ML17346B147

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Forwards Safety Sys Functional Insp Repts 50-250/85-32 & 50-251/85-32 on 850826-30 & 0909-13 & Summarizes Comments & Responses Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Made During 850913 Exit Meeting
ML17346B147
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/07/1985
From: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To: Williams J
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
Shared Package
ML17346B148 List:
References
NUDOCS 8510150224
Download: ML17346B147 (6)


See also: IR 05000250/1985032

Text

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Docket Nos.

50-250

and 50-251

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

October 7,

1985

Florida

Power and Light Company

ATTN:

Mr. J.

W. Williams, Jr.

Group Vice President

Nuclear Energy Department

P. 0.

Box 14000

Juno Beach,

Florida

33408

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

SAFETY

PS

EM FUNCTIONAL INSPECTION

REPORT

50-250 85-3

50-251/85-32

This letter forwards the report of the Safety System Functional

Inspection

performed

by an

NRC team from August 26-30 and September

9-13,

1985 involving

activities authorized

by

NRC Operating

License

Nos.

DPR-31 and

DPR-41 for your

Turkey Point facility.

This inspection

was conducted jointly by members of

Region II and the Office of Inspection

and Enforcement,

by

NRC contractors,

and with assistance

of the two Resident

Inspectors.

At the conclusion of the

inspection,

the findings were discussed

at an exit meeting with those

members

of your staff identified in the appendix to the enclosed

inspection report.

This

NRC effort at Turkey Point represents

a

new inspection

approach

involving

an assessment

of the operational

readiness

and functions of a selected

safety

system.

Particular

attention is directed to the details of modifications

and

design control, quality of maintenance

and surveillance,

and adequacy of testing

applicable

to that safety system.

At Turkey Point, the team selected

the

auxiliary feedwater

system

as described

in the operating license.

The report included findings that may result in enforcement action,

which would

be the subject of subsequent

correspondence.

The report also addresses

other

observations

and conclusions

made

by the inspection

team.

Section II of the

report is

a

summary of the safety effects of the more significant findings

on the operational

readiness

of Turkey Point's auxiliary feedwater

system.

The inspection

team exit discussion with your staff was held on September

13,

1985.

On September

30,

1985 you submitted

a letter to the Regional Administrator,

Region II concerning

the auxiliary feedwater

system

and the subject inspection.

The following summarizes

the Florida Power and Light (FPL) comments

and

NRC

staff responses:

FPL Coment:

Numerous positive steps,

involving FPL senior management,

ig

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pg

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1

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Turkey Point, which is

a system

shared

between

the two units of an early

generation

commercial nuclear

power plant.

--

8510150224-& 000250

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Florida Power

8 Light Company

NRC Staff Res

onse:

NRC recognizes

the effort by FPL and the team

reviewed detai

s of the upgrade

program.

However, the team believes

a

number of the inspection

issues

should have

been identified by FPL and

incorporated into its upgrade

program.

2.

FPL Comment:

FPL has installed

a non-safety

grade

standby

feedwater

system,

which employs

two motor-driven feedwater

pumps

and which provides

a capability in excess of the design

requirements

of the plant.

The

two pumps are provided with a backup, non-safety

grade diesel

generator

power supply.

NRC Staff Res onse:

The team determined at the time of the inspection

there were

no administrative controls or Technical Specification

requirements

in place to assure

the availability on demand of this

standby

system.

Consequently,

the

team concluded that it would be

inappropriate

to take into consideration

the capabilities of this

system during the team's

analysis of the inspection findings.

We

understand

that you recognize also the

need for administrative controls

over the standby feedwater

system

and that you have committed, in your

September

30,

1985 letter, to provide Technical Specification

requirements

to establish

those controls

needed

to ensure

system operability.

~ 'PL Comment:

A safety-related

nitrogen system is used

as

a backup to the

di

i <<p

<<h

ill y

d

flow control valves.

Control

room operators typically shift the flow

control valves

from automatic to manual

mode after an auxiliary feedwater

actuation.

With the flow control

va'I ves in manual

mode, the ni trogen

bleed

down rate decreases,

allowing in excess of 10 minutes for operator

action to valve in a standby nitrogen bottle.

This is in contrast

to the

6-7 minutes available if the flow control valves

remain in automatic.

NRC Staff Res onse:

As discussed

in section III.B.1 of the enclosed

inspection report, the team determined that it cannot

be assumed

that

control

room operators

would shift the flow control valves from automatic

to manual

mode within 6-7 minutes following an accident

because:

(1)

some operators

were trained to assume

they had 15-20 minutes

avai'lable to take action;

and (2) applicable

emergency

procedures

did

not include requirements

for the operators

to shift the flow control

valves to manual.

The Turkey Point facility has demonstrated

past

weaknesses

in the areas of

plant operations,

maintenance,

and quality assurance

programs.

These functional

areas

were rated Category

3 on your most recent Systematic

Assessment

of

Licensee

Performance

(SALP) (July 1, 1983-October

31, 1984); plant operations

was rated Category

3 in the previous

SALP as well.

As

a result of these

and

other identified concerns,

you implemented

a Performance

Enhancement

Program

t

(PEP) to improve regulatory

and operational

performance.

Despite this

additional

management

attention,

the inspection

team noted that performance

0.

0

Florida Power

8 Light Company

in the functional areas

of maintenance,

surveillance testing,

and design

changes

and modifications

has not markedly improved.

The lack of timely

resolution of these

concerns

has also

been

documented

in recent

NRC Region

II inspection reports.

You should, therefore,

review and evaluate

weaknesses

identified in the enclosed

report and take appropriate

actions to improve

management

controls over licensed activities.

Further, you should consider

whether similar weaknesses

apply to the operations

and functions of other

Turkey Point safety systems.

NRC staff understands

that subsequent

to the inspection exit meeting,

you

took prompt action to update

procedures

and training to address

the team's

safety concerns.

However,

we request that you respond to this office with

your further actions resulting from this inspection within 60 days of the

date of this report.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

Inspection

Report Nos.

50-250/85-32

and 50-251/85-32

cc w/enclosure:

Mr. C.

M. Wethey, Vice President

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

Mr. C. J. Baker, Plant Manager

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

DISTRIBUTION:

PCS

ORPB Reading

DI Reading

NRC

PDR

Local

PDR

WJDircks

JMTayl or

RHVollmer

JGPartlow

RLSpessard

PFMcKee

LJCallan

JNGrace,

Region II

SAElrod, Region II

DGMcDonald,

NRR

James

M. Taylor, Director

Office of Inspection

and Enforcement

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