ML17347B120
| ML17347B120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1989 |
| From: | Butcher R, Crlenjak R, Mcelhinney T, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17347B118 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-89-18, 50-251-89-18, NUDOCS 8906080261 | |
| Download: ML17347B120 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1989018
Text
~P,R REQIs
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MAR I ETTA ST R E E7, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-250/89-18
and 50-251/89-18
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102
Docket Nos.:
50-250
and 50-251
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Turkey Point
3 and
4
Inspection
Conducted:
March 31,
1989 through April 28,
1989
Inspectors:~D
R.
C. Butcher,
Senior
Residen 'nspector
Da
e
S gned
l~L
~ ~~. se,
s
T.
F. McElhinney, Resident
Insp ctor
( WC.I.s.r-'-
$C
.,
G. A.
S
ebli
Resident
Insp ctor
Approved by
R.
.
rlenjak,
i
hief
Division of Reactor Projects
Da
e Signed
s
Date Si
ned
~
C7
te
gned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine resident
inspector
inspection
entailed direct inspection
at the
site
in the
areas
of monthly surveillance
observations,
monthly maintenance
observations,
engineered
safety
features
walkdowns,
operational
safety
and
plant events.
Results:
One violation was identified:
Failure to follow procedure
resulting
in the
inadvertent actuation of Train A Safeguards.
Two Inspector
Followup Items were identified:
Followup on licensee's
actions to prevent recurrence
of voids in the
RCS.
One
concern
was expressed
to licensee
management
regarding
the licensee's
program to ensure
availability of the Black Start Diesels.
This is also
identified as
an Inspector
Followup Item.
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee'mployees
J.
d.
A d
,
Q~
"J. Arias,
Sr
~ Technical Advisor to Plant Manager
- L. W. Bladow, guality Assurance
Superintendent
J.
E. Cross,
Plant Manager-Nuclear
- R. J. Earl, guality Control Supervisor
T. A. Finn, Training Supervisor
- S. T. Hale,
Engineering
Project Supervisor
R. J. Gianfrencesco,
Maintenance
Superintendent
- V. A. Kaminskas,
Technical
Department Supervisor
J.
A. Labarraque,
Senior Technical Advisor
R.
G.
Mende,
Operations
Supervisor
- J.
S.
Odom, Site Vice President
- L. W. Pearce,
Operations
Superintendent
J.
C. Strong,
Mechanical
Department
Supervisor
- K. Van Dyne, Acting Regulatory
and Compliance Supervisor
M. B. Wayland, Electrical
Department Supervisor
J.
D. Webb, Operations - Maintenance
Coordinator
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
construction
craftsman,
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
and electricians.
"Attended exit interview on April 28,
1989
Note:
An Alphabetical Tabulation of acronyms
used in this report is
listed in paragraph
11.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance
(92702)
A review
was
conducted
of the following noncompliances
to assure
that
corrective actions
wer e adequately
implemented
and resulted
in conformance
with regulatory
requirements.
Verification of corrective
action
was
achieved
through record reviews,
observation
and discussions
with licensee
personnel.
Licensee
correspondence
was
evaluated
to
ensure
that
the
responses
were timely and that corrective actions
were
implemented within
the time periods specified in the reply.
(Closed)
Violation
50-251/87-46-01.
Failure
to
implement
approved
procedures
to control
the configuration of
a safety-related
system.
The
inspector
reviewed the licensee's
corrective actions
and verified that all
corrective actions
had been
completed.
The inspector verified that valve
3-937
had
been
removed
from the
system to prevent
inadvertent
closure.
Valve 4-937
was
removed previously.
The inspector also verified that the
valves
had
been
deleted
from
the
associated
operating
procedure
3/4-0P-064,
Safety Injection Accumulators.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation 50-250,251/88-18-01.
Failure to follow procedure
in
that the
ONOP for Reactor
Control
System Malfunction was not referred to
with one
RPI reading greater, than
12 steps
misaligned with other
RPIs in
the
same
bank.
The inspector
reviewed
the licensee's
corrective actions
and verified that all corrective
actions
had
been
completed.
Procedure
3/4-OSP-201. 1,
RCO Daily Logs,
was
revised
to require
comparison
of the
RPIs to the step counters
and to calculate
the difference
between
the two.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Yiolation 50-250,251/88-30-03.
Fai'lure to maintain
an audible
neutron
flux monitor
and
improper
use
of
a
procedure.
The
inspector
reviewed
the
licensee's
corrective
actions
and
verified that
all
corrective
actions
had
been
completed.
Procedure
3/4-0P-201,
Filling/Draining the
Refueling
Cavity
and
the
SFP Transfer
Canal
was
revised to add
an infrequent operation to raise
reactor
cavity level
and
procedure
3/4-OSP-201. 1,
RCO Daily Logs,
was revised to require
an audible
neutron
source monitor with a unit in Mode 6.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
URI 50-250,251/88-26-04.
Followup on personnel
access
control to
the
Emergency
Diesel
Generator
(EDG) area.
This event
was reviewed
by
q
Region II security
inspector
in inspection
report
50-250,251/88-31
and
resulted
in
a Notice of Violation and
impositon of civil penalty.
The
licensee's
corrective actions will be tracked
by the notice of violation.
This item is closed.
Followup on Inspector
Followup Items
( IFIs).
(Closed)
Inspector
Followup
Item
50-250,251/88-26-03.
Correction
of
nomenclature
errors
in Operating
Procedure
3/4-0P-094,
Containment
Post
Accident
Monitoring
Systems.
The
inspector
verified that
Procedure
3/4-OP-094
had
been revised to correct the identified nomenclature
errors.
This item is closed.
Onsite
Followup
and
In-Office Review of Written
Reports
of Nonroutine
Events
(92700/90712)
The
Licensee
Event
Reports
(LERs)
discussed
below were
reviewed
and
closed.
The inspectors verified that reporting requirements
had
been
met,
root
cause
analysis
was
performed,
corrective
actions
appeared
appropriate,
and generic applicability had
been considered.
Additionally,
the
inspectors
verified that
the
licensee
had
reviewed
each
event,
corrective actions
were implemented,
responsibility for corrective actions
not fully completed
was clearly
assigned,
safety
questions
had
been
evaluated
and resolved,
and violations of regulations
or TS conditions
had
been identified.
When applicable,
the criteria of
10 CFR 2, Appezdix C,
were applied.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/88-32.
Personnel
Error Results
in
Loss of Power to
Vital
Instrument
Bus
and
Automatic
Isolation
of
Control
Room
and
Containment
Ventilation.
This
event
was
reviewed
in inspection
report
50-250,251/88-39.
The
inspector
reviewed
the
licensee's
corrective
actions
and verified that all corrective
actions
had
been
completed.
Procedure
O-OP-003.3
was revised to require that the operator verify that
the inverter to
be de-energized
is not supplying
power
by checking
the
associated
ammeter prior to opening the breakers.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/88-05.
Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation
System
Power
Range
Detectors
Performed
Late
Due
to
Personnel
Error.
The
surveillance
was satisfactorily
completed
less
than
30 minutes following
the expiration of the grace period.
At the expiration of the grace period
the detectors
were declared
out of service
(OOS)
and
the unit entered
TS 3.0. 1 until the ~aillance
was completed.
The inspector
reviewed the
corrective
actions
implemented
by the licensee
and determined
they were
adequate
to preclude
future occurrences
of similar events.
This item is
closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/88-07.
Failure
o'f Source
Range
Neutron Flux Detector
Results
in
Subcritical
Reactor
Trip.
This
event
was'eviewed
in
inspection
report
50-250,251/88-21.
Source
Range
Detector
N-32
was
replaced
with
a
new
detector
and'
pulse
height
di scriminator
bias
was replaced
as
a preventive
measure.
This item is closed.
Complex Surveillance - Engineered
Safeguards
Test Review (61701)
The
inspector
reviewed
procedures
4-OSP-203. 1,
Train
A
Engineered
Safeguards
Integrated
Test,
dated April 3,
1989
and 4-0SP-203.2,
Train
B
Engineered
Safeguards
Integrated
Test,
dated
April
3,
1989.
The
procedures
were
verified
to
specify
appropriate
plant
conditions,
prerequisites
and
precautions.
The
procedures
had
received
the
appropriate
level of management
review and approval.
The above procedures
were
new in the
respect
that Train
A and Train
B tests
were
conducted
individually.
Previous tests
were conducted
on both trains concurrently.
The Train
A test
was
conducted
early
on April
14,
1989
and
several
equipment
problems
were identified, i.e
the
4C
bypass
valve
FCV-4-499 failed to close
and the
sequence
time for load centers
4A and
4C
were
out
of tolerance
by
approximately
0.2
seconds.
Also,
not all
verifications
were
completed
due to
a five minute time limit on safety
injection
pumps
running
in recirculation.
The test
was
halted
and
maintenance
corrected
noted
discrepancies.
Train
A
was
successfully
retested
on April 14,
1989.
The Train
B test
was conducted
on April 15,
1989
and step 7.3. 15 failed because
the
containment
spray
pump
(B train)
did not actuate.
It was
found that the
B containment
spray
pump breaker
was not fully racked in.
After fully racking in the breaker,
the test
was
rerun successfully.
The acceptance
criteria were in accordance
with TS
and prescribed
a qualitative or quantitative
method for determining
the
results of the test.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
Monthly Surveillance
Observations
(61726)
The
inspectors
observed
TS required
surveillance
testing
and verified:
That the test
procedure
conformed to the requirements
of the
TS, that
testing
was
performed
in accordance
with adequate
procedures,
that test
instrumentation
was calibrated,
that limiting conditions
for operation
(LCO) were met, that test results
met acceptance
criteria requirements
and
were reviewed
by personnel
other than the individual directing the test,
that
deficiencies
were identified,
as
appropriate,
and
were
properly
reviewed
and resolved
by management
personnel
and that
system restoration
was
adequate.
For completed tests,
the inspectors
verified that testing
frequencies
were met and tests
were performed
by qualified individuals.
The
inspectors
witnessed/reviewed
portions
of
the
following test
activities:
Overpressure
Mitigating System Nitrogen Backup
Leak and Functional -Test.
4-PMI-041.7,
RCS Temperature
Loop
B Protection
Channel
Set II
Calibration.
O-OSP-074.4,
Standby
Pumps/Cranking
Diesels Test.
On April
5,
1989,
during
performance
of 3-0SP-041.4,
revision
dated
March 2,
1989,
Power
Operated
Relief Valve
(PORV)
455C failed to open.
The
PORV was declared
out of service
and
a Plant
Work Order
(PWO)
was
initiated.
Troubleshooting
identified that the
actuator
cover
assembly
was leaking
and the capscrews
were loose.
The capscrews
were retorqued to
228 inch-pounds
and the leakage
was
stopped.
The valve
was
subsequently
tested
satisfactorily
and
placed
back
in service.
This
same
problem
occurred
on October
2,
1988,
and is discussed
in
NRC inspection
report
50-250,251/88-30
as
Inspector
Followup
Item
50-250,251/88-30-02.
The
licensee's
corrective
actions
were to install
an ethylene-propylene
( EP)
in
the
actuator
and
to install
lockwashers
on
the
capscrews..
These
actions,
however,
did not
prevent
the
capscrews
from
loosening
again.
Another
problem
to
note
was that the
I&C root cause
engineers
were
not
made
aware
of the
recent
failure of the
actuator.
Therefore,
an
analysis
of the
as-found
condition
was
not
made.
The
inspectors
will
continue
followup
of
this
problem
via
IFI
50-250,251/88-30-02
'n
Apri,l
19,
1989,
the
licensee
performed
O-OSP-074.4,
Standby
Steam
Generator
Pumps/Cranking
Diesels
Test, for the
B Standby
Steam
Generator
Pump
(SSGFP).
This test
was required to be performed
during
each refueling
outage
in accordance
with Technical
Specification
(TS) section
4.21.
The
purpose
of this test
was to power the
SSGFP
from
the Cranking Diesels
and operate
the
pump to provide
to the
Unit 4
steam
generators.
The Cranking Diesels
(Black Start)
and
SSGFPs
are not safety related,
however,
they provide
a backup
supply of electri-
city and feedwater to the nuclear units.
The licensee
experienced
problems
during the initial test
attempt.
The
operators
started
four cranking diesels
(nos.
1-4),
however,
no.
4 diesel
tripped and
none of the other diesels'reakers
closed
onto the dead bus.
A second
attempt
was
made
and this time only the 2, 3,
and
4 diesels
were
started
since
the
no.
1
diesel
had
an
outstatading
PWO for
the
auto-synchronizing circuitry.
The no.
4 breaker
closed
onto the
bus but
when the no.
3 breaker closed
a bus lockout on undervoltage
occurred.
The
test
was terminated
and electical
maintenance
began
troubleshooting
the
auto-synch circuitry.
A faulty relay
was
replaced
for the
no.
2 diesel
auto-synch circuitry and,a
run of the diesels
was, performed successfully.
The surveillance test
was run again
and the diesels
performed
as designed.
The
no.
2 breaker
closed first followed by no.
4 breaker
and
then
the
no.
3 breaker.
The
B SSGFP
was then started
and
was
pumped to
the
Unit 4
steam
generators
until
a
level
i'ncrease
was
observed.
The
inspectors
raised
several
concerns
regarding
the operability of the Black
77>>77.
7
assumes
that
these
units
are well maintained
and available for nuclear
plant use following a loss of AC power.
The
licensee's
April
17,
1989,
letter
concerning
station
blackout
specifies that these diesels
are capable of being aligned to the emergency
buses
in approximately twenty minutes.
However,
based
on the observations
made
during this test,
the
inspectors
raised
concerns
to 'icensee
management
as to the availability of the diesels.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
7.
monthly Naintenance
Observations
(62703)
Station
maintenance
activities
on safety-related
systems
and
components
were
observed
and
reviewed
to ascertain
that
they
were
conducted
in
accordance
with approved
procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry codes
and
standards,
and in conformance with TS.
The following items
were
considered
during this review,
as appropriate:
That
LCOs were met while components
or systems
were
removed
from service;
that approvals
were obtained prior to initiating work; that activities
were
accomplished
using
approved
procedures
and
were
inspected
as
applicable;
that
procedures
used
were
adequate
to control
the activity;
that
troubleshooting
activities
were
controlled
and
repai r
records
accurately
reflected
the
maintenance
performed;
that
functional
testing
and/or
calibrations
were
performed
prior to returning
components
or
systems
to service; that
gC records
were maintained; that activities were
accomplished
by qualified personnel;
that parts
and materials
used
were
properly certified; that radiological controls were properly
implemented;
that
gC hold points
were established
and
observed
where required;
that
fire prevention controls
were
implemented;
that outside contractor
force
activities were controlled in accordance
with the approved
gA program;
and
that housekeeping
was actively pursued.
The
inspectors
witnessed/reviewed
portions of the following maintenance
activities in progress:
Repair of Unit 3 Sea]
Table Leaks.
Troubleshooting
No.
2 Cranking Diesel.
Repair Unit 3 Pressurizer
Power Operated Relief Valve Actuator.
48
RHR seal
heat exchanger
leak.
Troubleshooting
4B
Reactor
Coolant
Pump
high
bearing
temperature.
Repacking of 4B Intake Cooling Water
pump.
Due to the
problems
encountered
during the surveillance test of the
Black Start Diesels
(see
paragraph
6), the inspectors
held discussions
with responsible
licensee
personnel
and identified several
areas
of
concern:
(2)
The diesel
engines
are
maintained
by the
Nuclear
Mechanical
Maintenance
Department.
There
are
currently
two preventive
maintenance
procedures
in
use
for those
units,
MI
102014
(Black Start
Diesel
Generator Quarterly Preventive
Maintenance)
and
MI 102015 (Blackstart
Diesel
Generator
18 Month Preventive
Maintenance).
The electrical
portion of the diesel
generators,
including
the
associated
switch
gear
is
maintained
by
the
Nuclear Electrical
Department.
However, there
are currently
no
procedures
in effect for electrical
maintenance
on the units.
Since fossil
(non-nuclear)
unit
personnel
operate
the units,
deficiencies
with the units will be identified by non-nuclear
plant
personnel.
Although
def ici enci es
identified
by
the
non-nuclear
operators
are turned
over to nuclear
personnel
to
ensure
nuclear
PWOs
are
generated
to correct
the
problem,
the
inspectors
consider that the non-nuclear
operators
may not have
the "attention
to detail"
concept
for problem identification
that is instilled in the nuclear operators.
(3)
(4)
At present,
these
units
are
not
assigned
a
system
engineer.
Therefore,
the routine
system
walkdowns
required
by the
system
engineers
on
their
assigned
systems
is
not
normally
accomplished.
The
system
engineer
currently
assigned
the
Emergency
Diesel
Generators
has
taken it
upon
himself
to
periodically walkdown the cranking diesels,
however,
no formal
program or requirement
exi sts to ensure this is accompli shed
on
a routine basis.
r
The
only -required
surveillance
procedure
on
the
units
i s
O-OSP-074.4
which
loads
the
standby
steam
generator
pumps onto the cranking diesels
every
18 months.
The licensee
stated that the non-nuclear plant normally runs the units weekly
to ensure availability.
However, there is
no formal requirement
or documentation
associated
with this.
(5)
During
the testing
witnessed
by the
inspectors,
deficiencies
were
noted
that
could
have
been
previously
identified
and
corrected if a
more
formal
program,
as discussed
in 1-4 above,
existed for these units.
These deficiencies
included:
Breaker
1W134 could not easily
be racked in by one person.
Wheels
were rusty
and the breaker
was hard to move in its
track.
, Lighting in the switch gear trailer and the engine trailers
is less
than adequate.
The
general
material
condition
of
.the
diesel s
and
switchgear
is
poor
compared
to
the
site's
emergency
diesels.
Diesels that were out of service (I and 2) were not listed
in t~~f=service
log.
During the initial performance
of the test these
two diesels
were also started.
Governor oil levels were in the low end of the sight glass.
Inappropriately rigged crankcase
pressure
indication
on the
engines
(tygon tubing and ruler).
Although the
Black Start
Diesels
installed at the site
were initially
under
the control of the fossil units for their use,
the nuclear units
also
take credit for
them
as
stated
in their
Diesel
Loading
Safety
Evaluation,
dated
June
12,
I986.
The units are not only used to power the
standby
feed
pumps via the "C" bus but can also
be
used to power the
"A"
'r
"B" busses
via the
"C" bus.
The evaluation
also
states
that
the
reliability analysis
assumes
that
these
units
are
well maintained
and
available for nuclear plant
use.
To ensure availability, maintenance
of
these
units
became
the
responsibility
of
the
Nuclear
Maintenance
Department.
Based
on
the
observ'ation
noted
during the testing
of the
units and the subsequent
discussions
with responsible
licensee
personnel,
the inspectors
consider
the licensee
should
have
a more in-depth program
for the maintenance,
surveillance,
and control of these units .
This wi 1 1
be identified as Inspector followup Item 50-250,251/89-18-02,
Followup on
licensee's
actions to ensure reliability/availability of the Black Start
Diesels.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors
observed control
room operations,
reviewed applicable
logs,
conducted
discussions
with control
room
operators,
observed
shift
turnovers
and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The
inspectors
verified the operability of selected
emergency
systems,
verified that
maintenance
work orders
had been
submitted
as required
and that followup
and prioritization
of work was
accompli shed.
The
inspectors
reviewed
tagout records, verified compliance with TS
LCOs
and verified the return
to service of affected
components.
By observation
and direct
interviews, verification was. made
that
the
physical security plan was being
implemented.
Plant
housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions
and
implementation
of
radiological controls were observed.
Tours of the intake structure
and diesel, auxiliary, control
and turbine
buildings
were conducted
to observe
plant equipment
conditions
including
potential fire hazards,
fluid leaks
and excessive
vibrations.
The
inspector s
walked
down accessible
portions of the following safety
related
systems
to verify operability and proper valve/switch alignment:
A and
B Fmergency Diesel
Generators
Control
Room Vertical Panels
and Safeguards
Racks
Intake
Cool in~~~fructure
4160 Volt Buses
and
480 Volt Load and Motor Control Centers
Unit 3 and
Platforms
Unit 3 and
4 Condensate
Storage
Tank Area
Area
Unit 3 and
4 Main Steam Platforms
On April 1,
1989,
a routine visual
inspection
of the Unit
3
seal
table
revealed
boron residue
on one of the fifty stainless
steel
guide tubes for
incore instrumentation.
The
leak
was approximately
one drop
per minute.
Further testing
has
shown indications
in other
guide tubes.
Preliminary
metallurgical
reports
from Westinghouse
have
concluded
the
indications
resulted
from transgranular
stress
corrosion
cracking.
The reports
also
indicate
the
defects
initiated
from the
outside
surface
and
was
most
likely the result
of chloride contamination.
The licensee
has efforts
under
way to determine
the
source
of the
contamination.
For further
information on this issue refer to Inspection
Report 50-250,251/89-22.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
Plant Events
(93702)
The following plant events
were reviewed to determine facility status
and
the
need for further followup action.
Plant
parameters
were
evaluated
during transient
response
The significance
of the event
was evaluated
along with the
performance
of the
appropriate
safety
systems
and
the
actions
taken
by the
licensee.
The
inspector s verified that
requi red
notifications were
made to the
NRC.
Evaluations
were
performed relative
to the
need for additional
NRC response
to the event.
Additionally, the
following issues
were
examined,
as
appropriate:
details
regarding
the
cause
of the event;
event chronology; safety
system performance;
licensee
compliance with approved
procedures;
radiological
consequences,
if any;
and proposed corrective actions.
On March 31,
1989, at 1:50 p.m.,
the licensee
declared
a significant event
due to the
"ioss of emergency notification communications.
Both Unit 3 and
Unit 4 were shut
down
~
The commercial
telephone
system
was being
used
as
a
compensato
y measure.
The
Emergency
Notification
System
(ENS)
phone
failed
a
normal
co'mmunications
check.
The
ENS was restored to operation
at 10:10 p.m.
On April 9,
1989, with Unit 3 in Mode 5,
the
Reactor
Control Operator
(RCO) noticed pressurizer
level decreasing.
Printouts
showed that level
dropped
from
78.9X to
71.4%
in approximately
11
minutes.
The
RCO
increased
charging
flow and isolated
letdown which restored
pressurizer
level.
The
pressurizer
level
stabalized
and
an
investigation
was
conducted'to
identify any reactor coolant
system
leakage.
The Unit 3 pipe
and valve room, Residual
Heat
Removal
(RHR)
pump
rooms,
and the charging
pump
rooms
were
inspected
and
no
l'eakage
was identified.
Based
on all
indications,
the operators
determined that the most probable
cause
of the
decreased
pressurizer
level
was the collapsing of
a void in the reactor
vessel
head.
The gases
were formed
due to
in the
head
vent
piping.
The gas buildup forced water into the pressurizer
which resulted
in
a gradual
increasa ~u essurizer
level
over the previous
two days.
Eventually,
the
gas
pressure
overcame
the loop seal
enabling
the
head to
vent
and
the pressurizer
level
dropped.
After reviewing data
from the
previous
fourteen
days,
the licensee
believed that
a similar event
may
have occurred
on April 7,
1989.
A void was also
formed in Unit 4 on March 14,
1989, exhibited
by a
5% drop
in'ressurizer
level.
The inspectors will monitor the licensees
actions
to prevent recurrence
of voids in the
RCS.
This will be tracked via IFI
50-250,251/89-18-03.
On April 12,
1989, at 11:40 a.m.,
a significant event
was declared
by the
licensee
due to an inadvertent actuation of train A of Unit 4 safeguards.'
Reactor
Operator
was installing fuses
in safeguard
rack 43,
when
an
inadvertent
SI signal
was
generated.
All train
A safeguards
equipment
functioned
as
designed.
The licensee
has
a procedure
for accomplishing
the
re-energization
of safeguard
Racks.
The
operator
did not utilize
procedure
4-0NOP-049,
Re-Energizing
Safeguard
Racks After Loss of Single
Power Supply,
and the required precautions
prior to replacing
fuses
FU-3
and
FU-4
were
not
implemented.
The
licensee
is preparing
information
placards
to caution
operators
that
an
SI signal
can
be
generated
when
installing certain
fuses
and refers
to procedure
3/4-ONOP-049.
TS 6.8. 1
requires
written
procedures
be established,
implemented
and
maintained
that meet or exceed
the requirements
and
recommendations
of Section
5.3 of
Section
5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972
requires
nuclear
power
plants
be
operated
in
accordance
with written procedures.
Procedure
4-0NOP-049,
Re-energizing
Safeguard
Racks After Loss
of Single
Power
Supply,
provides
instructions for re-energizing
safeguard
racks without
initiating an inad'vertent
safeguards
actuation.
.On April 12,
1989,
the
operator installed fuses
in safeguard
rack 43 resulting in re-energization
of the rack and
an inadvertent actuation of Train A of safeguards,
without
following 4-ONOP-049.
The failure to follow procedures
for re-energizing
safeguard
racks will be identified as violation 50-250,251/89-18-01.
On April 21,
1989,
with both units in
a cold
shutdown condition,
the
licensee notified the
NRC of a significant event in 'accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72.b.2.iiiA.
The
event
concerned
the potential
loss
of all
three
charging
pumps
in the event of
a fire.
In the Appendix
R Safe
Shutdown
Analysis,
credit is
taken
for
one
charging
pump
per
unit
as
being
available for safe
shutdown.
This charging
pump is required to maintain
hot
standby
and
achieve
cold
shutdown
in the
event
of
a fire.
The
charging
pump takes
suction
from either the
Volume Control Tank (VCT) or
the Refueling Mater Storage
Tank
(RWST) through inter locked valves.
The
VCT valve
LCV-115C is normally
open
and
the
RWST valve
LCV-115B is
normally closed.
A fire postulated
in certain fire areas
could
cause
spurious closure of LCV-115C and loss of automatic function could prevent
opening of LCV-115B.
Should the charging
pump (which is assumed
available
for safe
shutdown)
be running,
and
a fire in a given area
cause
spurious
\\
10
closure
of
LCV-115B,
the pump'ould
be starved
of suction flow.
This
could result
in the inability of the
pump to perform its required
safe
shutdown function due,to
damage resulting
from flow starvation.
Credit is
taken in the Appendix
R Safe
Shutdown Analysis for an operator action to
mitigate the
adverse
effects of spurious
closure of LCV-115C.
However,
without
admini stra~~gnirols
or
a
permanent
design
change,
this
operator
action
may not
be
taken
in time to'revent
pump
damage.
The
licensee
plans
to
implement
the
following administrative
contr ols to
ensure
safe
shutdown capability:
a.
Establish
continuous fire watches
in Fire Areas
N (Charging
Pump
Room)
and
R
(Rod
Control
Equipment
Room),
per
Plant
Procedure
O-ADM-016.4, with
a
means
of direct
and
immediate
communication
to
the Control
Room.
As
a minimum, the fire watch is required in Fire
Area
N
when
Charging
Pump
B is
running,
and
Fire
Area
R
when
Charging
pumps
A
and
C
are
running.
However,
at
the
Plant's
discretion
and in order to provide operator flexibility, continuous
fire watches
may be established
during the operation of any
charging'umps.
Coordinate
with
Health
Physics
prior
to
establishing
continuous fire watch in fire Area
N.
b.
Upon detection
of
a fire in Fire Area
N or R, fire watch personnel
shall
immediately notify the Plant Supervisor
Nuclear (PSN).
Upon notification of a fire, Control
Room operators will immediately
secure
Charging
Pump
B if a fire is reported
in Fire Area
N and
either Charging
Pump
A or
C if a fire is reported
in Fire Area
R.
These
actions will preclude
damage
to the
charging
pumps
due
to
potential
loss
of suction.
This action will be
taken prior to
invoking
the
Hot
Standby
Procedure.
Charging
flow will then
be
reestabli shed with the alternate
charging
pump( s) to continue control
of plant operating
parameters.
d.
Change/revise
the applicable procedure(s)
and/or prepare
a temporary
procedure
to
enforce
the
requirements,
stated
herein,
until
a
permanent
plant modification is installed to remove the restriction.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The
inspection
scope
and
findings
were
summarized
during
management
interviews held throughout the reporting
period with the Plant. Manager
Nuclear
and selected
members of his staff.
An exit meeting
was conducted
on April 28,
1989.
The
areas
requiring
management
attention
were
reviewed.
No proprietary
information
was
provided to the
inspectors
during the reporting period.
The inspectors
had the following findings:
50-250,251/89-18-01,
Violation.
Failure to follow procedure resulting in
the inadvertent actuation of Train A Safeguards.
(Paragraph
9).
50-250,251/89-18-02,
Inspector
Fo1 l owup
Item.
Fol 1 owup
on licen see '
actions
to ensure reliability/availability of the
Black Start
Diesels.
(Paragraph
7).
50-250,251/89-18-03,
Inspector
Fol 1owup
Item.
Fol 1owup
on licensee'
actions to prevent recurrence
of voids in the
RCS.
(Paragraph
9).
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADM
ANSI
CFR
DP
ICW
IEB
IFI
LCO
LER
LIV
NRC
ONOP
OP
OTSC
P.C/M
RCO
TS
Administr~
American National
Standards
In
Administrative Procedures
American Society of Mechanical
Component Cooling Water
Code of Federal
Regulations
Differential Pressure
Emergency Notification System
Florida Power
8 Light
Final Safety Analysis Report
High Head Safety Injection
Intake Cooling Water
Inspection
and Enforcement
Bul
Inspector
Followup Item
Limiting Condition for Operati
Licensee
Event Report
Licensee Identified Violation
Loss of Coolant Accident
Maintenance
Procedures
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Off Normal Operating
Procedure
Out of Service
Operating
Procedure
On the Spot
Change
Plant Change/Modification
Plant Supervisor
Nuclear
Physical
Security Procedures
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Reactor Control Operator
Reactor
Coolant
Pump
System
Residual
Heat
Removal
Senior Reactor Operator
Technical Specification
Temporary
System Alteration
Unresolved
Item
stitue
Engineers
letin
on