sequencer

3B the coil

on

a stripping

relay short

circuited.

The failure was determined to be generic for this type of

relay

and all relays

in the sequencers

spares

at Turkey Point were

replaced.

Subsequently

a

second

relay failure

occurr'ed

during

testing.

Trouble shooting determined that contacts, on the relay were

dislodged

and shorted to adjacent contacts.

Investigation

revealed

that

a manufacturing

defect

existed

in

a

series

of relays

assembled

during the March

1989 to September

1990

period.

The defect

was

improper installation of insulating

tape

between

the coil

and

the

inner winding terminal.

The inspection

findings resulted

in the

sequencer

vendor,

and

ASEA Brown Boveri,

(ABB) notifying the

NRC of

a potential

generic

defect

per

10 CFR Part 21 for relay model

RXMH-2.

The licensee verified that the only

other

relays

of this

model

were in the Unit

3

Emergency

Diesel

Generator

(EDG) Idle Start

System.

After the discovery of the

generic

defect

the

vendor

furnished

replacement

relays

for all

sequencers

and

spares

with the

proper

installation of insulating

tape.

The

second

relay failure was analyzed

by ABB and it was determined

that

a manufacturing deficiency

does

not exist and that the probable

root cause

was shipping

damage.

To eliminate

the

second

identified failure

mechanism all

RXMH-2

relays

were

inspected

and functionally tested

to verify proper

installation

of

the

contacts.

Applicable

portions

of

the

pre-operational

tests

were repeated

to verify proper reinstallation

of the relays in each

sequencer.

3.

Exit Interview

The inspection

scope

and results

were summarized

on August 30,

1991, with

those

persons

indicated

in paragraph

1.

The inspectors

described

the

areas

inspected

and discussed

in detail the inspection results.

Although

reviewed during this inspection,

proprietary information is not contained

.

in this report.

Subsequent

to

the

inspection

a

telecon

between

C. Julian

(Chief,

Engineering

Branch)

and L.

W. Pearce,

Turkey Point Plant Manager

was held

to identify the

concerns

with the

Eg

Documentation

Packages

as

a

violation.

Violation 250,

251/91-35-01,

Failure to maintain current

and accurate

Eg

Documentation

Packages

as required

by 10 CFR 50.49.